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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of economic reform on the technical and allocative 
efficiency of Chinese state enterprises, using survey data for 1980 and for 1984-88. 
Market-oriented economic reform of state enterprises began in the late 1970s and 
continued throughout the 1980s. The thesis focuses on two important aspects of reform: 
the process by which the central planning system was replaced with an open market 
system; and changes in institutions governing the financial relationship of enterprises and 
government, the financing of capital and the management of labour. Both aspects were 
necessary if state enterprises were to operate efficiently in a competitive market 
environment. The primary purpose of the thesis is to explore the impact of the reforms 
on the efficiency with which factor inputs, including energy, are used in a sample of state 
enterprises in China through the reform period. 
The reform was seriously flawed, particularly in the area of the financial relationship 
between enterprises and the govemment and banks. The efficiency of state enterprises is 
analysed within the framework of Komai's soft budget constraint hypothesis, where the 
key to improving technical and allocative efficiency is to harden sufficiently the budget 
constraint of state enterprises. According to Komai, at least three major factors 
contribute to the soft budget constraint of state enterprises in a centrally planned 
economy: soft prices, soft tax and soft credit. The thesis investigates in detail 
institutional change in these areas, assesses its impact on the behaviour of sample 
enterprises and estimates quantitatively its impact on technical and allocative efficiency. 
Technical efficiency is defined as the gap between maximum potential output and 
actual output assessed at a given level of inputs; allocative efficiency is defined as the 
deviation of input mix from the optimal expansion path assessed at the prevailing relative 
price of inputs. In estimating technical efficiency, the stochastic production frontier, a 
relatively new econometric approach, is adopted. As existing models are found to be 
inappropriate to address the issues in the study, a modified model is used to estimate the 
level of technical efficiency achieved by each enterprise. This model is also used to 
estimate allocative efficiency. 
The analysis indicates that, even after economic reform, the budget constraint of 
state enterprises was unduly soft. The estimation indicates that both technical and 
allocative efficiency have improved since 1980. Further estimation suggests that the 
commodity market and labour management reform were successful, contributing on 
average over 60 per cent of the improvement found in technical efficiency during the 
period studied. Due to a continuing soft budget constraint, reform in the areas of 
taxation and financing of capital did not have a positive impact on technical efficiency. 
vu 
The estimates of allocative efficiency indicate that capital expansion in state enterprises 
was too rapid to be economically rational — another sign of a soft budget constraint. 
In this study, I incorporate energy into the stochastic production function as an 
independent input for estimation. The Chinese economy has been characterised by 
scarcity and inefficient use of energy resources. The industrial sector has always been 
China's largest and least efficient consumer of energy. Efficiency in the use of energy 
therefore deserves attention. The efficiency of energy utilisation in state enterprises is 
discussed in the framework of Komai's soft budget constraint 
Based on the empirical results, the thesis discusses the implications of market-
oriented reform and institutional distortions for China's long-term economic growth, the 
fragile natural environment and future reform policies. 
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1 Market-Oriented Economic Reform and the 
Efficiency of State Enterprises 
In 1978, the Chinese government decided to embark on widespread economic reform. In 
the process of reform, the countr}''s centrally planned economic system was gradually 
replaced by a decentralised and market-based one. Reform was guided by two 
principles: liberalising foreign trade and opening the door to foreign investment; and 
deregulating the domestic economy and introducing a market system. In many ways, the 
reform process has been successful: economic institutions are far less regulated, and the 
past 15 years have seen high economic growth and an improvement in national income. 
The impressive economic growth of the 1980s can be attributed to market-oriented 
economic reform policies (Gamaut 1991). 
Of the many changes that have taken place in the Qiinese economy since the late 
1970s, one of the most significant has been the economic reform of state-owned and 
government-run industrial enterprises (hereafter called state enterprises). Reform has 
brought about fundamental changes in the environment in which state enterprises 
operate. As a result, state enterprises have become more market-oriented, though they 
are still ver\' different from firms operating in a free market economy. 
However, the reform of state enterprises has been seen as the least successful area of 
economic reform. While the growth of the industrial sector and of state enterprises as a 
whole has been reasonably high, the efficiency of state enterprises has always been a 
serious concern. In the 1980s and early 1990s, state enterprises suffered massive losses. 
Two-thirds of state enterprises in some areas were operating in the red, and able to 
survive only by relying on government subsidies and favoured treatment from banks 
(see, for example, Ni and Zhao 1993). Inefficiency in state enterprises is stiU today one 
of the thorniest problems facing Chinese policy-makers. 
The Chinese economy is characterised by an extreme scarcity of energy as weU poor 
utilisation of the limited resources available. Many believe that the scarcity and 
inefficient utilisation of energy threaten China's future economic growth. Industry has 
always been the largest consumer of energy, and inefficiency in this sector is thought to 
contribute significandy to the poor utilisation of energy resources in the economy as a 
whole. In view of the significant share of the state sector in the economy, the efficiency 
of energy use in state enterprises deser\-es special attention. 
The success of an economy depends upon its having efficient production processes. 
In this context, it is important to assess the impact of economic reform on the efficiency 
of individual enterprises, in particular with respect to energy usage. Research of this 
t>T)e can make a useful contribution to further institutional reform and govemment 
policy on energy. 
ECONO\nC GROWTH AND EFFICIENCY BEFORE REFORM: 
LNTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Growth of the Chinese economy in the pre-reform period was reasonably good. It has 
been estimated that Chinese gross domestic product grew at on average rate of 5.2 to 
5.6 per cent annually in 1957-731 and 7.2 per cent annually in 1962-78. This was above 
the world average of 4.6 per cent for 1962-78.^ However, in 1978 China was still one of 
the poorest countries in the world, and the gap in per capita national income between 
China and industrialised economies — even between China and many other developing 
economies — had v-idened considerably after three decades of development 
One factor helping to explain this paradox was the Chinese govemment's adoption 
of an extensive ratiier than an intensive growth strategy. Growth in output was the result 
of primarily of increasing inputs of various factors rather than of advances in technology 
or improvements in economic efficiency. One method used to measure the impact of 
different strategies on economic growth is total factor productivity,- defined as the 
residual of output net of the contribution of all input factors. The higher a country's 
total factor productivity and thus growth in output the more likely it is that the country 
has adopted an intensive strategy. 
.An international comparison of the contribution of total factor productivity' to the 
growth of gross domestic product puts China below industrialised countries and 
successful developing economies before the 1980s. During the period 1947-60, the total 
factor productivity' in the United States accounted for 38 per cent of growth in gross 
domestic product: in 1960-73 it accounted for 30 per cent (Christenson, Cummings and 
Jorgenson 1980). The spectacular growth of the Japanese economy in the post-war 
period relied heavily on advances in technology and improvements in economic 
efficiency. Consequendy the economy has had even stronger growth in total factor 
productivity. Depending on the estimates, the contribution of total factor productivity' to 
growth of gross domestic product was as high as 38 to 58 per cent in the 1950s and 
1960s.-^ Balassa and Bertrand's (1970) study showed that, in 1959-65, total factor 
^Official statistics do not provide figures for gross domestic product before 1978. The growth rate of 5.2 
per cent was estimated by Field (1976) and that of 5.6 per cent by Perkins (1983). Both estimates are at 
1957 constant price and are quoted by Lardy (1979. p. 164). According to Gamaut and .\nderson (1980. 
p. 384) the growth rate (constant price) of gross domestic product per capita was 5.2 per cent in 1960-
76. This is in conformity with Field's and Perkins" results. 
'.As calculated from data from the Intemanonal Economic Data Bank. Australian National University. 
-Total factor productivity is different from the efficiency index discussed later in this study, although 
both can be used to measure economic performance (chapter 5). 
•^According to Jorgenson and EsaJd (1973), in Japan total factor productivity contributed 38 per cent to 
grov,-th in gross domestic product in 1952-71. Denison and Chung (1976) estimated that total factor 
productivity accounted for 58 per cent of growth in Japanese gross domestic product in 1953-71. 
Watanabe (1972) and Nishimizu and Hulten (1978) confirmed that both growth in total factor 
productivity accounted for 44 per cent of the growth in the gross domestic product in 
Spain. A comparative study of 12 industrialised economies (Chenery, Robinson and 
Surquin 1986, chapter 2) demonstrated that total factor productivity contributed 49 per 
cent of their growth in gross domestic product in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The large share of total factor productivity in gross domestic product is not confined 
to the industrialised economies; it is also a characteristic of successful newly 
industrialised economies and many other developing countries. The total factor 
productivity of the Republic of Korea accounted for 47 percent of growth in gross 
domestic product in 1955-60 (Chen 1977) and 57 per cent between 1955 and 1970 
(Christenson, Cummings and Jorgenson 1980). In Brazil, total factor productivity had a 
share of 22 per cent of growth in gross domestic product in 1960-74 (Elias 1978). In the 
two decades since the early 1950s, 19 developing countries had a 31 per cent share of 
total factor productivity in the growth of their gross domestic product (Chenery, 
Robinson and Surquin 1986, chapter 2). The preceding analysis suggests that the 
success of economic development depends on technological progress and improvements 
in efficiency. 
The performance of total factor productivity in the Chinese economy in the pre-
reform era is in striking contrast with that of the economies mentioned above. 
According to the World Bank (1985a), the contribution to gross domestic product of 
total factor productivity was negative in 1952-81. In other words, although the economy 
was producing more output, each unit of input generated less output over time. 
Naturally enough, there was little improvement in per capita national income despite a 
reasonable level of growth in gross domestic product. 
High growth rates and low efficiency also characterised China's industrial sector. In 
1952-78, the average annual growth rate of gross industrial product evaluated at 
constant price was 13.7 per cent^ (Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, p. 413). 
However, estimates of total factor productivity have shown that productivity was at best 
stagnant and most likely declined by 0.5 per cent (Field 1983; Tidrick 1986; Chow 
1985). Even the most optimistic estimate (Kuan Chen et al. 1988a), which was based on 
a series of revised capital stock, found that total factor productivity increased by a mere 
0.4 per cent and contributed only 5 per cent to growth of output. 
The analysis so far leads to two important conclusions. First, efficiency, of the 
industrial sector in particular, is an important factor in the healthy and successful 
development of a country's economy. China, which is still in the early stages of 
development, needs to make a strategic shift from extensive to intensive growth, relying 
productivity and its contribution to growth in gross domestic product were within the range specified by 
Jorgenson and Esaki (1973) and Denison and Chung (1976) for these two decades. 
-This included the four years (1961-62, 1967-68) in which the economy was seriously disrupted by 
economic mismanagement and political movements. In 1961 output fell by nearly 40 per cent and in the 
other three years by around 15 per cent. The annual growth rate excluding these abnormal years was 
20.8 per cent. 
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more on technological advancement and improvements in efficiency, if it is to achieve 
long-run economic success. Second, improving the efficiency of state enterprises is 
crucial to industrialisation and the development of the Qiinese national economy. In 
1992, the state sector accounted for 44.2 per cent of all labour employment in urban 
areas and produced nearly half of the output of the industrial sector {Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1993, p. 99 and p. 412). Most capital investment over the past four 
decades has been concentrated in the state sector, which has thus accumulated a 
significant level of capital stock. The efficiency of the state sector will to a great extent 
determine the efficiency of the economy as a whole, and its development will 
considerably influence the growth path of the economy, at least in the foreseeable 
future. 
ECONOMIC REFORM AND THE EFFICIENCY OF STATE ENTERPRISES 
According to the orthodox Marxist Labour Theory of Value, because the value of a 
commodity is created exclusively by labour, the price of a good should be determined by 
the amount of "socially necessary labour" involved in its production (Hsu 1991, p. 144). 
The practitioners of this theory later identified the following three characteristics of state 
enterprises as distinguished from capitalist firms. First, conceptually state enterprises are 
owned by the people as a whole rather than by private individuals and are run by the 
government. Second, operationally resources are allocated through the govemment 
planning system rather than the open market. Commodities, including energy and raw 
materials, capital and labour are not supposed to be treated as tradeable goods as is the 
case in a free market economy. Third, the price of a good or service reflects exclusively 
the value of "socially necessary labour" involved in its production rather than the 
scarcity of the resource used in the production of the good or service relative to the 
utility of consuming that good or service. The price of goods is therefore determined by 
the central govemment instead of through the interaction of demand and supply in the 
marketplace. 
Economic reform of state enterprises was intended to replace the centrally based 
resource allocation system with a market-based system of resource allocation. Real 
change started in the late 1970s, although the Chinese govemment was rhetorically 
equivocal about the nature of this process until 1992, when the concept of "socialist 
market economy" was officially endorsed at the Fourteenth National Conference of the 
Communist Party. For such a fundamental institutional change in state enterprises to be 
successful, not only the mechanism of allocation per (Wu and Zhou 1990), but 
enterprises' management practices as well (Li 1986) needed to be reformed.^ The 
^In the second half of the 1980s, there was a heated debate about the appropriate sequence of the reform 
of state enterprises. One school, headed by Li Yining (1986. China Daily, 25 June), advocated 
reforming the internal management of state enterprises as the fundamental prerequisite for successful 
market reform. The other school, headed by Wu Jinglian (Wu and Zhou 1990), paid more attention to 
reform had two major components. First, at the management level state enterprises were 
gradually transformed from being "appendages of the state apparatus of economic 
administration" (Xue 1982) into profit-oriented, operationally independent and 
financially accountable firms. Second, a competitive market environment and a more 
flexible and "rational" pricing system were created in the economy to facilitate the 
transformation. 
The creation of a competitive market was greatly aided by the boom in the non-state 
sector, which involved township and village enterprises in the vast rural areas,"^ 
collective and private enterprises in the urban areas and enterprises fully or partly funded 
by foreign capital. With the dramatic growth of the non-state sector, an open and 
competitive market quickly became an important means of trading goods and services, 
and an altemative to the state planned allocation system. By around 1985, the allocation 
of many goods in the Qiinese economy was realised primarily through the market (Byrd 
1988). One and half decades after the reform, fundamental changes had taken place in 
the structure of the industrial sector in terms of output value (Table 1.1). Although the 
state sector still accounted for nearly half of industrial output in 1992, its share declined 
consistently and significantly during the period 1978-92. 
Table 1.1 Industrial Output by State and Non-state Sector, 1978-92 
(unit: billion yuan) 
Year Total Output State Enterprises Collective Enterprises Other Enterprises State Sector's Share (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2)/(l) 
1978 423.70 328.92 94.78 n.a. 77,63 
1979 468.13 367.36 100.77 n.a. 78.47 
1980 515.43 391.56 121.34 2.53 75.97 
1981 539.98 403.71 132.94 3.33 74.76 
1982 581.12 432.60 144.24 4.28 74.44 
1983 646.10 473.94 166.31 5.79 73.35 
1984 761.73 526.27 226.31 9.15 69.09 
1985 971.65 630.21 311.72 29.72 64.86 
1986 1119.43 697.11 375.15 47.16 62.27 
1987 1381.30 825.01 478.17 78.12 59.73 
1988 1822.40 1035.13 658.75 128.58 56.80 
1989 2201.71 1234.29 785.81 181.61 56.06 
1990 2392.44 1306.38 852.27 233.79 54.60 
1991 2824.80 1495.46 1008.48 320.87 52.94 
1992 3706.57 1782.42 1410.12 514.04 48.09 
Notes: 
Source: 
1) Output values in the table are in current price. 
2) "Collective enterprises" include township and village enterprises owned and operated by 
the authorities at and above village level. 
3) "Other enterprises" include joint ventures funded by foreign capital. 
Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, p. 412. 
creating a competitive market system, while at the same time acknowledging the importance of 
reforming the management of state enterprises. 
^Refer to Byrd and Lin (1990) and Chen and Xia (1989) for a comprehensive analysis of the 
development of township and village enterprises in the 1980s. 
The development of the domestic market was accompanied by increasingly 
intensified foreign trade, which forced both state and non-state sectors to face directly 
intemational competition. Two-way foreign trade increased from US$20.6 billion in 
1978 to US$165.6 billion in 1992, a growth rate of 16 per cent per annum {Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1992, p. 633). As a result, foreign trade as a proportion of gross 
national product increased from 9.9 per cent in 1978 to 38 per cent in 1992^ {Statistical 
Yearbook of China 1992, p. 31 and p. 633) and China's share of world merchandise 
trade increased from 0.8 per cent in 1979 to 2.1 per cent in 1992 (Intemational 
Economic Data Bank, Australian National University). 
For state enterprises to compete on the market and operate successfully in the new 
system, it was necessary to reform their internal systems of management The 
government carried out this reform mainly by decentralising business decision-making 
power' and delegating it to the managers of state enterprises, and by creating economic 
incentives to generate independent and profit-oriented managerial objectives. With 
decentrahsation came associated reforms in the areas of trade of output and input 
materials, labour and capital management, investment planning and forms of ownership. 
Under the reform pohcy, methods of pricing and marketing experienced substantial 
change. Two approaches were taken to price reform: correcting for price distortion in 
the case of goods allocated within state planning channels; and releasing an increasing 
number of goods and services from the state planning enclave to the "invisible hand" of 
a burgeoning though imperfect market system. The best-known reform of the pricing 
system was the two-tier price system, whereby some goods and services are traded 
freely on the open market at a price determined by the market while others are allocated 
through the state planning system at a price fixed by the government 
State enterprises were at the same time allowed to trade their above-quota output 
and input materials direcdy on the open market. WhUe there is no systematic 
information in official statistics to show the degree to which state enterprises 
participated in market competition, case studies have suggested that in the 1980s the 
open market became an important destination for output and a major source of 
procurement of input materials (Tidrick and Chen 1987; Byrd 1992b; Gao and Zhao 
1990). 
^This calculation is based on Chinese currency. It has been argued that China's gross national product 
has been systematically under-valued (Gamaut and Ma 1993) in US dollar terms. These figures would, 
therefore, be significantly lower if based on the adjusted values of gross national product. However, this 
does not affect the relative trend over the period. 
'The central government also decentralised decision making-power in the mid-1950s and the early 
1970s, by delegating responsibility to provincial and local governments. See Lardy (1979) for an 
analysis of the process and impact of the decentralisation campaigns on the distribution of budget at 
provincial level. In the 1980s, the central government intended to pass decision-making power to the 
enterprises. However, Wong (1988) argues that provincial and local governments retained and even 
gained power at the expense of both the central government and enterprises. 
However, market reform did not take place equally across the board and affected the 
four productive factors — labour, capital, energy and raw materials — to a varying 
degree. By the late 1980s, marketisation of the trade of input materials and, to a lesser 
extent, energy was proceeding well. Labour was still stricdy controlled by the central 
and local governments. A labour market for state enterprises was virtually non-existent 
and wage determination was only partially decentralised. The management of capital 
underwent some reform: state enterprises were required to finance their working capital 
and some investment projects through interest-bearing loans from banks rather than free 
govemment allocation and grants. However, a genuine capital market has never existed, 
and interest rates have at ail times been determined by the central govemment 
Market reform was accompanied by the creation of new economic incentives for the 
managers and workers of state enterprises. The first such incentive was the prorit-
sharing scheme of the late 1970s, which entided enterprises to share profit with the 
govemment rather than handing over all profit as in the former system. This system was 
soon replaced by income taxation as the central govemment attempted to regularise its 
financial relationship with enterprises. Starting from 1985, the financial obligation of 
state enterprises to the state was redefined under the Contract Management 
Responsibility System, under which the govemment made further concessions to 
enterprises. At the same time, the bonus system was restored in state enterprises. 
Enterprise managers obtained the discretionary power to use retained profit to fund 
workers' bonuses, based on their performance in the workplace, and collective welfare. 
The impact of economic reform on state enterprises has been a controversial topic, 
on which economists failed to reach a reasonable degree of consensus until 1988 
(Reynolds 1987b). Since the work of Kuan Chen et al. (1988a), most empirical studies 
have found an improvement in the efficiency of state enterprises. The literature is, 
however, fiawed in three respects. First, as discussed, economic reform was an 
extremely complex process made up of multiple and distinct policies implemented 
simultaneously. Due to limitations in econometric methods, existing studies have so far 
failed to disentangle the impact of various reform policies and to pinpoint the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of individual policies. We can therefore infer only very 
limited policy implications from the results. Second, in production theory, firm-specific 
economic efficiency consists of two main elements: technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency. The advantage of the market mechanism lies in its efficiency in achieving an 
optimal relationship between various factors in the production process, and this is 
important for future development. Despite its importance, (enterprise-specific) allocative 
efficiency has largely been ignored in the literature. Third, existing studies include only 
labour and capital in their estimation of efficiency. Efficiency of energy utilisation has 
failed to attract the attention it deserves. 
CHINA'S ENERGY SHORTAGE AND INEFFICIENCY 
In the last decade, China has emerged as one of the world's largest producers of energy. 
The government has made considerable efforts to improve the supply of energy. In 
1981-92, the govemment's capital investment in the energy sector increased from 9.5 
billion yuan to 80.4 bUIion yuan;i° capital investment in energy as a share of total capital 
investment increased from 21.4 to 26.7 per cent in the same period {Statistical Yearbook 
of China, 1993, p. 158). This large-scale investment has led to impressive growth in 
energy production over the last decade or so. Domestic output of energy increased from 
627.7 miUion tonnes of standard coal equivalent in 1978 to 1,072.6 million tonnes in 
1992, equivalent to a growth rate of 4 per cent per year. 
Despite this significant increase in supply, the government often has found it difficult 
to cope with ever-growing demand.^^ Energy shortage has from time to time plagued 
the development of the economy and has reponedly resulted in substantial economic 
losses. Industrial capacity was under-utilised by 20 to 30 per cent in the early 1980s, 
solely due to an insufficient supply of energy (Li Guangan and Wei Liqun 1982; Wang 
1988). As a result, the economy suffered an annual loss of 70-80 billion >aian during 
these years (Tian 1990). With the exception of 1985, the energy market was fairly tight 
throughout the 1980s and in a number of regions industrial production was curtailed 
because of the unavailability of coal, oU or electricity. Smil (1993) predicted that the 
energy shortage would be a major constraint on the nation's growth. 
The problem has been compounded by staggering inefficiencies in energy utilisation. 
A straightforward comparison of China with developed countries reveals that China 
produces far less output per unit of energy input than the industrialised economies. 
Energy intensity, defined as tonnes of oil equivalent per US$1,000 of gross domestic 
product, was 1.75 in the early 1990s. This was nearly ten times higher than in Australia. 
New Zealand and Japan, four times higher than in North America and four times the 
world average {International Energy Agency 1993).^^ Even allowing for under-
estimation of gross domestic product in official statistics (Gamaut and Ma 1993),^^ 
energy intensity was still nearly twice the world average (Drysdale 1994). The former 
^ • ^ e real increment in investment in the energy sector is lower than the figures would indicate. 
According to the estimation of Perkins. Zheng and Cao (1992), the price of capital goods doubled 
during 1980-89 in most industrial sectors. Therefore, very- roughly, real investment in the energy sector 
increased by four times during 1981-92. 
In the 1980s most energy output was consumed domestically; imports of energy were very small, and 
only about 6.9 per cent was exported. 
I'This figure is not a perfect indicator of energy efficiency, as these countries have differing economic 
structures. In panicular, energy-intensive sectors including heav7 industry account for a substantially 
higher proportion of the Chinese economy than in the other countries. These figures therefore give only 
a rough indication of how serious the energy situation really is. 
i-The true figure for per capita GDP in China is a subject of controversy. Gamaut and Ma (1993) 
suggested that real per capita GDP could be two to three times higher than the official figure. Perkins 
(1992) reached a similar conclusion. 
Ministry of Energy (1989, p. 10) acknowledged that China's unit GNP energy 
consumption was among the highest in the w^orld. 
The efficiency of energy utilisation in the industrial sector is another serious concern. In 
1982, CMia's energy efficiency in power generation and transportation was generally 
lower but still comparable with that of the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan 
one decade earlier (Table 1.2). Economy-wide efficiency and the efficiency of industry 
and the residential sector were substantiallv lower. 
Table 1.2 Energy Utilisation in China, the United States, the United Kingdom 
and Japan (%) 
China United States United Kingdom Japan 
(1982) (1970) (1973) (1975) 
E c 0 no mv-wide - Effic ie ncy 30 51 40 44 
Industry 39 78 67 77 
Power Generation 27 31 27 36 
Transportation 20 25 20 25 
Residential 20 80 70 80 
Noie\ Energy efficiency is defined as the ratio of realised heat value to potential %-alue and 
therefore depends on the choice of denominator. According to Gyftopoulos. Lazaridis and 
Widmer (1974), the average energy efficiency of existing plant and equipment (in the United 
States) was only 5-10 per cent of the maximum possible efficiency based on the Second Law 
of TTiermodNTiamics. One should therefore be cautious about interpreting absolute values, 
although relative value is still a useful concept. The results given here are consistent with 
recent estimates by Qingyi Wang (1994). which suggest that China's energy efficiency is 28 
per cent, which is 10 per cent lower than that of European Union countries. 
Source-. Gu 1985. p. 22. 
.Among the causes of low energy efficiency, the following three stand out. First, the 
technology employed in Chinese industry is often outmoded and inefficient. One 
estimate showed that in the late 1980s only 25 per cent of machinery- used in the 
industrial sector w a^s reasonably up-to-date and over half was virtually obsolete (Huang 
1990). According to another survey (Liu 1990), 70 per cent of the machinery- used in 
state enterprises in Shanghai was based on technology dating from the 1950s and 1960s, 
and another 10 per cent on technology dating from the 1920s and 1930s.i- Small 
i-^Trends such as these are not perfect indicators of the comparative energy efficiency of two economies. 
Coal was the source of more than 70 per cent of all energy consumed in China, a far higher proportion 
than in most developed countries. With current technology, the thermal utilisation of coal is necessarily 
lower than that of oil. Even so. this difference in the energy structure cannot fully explain the 
substantial difference in efficiency between China and industriahsed economies. 
According to Liu (1990). the low depreciation rate for equipment was partly responsible for the 
continued use of out-of-date technology. In 1942. the service limit for industrial equipment was 20 years 
in the United States, equivalent to a 5 per cent depreciation rate: in 1973 this had fallen to 10.1 years. 
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wonder then that Chinese industry utilised only 39 per cent of the potential heat value of 
energy in 1982 compared with 60 to 70 per cent in developed economies one decade 
earlier (Table 1.2). 
Second, the structure of energy does not favour the efficient utilisation of energy. 
Oiina's production and consumption of primary energy are seriously biased in favour of 
coal. Since 1949, coal has consistently accounted for over 70 per cent of all types of 
energy output and consumption and for nearly 95 per cent in some years. China used 
substantially more coal than the United States (21 per cent), West Germany (35 per 
cent), Japan (15 per cent) and the world average (30 per cent) in the 1970s (Cheng 
1984, p. 33; Xu 1981, p. 445). Current technology is such that the thermal utilisation of 
coal is in any case necessarily lower than that of oil or natural gas. 
The degree of processing of primary energy to convert it into more efficient 
secondary energy has been fairly low. During 1977-79, 28.3 per cent of coal output was 
washed (Xu 1982, p. 119); in 1988 this had declined to only 17.5 per cent {Ministry of 
Energy 1989, p. 42).^ ® This is in sharp contrast with industrialised economies: in 1980 
the ratio of prepared clean coal was already 42 per cent in the United States, 56 per cent 
in the former Soviet Union, 69.9 per cent in the former West Germany, 94.9 per cent in 
the United Kingdom and 57.3 in Australia (Qingyi Wang 1988, p. 107). 
Electrification is an important measure of how efficientiy industrialised economies 
use energy. As early as 1959, the share of electricity in total energy consumption was 
23.6 per cent in the United States: 26.4 per cent in the residential sector and 24.7 per 
cent in the industrial sector (Xu 1982, p. 446). After the first oil crisis industriahsed 
economies hastened the process of electrification, and the ratio of electricity to total 
output of primary energy increased even faster (Huang 1990, pp. lll-H).!"^ The 
simation in China has been very different In 1980-92, electricity as a share of the total 
energy consumption of the economy was on average 4.8 per cent {Statistical Yearbook 
of China 1992, p. 477). In 1985, the rate was 9.8 per cent for the industrial sector and 
1.7 per cent for the residential sector ((^g>d Wang 1988). Direct combustion of raw-
coal and other sources of primar>' energy (such as heavy oil) was common in botii 
sectors, and this has considerably lowered the efficiency of energy utilisation in the 
economy. 
The third main cause of low energy efficiency is serious distortion in official energy 
prices. For years these have been set at excessively low levels (Table 1.3). In the 1980s, 
In Japan, the limit on depreciation was on average only 6.8 years in 1973. In China, the service limit 
was on average over 25 years in the late 1980s. This is equivalent to a depreciation rate of 4.2 per cent. 
^^This reduction was mainly due to the fast growth of towTiship and village enterprises, which were 
without coal preparation facilities (Huang 1990). 
^''in the decade starting from 1975, the share of electricity in total primar>' energy output increased from 
29.1 per cent to 33.9 per cent in the United States; from 32.9 per cent to 34.4 per cent in the United 
Kingdom, from 37.4 per cent to 38.4 per cent in Japan, from 28.76 per cent to 35.1 per cent in former 
West Germany, from 33.57 per cent to 43.8 per cent in Canada and from 36.8 per cent to 51.8 per cent 
in Sweden. 
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the official price of energy was on average far less than 40 per cent of the international 
price. Based on straightforward calculation, the prices of almost all types of energy in 
China— the exceptions being gasoline and electricity in 1980 — were lower than their 
international prices.^^ Nor did the situation improve significantly throughout the decade. 
Relative prices in the open market in 1990 do suggest, though, that the establishment of 
an energy market pushed domestic energy prices far closer to international prices. 
Table 1.3 Ratio of Domestic and International Prices of Energy (%) 
1980 1984 1987 1990 
Energy n.a. 24.5 34.5 22.9 (71.1) 
Coal 53.3 (25.9) 24.3 35.3 22.1 (68.4) 
Crude Oil 50.4 (24.5) 17.3 33.9 22.3 (61.0) 
Natural Gas 48.9 (23.9) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Coking Coal 30.4(14.8) 32.0 n.a. n.a. 
Gasoline 252.5 (123.0) 93.5 n.a. 45.26 (94.6) 
Diesel n.a. 48.7 61.2 22.88 (83.2) 
Fuel Oil n.a. 12.9 34.2 17.12(82.0) 
Electricity 154.9 (76.5) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Note: Figures in brackets are relative price calculated by the author based on the exchange rates 
of foreign currency on the swap market. 
Sources: Xu (1982, p. 518) for 1980 data; Lardy (1992, p. 92) for 1984 data: Xong (1991, p. 57) 
for 1987 and 1990 data; Yang (1993) for exchange rates of foreign currency on the swap 
market. 
The low cost of energy in China has induced excessive levels of consumption at the 
same time as it has suppressed investment in the energy sector. This double-edged effect 
has certainly been an important factor in the constant shortages of energy faced in the 
past decade. Efficient utilisation of energy also has implications for the natural 
environment and long-term economic growth. According to the World Bank (1992b), 
five capital cities in China are among the most seriously polluted in East Asia. China is 
likely to be the world's largest polluter by 2010 (Prysdale 1994). The potential for 
damage to the natural environment could put sustained long-term development at stake 
unless appropriate energy policies are implemented. 
The industrial sector and manufacturing industry in particular is the largest consumer 
of energy (Table 1.4). The manufacturing sector accounts for more than 50 per cent of 
i^The high domestic price of electricity can be attributed primarily to China's over-valued currency. 
The following two factors contributed to the high domestic price of gasoline: the over-valued Chinese 
currency and the distorted price of gasoline. Liu (1989) found that in the 1980s gasoline was over-
priced relative to other petroleum products. 
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total energy consumption whereas the residential sector has an insignificant proportion 
of the total commercial energy supply . ^^  The power generating sector consumes only 
about 4 per cent of total energy. 
Table 1.4 Structure of China's Energy Consumption, 1985-91 (%) 
Sector 1985 1988 1990 1991 
Productive 79.4 79.9 80.5 80.8 
AFAFW 5.3 5.1 4.9 4.9 
Industry 66.6 (56.7) 67.8 (57.9) 68.5 (58.2) 68.8 (58.3) 
Construction 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Transport and 
Communication 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 
Service 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 
Subtotal 79.4 79.9 80.5 
Non productive 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.8 
Residential 17.4 16.7 16.0 15.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 1)AFAFW is agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fishery and water management 
projects. 
2)Numbers in brackets are the ratio of energy consumed by manufacturing industry to total 
consumption. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1989, 1993. 
Table 1.5 International Comparison of Structure of Energy and Electricity 
Consumption in 1985 (%) 
Industry Transportation Residential & Service Others 
China 66.6 (74.6) 4.8 (0.7) 17.4 (7.5) 4.9 (17.2) 
United States 30.6 (33.7) 34.7 (0.1) 31.2 (66.2) 3.4 
Japan 47.6 (60.2) 23.0 (2.9) 26.1 (36.6) 3.4 (0.3) 
West Gennany 34.6 (47.2) 21.9(3.2) 41.3 (47.4) 2.3 (2.2) 
France 33.4 26.5 37.3 2.9 
United Kingdom 29.9 (34.6) 26.3 (1.3) 41.5 (62.5) 2.4(1.6) 
Canada (42.2) (0.7) (54.4) (2.7) 
Notes: 1) Figures in brackets indicate electricity consumption. 
2) In the case of China, consumption of electricity in "other" category refers mainly the 
agricultural sector. 
Sources: Statistical Yearbook of China 1989 for energy consumption of China; Qingyi Wang (1988, 
p. 49) for other data 
i^China's rural population relies mainly on biomass energy. Because it is used for domestic purposes, 
biomass energy is classified as non-commercial energy and is not included in official statistics. Other 
sources of energy are classified as commercial energy. According to the Ministry of Energy (1989, p. 
10), 75 percent of energy used in rural areas for domestic purposes is biomass energy. The ministry 
added that 230 million tonnes of firewood is burned each year, or 2.6 times the amount that could be 
used without causing serious ecological damage. 
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This pattern of consumption differs markedly from that of many industrialised 
countries (Table 1.5). Consumption of energy by the industrial sector in all the countries 
hsted in the table is lower than that in China. Japan comes closest, but at 47.6 per cent is 
still 19 per cent behind China. By contrast, the residential and service sectors of the 
industrialised countries listed in Table 1.5 are far larger consumers of energy than these 
sectors in China. 
Improving the efficiency with which the state industrial sector utilises energy is 
extremely important, it has been identified by the Chinese govemment as one of the five 
main objectives of economic reform (Tidrick and Chen 1987, p. 1). Energy and the 
impact of economic reform on its utilisation therefore deserves greater attention from 
researchers than it has hitherto received. 
MAIN ISSUES, HYPOTHESES AND STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis asks whether economic reform has been effective in improving the technical 
and allocative efficiency of state enterprises. In estimation and discussion, attention 
focuses on the efficiency of labour and capital as well as that of energy. 
In the light of trends in technical and allocative efficiency, it is of interest to 
determine the impact of individual reform policies on the efficiency of state enterprises 
and productive factors including energy. The findings have a number of implications for 
future economic reform of the state sector, for economic growth and for energy policy. 
In the framework of the economics of shortage (Komai 1980), the key to improving 
technical and allocative efficiency is to harden sufficiently the budget constraint of state 
enterprises. According to Komai's soft budget constraint hypothesis, at least three 
factors soften the budget constraint of state enterprises in a centrally planned economy: 
soft price, soft tax and soft credit. Each of these areas will be examined in detail in this 
thesis. As weU, rigorous estimation procedures wiU be used to estimate the impact of 
reform policies on enterprise-specific efficiency. If reform has been successful, budget 
constraint will have hardened and we can expect to see an improvement in the efficiency 
index. We can then pinpoint the individual contribution of reform policies to this 
improvement in efficiency. 
The stochastic production frontier, a relatively new econometric approach, is 
adopted in the estimation of technical efficiency. As existing models of the stochastic 
production frontier are found to be inappropriate to address the issues in this study, an 
appropriate model is developed and used to estimate both the level of technical 
efficiency achieved by enterprises as well as allocative efficiency. The empirical study is 
based on a set of data from a survey conducted by the State Bureau of Statistics of 
China in 1989. 
Chapter 2 places concepts of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency in the 
framework of neoclassical production theory. This is followed by a discussion of the soft 
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budget constraint and its implications for technical and allocative efficiency. The next 
section discusses some methodological issues in the estimation of technical and 
allocative efficiency. Characteristics of sample enterprises are then analysed briefly. 
A description and assessment of the process of market reform (including the energy 
market) is undertaken in chapter 3. This is based on information from various sources 
and replies to questionnaires distributed to managers of sample enterprises. The 
assessment focuses on analysing changes in the pricing mechanism and in the allocation 
of inputs and output. Tests are then conducted on the degree of competitiveness in the 
marketplace and on changes in state enterprises behaviour in response to market reform. 
Chapter 4 looks at the intemal management of state enterprises. The main areas of 
interest are reform of the financial relationship of the govemment and state enterprises 
(including taxation), the role of the govemment and banks in financing working capital 
and investment in fixed assets, and the management of labour. The chapter then 
examines changes in the degree of market-orientation of managerial objectives and in 
the softness of budget constraint. 
The following chapter develops a new stochastic production frontier model and 
method of measurements. These are used to estimate the technical efficiency of sample 
enterprises. Trends in the estimated efficiency index are discussed briefly. 
The cell mean corrected model is used in chapter 6 to estimate the impact of four 
reform policy variables on the technical efficiency index. The analysis-of-covariance 
procedure is used to test homogeneity of parameters and to select an appropriate 
econometric model for estimation. 
Chapter 7 estimates the allocative efficiency indices and discusses the impact of 
economic reform on state enterprises' allocation of productive factors. The chapter also 
looks at length at energy efficiency. 
The last chapter summarises the main findings of the thesis and discusses the 
implications for long-term economic growth, future reform of state enterprises and the 
government's energy policies. 
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2 Enterprise-Specific Technical and Allocative 
Efficiency — Theory and Data 
The main objective of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework in which to 
address the impact of economic reform on enterprise-specific technical and allocative 
efficiency. In studying the efficiency problem of China's state enterprises, we face 
theoretical difficulties if we confine ourselves strictly to neoclassical economic theory. 
In this study, therefore, we use Komai's soft budget constraint theory (Komai 1980) to 
establish a theoretical linkage between economic reform and enterprise-specific 
technical and allocative efficiency. Neoclassical production theory still serves as the 
theoretical foundation for estimating and evaluating efficiency and making policy 
implications. 
Conceptually, economic systems are of two types: the centrally planned economy, 
and the decentralised free market economy. In reality, however, most economies are 
somewhere on the spectrum between these two extremes and combine characteristics 
of both. China's state enterprises in the 1980s were gradually moving from the former 
end of the spectrum to the latter. As the transformation was incomplete, it was 
inevitable that at the end of the decade Chinese state enterprises stiU carried some 
inheritance of the centrally planned system. Study of efficiency in China's state 
enterprises in the 1980s needs to take this into account. 
Neoclassical production theory is an abstraction of firms operating in a 
decentralised free market economy. Its techniques can be used to estimate productive 
efficiency, explore the reasons for inter-firm and intra-firm variation in efficiency and 
examine policy implications. This theory will be employed in this study as a reference 
point for analysing efficiency in state enterprises. 
Komai's soft budget constraint theory is used widely in analysis of a number of 
important issues affecting centrally planned economies. In this chapter, it serves as a 
theoretical foundation for identifying the sources of economic inefficiency in state 
enterprises and exploring ways of improving efficiency. 
Empirical studies have so far tended either to measure changes in total factor 
productivity or to focus on partial productivity measures such as that of labour or 
capital. Both approaches have serious limitations. ^  In this study the performance of 
Chinese state enterprises is examined in terms of enterprise-specific technical and 
allocative efficiency. The stochastic frontier production approach is used to estimate the 
^The drawbacks of partial productivity measures are well known and do not need to be repeated here. 
See chapter 5 for a discussion of the limitations of the total factor productivity approach. 
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two efficiency indices and analyse the impact of economic reform on state enterprises' 
efficiency. 
DEFLXmON AND MEASUREMENT OF TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
Technical efficiency and allocative efficiency are generally considered to be the major 
components of economic efficiency.- They were first concepmalised by Debreu (1951) 
and Koopmans (1951). 
Technical efficiency is defined as the capacity and willingness of an economic unit 
to produce the maximum possible output from a given bundle of inputs and technology; 
allocative efficiency is defined as the ability and willingness of an economic unit to 
achieve maximum possible profit by equating its specific marginal value product with its 
marginal cost, evaluated at a given output level.^ Although there is no difference of 
opinion about the definition of allocative efficiency, there are different views about its 
measurement. Before we embark on estimation and discussion of efficiency in China's 
state enterprises, it is necessary to clarify this controversy — different measurements 
will, after all, affect the results and have different implications.'^ Basically, there are two 
approaches to measuring allocative efficiency: FarreU's (1957) approach and the 
conventional approach. 
In his pioneering paper, FarreU (1957) decomposed the efficiency of firms into 
technical and allocative components. He then proposed two indexes, one each for 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency, as well as an index for overall economic 
efficiency. 
-Fare and Grosskopf (1983a. 1983b) later decomposed economic efficiency into technical, structural 
and allocative efficiency. Fare, Grosskopf, Lovell (1985) added scale efficiency, a concept distinct 
from the previous three. But. these concepts have been explained by following the programming 
approach of estimating the frontier function, which I do not use in this study. 
^ Fare Grosskopf and Lovell (1985, p. 3) discussed FarreU's efficiency measures with a high degree of 
clarit)' and rigour, as follows: 
A producer is said to be technically efficient if production occurs on the boundary of the 
producer's production possibiliues set. and technically inefficient if production occurs 
on the interior of the production possibilities set. A technically efficient producer is said 
to be allocatively efficient if production occurs in a subset of the uncongested set of the 
production possibilities set that satisfies the producer's behavioural objective. The 
location of this subset is determined by the prices faced by the producer and by the 
producer's behavioural goal. Thus a producer is said to be allocatively inefficient if 
production occurs at the w o n g point in the uncongested set of the production 
possibiliues set. wrong in relation to the prices faced by the producer and behavioural 
goal pursued by the producer. 
•^See chapter 7 for a discussion of the different economic implications depending on which measure of 
allocative efficiency is used. 
17 
Approach A 
Following Farrell's (1957) approach, the measurement of technical and allocative 
efficiency is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 Measurement of Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
The figure illustrates the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency using 
isoquants and iso-cost lines. A is the observed input vector producing output y', and the 
curve y ' j ' is the isoquant or production frontier. The technical efficiency of the firm is 
defined as OB/OA given constant returns to scale of the production function, since 
point B is the technically efficient point. Allocative efficiency is OD/OB following the 
definition of Farrell (1957). To produce output y', the producer needs to move from B 
to £ in order to maximise profit or minimise cost of production given relative input 
price P. But the points E and D are on the iso-cost line at price P. Therefore the 
distance between B and D is the cost to the producer that could have been avoided by 
producing at point E. Based on the conceptualisation by Farrell, allocative efficiency is 
actually measured from point B, a technically efficient point 
Economic efficiency is a concept which involves both technical and allocative 
efficiencies.^ In Figure 2.1, following FarreU's approach, economic efficiency is 
measured by OD/OA and economic inefficiency hy I-OD / OA. Simple algebra proves 
that economic efficiency is a product of technical and allocative efficiencies. Economic 
inefficiency therefore measures the total opportunity cost of producing output j ' at 
point A, which would not have been incurred had the firm produced y' at point E, a 
point that is not only feasible but also, by definition, technically and allocatively 
efficient 
^Economic efficiency is sometimes called total efficiency or cost efficiency. I will use the 
"economic efficiency" tliroughout this thesis. 
term 
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Approach B 
In the conventional approach, allocative efficiency is measured ft-om the observed 
production function. In Figure 2.2, given a homothetic production function with 
constant returns to scale, relative price P and output >'', the production point e is 
inefficient both technically and aUocatively since it is off the production frontier j ' and 
incompatible with relative price P. The points d and c are technically efficient but 
aUocatively inefficient since they are on the production frontier consistent with j ' but 
inconsistent with relative price P. The point B' in Figure 2.2 is aUocatively efficient but 
technicaUy inefficient^ This is because point B' needs to be associated with output level 
y" for a producer to be considered technicaUy efficient Therefore a producer at point 
B' uses more inputs to produce >'' than would a technicaUy efficient producer. In Figure 
2.2, only point B is both technicaUy and aUocatively efficient Based on a weU-defined 
production function, allocative efficiency can be measured by the deviation of the 
observed production point e from the aUocatively efficient (although stUl technicaUy 
inefficient) point B'. This measure is caUed sub-optimal allocative efficiency in the 
literature. 
This approach to defining the concepts of technical and allocative efficiency impUes 
that a firm can be technicaUy inefficient but stiU aUocatively efficient Thus allocative 
efficiency is not dependent on technical efficiency when measured from the observed 
production function rather than from the frontier. 
Figure 2.2 Examples of Technically and AUocatively Efficient Points 
^Allocative efficiency independent of technical efficiency cannot be defined without specifying the 
production function. In this case, the production function is specified as homothetic. 
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Measurement of Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
We now need to put the two distinct approaches in a framework for empirical study. In 
Figure 2.3, 0 ^ 2 ^^  ^^^ observed production function, M2M2 is the potential production 
function or production frontier, PP' is the firm-specific price line, and q's refer to 
restricted profit (total revenue minus variable costs) associated with different input 
levels. The firm actually uses Xj input and produces yj output on its observed function, 
suggesting that it does not operate on the most efficient function. If it did, Xj mput 
would have resulted in output. Therefore the technical efficiency of the firm is 
y^  / y2- This measurement does not differ ft-om that obtained using isoquants (approach 
A), since q^ and q^ correspond to points A and B respectively in Figure 2.1. Following 
approach A, allocative efficiency is measured from the efficient function M1M2 as 
I Qy Note that q^ and (7^  correspond to points E and B respectively in Figure 2.1. 
Following approach B, allocative efficiency is measured from the observed production 
function o p 2 ^^ I Qi- However, economic efficiency is measured as I q^. As 
economic efficiency is defined as comprising both technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency and, further, as equalisation of the marginal value of a product with marginal 
cost requires knowledge of the parameters of the efficient production function, it is 
argued in this dissertation that allocative efficiency is best measured by following 
approach A. 
Figure 2.3 Comparison of Alternative Approaches 
ou^ut 
efficient fimction 
variable iiqiut 
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It is necessary to clarify a few relevant concepts before leaving this topic. Both 
M^M, and 0 ^ 2 ^ ^ production evaluated at the same technology. The difference 
between the corresponding points on the two curves, for example QJ and q^ or q^ and 
q2, indicates the outcomes arising from altemative uses of a given set of inputs and 
technology by the same firm, or from an efficient and inefficient firm using the same 
inputs and technology. We should not confuse this with different production functions 
and production frontiers or a shift in these, which usually result firom adoption of new 
technology. In the literature, a shift in the production function and frontier is defined as 
technical progress (Fan 1991; Nishimizu and Page 1982). By definition, the 
combination of technical progress and improvement in technical efficiency is equivalent 
to change in total factor productivity (Lau and Brada 1990). 
SOURCES OF TECHNICAL AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY 
The pervasive inefficiency of China's state enterprises in the three decades until 1978 
can be attributed to the institutional problems common to most centrally planned 
economies. Economic reform was intended to replace inefficient institutions with a 
market system. It is reasonable to argue that the key to its success lay in how well it 
eradicated sources of inefficiency rooted in the centrally planned system. This argument 
leads us to trace inefficiency in post-reform state enterprises back to its origins in the 
pre-reform system. 
In our empirical estimation we also have to pay attention to other sources of 
inefficiency. As producers, state enterprises share many efficiency-related 
characteristics with firms operating in a free market economy. Inefficiency in this 
context is best handled within the framework of neoclassical production theory. In 
empirical study, then, it is important not to confuse the different sources of inefficiency. 
Efficiency in the Perfect Competition Model of Neoclassical Theory 
Neoclassical economic theory is founded on three main assumptions. These are: agents 
are rational;^ markets exist and function to direct resource allocation; and (implicitly) 
agents are free and independentiy able to make decisions and choices. In production 
theory, rationality implies that producers maximises profit, although this concept has 
remained controversial.^ It is easy to demonstrate that firms will be technically and 
'^According to Gravelle and Rees (1986, p. 7), rational decision-making takes the following form: 
(a) the decision-maker sets out all feasible alternatives: (b) the decision-maker takes into account 
whatever information is readily available, or worth collecting, to assess the consequences of choosing 
each altemative: (c) in light of this the decision-maker ranks alternatives in order of preference, where 
this ordering satisfies certain assumptions of completeness and consistency: and (d) the decision-
maker chooses the altemative highest in this ordering, i.e. the altemative with consequences preferred 
over all others available. 
^The concept of rationality defmed as profit maximisation has been challenged by Berle and Means 
(1932), Marris (1964) and Simon (1972). 
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allocatively efficient if certain conditions with respect to market, behaviour and 
information are satisfied. 
The perfect competition model of neoclassical theory is the starting point for 
analysis of a firm's efficiency. In this model, the producer is assumed to maximise profit 
subject to budget or price constraints, given the technology. In the case of a single 
product, this can be expressed as follows, 
Max K = px >'(.r) - w x .v 
( 2 . 1 ) s.t, y = }ix) 
where t: is profit, p is product price, >' is quantity of product, y(x) is the production 
function, h' is the factor prices vector and .r is the input factor vector. The input factor 
vector x is the set of choice variables. Both output and input prices are determined 
exogenously to the fum and the production function or technology is not variable. 
In this model, the following conditions are implicitly or explicitly assumed:^ 
CI. The behavioural equation implies that the rational behaviour of the 
decision-maker is profit maximisation. 
C2. Markets for both inputs and output exist and are perfectly 
competitive since all prices are exogenous and prices are not choice 
variables. 
C3. The decision-maker has perfect information about both input and 
output markets. 
C4. The decision-maker has perfect information about the production 
function or technology in the optimisation process since the 
production function is explicitiy given. 
C5. The firm is constrained by its capability to generate financial 
resources intemally and to borrow from extemal sources, which has 
to be done strictiy following certain regular rules. In Komai's (1980) 
terminology, the budget constraint is not soft.i° 
We can show that, given these conditions, the production process represented by 
equation (2.1) will be technically and allocatively efficient 
^Technical assumptions of neoclassical production theory that are not relevant for the purposes of this 
study have been excluded from the list 
^®The concept of soft budget constraint will be discussed later in this chapter. This has theoretical 
ramifications for the technical and allocadve efficiency of state enterprises both in a traditional 
centrally planned economy and in the transition to a market economy. 
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The reasons for perfect technical efficiency are self-explanatory. A firm that has 
perfect knowledge of production technology can with certainty locate the production 
frontier y'y' (Figure 2.1). Under the assumption of profit maximisation, which implies 
that the firm is willing to use that knowledge, the firm is sure to produce at a point on 
y'y'. Any point deviating from y'y', such as A, is not consistent with the assumption of 
profit maximisation, because the firm can use fewer inputs, Xi and by moving from A 
to B with a net gain in profit 
Similarly, we can prove that a firm will be allocatively efficient if the listed 
conditions are satisfied. In Figure 2.3 an improvement in allocative efficiency typically 
refers to the movement of production from point q^ to point q^}^ Perfect competition 
implies that prices are determined exogenously and the slope of price line p'p' is beyond 
the control of the firm. A profit maximiser with perfect knowledge of production 
technology {MjM2 curve) and market (p'p' line), will certainly move production to 
point q^, which is the only point consistent with maximum profit 
Improving allocative efficiency is the rational response of a firm to a market 
opportunity that can be exploited by adjusting input-output and input-input 
combinations. In other words, it is the typical response of a firm under the drive to 
maximise profits to a particular set-up of the market 
Therefore the assumption of market competitiveness — in particular the way prices 
are determined — is important in determining the degree of firm-specific allocative 
efficiency. In neoclassical economic theory price determination has a strong bearing on 
the degree of market competitiveness. In a perfectly competitive market, the firm 
cannot influence the level of prices and therefore is a price taker. This type of market, 
as we have shown, will lead to allocative efficiency. A firm in a monopolistic market is 
a price-maker; it can exploit its advantage in the market to gain profit within a certain 
price range. The firm in a market between these two extremes, eg. an oligopolist or 
monopolistic competitor, has limited influence on the level of prices. In both situations, 
inefficiency in allocation can be expected to occur. 
This discussion of technical and allocative efficiency leads to an important 
conclusion, namely that a firm, if found to be inefficient, must have failed to satisfy 
some or all of the neoclassical assumptions. In other words, a failure to maximise 
profit, a noncompetitive market structure, and imperfect information about production 
technology and markets may aU result in technical and/or allocative inefficiency. As we 
i^Two qualifications need to be made here. First, I assume hereafter that the production function 
satisfies the regularity conditions. I therefore ignore technical problems of equilibrium, such as 
existence, stability and uniqueness, since they are not at issue in this thesis. Second, in the 
conventional approach, improvement in allocative efficiency does not exclude movement from to 
in Figure 2.3, an allocatively efficient but technically inefficient point. In other words, improvement in 
allocative efficiency can. by defmition, take place at any level of technical efficiency. But the 
measurement of allocative efficiency, as I noted earlier, should be carried out on the production 
frontier or efficient production function in Figure 2.3. 
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will show later in this chapter, empirical economists find that inefficiency has been 
caused by a violation of neoclassical assumptions in a fi-ee market economy, often as a 
result of government interventionist policies. 
For state enterprises in a centrally planned economy, there is another important 
source of inefficiency: an unduly soft budget constraint (Komai 1980). In study of the 
impact of economic reform on the efficiency of state enterprises, this is a crucial issue. 
Soft Budget Constraint: An Important Source of State Enterprise Inefficiency 
The operation of state enterprises in a centrally planned system is in sharp contrast with 
that of firms in a decentralised free market economy, as is evident if we compare the 
neoclassical model (equation 2.1) and its relevant assumptions with the characteristics 
of a centrally planned system (chapter 1). 
Komai's (1980) soft budget constraint hypothesis is widely used to describe the 
conduct of state enterprises in centrally planned e c o n o m i e s . ^^  According to this 
hypothesis, state enterprises face unduly soft financial constraint and at the same time 
behave in such a way as to maximise physical output rather than profit. As a result, 
enterprises have a weak incentive to improve productivity and are reluctant to respond 
to price signals. The former results in technical inefficiency, the latter leads to allocative 
inefficiency; and both create a tendency for enterprises to use capital excessively. 
Komai repeatedly stressed the point that a soft budget constraint among state 
enterprises is not simply a financial problem; fundamentally, it is a type of behaviour 
induced by the institutional characteristics of a centrally planned economy and the 
unique relationship of govemment with enterprises. Following this argument, I argue 
that the key to the success of future reform is to design reform policy so as to harden 
the budget constraint of state enterprises. 
Komai (1980) demonstrated that soft budget constraint is the major cause of a 
range of economic phenomena unique to centrally planned economies: prolonged 
shortages of goods and services, for example, or the distorted behaviour of buyers and 
sellers. Some of these characteristics are discussed later in this chapter. 
Definition of Budget Constraint 
Following Komai (1980, chapter 13), a soft budget constraint for a particular firm can 
be explained in the following simplified financial balance sheet: 
i^Komai (1980) makes it very clear that his w o ± is based mainly upon study of Hungary's economy. 
However, with a few changes it is substantially applicable to other centrally planned economies. Komai 
(1986a) later applied the model to former East European countries other than Hungary and to the 
Chinese economy (Komai 1986b). 
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Total Payment 
in the 
t'th Period 
M(t) 
Initial Money Stock 
in the t'th Period 
Total Receipts 
in the 
t'th Period 
(2.2) 
On the right-hand side, money stock refers only to cash held by the firm at the 
beginning of the r^ ^ period which it can dispose of directly and immediately. This 
corresponds roughly to Ml in monetary theory. Total receipts include the following 
variables: proceeds from the sale of products, govemment subsidies and other grants; 
money borrowed by the enterprise from extemal non-govemmental agents including 
credit issued from banks; instalments and interest received on credits granted 
previously; and owners' (of the enterprise) monetary investment Total payments 
includes expenditure on productive factors and intermediate inputs, state tax and other 
payments to the govemment, credit granted, instalments and interest paid on credit 
received previously, and withdrawal of profit by owners. 
Equation (2.2) means that in any particular period an enterprise cannot expend 
more than it can acquire either through changes in productive activity (input of factors 
and intermediate goods, and output of products) or from extemal sources (prices of 
inputs and output, subsidies, credit and tax etc.) 
In this study, in order to facilitate our discussion of a soft budget constraint and 
important reform issues, we exclude some variables on both sides of the equation. On 
the right-hand side, we ignore the following variables: initial money stock, money 
borrowed by the firm from non-govemmental and non-banking agents, instalments and 
interest received on credits granted previously, and owners' monetary investment On 
the left-hand side, we ignore the variables of credit granted, instalments and interest 
paid on credit received previously from non-govemmental and non-banking institutions, 
and withdrawal of profit by owners.^^ Another way to look at the exclusion of these 
variables is to assume that the value of the ignored variables is exogenously determined 
and given to the decision-makers of the enterprises, and that these variables are not 
factors in the decision-making process. 
Excluding these variables allows us to focus our attention on proceeds from the sale 
of products, govemment subsidies and other grants, and credit from banks on the right-
hand side of equation (2.2), and on the left-hand side on expenditure on inputs, tax and 
other payments to the state and interest on credit previously received from banks. 
^-This means that we implicitly remove inter-enterprise loans from the study, despite their significance 
from time to time as a source of serious operational difficulties in the state industrial sector. For 
example, inter-enterprise debts among state enterprises peaked in 1991 at 158 billion yuan (World 
Bank 1992a. p. 2), leading to a national campaign by the govemment against these so-called 
'triangular debts'. Discussion of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Three Budget Constraint Scenarios 
Equation (2.2) must hold ex post as an accounting balance. This does not mean that it 
automatically acts as a constraint actually regulating the behaviour of an enterprise 
deciding how, for example, to use short-term or long-term investment funds. Behaviour 
will depend rather ex ante on the decision-maker's expectation about the possibility of 
being restricted by this condition and the probability of breaching it without having 
serious consequences. For example, in the case of budgeting, if decision-makers know 
that deficits will always be accommodated then overspending is likely to occur. 
It is this expectation that determines the degree of softness of budget constraint, 
though this statement needs some clarification. In studying and applying this theory, a 
soft budget constraint should not be confused with occasional overspending or deficits 
resulting from carelessness or incompetence. Komai (1980) emphasised that the soft 
budget constraint is a type of institution-induced human behaviour in the sense that the 
decision-maker, as a rational economic agent, deliberately and consistentiy spends more 
than she/he should and that such behaviour is justified by the economic institution. The 
soft budget constraint stems from intentional and habitual action which is 
accommodated, tolerated, induced and even reinforced by the institutions of the 
centrally planned economy. 
Komai distinguished three theoretical scenarios for different types of budget 
constraint: a purely hard constraint, an almost hard constraint and a soft constraint. The 
budget constraint is said to be hard if the following conditions are satisfied (P is "a 
purely hard budget constraint"): 
PL Prices of inputs and output are exogenous. This implies that the firm 
is purely a price-taker. It does not matter how prices are determined 
— whether they are dictated by the govemment or result from the 
operation of a competitive market which cannot be influenced by the 
action of any individual firm. 
P2. Taxation is hard. First, tax laws and regulations must be practically 
enforceable: that is, based on explicit, inflexible and measurable 
criteria which are not subject to arbitrary interpretation. Second, tax 
laws and regulations must be strictiy observed. In particular, the 
formation of tax rules are exogenous to the firm and collection of 
taxes is not subject to negotiation which may lead to reduction or 
exemption. We should note that a hard tax system does not 
necessarily result in a high tax rate. 
P3. There are no free state grants. Under this condition the firm does not 
expect (and in fact cannot get access to) free money from external 
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economic agents, especially the government, to cover operational 
costs. 
P4. No credit is allowed. No credit can be obtained from any external 
source for a debt-fmanced operation, and purchase of inputs must be 
made in cash. The firm cannot force credit from suppliers by 
breaking contracts or failing to make payments for purchases 
without incurring a severe penalty. 
P5. There can be no extemal financial investment. This condition is 
relevant to firms in general, and not just those operating in a 
centrally planned e c o n o m y . I n the case of reform of Qiinese state 
enterprises, this condition is not relevant and is therefore not 
discussed further here. 
In exploring the essence of the soft and hard budget constraint, Komai (1980) made 
a distinction between two sets of variables, namely variables in the real sphere and 
those in the control sphere. The former refers to variables directly related to the 
production and operation of the firm, such as input-output combinations and the firm's 
management skills. The latter consists mainly of financial variables, such as prices, 
credit, subsidies and tax. In the presentation of the neoclassical competitive model 
(equation 2.1), the production function contains exclusively variables in the real sphere 
and while behavioural equation contains, explicitly or implicitly, those in the control 
sphere. 
Variables in the real sphere are determined within the firm in both a free market and 
a centrally planned economy. Control variables, however, are determined differently in 
the two types of economy. For a (private) firm in a free market economy, some control 
variables (prices of labour, capital, inputs and output) are determined by the rules of the 
marketplace and others by tax rules defined in a hard tax system. For state enterprises 
in a centrally planned economy, aU control variables are determined in the government 
office through negotiation and bargaining. This will be discussed in more depth later in 
this section. 
The five conditions for a purely hard budget constraint imply that there is in fact no 
room for the firm to manipulate variables in the control sphere and, more importantly, 
that the firm's expectation is consistent with this. In this situation, equation 2.2 ex ante 
holds fully and is complied with by the firm when it makes business decisions on 
variables in both the real and control spheres. In other words, a hard budget constraint 
implies that any ouday of the firm can only be recouped through changes in the real 
i^Komai (1985. 1986b) stresses that soft the budget constraint is not only applicable to traditional 
socialist economies. To a lesser extent, it can be applied to mixed economies and even to industrial free 
market economies. The latter will be discussed shortly. 
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sphere, and the firm's growth can be financed only through internal financial 
accumulation. 
According to Komai, a firm needs to fiilfil all these conditions for its budget 
constraint to be perfecdy hard. In reality, however, the budget constraint of firms has 
never been completely hard even in free market economies. As Komai (1980, pp. 311-
12) notes: 
[In the capitalist economies] the normal degree of hardness of the constraint 
seems to have shifted: the trend is in the direction of softening. Perfect hardness 
in its absolute purity may never have existed, even through the capitalist system 
came close to this abstract extreme poin t . . . in the 19th cenmry. Bankruptcy was 
real bankruptcy; the firm that failed was not helped out by anyone but cmshed 
ruthlessly by more successful competitors ... The econcmy is becoming highly 
concentrated; huge corporations are being founded. They are no longer price-
takers but price-makers. This is one of the basic factors f rom the point of view of 
softening the budget constraint. A large capitalist corporation is able to react to 
input price changes not only by adapting its input-output combination, but by 
adjusting output price to actual costs plus the expected maiic-up. By its price-
making power it can almost 'automatically' guarantee its survival, its self-
perpetuation. 
Based on this observation of a trend of softening budget constraint in free market 
economies and, despite this, behaviour differing markedly from that of state enterprises 
in socialist countries, Komai proposes the scenario of "an almost hard budget 
constraint". 
The budget constraint is said to be "almost hard" if conditions P2 and P3 stand but 
PI and P4 are relaxed somewhat. But diis warrants immediate qualification. First, in 
this scenario the firm can be a price-maker (for example, an imperfect competitor, an 
oligopolist or even a monopolist), but it can manipulate prices only through the market 
and can achieve its objectives only within a certain price range. ^ ^ Second, credit makes 
the budget constraint almost hard if it is issued subject to full guarantee of the firm's 
ability to repay on schedule and on the prescribed terms. 'Orthodox' and 'conservative' 
creditworthiness must be the principle guiding the issuing of loans; in particular, the 
loan should not be used solely to bail the firm out of short-term financial difficulties. 
^^Komai (1985) further qualified the notion of the "almost hard budget constraint" with respect to the 
price determination mechanism. He made it clear that it is not justifiable to include price-making 
oligopolists and many other cases of imperfect competition in the "SBC [soft budget constraint]-
syndrome" (p. 49). He further clarified this as follows (pp. 50): 
This was certainly not my intention [to include oligopolists and imperfect 
competitors], when creating the concept of soft budget constraint. I want to limit the 
case of 'softening the budget constraint' exclusively to situations in which a decision-
making unit (a fuTn or another organisation) gets some external assistance from some 
large paternalistic instimtion. In most cases this is the State ... But in all cases the 
distinguishing feature is assistance received from an institution outside the market-
place with the aid of negotiations, bargaining, lobbying, political pressures, etc. That 
is clearly different from the situation of a fum which may exploit its position in the 
marketplace, and not in the corridor of a bureaucratic patron. 
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The principle of creditworthiness should not only serve as a guideline for financial 
institutions in reality but should also be consistent with firms' perceptions and 
expectations. 
Komai did not rate the degree of hardness of budget constraint of firms in modem 
industrialised market economies, indicating only that budget constraint was 'almost 
hard' in some areas and 'not very hard' in others (1980, p. 313). Even so, the budget 
constraint in the firms examined by Komai was clearly much harder than is the case in 
centrally planned economies. Neither persistent economy-wide shortages of goods and 
services in the marketplace nor the automatic guarantee of survival of the firm — two 
phenomena responsible for the soft budget constraint in planned economies, according 
to Kornai — are observed in free market economies. 
The third scenario concems the soft budget constraint (S). In this situation, all five 
conditions are completely relaxed, as follows: 
51. Prices of output and inputs are soft. Prices are determined 
administratively outside the marketplace. The major mechanisms of 
price determination are negotiation, bargaining, lobbying and the 
exercise of political pressure. The final outcome is based on ad hoc 
irregularity and realised through the pricing authority of the 
govemmenL 
52. The tax system is soft. First, tax laws or regulations may not be 
strictiy implemented, because the criteria are not objectively 
measurable or observable, because tax is not collected properly or 
because the system leaves room for arbitrary exemptions. Second, 
the tax system is such that the criteria for some taxes are not clear-
cut. Taxes, and especially firm-specific taxes, are then subject to the 
arbitrary interpretation of the firm, the discretion of the tax authority 
and negotiation between the firm and the tax authority. ^ ^ 
53. Free state grants are provided. This implies that firms have access to 
external financial sources to fund shon-term expenditure, long-term 
investment and operational loss. 
54. Credit is soft. Credit is issued without a full guarantee of the firm's 
ability to repay on schedule and on the prescribed terms. To use 
Komai's terminology, the credit issue does not follow "orthodox" 
and "conservative" principles. Credit refers not only to bank loans, 
but also to "forced credit": failure to honour contracts, and delays in 
paying for or non-payment of inputs purchased from other firms. 
i^The "adjustment tax' is a tv-pical example of such a firm-specific tax. The Chinese government 
introduced this tax in the early 1980s. See chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of the tax issue. 
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The budget constraint is rendered soft when such practices do not 
incur a penalty. 
S5. Conditions for external financial investment are soft. If the 
investment fund comes from the government, this condition is 
equivalent to S2 (tax concessions or exemptions) and S3 (free 
grants); if financed by banks, it is the same as S4. 
We need to pay attention to how soft prices, soft tax and soft credit (including free 
state grants) change equation (2.2). Komai (1985, p. 50) repeatedly emphasised that 
the soft budget constraint is not purely a financial issue in the narrow sense of the 
relationship between an enterprise's income and its expenditure. It is rather the typical 
and expected behaviour of, for example, state enterprises in centrally planned 
economies. 
A firm's decision-maker has a subjective expectation about the probability of 
successfully acquiring assistance from the govemment or banks when in financial 
difficulty. This probability depends on how seriously the rules of the economic 
institution are flawed (conditions S1-S5) in reality. If prices, tax or credit are in fact 
soft, the rules wiU help forge ex ante the enterprise's perception of reality. A rational 
economic agent wiU then take this into account in the decision-making process, 
capitalising on the flaws of the system. In this way ex ante expectations are translated 
into distorted and economically irrational behaviour: deliberate overspending; 
imprudent decisions on capital investment projects; reluctance to respond to price 
signals; a tendency to increase output relying exclusively on an increase in inputs and so 
on. Equation (2.2) in reality fails to constrain the behaviour of state enterprises in the 
decision-making process. The concept of a soft budget constraint thus refers not only 
to flaws in the rules governing economic institutions (conditions S1-S5) but also to the 
behaviour of producers operating under such institutions. A soft budget constraint leads 
to phenomena unique to the centrally planned system: unusually low productivity 
(including technical and allocative efficiency) and a persistent shortage of goods and 
services, among other things. These will be addressed in the next two sections. 
Inefficiency under a Soft Budget Constraint 
The conduct of state enterprises under a soft budget constraint has serious implications 
for technical and allocative efficiency. A rational decision-maker faced with the choice 
of altering variables in the control sphere (financial variables) or those in the real sphere 
(production function variables) in a drive to increase either output or profit wiU always 
opt for the former. This is because it is usually easier to acquire additional resources 
(from govemment) by manipulating financial variables than to economise on the use of 
available resources by altering variables in the input-output relationship. Nevertheless, a 
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correct input-output relationship is critically important for achieving both technical and 
allocative efficiency (Figures 2.1-2.3). Without prompt and appropriate adjustment in 
the face of changing technology and prices, poor technical and allocative efficiency is 
inevitable. 
We look now at the relationship between a soft budget constraint and allocative 
efficiency. Komai (1980) argued that state enterprises under soft budget constraint are 
insensitive to fluctuations in the prices of output and inputs and reluctant to make 
changes in the input-output relationship. So long as enterprises can influence the pricing 
rules for output or input by appealing to the government pricing authority, they do not 
need to adjust the input-output combination. Even if they fail to effect a change in 
prices, they can achieve their objective (compensating for operational losses or 
maximising profit) by lobbying the government for additional grants, tax concessions or 
postponement of or exemption from repayment of loans from banks (owned by 
government). The response of enterprise under a soft budget constraint to a change in 
input or output prices (Figure 2.4) is in strong contrast to that of the profit-maximising 
firms of neoclassical economic theory. 
Figure 2.4 Response to a Change in Prices under the Soft and Hard 
Budget Constraints 
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In the figure, the response to a change in output price is illustrated in phase A 
(upper-left panel) and phase B (upper-right panel). In phase A, Y and A: are respectively 
output and input and y{x) is the production function. In period zero, the relative price is 
P, / Py and in period one it is p] / p\ In phase B, p° and p'^ are output prices in 
absolute terms in period zero and period one respectively. The curve is the 
constrained output supply function. 
The enterprise initially produces at point a" using input to produce output 
with a relative price of / The enterprise is hence efficient by definition. If the 
output price fails to p'^  in period one and relative price becomes p^/p^, then 
neoclassical economic theory predicts that a cost minimising (or profit maximising) firm 
would shift the input-output combination point to a^ to achieve a reduction in output 
and input In phase B, this movement from to b^ indicates a normal upward-
sloping output supply curve. 
However, this relationship collapses under soft budget constraint. The new input-
output combination simply does not change or moves to somewhere between and 
a}\ an allocatively inefficient zone (see also Figure 2.3). It is reasonable to predict that 
the softer budget constraint is, the closer to point <3° the new point will be. 
Similarly, we can predict the response of enterprises under soft budget constraint to 
a rise in input prices, as illustrated in panels A and C (lower panel). In panel C, x and p^ 
are respectively input and input price, and superscripts refer to different time periods. 
The curve D^ is the input demand function for x. Starting from the original equilibrium 
a cost minimising firm wiU move the production point to a ' in the neoclassical 
framework if input price increases to P\ However, the enterprise under a soft 
budget constraint wiU again move to somewhere between and a} or stay at point 
A soft budget constraint is empirically measurable. As the production point does 
not move by the fuU amount (from a° to a}), output supply (5^) will be flatter and 
demand curve D^ steeper than would be the case with the neoclassical firm. If the 
budget constraint is extremely soft, the former will be a vertical line and the latter a 
horizontal one. In neoclassical terminology, price demand for input and output is 
inelastic. In short, prices, interest rates and wages may fail to guide the allocation of 
resources under soft budget constraint. 
A soft budget constraint has implications for technical efficiency (a term Komai did 
not himself use^" )^. Technical inefficiency can be analysed from both a static and a 
dynamic perspective. Statically, soft tax, soft credit, soft input and output prices, and 
free state grants weaken the enterprise's incentive to improve its performance by 
optimising the input-output relationship. The distortion in behaviour that results 
naturally leads to inefficient use of existing resources and hence technical inefficiency. If 
I'^Komai (1986b) prefers the term 'loss of x-efficiency'. 
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the budget constraint remains soft, the enterprise may operate far away from the 
production frontier even in the long run. Goldfelf and Quant (1988) demonstrated that 
enterprises under a soft constraint do indeed use more inputs than they would 
otherwise. 
Dynamically, the availability of free extemal financial assistance weakens or 
removes the incentive for the enterprise to balance the economic benefits and risks of 
investment. A moral hazard problem prevails among such enterprises, and investment 
projects fail at an unusually high rate. The enterprise produces far below the production 
frontier consistent with its investment funding. 
The financial resources used to support poorly performing enterprises are collected 
from efficient enterprises, often without compensation, This not only exhausts the 
resources of efficient enterprises, it also dampens their incentive to make "constructive 
destruction" (Schumpeter 1934), a process in which products, technology and 
management are improved. The output of state enterprises under soft budget constraint 
will, then, tend to expand through an increase in inputs rather than through 
technological progress, improvement of technical efficiency and the development of 
new products. ^ ^ 
Technical inefficiency caused by a soft budget constraint manifests in two ways. 
First, enterprises expand their capital stock at an unusually fast rate. For any individual 
enterprise, govemment resources are easy to obtain, without cost and nearly 
inexhaustible. In attempting to exceed the production quotas assigned by govemment,^^ 
enterprises tend to rely on new capital, and leading to excessive expansion of their 
capital stock. 
Second, a large number of enterprises continue to operate at a loss. The 
government props up loss-making enterprises, which are thus able to survive short-term 
fmancial difficulties as well as long-term economic losses. 
Sofi Budget Constraint and the Economy 
A soft budget constraint accounts for a number of economic phenomena unique to 
centrally planned economies. The most notable of these are firstly a shortage of goods 
and services, and secondly the distorted behaviour of both buyers and sellers in the 
marketplace. 
Komai argued strongly that in centrally planned economies shortage is not 
exclusively a consequence of human error in the planning or implementation process. 
'^Refer to Komai (1986b) for an empirical study of the relationship between allocation of govemment 
fmancial assistance and the performance of recipients in Hungary and former Yugoslavia. 
^^Komai argues that the failure to develop new products is the most 'important' consequence of 
shortage and the outstanding feature of the market in centrally planned economies (Jutta-Pietsch, 1982, 
p. 107). 
2®Output maximisation is another type of state enterprise behaviour. It is discussed later in the chapter. 
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Neither is it due to supply side factors — such as low levels of development, backward 
technology or explicidy distorted market prices (Jutta-Pietsch 1982). It stems rather 
from the systematic and distorted behaviour of state enterprises. 
Aggregate demand becomes almost "insatiable" in a system in which every 
enterprise is clamouring for economic resources. There is, of course, a limit on supply, 
and hence persistent excess demand is a feature of centrally planned economies. The 
shortage of goods and services creates and reinforces the expectation of future 
shortages, leading to the hoarding of goods and productive factors by enterprises. 
Shortage generates shortage, and the price mechanism becomes ineffective in clearing 
excess demand even in the long run. The expansion of enterprises continues until it hits 
the resource constraint, at which point the economy reaches a "resource-constrained 
equilibrium". This is the point at which the economy is characterised by a permanent 
shortage of goods and services at any feasible price level. Komai (1980) showed that 
this equilibrium is sustainable in the long run, given a soft budget constraint and some 
other assumptions. 
In centrally planned economies, shortage results in distorted behaviour among 
buyers and sellers in the marketplace. Since prices are often fixed by govemment, 
shortage leads first to the rationing of goods and services. This creates a seller's 
market: sellers are always in the stronger position and dominate transactions. Since 
there are few or no altemative suppliers, buyers have to make various (non-price) 
concessions in order to secure a source of supply. Consequentiy, long queuing in the 
marketplace and the hoarding of input stock in factories^^ are common. 
Soft Budget Constraint as an Institutional Problem 
Komai (1980) stated that the prevalence of the soft budget constraint in centrally 
planned economies is explained by the unique institutional relationship of govemment 
with state enterprises defined under existing law. He contended that, so long as this 
relationship remained intact, the problems associated with a soft budget constraint 
would continue and enterprises would operate inefficiently. 
In a centrally planned economy, the state is the owner of enterprises by law. 
Govemment operates and controls all aspects of state enterprises on behalf of the state, 
including planning, investment, production, management of input factors and 
marketing. Under this definition, the govemment is like a protective father or patron 
while the enterprise is like a child or client (Komai 1986b, p. 8). The govemment is 
^^Some economists have offered different explanations for the hoarding of inputs, such as 
mismanagement of the planning system. For example Linz and Martin (1982) interpreted the high 
level of inventory as being a safety factor to counteract uncertain supply. Ericson (1983) argued that it 
was a result of centralised decision making. The problem starts, according to Ericson, when inputs are 
not delivered in the right proportion. The planner does not have the information to adapt the plan to 
the changing environment and fuins are not allowed to exchange resources among themselves. As a 
result, some inputs sit idle and accumulate. 
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legaUy obliged to ensure that state enterprises survive at aU costs, and thus has 
difficulty in rejecting requests for additional resources even from loss-making or debt-
ridden enterprises. Komai (1980) calls this attitude — common among socialist 
governments and consistent with socialist principles — "patemalism". A soft budget 
constraint is simply the product of a patemalistic relationship. 
Economists have argued that the business objective of state enterprises in a 
centrally planned economy is to maximise physical output rather than profit. It can be 
proved in theory that an enterprise producing at the equilibrium of maximum output 
could be economically inefficient and making a loss. This business objective is explained 
by the pattern of govemment behaviour (Porte 1969), which requires enterprises to 
produce as much as possible in order to achieve output targets. Only under-fulfilment 
of the quota incurs a penalty. 
It has been argued that the link between the fulfilment of the output quota and 
benefits to managers (promotion and bonuses) encourages enterprises to maximise their 
output. This implies that the problems associated with soft budget constraint would 
disappear if profit rather than output was the yardstick for rewarding managers. 
While agreeing that state enterprises maximise physical output, Komai (1980) 
disagreed that this was the primary cause of inefficiency. Komai maintained that state 
enterprises maximise output not simply in passive response to govemment directives, 
but rather as a voluntary action under a soft budget constraint (pp. 318-9). It is 
govemment toleration of high production costs and economic losses (soft constraint) 
— the other side of govemment behaviour — that induces state enterprises to target 
output, resulting in inefficiency. 
Komai (1980) argued that soft budget constraint could still be a source of 
inefficiency even in profit maximising enterprises. He pointed out that material 
incentives do not guarantee that managers wiU run their enterprises efficientiy. If the 
budget constraint is soft, incentives wiU simply induce managers to realise additional 
profit by using more resources. Profit maximisation is, therefore, a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic efficiency. 
Implications for Reform Policies 
The situation in pre-reform China was similar to that modelled by Komai: productive 
factors and input materials were allocated by govemment at administratively 
determined prices; all profit was collected by the govemment through a profit 
submission system; and investment funds were allocated through a state budgetary 
grant system and determined through a bargaining process conducted by state 
enterprises and the relevant govemment planning agency. The productivity of state 
enterprises showed little improvement in tiie two and half decades to 1978 (World 
Bank 1992a, p. xvi). Many of the phenomena predicted by Komai's model were clearly 
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present: a shortage of producer and consumer goods, for example, and a sellers' 
market. 
Based upon our analysis of the relationship between a soft budget constraint and 
technical and allocative efficiency, we can reasonably argue that the key to reform was 
to harden sufficiendy the budget constraint of state enterprises on the multiple fronts 
described by conditions S1-S5. 
The previous analysis also implies that, to improve their economic efficiency, the 
Chinese govemment needed to transform state enterprises into operationally 
independent and financially accountable entities. The govemment needed not only to 
change the prices of output, input materials and other productive factors, but more 
importantiy to alter both its own relationship with enterprises and the pricing rules to 
make budget constraint effective and binding. The cultivation of a profit-oriented 
business objective among state enterprises was another aspect of reform. To achieve 
this, the govemment needed to establish an incentive system that would encourage 
profit-oriented behaviour and economic efficiency. 
One way to the harden budget constraint is to marketise the trade of output, input 
materials and other productive factors. In a competitive market in particular there is no 
room for individual enterprises to bargain over prices. As far as the budget constraint is 
concerned, this is the case even when the market is subject to a degree of 
monopolisation. Intemational experience suggests that market competition raises the 
efficiency of enterprises and eliminates shortages of goods and services. The presence 
of altemative suppliers in the market forces enterprises to adopt advanced technology, 
reduce production costs and improve the quality of products, leading to overall 
improvements in efficiency and productivity. 
Qiina's experience in the reform of agriculture over the past one and half decades 
has proved that marketisation associated with appropriate institutional change is an 
effective way of improving producers' productivity and efficiency in agriculture (Lin 
1988, 1992; McMillan, Whalley and Zhu 1989; Fan 1991). However, the reform of 
industry is a far more complex task; a soft budget constraint, for example, was not an 
issue in the process of agricultural reform. 
The overview given in chapter 1 of reform of the industrial sector in the 1980s 
suggests that economic reform was not thorough going and that many causes of the 
soft budget constraint were not addressed. Notably, the govemment remained an 
important player in the transaction of important resources; labour and capital markets 
were not established; and state enterprises did not face a serious threat of bankruptcy. 
Other Sources of Inefficiency: A Brief Review of the Literature 
The primary objective of this thesis is to evaluate the impact of reform policies on the 
enterprise-specific technical and allocative efficiency of state enterprises. In the 
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estimation, it is critically important to specify the econometric model correctiy and to 
distinguish between the impact of reform measures and other factors on enterprise 
productivity. This section provides a brief review of the relevant literature to facilitate 
discussion of model specification and the estimation of efficiency. Of the many factors 
that can effect enterprise productivity, only the following are relevant to this study: 1) 
increasing returns to scale; 2) technical progress; 3) enterprise behaviour; and 4) market 
structure. 
If the production function is such that a proportionate increase in the vector of 
inputs would result in a more than proportionate increase in output, then the 
technology is said to have increasing returns to scale. This implies that an improvement 
in productivity can be realised simply by expanding the scale of the firm, if other factors 
remain constant. Increasing returns to scale is the technical reason for economies of 
scale. Productivity gain from larger scales is observable in agriculture (Junanker 1976) 
and manufacuiring industry (Pitt and Lee 1981; Weiss and Pascoe 1985; Shephard 
1972a, 1972b). 
In industrial economics, increasing returns to scale is an important source of 
productivity although, under certain conditions, it may lead to natural monopoly and 
hence allocative inefficiency (Hollas and Hereen 1982; Gollop and Karlsson 1978). In 
free market economies, govemment commonly attempts to regulate the electric power 
industry (Primeau 1977, 1978, 1985, 1986; Stevenson 1982; HoUas and Hereen 1982) 
and the airline industry (Sickle, Good and Johnson 1986) to exploit increasing returns 
to scale. 
Research on technical progress was pioneered by Solow (1957) and extended by 
Kendrick and Sato (1963), Diewert (1976), Jorgenson and Nishimizu (1978). The 
concept of technical progress has been widely applied to the industrial sector in many 
economies, including Australia (Gregory and James 1973), Tanzania (Shapiro and 
MuUer 1977) and China (Field 1983; Kuan Chen et al. 1988a; Kalirajan and Cao 1993). 
We should note that technical progress differs from change in technical efficiency. 
Conceptually, the former is defined as the gain in productivity achieved by adopting 
new technology and the latter as gain in productivity based on a given level of 
technology. In the production frontier framework, technical progress refers to a shift in 
the production frontier whereas variations in technical efficiency arise from change in 
observed output relative to a given frontier. 
The assumption of profit maximisation has been controversial since Berle and 
Means (1932). The most relevant theoretical hypothesis put forward against profit 
maximisation was Leibenstein's (1966, 1976, 1979) x-efficiency theory. In his theory, 
technical efficiency was caused by factors that cannot be explained in the neo-classical 
framework. 
37 
Non-profit-maximising behaviour also has theoretical implications for technical and 
allocative efficiency in market economies (Baumol 1959; Marris 1963; Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972; Jenson and Meckling 1979; Scitovsky 1943). In the empirical literature, 
economists have suggested that the following factors contribute to non-profit-
maximisation behaviour and thus inefficiency: ill-defined ownership- (Berle and Means 
1932; Levy 1981), an imperfect market (Alchian and Kessel 1962) and govemment 
regulation (Joskow 1974; Pustay 1978). 
Market structure or competition also has implications for technical and allocative 
efficiency. The efficiency loss arising from weakening competition may be due to 
protection for domestic firms-^ (Tyler 1979; Katrak 1980) or a monopolistic market 
structure associated with a high market concentration^-* (Carlsson 1972; Shephard 
1972a. 1972b). 
METHODOLOGY: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE LTTERATURE 
Conventionally, economists follow Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze (1966) in using the 
average production function approach to estimate a firm's productivity. The drawback 
to this approach is that some observations inevitably lie above the estimated production 
function. This contradict economic theory, in which production function is defined as 
the relationship between inputs and maximum output. The attempt to solve this 
problem led to the development of the production frontier approach, according to 
which all observations are enveloped under an estimated potential hyperplane.--^ 
Technical efficiency and allocative efficiency are therefore assessed against this 
potential hyperplane. 
Technical Efficiency 
In the application of Farrell's efficiencies, there are two main streams of work. Studies 
in the first stream, pioneered by .Aigner and Chu (1968) and added to by Afrait (1972), 
Richmond (1974) and others, tj'pically rely on linear or non-linear programming 
methods. The second stream, pioneered independentiy by .Aigner, LoveU and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), uses the stochastic frontier approach. 
Since the stochastic frontier approach is used in this thesis, only literature in the 
second stream is reviewed. Strictiy speaJdng, there are no theoretical grounds for 
choosing this approach over others. All are theoretically valid and empirically each has 
--The implications of ov^Tiership issues for firm efficiency is also discussed in Silkman and Young 
(1982), Shelton (1967), Pitt and Lee (1981), Monsen Oiiu and Cooley (1968). McEachem (1978). 
Newhouse (1973), Davis (1973). Junanker (1976), Timmer (1971), Bradley and Gelb (1981), Bruggink 
(1982), Gillis (1982), Page (1980) and Sterner (1990). 
--'See also Lecraw (1977,1978 and 1979), White (1979), Bergsman (1974) and McFetridge (1973). 
-^This is also discussed in Weiss and Pascoe (1985), McFetridge (1973). Katrak (1980) and Primeaux 
(1977, 1978. 1985. 1986). 
--In a single input case the h>perplane collapses into a curve. 
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its own advantages and disadvantages. The major consideration in selecting this 
approach was its stochastic property. The stochastic frontier approach makes 
allowances for the effects of factors not under the control of individual firms and as 
w e^ll is consistent with economic theory. Of course, this approach has its own 
limitations. First, we have to assume a specific production technology, and in doing so 
it is important to choose the appropriate production function. Second, we have to 
impose a specific distribution for (technical) inefficiency. The choice of distribution is 
somewhat arbitrary and again we have to ensure that the most appropriate one is 
chosen.-® 
According to Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck 
(1977), the realised production function can be written as follows: 
J = /(.v,P)exp(e) (2.3) 
or, in a log-linear form: 
J = x(3 + e (2.4) 
where e = v + w, y is output in logarithm, j is the vector of logarithm of input factors 
and (3 the corresponding vector of coefficients of the production frontier; v is a random 
variable and is distributed identically and independentiy as N(0, a j ) ; and u is also a 
random variable, which is non-negative and truncated at zero (u < 0). 
The production frontier is represented by: 
>' '=/(x,P)exp(v) (2.5) 
which is obviously stochastic due to the inclusion of the random variable v. Actual or 
realised output y in (2.4) must be smaller than y ' in (2.5) since u < 0. This means that 
output can never exceed the frontier in magnitude. It is therefore proposed that 
technical efficiency as defined earlier in this chapter be determined by the magnitude of 
u, which is the difference between actual and potential output levels. 
The distribution of u can be defined in a number of ways. Aigner, Lovell and 
Schmidt (1977) proposed a half-normal distribution for u, and Meeusen and Van den 
-^Similar concerns were raised in Schmidt and Lovell (1979, footnote 3). They believe that "the only 
real solution is to try various alternative distributions for u. and see which fits best". However, the 
practical difficulties of exhausting all possible one-sided distributions and deriving neat expressions 
for the calculation of inefficiency rates are obvious. In previous studies, Meeusen and Van den Broeck 
(1977) and .Aigner. Lovell and Schmidt (1977) provide explicit expressions for cases of exponential 
and half-normal distributions. 
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Broeck (1977) an exponential distribution. Following Aigner Lovell and Schmidt 
(1977) and Meeusen and Van de Broeck (1977), a number of empirical studies have 
estimated technical efficiency. For example, Kalirajan (1982) estimated the maximum 
yield of a set of Indian farms and calculated the difference between maximum and 
actual yields, and Van den Broeck, Broeckx and Kaufman (1987) and Van den Broeck 
(1988) estimated technical efficiency of Belgian manufacturing sector. 
Economists have offered various interpretations of u. In Aigner LoveU and Schmidt 
(1977) "any such deviation is the result of factors under the firm's control, such as 
technical and economic efficiency, the will and effort of the producer and his 
employees, and perhaps such factors as defective and damaged products" (p. 25).^^ The 
variable v is interpreted as being measurement error and factors extemal to the firm 
which cannot be controlled by the producer, such as luck, climate, machinery 
performance etc. These would seem to take place randomly and are exogenous to the 
production process. 
In this thesis, the variable w, representing technical efficiency, is interpreted slightly 
differently. The cross-sectional inter-firm variation of u and intra-firm variation of u 
over time are assumed to be influenced by institutional change taking place in the 
process of economic reform. More specifically, if economic reform has been successful, 
then the absolute value of u wiU approach zero and actual output >' wiU approach its 
potential, j ' ; if not, u will be away from zero. 
In another development, Stevenson (1980) relaxed the assumption that the 
distribution of w is a half normal and introduced the assumption of u being truncated at 
zero. In his model, the mean of the truncated distribution is determined by the 
estimation and is different from zero. 
The stochastic production frontier had one important unsolved problem: the value 
of the technical inefficiency of an individual firm could not be found. Jondrow et al. 
(1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) independentiy developed methods for estimating 
firm-specific technical efficiency. Kalirajan and Flinn used a more general homothetic 
translog functional form to approximate production technology. This estimation of 
firm-specific technical efficiency was based on a conditional expectation of u, given e. 
They considered the case in which u had a half-normal distribution (truncated at zero). 
Following Kalirajan and Flinn's formulation, the technical efficiency for the 
enterprise can be estimated as:^^ 
""^Other interpretations are offered in Aigner and Chu (1968), and Timmer (1971). There is not much 
difference in essence between these interpretations and that of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and 
I w l l therefore not list them here. 
'^Note the firm-specific efficiency ( u j is defmed as non-positive, which is not the case in equation 
(2.5). 
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EW'Ku^ + V.)] = _ l - i _ ] (2.6) 
a a V l - r 
where / ( • ) and are the standard normal density and distribution function 
evaluated at 
+ V, 
1 - r 
However, it should be noted that since the total disturbance term (w + v_) contains only 
imperfect information about the one-sided disturbance {u), it has some intrinsic 
variability and is, therefore, not statistically consistent (Waldman 1984). 
The above-mentioned studies were based on cross-sectional data. The availability of 
panel data containing both time-series and cross-sectional dimensions invoked interest 
among economists modelling the behaviour of technical efficiency over time. Studies in 
this group include Pitt and Lee (1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Battese, Coelli and 
Colby (1989), Comwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990). As these 
models are closely related to my own modelling, I will discuss them further in the 
relevant context (chapter 5). 
Allocative Efficiency 
The estimation of allocative efficiency is based on the first order condition derived from 
equation (2.1). Under the assumption of profit maximisation, the production process is 
said to be allocatively efficient only if it satisfies the first order conditions: 
p ( y ) x M x ) = C, (x ,w) f o r a l U (2.7) 
(x) / f^ {x) = C, {x, w) / c . {x, w) for all k and ; (2.8) 
where f,,{x) and f j { x ) are respectively the marginal product of factors k and j, 
and Cj(x,w) are respectively the marginal cost of using factors k and j, p{y) 
is the price of the product, and the left-hand side of equation (2.7) is the marginal value 
product of factor k. 
If product and factor markets are perfectly competitive or the economic institution is 
such that the prices of both output and input factors are determined exogenously to the 
firm, then the marginal cost of factors is equal to the price paid for the factor. Then, in 
this case: 
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= foralU (2.9) 
A / f j = / w for all k and j (2.10) 
where w^ and w^ . are respectively the prices of factors k and j. 
Based on these conditions, the production process is said to be allocatively inefficient 
if equations (2.7) and (2.8) do not hold exactiy in general circumstances and equations 
(2.9) and (2.10) do not hold exactly when prices are determined exogenously to the firm. 
These equations therefore become the starting point of any econometric model for the 
analysis of allocative efficiency, no matter how sophisticated the econometric techniques 
used. 
However, the method of estimation differs substantially in the literature according to 
the assumptions made about the behavioural objective of the firm and market structure. 
Profit maximisation is usually an appropriate behavioural assumption for agriculture and 
manufacturing industry in free market economies. If this assumption holds and input and 
output markets are competitive, then we can use either the primal approach to define a 
production function frontier or follow the dual approach to define a profit frontier based 
on duality theory (McFadden 1971). A set of first order conditions will then be consistent 
with the maximum possible level of profit Allocative inefficiency, defined as profit that is 
less than the maximum level, is expressed as the degree of departure from first order 
conditions. 
Either a single equation approach or a simultaneous equation system can be used in 
the estimation. Following the former method, we first estimate the production or profit 
frontier. We then apply the estimates of the production or profit frontier coefficients and 
the input-output price ratio to the first order conditions to calculate allocative efficiency 
(Kalirajan and Shand 1982b). This method is straightforward and easy to use. 
Alternatively, we can use a simultaneous equation system to estimate technical and 
allocative efficiency jointiy (Lau and Yotopolous 1971; Yotopolous and Lau 1973; 
Kalirajan 1986, 1990; Kumbhakar 1987a). In study of a profit-maximiser in a competitive 
market, the latter approach has clear advantages: the problem of simultaneous equation 
bias can be avoided, and statistical tests on model specifications can easily be carried out. 
It is, moreover, possible to derive supply and demand functions conditional on technical 
and allocative efficiency. These provide useful information about the effects of efficiency 
on supply of output and demand for inputs. 
However, even in a well-developed free market economy the profit maximisation 
assumption is often found to be inappropriate for industries that are subject to strict 
govemment regulation on output and/or output prices, for example, electrical power 
generation (Schmidt and Lovell 1979, 1980), railroad transportation (Kumbhakar 1987b, 
1988), and civil aviation (Sickle, Good and Johnson 1986). In such cases, cost 
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minimisation, a less restrictive assumption, can be adopted in the for empirical estimation. 
As before, either a single equation or simultaneous equation method and either a primal 
or dual approach can be used. Although the simultaneous equation system again exhibits 
various advantages (Schmidt and LoveU 1979, 1980; Kumbhakar 1987b, 1988, 1990), it 
is not possible this time to derive a supply function. 
DATA 
Table 2 Distribution of Enterprises in the Sample 
Industry Number of Enterprises 
Petrochemicals 4 
Coal Products 5 
Industrial Chemicals 18 
Unidentified 1 
Construction Materials 12 
Ferrous Metal Melting and Forging 7 
Non-ferrous Metal Melting and Forging 7 
Metal Products 9 
Machinery 57 
Transport Vehicles 15 
Electric Machinery 14 
Electronics & Communications Equipment 17 
Measuring Instruments & Apparatus 8 
Food 12 
Soft Drink 8 
Tobacco 5 
Animal Feed 1 
Textiles 26 
Qothing 5 
Leather Products 6 
Wood & and Bamboo Products 6 
Furniture 2 
Paper Products 7 
Printing 10 
Sports Equipment 3 
Handicrafts 1 
Phaniiaceutical 10 
Chemical Fibres 5 
Rubber Products 7 
Plastic Products 8 
Total 296 
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In this thesis, we use survey data on 296 manufacturing enterprises collected by the 
State Statistics Bureau of China in 1989. The survey consisted of two questionnaires: 
one containing questions about the management of enterprises and eliciting responses 
from managers about various reform policies; the other asking for comprehensive 
quantitative information about factor and material inputs, output, revenue, expenditure, 
profit. The former questionnaire is used in this thesis to evaluate the impact of 
economic reform, while the latter provides a basis both for policy analysis and the 
estimation of efficiency. The quantitative data are for 1980 and 1984-88. 
Enterprises in the sample are located in six cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan in 
Hubei province, Chongqing in Sichuan province, Guangzhou in Guangdong province 
and Shenyang in Liaoning province. While the wide geographical dispersion of the 
localities complicates the analysis, it also provides opportunities to examine inter-
regional differences in the efficiency of state enterprises. 
Of the 296 enterprises, 182 are classified as large and the rest as medium-sized 
enterprises. The enterprises belong to 30 industrial sectors: 13 classified as heavy 
industry and 17 as light The distribution of enterprises by industry is shown in Table 2. 
These data will be used in the following chapters to analyse the effect of economic 
reforms in China on the efficiency with which state enterprises have operated through 
the 1980s. 
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3 Market Reform and Market Competition 
It was argued in chapter 2 that the development of a goods market and market 
competition are important factors in improving the technical and allocative efficiency of 
state enterprises. This chapter describes how a goods market was developed in China and 
discusses the effects of goods market reform on state enterprise behaviour. i 
In China, market reform of state enterprises has been a complex and somewhat 
"mishmash" process (Ishihara 1987), probably because of the lack of a blueprint for 
reform in the very beginning. As a description of the process of market reform is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, I wiU not provide a comprehensive summary of the reform 
process here. Rather I will investigate 1) whether the state monopoly did indeed decline 
and the goods market become more competitive in the 1980s, and 2) whether state 
enterprises adapted to market competition by changing their behaviour in the way profit 
maximising firms would have. 
Marketisation constituted an unprecedented attempt by the Chinese government to 
reform state enterprises. Enormous controversy surrounded market reform in terms of its 
theoretical justification, policy making and implementation. Debates among economists 
influenced to a great extent the way market reform was carried out and it is important to 
provide some background of this. 
PRICE DETERMINATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODFTIES IN 
THE PRE-REFORM ERA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
In achieving market reform of state enterprises in a centrally planned economy, the core 
issues are decentralisation of price determination and breaking down the monopoly of 
the state. In the decades preceding economic reform, though Chinese economists 
debated the theory of price determination, there was little relationship between theory 
and practice. It should be noted that "price" referred exclusively to the price of goods, 
namely output of products, and raw materials and intermediate inputs. Interest payments 
on capital and wages, two important factors of production, received little attention. 
China experienced nearly three decades of centralised price determination before the 
reform process began in 1978. Prior to 1984, centrahsed price determination was never 
seriously questioned by Chinese economists. Discussion focused rather on how to create 
a sector-specific formula which would best serve the growth of the economy, without 
regard to the interaction of demand and supply in the marketplace. Although various 
I^n the thesis the term "administrative price" and "planned price" are used interchangeably. 
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theoretical formulae were proposed by academics, the practice of price determination 
was free of any theoretical foundation (Guo 1992). 
Major theoretical debates on the determination of the price of goods developed over 
four distinct periods (Xing Junfang 1985): 1956-1957, 1959-1964, 1977-1983 and post-
1984. During the first three periods, economists almost unanimously stuck by the 
Marxist labour theory of value, in which the value of a commodity is determined by the 
amount of 'socially necessary labour' used to create it, independently of the interaction 
of supply and demand. Discussion of price determination in the first period focused on 
the methodology of transforming the value of labour into price of goods. In the second 
period, the emphasis was on whether and how the charge for using capital should be 
incorporated into the price of goods.^ In the third period, discussion again focused on 
the technicality of the formulation of centrally planned prices based upon the labour 
theory of value. Hsu (1991) pointed out that "whatever the method of profit and price 
determination, the resultant prices are not market-clearing prices; they are a type of 
'cost-plus' price in which demand does not affect the rate of profit and prices" (p. 
148).3 
Real change in economists' views of price determination took place in 1983-84, 
when the effects of demand on commodity prices were discussed for the first time. 
However, as most (mainly veteran) economists were not prepared to give up the labour 
theory of value as the theoretical foundation for price determination, the dominant view 
was still that market price was a goal of long-term reform rather than an immediate 
concern. It was not until 1986 that theoreticians began to focus increasingly upon the 
market demand-supply mechanism in price determination, and it was not until 1988 that 
Zili Liu (1988) openly proposed complete abandonment of planned prices in favour of 
market-determined prices. 
In practice, price determination before 1983 had littie relevance to any of the models 
suggested by academics in the first three periods. Guo (1992) found that the Chinese 
government used four criteria in determining commodity prices in the pre-reform era: the 
model cost method; the deduction method; the individual factories' actual cost method; 
and historical price data. According to Guo (1992, pp. 50-1): 
The first method, model cost, was based on model firms, believed to be 
representative of all firms producing the same products. Their average production 
costs were computed as the basis for pricing. Profits per unit of product were 
calculated in relation to cost or capital. The second method, deduction, was used 
to find producer and procurement prices by deducting distribution costs and trade 
profits from retail prices. The third method, actual costs of individual factories, 
was applied to new products and those manufactured by only a few factories. 
According to this method, prices were determined primarily at the experimental 
^This debate was quite short-lived. Sun Yefang, the leading economist in this debate, was persecuted due 
to his view that a charge should apply to the use of capital. 
^Yu Guangyuan (1986) also complained that the discussion had been misdirected. 
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costs level, and also by the actual costs of a particular enterprise; this type of 
price could be cut when production costs fell. The fourth method, employed 
mainly for the purpose of adjusting prices, used historical prices as a basis. 
'Historical prices' referred to the price prevailing between 1930 and 1936, a 
period of relative price stability ... This method was regarded as the simplest, and 
was used to determine the price level of many daily staples between 1950 and 
1953. 
The government used a different method or combination of methods for pricing 
different commodities. For example, the price of coal was determined largely according 
to the historical price method; the price of cotton according to a combination of 
deduction and historical price methods; the price of steel initially according to the 
historical price method and later according to the costs of large steel mills (model 
method); and the price of bicycles according to either the experimental or actual costs of 
individual factories. 
In the pre-reform period, the planning system determined the pricing of all industrial 
goods; industry was virtually monopolised by governments at the central, provincial, 
prefectural or county levels."^ Industrial output was defined either as being "materials and 
equipment" (wuzi) or "commodities" (shangpin). The former were those goods 
distributed among state enterprises, while commodities (shangpin) were distributed to 
non-state sectors and consumers.^ The former were thus the equivalent of producer 
goods, while the latter included consumer and some producer goods.^ Prior to economic 
reform, both types of goods were included in the comprehensive planning system 
administered by the State Planning Commission but were distributed through different 
channels. Generally speaking, materials and equipment (wuzi) were distributed through 
wholesale stations operated by the State Bureau of Materials and Equipment and 
through the networks of the State Council's ministries of industry. Commodities were 
distributed to urban consumers through the wholesale stations of the Ministry of 
Commerce and to rural consumers through the National Supply and Marketing 
^Some state enterprises are under the control of provincial, prefectural and county governments. 
^During the course of economic reform, the definition of "commodity" changed significantly. According 
to Stalinist theory, producer goods exchanged among state enterprises were not to be viewed as 
"commodities" as they belonged to one owner both before and after the exchange. This is in contrast to 
market exchange, which took place between two owners (Zhou Shulian 1982). Producer goods were 
therefore classified as "materials and equipment". According Stalinist theory, the market-based 
mechanism of price determination was incompatible with the exchange of producer goods among state 
enterprises. However, since the economic reform, enterprises of various kinds — such as township and 
village enterprises, private enterprises and joint ventures — have emerged and trade between state and 
non-state enterprises has become increasingly important to the economy. The distinction between 
"materials and equipment" (wuzi) and "commodities" became blurred, then irrelevant. At the same time 
economists advocated abandoning the distinction between "materials and equipment" and 
"commodities" (Sun, Chen and Zhang 1979), although the term wuzi, equivalent to producer goods, is 
still in use. 
I^t should be noted that some goods were classified as both wuzi and shangpin. For example, coal used 
by enterprises and for production purposes was classified as wuzi whereas coal used by residents for such 
purposes as cooking and heating was classified as shangpin. 
47 
Cooperative and its networks. Since economic reform, some producer goods have been 
supplied to wholesale stations of the Ministry of Commerce by the State Bureau of 
Materials and Equipment. This leakage was due to the emergence of non-state 
enterprises in rural and urban areas.'^ 
There were three categories of wuzi and shangpin according to their importance to 
the economy. Goods in category 1 for "materials and equipment" {tongyi fenpei wuzi) 
were produced and distributed under the unified central planning, supervised by the 
State Planning Commission. The State Bureau of Materials and Equipment prepared the 
balance charts and undertook distribution planning for goods in this category. These 
goods mainly comprised vital raw materials and machinery, such as energy, ferrous and 
nonferrous metal products, major industrial chemicals, some construction materials, 
power machinery and metalworking machinery. Goods in category 2 were known as 
"materials and equipment distributed by the ministries of industry of the central 
govemment" {zhongyang ge gongyebu fenpei wuzi). Included in this category were 
specialised production and capital goods, such as spinning equipment distributed by the 
Ministry of Textile Industry, coalmining machinery distributed by the Ministry of Coal 
Industry and ferrous alloys and coke distributed by the Ministry of Metallurgical 
Industry. Other goods feU into category 3, called "materials and equipment managed 
locally" (difang guanli wuzi). These goods were managed and distributed by 
corporations and departments of provincial, prefectural and county governments. Prior 
to economic reform, goods in categories 1 and 2 totalled 837, and there were over 1,000 
items in category 3.^ The entire process of the production, purchasing and supply of 
major wuzi items was centrally planned, and prices were centrally fixed. Production and 
distribution of materials and equipment in category 1, which were considered to be 
fundamental to the entire economy, took place under the auspices of the State Bureau of 
Materials and Equipment. According to Ishihara (1987), central control of these goods 
was the backbone of the planning system. 
Commodities {shangpin) also feU into three major categories. Commodities in 
category 1 were controlled by the ministries and commissions of the State Council and 
were distributed under the state monopoly on trade {tonggou tongxiao). They comprised 
goods vital to the national economy and the people's livelihood, such as edible oil, 
cotton, cotton yam, cotton fabric, gasoline, diesel and coal, etc. Commodities in 
category 2 were those necessary for agricultural production and the people's livelihood. 
"^Refer to Ishihara (1987) for an explanation of the functions of distribution channels. 
^In the early years of the People's Republic, the central govemment planning was limited in scope. For 
example, only eight items were centrally distributed in the early 1950s, namely steel, lumber, coal, 
cement, refmed soda, copper, machine tools and hemp bags. This number increased dramatically as 
centralisation took hold and as the economy became more complex. There is controversy with respect to 
the exact number of goods allocated under central planning. For example, Naughton (1990, pp. 745-6) 
argued that the central planner typically allocated about 200, and never as many as 600, goods before 
economic reform. The difference may stem from disagreement about the defmition of central planning; 
only goods in category 1 is included in Naughton's calculation. 
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They included many crops and agricultural by-products, fertilisers, durables such as 
sewing machines and bicycles, and medicines. Commodities in category 2 were 
distributed under the monopoly purchase (tonggou) and exclusive sale {baoxiao) system. 
Other commodities fell into category 3. Included in this category were fish, fruit and 
household necessities. In the late 1970s, the state plan covered 256 commodities in all 
three categories. The distribution of commodities was managed either by the central 
govemment or by local governments. However, the prices of commodities in all 
categories were uniformly determined by the central govemment. 
MARKET REFORM AND THE MARKETISATION OF STATE ENTERPRISES 
Market reform suggests not only that the govemment monopoly over the trade of goods 
will be dismantled or weakened but also that a truly competitive market will become the 
dominant institution for the trade of goods and economic resources. In the Chinese 
context, dismantling of the govemment monopoly implies that the right of price 
determination devolves to state as well as non-state enterprises, and that there is a 
decrease in the degree of govemment control over the distribution and trade of goods in 
the economy. Development of a truly competitive market implies an adjustment in the 
behaviour of economic agents so that enterprises aim to maximise profits, and a decrease 
in govemment market intervention so that resources are allocated with minimum 
distortion. For state enterprises specifically, marketisation can be understood to involve 
an increase in both output and inputs allocated through the market system, and a decUne 
in quotas and in the degree of govemment intervention in the production and trade of 
inputs and output. 
Theory and Method of Price Reform 
According to Tian, Chen and Lu (1986), prices have three major functions in economic 
theory: to serve as a unit for accounting; to act as an instmment of income distribution; 
and to facilitate resource allocation through the market mechanism. In pre-reform China, 
prices had the first two functions but were of little use in resource allocation.^ The 
income distribution function of price was a reflection of political rather than economic 
considerations, while the function of resource allocation was more closely associated 
with economic considerations. Thus the administratively determined price was unlikely 
to reflect accurately either the scarcity of a resource or the demand-supply situation, and 
thus was economically irrational. The purpose of price reform was to strengthen the 
resource allocation function of price and to weaken that of the income distribution 
function (Tian, Chen and Lu 1986; Zhang Weiying 1985; Liu Guoguang 1986). Liu 
further states that "the price structure would no longer be merely an accounting tool or 
^This is true not only for China but also for other centrally planned economies such as the former Soviet 
Union (Wilczynski 1972). 
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an mstniment for the distribution of national income but, rather, a measure of economic 
efficiency, a means of stimulating technical advances and a gauge of both supply and 
demand to guide the allocation of national resources" (Liu 1986, p. 16). 
Although most economists agreed that the pricing system was economically 
irrational, they disagreed widely on how to reform it. Depending on their views on price 
reform, economists were of three types (Guo 1992): "centralists", "administrative 
decentralists"io and "market reformers", These groups argued intensively about such 
issues as the function of price, principles of price-setting, new methods of pricing, agents 
of price determination. 
Centralists contended that planning was essential to the Chinese economy and that 
the market should play a supplementary role (Xu et al. 1982). According to them 
commodity prices had two major functions: to serve as an accounting unit, and to act as 
an instrument of income distribution. They therefore proposed that prices be set 
according to average production costs. They insisted on the necessity for fixed prices to 
be determined by the central government, although they agreed that prices were not 
sufficientiy rational at that time and needed "adjustment". 
Administrative decentralists believed that the primary functions of prices were 
resource allocation and income distribution, but said that the price of a commodity 
should be set according to its cost of production rather than the supply-demand 
situation. While they thought that centralised price determination had resulted in 
inefficiencies, they were sceptical about market forces as an altemative (Tian, Chen and 
Lu 1986; Wang and Wang 1986). They suggested that prices be determined jointiy by 
the central government, local govemments and enterprises, with the reformed price 
being allowed to float within a specified range. Their proposal for price reform was thus 
a combination of "adjustment" and "liberalisation". 
Market reformers believed that resource allocation alone was the economically 
meaningful function of price. They were mainly concemed with the economic efficiency 
of resource allocation and felt that the central pricing authority was a poor instrument 
for rationalising the pricing system (Hua et al. 1985; Zhang Weiying 1985). The price of 
goods, according to this group, should be completely liberalised and determined freely 
by enterprises based upon market supply and demand. Chen et al. (1987) went even 
further, suggesting that all factors of production, including labour and capital, be 
marketised. 
found that administrative decentralists tended to be those economists who were involved in the 
central government policy making process. They were aware of the operational difficulties of regulating 
and fixing a large number of commodity prices. 
^^  Market reformers were mainly young economists working in the Economic Structure Reform 
Commission and its research institute. 
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Development of Goods Markets 
Market development in China since 1978 has been a complex process involving a 
gradual decrease in government control over the distribution of both wuzi and shangpin 
accompanied by increasing decentraUsation of price determination. From the 
distributional point of view, there were at least three important domestic factors which 
jointly contributed to the development of a goods market in the Chinese e c o n o m y . 
These were 1) establishment of a large number of non-govemmental enterprises, 
including township and village enterprises in rural areas, collective and private 
enterprises in urban areas, and enterprises funded or joindy funded by foreign capital; 2) 
the expansion of enterprises owned and operated by local authorities; and 3) the 
marketisation of existing state enterprises. 
Township and village enterprises operated outside the planning system. They reUed 
almost entirely on the market for the sale of products and the purchase of inputs. They 
had to compete on the goods market not only among themselves but also with state and 
other enterprises. The growth of this set of enterprises was particularly strong in the 
1980s. The industrial output value of township and village enterprises increased twelve-
fold from 43.4 billion yuan in 1979 to 524.4 billion yuan in 1989 — an annual growth 
rate of 28.3 per cent. As a result, the share of township and village enterprises in 
industrial output increased from 9 per cent in 1979 to 23.8 per cent in 1989. Byrd and 
Lin (1990) indicated that it was these enterprises that shaped the course of marketisation 
in the 1980s. Township and village enterprises were joined by another two groups of 
non-govemmental enterprises, namely enterprises funded or joindy funded by foreign 
capital and private enterprises in urban areas. These enterprises still have a relatively 
small share of industrial output. The emergence and rapid development of township and 
village enterprises and other enterprises contributed to the breakdown of the state 
monopoly over the trade of industrial goods. 
The expansion of enterprises owned and operated by provincial, prefectural and 
county govemments was another major factor in the development of a competitive 
goods market in China. Before economic reform these enterprises were simply one part 
of a comprehensive planning system. Distribution of inputs and output was provided for 
by the planning system either at the central level (mainly for shangpin in categories 1 and 
2) or at the local level (for shangpin in category 3), and the prices of all products were 
typically centrally determined. Following economic reform, two important changes made 
it possible for these enterprises to operate outside the state planning system. The first of 
these was that the central govemment handed over the power to collect taxes to local 
governments, which were allowed to retain a certain proportion. This change greatly 
strengthened the financial capability of local govemments and created an incentive for 
'^Reform of the international trade system also helps to establish a competitive market. In this thesis, 
however, I will not address the trade issue. 
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them to capitalise on the new system by setting up enterprises in their own jurisdictions. 
These newly established enterprises operated outside of the central planning system. The 
second change was the privatisation of the commercial sector, which began in 1982. The 
locally and privately owned commercial and service sector grew rapidly after that. The 
World Bank (1992a, p. 45) reported that 74 per cent of state-owned commercial and 
service companies had been sold or leased to private owners by 1985. At the same time, 
more autonomy was delegated to other state-owned retailers. Under the new system, 
state-owned retailers were given the power to decide their own sources of supply of 
goods at a price they deemed acceptable. With this reform, products from enterprises 
financed by local govemments could be distributed independently of central planning and 
compete on the market against goods produced by state enterprises and other local and 
private enterprises. These local enterprises contributed significantly to market 
competition. In some cases competition became fairly intense, as happened, for example 
during the textile price war of the 1980s. There has also been intense competition in the 
machinery market since 1981. 
Market reform of the state sector was characterised by a reduction in the number of 
goods (both wuzi and shangpin) covered by central planning, substitution of a guidance 
quota for the mandatory quota on many items within the central plan, the granting to 
state enterprises of the right to sell their excess output independently after filling the 
government q u o t a . A s a result of these reforms and the surge in non-state enterprises, 
state control over economic resources declined significantly. 
Although official statistics do not provide any systematic information about central 
planning, the information available in various publications suggests that a growing 
number of goods was being traded outside the planning system. For example, by 1985 
the proportion of coal and steel being distributed by the central govemment had fallen to 
less than 50 per cent, cement to less than 20 per cent and lumber to 40 per cent (Ishihara 
1990, p. 292); in 1986, producer goods (wuzi) under central govemment control had 
fallen to 60 per cent of total output (Yan Tao in People's Daily, 12 June 1987). The 
number of wuzi items covered by central planning fell from nearly 2,000 in the 1970s to 
120 in 1986, and this had declined further to 60 by the end of 1986. Consequently, the 
share of gross industrial output {wuzi and shangpin combined) controlled by the state 
decreased from 40 to 20 per cent in 1986. Similarly the number of centrally distributed 
"commodities" {shangpin) also fell after economic reform. The number of commodities 
distributed by the state fell from 256 to 20 and the number managed by the Ministry of 
Commerce from 188 to 23 in 1986 (Guo 1992, p. 116). With their newly obtained 
autonomy to sell above-quota output on the market, state enterprises were exposed to 
Refer to Naughton (1990) for details on the change of govemment policy. 
52 
market competition from state and non-state enterprises. Byrd (1988) argues that in 
1985 the Chinese economy was "well on its way toward becoming an economy where 
the allocation of goods [was] determined primarily by the market, rather than by 
directive plans and administrative controls". 
As the preceding analysis suggests, the degree of marketisation of state enterprises 
depends greatly on the nature of goods produced and the sector enterprises belonged to. 
Ishihara (1990, p. 295) found that the govemment has developed a diversified system of 
multiple trading methods since 1980. Under the new system many but not all goods were 
subject to market trading. There were four methods for purchasing goods: 1) purchases 
and sales using the state monopoly system (tonggou tongxiao); 2) planned state 
purchases (jihua shougou); 3) purchases by order (dinggou); and 4) selective purchases 
(xuangou). The first method, the same as that used before the reform, applied to 11 
goods including cotton yam, cotton fabric and oil. State enterprises producing theses 
goods were not allowed to sell any of their output on the market. The second method 
applied to 24 goods, including sugar, cigarettes, chemical fibres, woollen fabrics, silk 
fabrics, towels, wool yam, rubber shoes, matches, soup, pencils, watches and bicycles. 
State enterprises were allowed to sell excess output on the market after filling their 
quota. The third method covered 18 commodities, including powdered milk, brand name 
wine and liquors, sewing needles, spirits, wines, fabric shoes, aluminium pots and 
television sets. State distribution commercial agents usually negotiate a contract with 
producers to purchase these goods. The last method applied to commodities in category 
3. Trade in these commodities was regulated solely by demand and supply. 
Reform of the centralised price-setting regime can be divided into three stages (Guo 
1992). In the first stage (1979-82), price reform was achieved through the "adjustment 
method". In 1979, after the third Plenary Session of the 11th Communist Party 
Congress, the govemment decided to raise average procurement prices for farm 
products by 24.8 per cent {People's Daily, 25 October 1979; Guo 1992, p. 36), as well 
as the retail prices of selected farm products, and the prices of coal, mineral products, 
and iron and steel. The govemment also decided to allow the price of some electronic 
products to float within a predetermined price range {Economic Daily 18 January 1983). 
The second stage (1982-84) was characterised by a mixture of "adjustment and 
liberalisation" of goods in three categories (Guo 1992).!^ The adjustment method was 
applied to the price of goods in category 1 and liberalisation to goods in categories 2 and 
3. According to Dong Furen (1987, p. 297) the prices of 100 minor commodities were 
determined by enterprises early on in this stage. In 1982 the State Council approved the 
'•^ In some cases, state enterprises did not voluntarily seek this power. Rather they were forced to sell on 
the market when the govemment failed to honour its purchasing commitment. Many state enterprises 
producing machinery, for example, faced this sinjation in 1981 (Tidrick and Chen 1987). 
i^See Wei and Chao (1982, p. 317) and Ishihara (1987) for a more detailed listing of commodities in 
these three categories. 
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"Report on the Gradual Relaxation of Control over Prices of Minor Commodities" and 
gave permission for prices to be determined by the market. With this policy change came 
substantially decentralised price determination. According to Price: Theory and Practice 
(1983, p. 43) the prices of 163 types of commodities were virtually determined by 
enterprises in 1982 and price control over another 350 types of commodities was 
abandoned in 1983. In October 1984, the govemment endorsed the "Policy of 
Completely Abolishing Control over Prices of Minor Commodities". This liberalisation 
of the centralised pricing regime enabled many enterprises to set prices for their goods. 
However, even though the govemment authorised enterprises to set prices for most light 
and textile commodities in category 2 and virtually all commodities in category 3, Guo 
(1992, p. 37) argues that the state still played "a primary role in price determination", 
allocating large blocks of goods at this time. 
The third stage in price reform (1984-86) followed the announcement in 1984 of the 
"Ten Regulations for Decentralisation of Autonomy to State Enterprises". These 
regulations officially delegated to enterprises the right to trade and set prices for output 
above the production quota. Initially, prices were allowed to float within 20 per cent of 
the official price. This limit was abolished in 1985. At the same time, the prices of all 
commodities in category 2 gradually became subject to market determination. 
Enterprises could also determine the prices of many commodities in category 1, the 
prices of other goods were subject to adjustment through administrative command (Guo 
1992, pp. 35). For example, the price of coal and many construction materials covered 
by the state plan was adjusted, with the price of balance being determined by producers. 
The Energy Market 
Energy is a good in category 1. Prior to economic reform, the coal industry mainly 
comprised enterprises administered either by the central or a local govemment. The 
distribution of coal was achieved through planning channels administered centrally, and 
prices were centrally fixed. As with most other primary raw materials, the price of coal 
was artificially and irrationally low before the reform (Hua et al. 1985). As Table 3.1 
shows, prices were so low that in at least three years before 1978 the coal industry ran at 
a loss.^^ The govemment was forced to make four upward adjustments to the price of 
coal, in 1958, 1962, 1965 and 1979 (Guo 1992 p. 83), to make the development of the 
coal industry financially viable. 
^^According to an interview I conducted when working for the Ministry of Coal Industry (1983-86), the 
coal industry recorded losses in 13 years from 1949 to 1978. These losses were mainly caused by an 
increase in production costs arising from a rise in the price of power and raw materials. 
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Table 3.1 Unit Cost, Average Price and Unit Profit in the Coal Industry 
1952-1980 
(Unit: yuan/tonne) 
Year Cost Producer Price Profit Profit/ Cost 
1952 9.00 11.46 1.60 17.78 
1957 10.90 12.05 0.25 2.29 
1960 9.17 14.97 4.60 50.00 
1962 17.28 15.20 n.a. n.a. 
1965 15.77 18.00 0.79 5.00 
1970 13.47 18.00 3.09 22.94 
1971 13.60 18.00 2.96 21.76 
1972 14.08 18.00 2.48 17.61 
1973 14.51 18.00 2.05 14.13 
1974 17.14 18.00 -0.58 -3.38 
1975 15.86 18.00 0.70 4.41 
1976 16.70 18.00 •0.14 -0.84 
1977 16.61 18.00 -0.05 -0.30 
1978 16.12 18.00 0.44 2.73 
1979 17.78 22.10 2.55 14.34 
1980 20.00 
Notes: 1) Unit cost refers to the total cost of capital construction and production. The cost of 
coal preparation could be insignificant, since most of the supply was made up of raw 
coal. 
2) Profit is measured as price minus costs and taxes. 
3) Boldface indicates a loss in that year. 
Source: Guo 1992, p. 55. 
Energy pricing was an extremely sensitive area, for two reasons. First, energy was of 
primary importance to the economy. Any rise in the price of energy was likely to have an 
inflationary effect on the whole economy and cause political conflict among 
administrative institutions (Xu et al. 1982, p. 155; Guo 1992, pp. 64-5). Second, the 
price of energy, particularly the price of coal, had been heavily subsidised for many 
years. The impact of price rises on the economy was thus unpredictable. 
For decades, coal has accounted for over 70% of total energy consumption in China, 
and so the government proceeded cautiously with reform. According to Guo (1992), 
coal price reform was carried out through a combination of adjustment and liberalisation. 
During 1978-81, only the adjustment method was used (Table 3.1); in 1982-87, a 
combination of adjustment and liberalisation applied. Reform took place in five distinct 
stages. First, in 1982 the govemment formally endorsed a scheme by which some coal 
producers were delegated the right to impose a surcharge on coal shipped out of 
provincial territories (Yamanouchi 1986, p. 5). Second, in the same year the govemment 
gave coalmines permission to sell their above-quota coal to other provinces and to 
charge a price higher than the planned price (World Bank 1985b, p. 94). Third, in 1983 
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the State Council approved a report prepared by the Ministry of Coal Industry for the 
development of township and village coalmining enterprises. These mines operated 
independently of the central planning system. In 1984 a free pricing system for these 
coalmines was formally endorsed by the central govemment (Guo 1992, p. 89). Fourth, 
the govemment decided to offer a premium price for above-quota coal from local mines 
in 1984 and from state mines in 1985. The premium price was 20-50 per cent higher than 
the planned price in the case of local mines, and 50-100 per cent higher than the planned 
price in the case of state mines. This marked the beginning of the famous dual-track 
pricing system for coal. Fifth, in 1984 the State Council endorsed the General Contract 
Responsibility System, which was largely responsible for the development of large and 
medium-sized coalmines. Under this system, the Ministry of Coal Industry committed 
itself to increasing coal output by 40 million tonnes per year, reducing the deficit of state 
mines '^^  and guaranteeing a reasonable ratio between coal production and capital 
construction^® {Economic Daily 13 September 1985). Under the General Contract 
Responsibility System, state-run coalmines negotiated contracts with the Ministry of 
Coal Industry. The system gave state coalmines virtually a free hand to trade output 
above the state quota. 
Table 3.2 Share of Coal Output Subject to Free Pricing, 1979-86 (%) 
Y e a r C o a l 
1 9 7 9 1 6.7 
1 9 8 0 1 8.3 
198 1 20 .4 
1982 21 .9 
1983 23 .8 
1984 25 .7 
1985 4 9 . 6 
1986 57 .7 
Source-. Guo 1992, p. 117. 
According to Almanac of Coal Industry (19S9, p. 47), this target was not achieved, and losses actually 
increased after the General Contract Responsibility System was implemented. 
i^Capital construction mainly refers to the exploration of new reserves, the building of infrastructure and 
the preparation of new mines. A balanced ratio between the extraction of coal from established reserves 
and the generation of new reserves is critically important in achieving a sustained output level. During 
the first Five Year Plan (1951-55) the ratio between extraction at established sites and the generation of 
new reserves was 1:1. In 1959-62 when, under the slogan "Great Leap Forward", the govemmem was 
campaigning to raise output to an unrealistically high level, this ratio became far too high. As a result, 
the coal industry suffered a setback in the following years. This happened again in 1967-68 (Keith 1986, 
pp. 41-3). 
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The effect of these reforms was to stimulate the growth of the coal market and speed 
up the process of decentralisation of price determination. In a matter of seven years, the 
share of coal traded on the market — including a large proportion of the coal produced 
by local government-owned mines, all of the coal produced by township and village 
enterprises, and above-quota output from state mines— increased steadily from 16.7% 
in 1979 to 57.7% in 1986. This process accelerated dramatically in 1985, two years after 
the development of township and village enterprises was officially endorsed and one year 
after state-run coalmines adopted the contract responsibility system. 
The results of a comprehensive survey of coal traded on the market across 19 
provinces reported in Liu (1991) confirms this trend (Table 3.3). According to this 
survey, 52 per cent of coal in the 19 provinces was traded on the market in 1989. In 
Jiangsu province, the market share was as high as 82 per cent. Eight out of 19 provinces 
traded more than 50 per cent of their coal through the market system. 
Table 3.3 Coal Traded Centrally and on the Market in 19 Provinces, 1989 
Province Planning Market 
(1) (2) 
(unit: 10.000 tonnes) (unit: 10,000 tonnes) 
Market Share 
(2)/(4) 
(unit: per cent) 
Total 
(4) 
(unit: 10,000 tonnes) 
Tianjin 771.0 471.6 39.9 1182.6 
Hebei 1157.7 3280.3 73.9 4438.0 
Neimenggu 1253.0 1495.1 54.4 2748.1 
Liaoning 5500.0 2606.0 32.2 8106.0 
Jilin 1200.0 900.0 42.9 2100.0 
Shanghai 1678.0 560.0 25.0 2238.0 
Jiangsu 1140.0 5224.3 82.1 6364.3 
Zhejiang 584.4 1921.7 76.7 2506.0 
Anhui 773.9 833.1 51.9 1607.0 
Fuji an 800.0 300.0 27.3 1100.0 
Henan 2754.0 2733.0 49.8 5487.0 
Hubei 1840.0 1360.0 42.5 3200.0 
Hunan 946.7 2971.3 75.8 3918.0 
Guangdong 883.2 1976.8 68.0 2760.0 
Yunnan 1056.0 144.0 12.0 1200.0 
Shaanxi 345.6 241.6 41.1 587.2 
Gansu 520.1 866.7 62.5 1386.9 
Qinghai 300.0 140.0 31.8 440.0 
Xinjiang 767.4 191.9 20.0 959.3 
Total 24211.0 26117.2 51.9 50328,2 
Source\Un Shujie 1991, p. 29. 
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Other studies suggest that, while official prices remained low and stable, the market 
pricei9 for coal was flexible and higher than the official price. Thus the market price 
reflected more accurately the interaction of demand and supply and the scarcity of 
energy in China. For example, the average official price for raw coal was about 22 yuan 
per tonne in 1984 and 25 yuan per tonne in 1985; the average market price was 75 yuan 
per tonne and 102 yuan per tonne in these two years (Guo 1992, p. 122). The market 
price of coal fell from 150-200 yuan per tonne in 1984 to 80-120 yuan per tonne in 1985 
in Jiangsu province due to an increase in supply (Wu Jinglian and Zhao Renwei 1987). 
According to another report (State Pricing Bureau 1989), the coal market was very 
active and even somewhat volatile in 1988 in Shanghai and Jiangsu province, where the 
price of raw coal was about 103 yuan per tonne in January and as much as 210 yuan per 
tonne in December. 
The new coal market gave non-state enterprises access to a much-needed energy 
supply; state enterprises too, had to rely on the market to make up the widening gap 
between demand and supply through the state planning channel.^o Hu (1986, p. 30) 
estimated that about 10 per cent of the coal used by state enterprises in the 
manufacturing industry in Shanghai in 1984 was purchased from the market, and 
projected that this share would increase further. 
In the coal industry, the marketisation process was greatly aided by the large-scale 
participation of township and village as well as local govemment coalmines. The 
producers of petroleum products, however, were mainly state enterprises, and price 
reform did not take place at all in this industry until 1983 (Qimin Liu 1991). The degree 
of central planning in this sector in terms of pricing and distribution was always much 
higher than it was for the coal industry,^! the govemment relied more on adjustment of 
planned prices than on market-determined prices, and relatively fewer petroleum 
products could be traded on the open market. 
In 1983, the central govemment allowed refineries to sell some of their products at a 
higher but fixed price to finance the expansion of production. In 1985 the govemment 
allowed above-quota petroleum products to be traded at producer-determined prices. In 
the same year, an open market for petroleum products began to emerge. However, in the 
face of sharp increases in the price of petroleum products and continuing strong demand 
in 1986, the govemment imposed a price ceiling on these products and introduced a 
more sophisticated pricing s y s t e m . 2 2 Instead of letting the market determine prices, since 
1986 the govemment has relied mainly on adjustments in the official price to correct 
^^The market price includes floating prices and prices negotiated by state-run coalmines. 
govemment usually supplied energy and intermediate inputs for enterprises to meet their 
production quotas. State enterprises had to rely on the market, if they intended to produce output above 
the quota. 
^^This is also confmned by the information in our survey data (Table 3.7 in this chapter). 
22Refer to Liu (1991) for details of price adjustment of different kinds of petroleum products. 
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Table 3.4 Average Price of Petroleum Products, 1984 and 1990 
(Unit: yuan/tonne) 
1984 1990 
Petrol 628.27 779.87 
Kerosene 452.08 526.05 
Diesel 353.77 450.24 
Heavy Oil 78.53 165.89 
Liquefied Gas 140.55 379.69 
Note: The average price is a mix of planned price and market price. 
Source: Liu Qimin 1991, p. 30. 
irrationally low petroleum prices. The official petroleum price was raised by 10 yuan in 
January 1988, 27 yuan in 1989 and another 30 yuan in January 1990 (Liu 1991). 
There is no systematic information on the degree of marketisation in the petroleum 
industry either in the literature or in govemment statistics. However, the available 
information suggests that the price of petroleum products rose substantially after 1983, 
as a result of adjustments in the official price and the development of open market (Table 
3.4). 
Market Reform of State Enterprises 
Researchers have analyses the impact of market-oriented economic reform on state 
enterprises at a highly aggregated level. Unfortunately, these studies provide little 
quantitative information or detail about the effects of specific reform measures at 
enterprise level — in particular the large and medium-sized enterprises that constitute the 
mainstay of the centrally planned system. The survey data contained in this study provide 
a rare and valuable source of information about the realities of marketisation in large and 
medium-sized state enterprises. Since the enterprises in our data set represent a cross-
section of industrial sectors in six geographical locations, we are also able to investigate 
both the sector-specific and region-specific characteristics of the marketisation process. 
The trends in marketisation during the years of economic reform are clearly reflected 
in the survey data. The market share of both output and material inputs of enterprises in 
the sample increased steadily after 1980, although the marginal increment in market share 
was less than 2 per cent annually. Here, market share is defined as 100 minus the 
percentage of total output value purchased by the govemment under the mandatory plan. 
Output value is evaluated at 1980 constant price. Market share of inputs is defined as 
100 minus the percentage of tiie value of material inputs allocated through govemment 
distributional channels. This is evaluated at current price level. Our data reveal that a 
high proponion of output and material inputs were already been traded on the market in 
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1980, only two years after the central government launched its economic reform of the 
industrial sector. 
We use two indicators to measure the degree of marketisation: average and weighted 
average market shares. Average market share is defined as the proportion of total output 
or material inputs traded on the market divided by the number of sample enterprises, and 
weighted market share is defined as the proportion of total output traded on the market 
weighted by each enterprise's share in total output or material inputs. The average and 
weighted (by enterprise output) average market shares of the 296 enterprises are shown 
in Table 3.5. According to Table 3.5, the market share of both output and inputs 
increased steadily. The average and weighted average market shares of output increased 
from 46.9 per cent and 26 per cent respectively in 1980 to 57.4 per cent and 32.6 per 
cent in 1988. The average and weighted average market shares of inputs increased from 
61.7 per cent and 44.3 per cent respectively in 1980 to 75.1 per cent and 62.3 per cent in 
1988. 
Table 3.5 Market Share of 296 State Enterprises, 1980 and 1984-88 
Year Output Input 
Average Share Weighted Average Share Average Share Weighted Average Share 
1980 46.89 25.97 61.72 44.28 
1984 49.67 26.75 66.22 50.90 
1985 51.34 26.05 68.70 53.20 
1986 53.74 29.77 70.60 54.57 
1987 56.03 30.91 72.88 58.33 
1988 57.43 32.55 75.14 62.30 
Note: Data for the period 1981-83 are not available. 
Source: Survey data. 
Two important features of the marketisation process are revealed in Table 3.5. First, 
the size of market share varies inversely with the size of the enterprise. Since each 
enterprise is given an equal weight in the case of average market share and a weight 
proportional to its size in the case of weighted average market share, a lower value for 
the latter implies that the size of the enterprise weights the market share. This suggests 
that the degree of marketisation is higher among smaller than larger enterprises. 
Second, while enterprises in the sample became increasingly marketised, the process 
remained carefully controlled. Table 3.6 presents the distribution of the market share of 
sample enterprises for six years in the 1980s. While enterprises under complete 
government control, represented by nil market share, decreased from 28 per cent to 10.5 
per cent (first row), the number of enterprises with a high degree of marketisation 
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Table 3.6 Distribution of Marl^et Share of Output, 1980 and 1984-88 (%) 
% 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
0 28.00 18.60 13.50 10.10 9.80 10.50 
0<= and <10 13.12 17.20 16.90 18.60 16.20 12.80 
10<= and <20 4.40 6.10 7.80 7.10 6.80 8.10 
20<= and <30 2.40 4.70 5.40 5.40 4.10 4.40 
30<= and <40 4.70 1.00 2.70 3.00 4.70 3.00 
40<= and <50 2.30 3.00 4.10 3.00 3.00 4.40 
50<= and <60 2.70 2.70 2.70 2.40 2.40 2.40 
60<= and <70 2.70 4.70 3.40 4.40 4.10 3.70 
70 <= and < 80 3.40 3.40 4.70 4.40 6.80 6.80 
80 <= and <90 1.40 2.40 4.10 5.40 5.10 6.10 
90<= and <=100 34.80 36.10 34.80 36.10 37.20 37.80 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Survey data. 
remained relatively stable. For example, the group of enterprises with a market share of 
90 per cent or over increased by only 3 per cent. This distribution suggests that the 
process of marketisation was gradual and incomplete. 
Third, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that, although marketisation progressed steadily 
among state enterprises in the period 1980-88, the govemment still played a very 
important role in the trade of output and inputs of large and medium-sized state 
enterprises. More than 67.5 per cent of output was still determined by the planning 
system and traded through govemment distribution channels. Moreover, the output of 
10.5 per cent of enterprises was still completely controlled by the govemment in 1988. 
The data also show that the market share of manufacturing industries differed 
considerably (Table 3.7). For example, in 1988 the average market share of output was 
over 90 per cent for the beverage industry but less than 3 per cent for the tobacco 
industry. Generally speaking, enterprises producing consumer goods, especially goods 
based on agricultural products (food, beverages, leather and wood products) held a 
higher market share than those making producer goods. Among makers of producer 
goods, manufacturers of machinery, electrical machinery and instruments seem to have 
enjoyed a higher degree of freedom in trading their output. These differences in market 
share between industries were clearly related to the sequence of marketisation, which 
began with agricultural products followed by machinery and electronic products. The 
mineral-based industries, such as coke and coal products, petroleum products and metal 
products, generally lagged far behind other industries, and in 1988 were still largely 
under the control of the government. Even so, some made significant progress towards 
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Table 3.7 Average Market Share of Output by industry, 1980 and 1984-88 (%) 
Sector 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Food 52.8 55.2 56.5 57.1 61.1 64.9 
SoftDnnks 72.4 86.3 88.7 89.4 91.5 92.2 
Tobaco 8.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 0.6 2.5 
Animal Food 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Textiles 22.6 26.6 17.7 22.3 22.7 25.0 
aothing 6.9 6.8 12.0 21.3 25.8 27.5 
Leather Products 68.4 71.6 67.3 70.6 66.6 64.9 
Wood and Bamboo Products 54.6 57.9 72.8 70.4 73.7 77.3 
Furniture 41.5 33.7 41.9 41.1 82.2 60.6 
Paper Products 25.4 21.2 19.6 20.2 22.7 45.5 
Printing 77.6 79.6 67.2 64.9 65.3 64.5 
Sports Equipment 25.0 21.4 22.4 25.2 25.7 34.7 
Handicrafts 0.9 1.5 1.7 2.9 8.1 15.3 
Petrochemicals 0.0 6.4 6.0 9.3 10.0 16.4 
Coal Products 19.8 23.8 25.3 26.5 27.1 29.1 
Industrial Chemicals 33.7 32.8 36.2 40.5 42.7 43.7 
Pharmaceutical 21.9 47.3 46.6 45.6 49.7 56.4 
Chanical Fibres 0.0 12.2 19.6 20.8 22.3 23.8 
Rubber Products 24.3 26.7 26.6 28.4 29.9 32.4 
Plastic Products 13.9 33.4 36.6 34.0 31.5 25.4 
Construction Materials 25.9 42.6 46.8 47.6 49.3 45.6 
Fabricated Forous Metal Products 15.5 9.6 11.4 14.0 16.4 13.1 
Non-ferrous Metal Melting and Forging 87.5 86.3 48.8 50.5 58.0 57.8 
Metal Products 38.7 24.0 35.8 39.9 42.8 43.1 
Machinery 40.4 42.1 48.4 50.4 53.9 57.2 
Transpon Vehicles 12.4 17.6 19.8 25.8 33.8 33.6 
Electrical Machinery 69.0 68.6 43.5 40.9 41.5 42.4 
Electronics & Communication Equipment 61.7 40.9 43.7 42.1 42.7 45.8 
Measuring Instruments & Apparatus 64.4 72.2 76.1 81.2 83.6 85.6 
Note: Sample consists of 295 enterprises as one enterprise could not be classified. 
Source: Survey data. 
marketisation; the market share of petroleum refineries, for example, increased from zero 
in 1980 to 16.38 per cent in 1988. This is consistent with our previous suggestion that 
the market mechanism was introduced unevenly at different rates among enterprises 
depending on the "materials and equipment" {wuzi) and "commodities" (shangpin) they 
produced. 
It is apparent from Table 3.7 that growth in market share was positive for most 
industrial sectors over the period 1980-88; 20 out of 29 sectors experienced an upward 
movement in market share. The market share of four industries declined, and of these the 
market share of the electrical industrial machinery and electronic communication 
equipment industries experienced a significant decline. Four other industries did not 
^^It is perhaps not unusual for different sectors to have different degree of marketisation. The fmding 
here is quite consistent with Groves et al. (1991). 
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show a consistent pattern, and one enterprise producing animal feed enjoyed a 100 per 
cent market share in all six years. 
ANALYSIS OF MARKET COMPETITION 
The rapid development of township and village enterprises in the 1980s, the 
establishment of local enterprises and the marketisation of state enterprises joindy 
contributed to the development of a competitive market in the Chinese economy 
(McMillan and Naughton 1992). During the decade, the share of total output of both 
township and village enterprises and other non-state enterprises increased significantly. 
The output of state enterprises, township and village enterprises and other non-state 
enterprises is presented in Table 3.8. 
Byrd and Lin (1990) suggested that the dynamic growth of township and village 
enterprises can be attributed to their managers' strong sense of competition. From the 
early 1980s, these enterprises competed not only among themselves but also with state 
enterprises. At the same time, local governments, capitalising on the privileges obtained 
through the reform, set up local enterprises, which became one more important source of 
competition. Table 3.8 shows that the share of township and village and other enterprises 
Table 3.8 Share of State and Non-state Industrial Enterprises, 1979-89 
(Unit: Billion Yuan) 
Year Total State Enterprises TVEs Other S. E. Share TVEs (%) Others (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (3)/(l) (4)/(l) 
1979 468.13 367.60 42.35 58.18 78.53 9.05 12.43 
1980 515.43 391.56 50.94 72.92 75.97 9.89 14.15 
1981 539.98 403.71 57.93 78.34 74.76 10.73 14.51 
1982 581.12 432.60 64.60 83.92 74.44 11.12 14.44 
1983 646.04 473.94 75.71 96.39 73.36 11.72 14.92 
1984 761.73 526.27 124.54 110.92 69.09 16.35 14.56 
1985 971.65 630.20 182.72 158.73 64.86 18.81 16.34 
1986 1119.43 697.11 241.34 180.98 62.27 21.56 16.17 
1987 1381.30 825.01 324.39 231.90 59.73 23.48 16.79 
1988 1822.46 1035.12 452.94 334.40 56.80 24.85 18.35 
1989 2201.71 1234.50 524.41 442.80 56.07 23.82 20.11 
Notes-. 1) S. E. Share refers to share of state enterprises. 
2) TVEs stands for township and village enterprises. This does not include collective 
enterprises in urban areas and therefore output values are smaller than those for 
"Collective Enterprises in Table 1.1 of chapter 1. 
3) Values for 1979 are 1970 constant price; values for 1980-89 are 1980 constant price. 
4) "Other" columns include collective enterprises, private enterprises and enterprises funded 
or jointly funded by foreign capital. 
Sources: China Statistics Yearbook (1990, p. 414) for data on state enterprises; Almanac of Township 
and Village Enterprises (1990, p. 1024) for data on TVEs. 
63 
in total industrial output more than doubled in the 11 years after 1979. This rise in the 
share of these two groups of enterprises impUes that the monopoly position of state 
enterprises was substantially weakened by market competition. 
Economists have proposed two distinct tools for measuring market competition. One 
comprises various market concentration indices popularly used in free market economies, 
and the other is the "Komai index" proposed by Janos Komai. 
Industrial economists use market concentration indices to measure the 
competitiveness of market economies.^-^ Market concentration "refers to the degree to 
which production for or in a particular market or industry is concentrated in the hands of 
a few large firms" (Clarke 1985, p. 9). The rationale for this is that higher concentrations 
are associated with the greater market power of large firms in a free market economy. In 
economic theory, the degree of market competition is hypothesised to be positively 
related to the number of producers in a particular market. The perfect competition 
hypothesis in the production theory of neoclassical economics is valid only if there are 
large number of producers competing for consumers in the marketplace; thus no 
particular producer can determine the market price level and, as a result of competition, 
market price is forced down to the long-run average cost in equilibrium. Therefore the 
inverse of the market concentration ratio measures the degree of market competition. 
The most widely used index is the concentration ratio. It is typically defined as "the 
proportion of industrial output accounted for by the r largest firms, where r is an 
arbitrary' number" (Clarke 1985, p. 13). Market competition in the Chinese economy in 
the 1980s can be measured using the inverse of the ratio of output concentrated in state 
enterprises, which represents the state monopoly over the market. This concentration 
ratio is formally defined as: 
where C is concentration ratio between zero and one; 5 is the value of the output of state 
enterprises; T is total output; and i is the industry. Thus the lower (higher) the value 
of Q, the higher (lower) the degree of market competition in industry /. The 
concentration ratios for selected industrial sectors during the 1980s are given in Table 
3.9. 
Two technical differences between concentration ratios obtained using the 
conventional definition and those presented in Table 3.9 should be noted. First, while the 
number of "large" firms is by convention fixed, the number of state enterprises varied 
during the period 1980-90. Thus the ratios given here should be interpreted as 
Refer to Clarke (1985) for the definition and use of market concentration indices. 
64 
representing the degree of concentration in state enterprises of which the number is 
subject to variation. Second, Table 3.9 gives only a rough indication of state monopoly 
or, inversely, market competition, because a significant proportion of output produced by 
state enterprises is distributed independently of the state (refer to Table 3.5) and 
therefore is beyond government control. Thus the results provided in Table 3.9 may well 
overstate the monopoly power of the govemment and understate market competition. In 
other words, market competition could be more intense than the numbers suggest. 
Table 3.9 Concentration Ratios for Selected Industries, 1980-90 
Year Food Processing Machinery Coalmining Textiles Electronic Products Construction Materials 
1980 a a . a a . a a . 0.90 0.74 a a . 
1981 rua. n.a. 0.54 0.88 0.72 a a . 
1982 n.a. 0.64 0.53 0.87 0.76 0.44 
1983 n.a. 0.64 0.51 0.78 0.76 0.44 
1984 rua. 0.61 0.49 0.72 0.76 a a . 
1985 0.87 0.62 0.47 0.71 0.73 0.30 
1986 0.85 0.59 0.46 0.73 0.74 a a . 
1987 0.83 0.57 0.45 0.71 0.72 a a . 
1988 0.79 0.56 0.44 0.68 a a . 0.19 
1989 0.79 0.54 0.43 0.62 n.a. 0.17 
1990 n.a. 0.53 0.44 0.58 a a . a a. 
Note: Calculation of concentration ratios is based on output value, except in the case of the coal 
industry. Physical output is a better measurement for the coal industry, since a) the coal 
industry provides a fairly homogeneous products; and b) a ratio based on output value could 
be inaccurate due to the difference between the market price for coal and lower official coal 
prices. 
Sources'. Almanac of the Chinese Food Industry (1986-90) for the data on the food industry; Almanac 
of the Chinese Machinery and Electronics Industry (1983, 1984 and 1985) for 1982-84 data 
on the machinery industry; Almanac of Chinese Machinery (1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 
and 1991) for 1985-90 data on the machinery industry; Almanac of the Chinese Coal 
Industry (1982-91) for data on the coalmining industry; Almanac of the Chinese Textile 
Industry (1981-91) for data on the textile industry; Almanac of the Chinese Machinery and 
Electronics Industry (1983, 1984 and 1985) for 1980-84 data on the electronics industry; 
Almanac of the Chinese Electronics Industry (1986, 1987 and 1988) for 1985-1987 data on 
the electronics industry; Almanac of the Chinese Construction Materials Industry (1989, 
1990) for data on the construction materials industry. 
According to the table, the market concentration ratio declined for all industries 
during the decade 1980-90 and some ratios dropped significandy, in particular those of 
the textile and construction material industries. The textile industry's concentration ratio 
almost halved, from 0.90 in 1980 to 0.58 in 1990, while the construction materials 
industry went from 0.44 in 1982 to 0.17 in 1989, a drop of two-thirds in seven years. 
The fall in the concentration ratio for the coal industry can be attributed mainly to strong 
growth in township and village enterprises, as local enterprises did not contribute 
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significantly to national output. The decline in the ratio indicates that the monopoly of 
state enterprises was substantially weakened by the large-scale entry of non-state 
enterprises, which whittled away their market share. 
Apart from providing another measure of the degree of market competition in an 
economy, the Komai index adds an extra dimension in indicating the response of state 
enterprises to the degree of market competition. This index is particularly useful in 
examining the transition of a centrally planned economy into a market economy. Komai 
(1980) proposed that the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe were 
characterised by a sellers' market, compared with the buyers' market of industrial market 
economies. According to Komai, a sellers' market refers to a marketplace in which there 
is a permanent shortage of goods and services. No feasible price will clear excess 
demand and bring the market into a state of Walrasian-type equilibrium in the long term, 
because agents and even institutions adapt to these market conditions and behave in such 
a way as to reinforce the shortage. Thus, in a sellers' market, producers are always 
certain of having excess demand for their products. In a buyers' market, on the other 
hand, producers act as if there is excess supply in the market. In such a market, 
producers face uncertain demand and can never be sure of finding a buyer for their 
product. 
According to Komai, market type carries important implications for the way in which 
market competition takes place. In a sellers' market, the producer, faced with excess 
demand, does not have to compete with other producers for customers. Market 
competition takes place only among consumers. The reverse is the case in a buyers' 
market: a producer facing uncertain demand has to compete consciously with other 
producers for customers. Thus competition among producers is only possible in a buyers' 
market. Producers are, however, also consumers of inputs. In a sellers' market, the 
producer has to compete with other producers for raw materials. This sort of 
competition for inputs does not take place in a buyers' market, due to the absence of 
shortages in this kind of market. 
Komai suggests that producers in a buyers' market behave differendy from those in a 
sellers' market. In a buyers' market, producers tend to keep a reasonably large inventory 
on hand in order to meet any unexpected surge in demand. Producers in a sellers' 
market, on the other hand, keep little inventory, as they can always find customers 
prepared to buy whatever they make. In their role as consumers of inputs, producers in a 
sellers' market tend to keep large quantities of inputs on hand so that they can continue 
to produce goods without interruption. A cost minimising or profit maximising producer 
in a buyers' market, on the other hand, maintains a minimum quantity of input stock — 
the producer is always able to obtain raw materials and intermediate inputs, and keeping 
excess input stock is costly. 
The Komai index, which is based on the difference in behaviour of producers in a 
sellers' and a buyers' market, can be defined as: 
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where z, is the Komai index; s^  is input stock; and s^ is output stock. A high value 
indicates a sellers' market, while a low value is associated with a buyers' market. Again, 
during the transformation of an economy from a sellers' market into a buyers' market, 
we would expect to observe a decline in the Komai index. Thus the index not only 
indicates the nature of the market (sellers' or buyers'), it also gauges the degree of 
market competition and serves as an indicator of producers' responses to competition in 
their market.^^ 
Komai (1987) calculated the ratios for three buyers' market economies and three 
sellers' market economies. He found that these ratios were consistently and significandy 
higher in the planned economies of former East European countries than in industrial 
market economies. The results are presented in Table 3.10. The figures in the table show 
the striking contrast between the two groups of economies: the Komai index is on 
average around ten times higher in the sellers' markets than in the buyers' markets. 
Table 3.10 Kornai Index for Selected Buyers' and Sellers' Markets 
Country Period 
Ratio of Input Stocks 
to Output Stocks 
Buyers' Market Economies 
Austria 1972-77 1.50 
Sweden 1968-72 0.70-0.74 
United States 1960-77 0.94-1.16 
Sellers' Market Economies 
Hungary 1971-80 7.26-8.52 
Poland 1975 10.3 
Soviet Union 1960-77 9.20-12.30 
Source: Komai 1987. p. 322. 
^-From the perspective of market competition, we can hypothetic ally propose the following three 
situations for the Chinese economy in the 1980s: 1) both output and input markets are transformed from 
a sellers' market into a buyers' market; 2) the output market is transformed from a sellers' market into a 
buyers' market but the input market remains unchanged: and 3) the input market is transformed from a 
sellers' market into a buyers' market but the output market is unchanged. The Komai index will decline 
in all three cases. However, market competition in the neoclassical sense takes place only in cases 1 and 
2. and it would not be meaningful for state enterprises in case 3 to change their behaviour and meet the 
challenge of competition. Although we cannot completely mle out this case in reality, there is no 
evidence in the available literature to suggest that this kind of asvinmetric situation might have taken 
place in the Chinese economy in the 1980s. Our analysis of market share and concentration ratios 
suggests that market competition during economic reform intensified across multiple sectors. Therefore 
we can safely ignore case 3. 
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Table 3.11 Kornai Index of Chinese State Enterprises, 1980-87 
Year 1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Komai Index 6.249 6.541 5.523 4.799 5.025 5.234 
Source: Du et al. 1990. p. 6. 
The literature suggests that the Chinese economy was gradually transformed from a 
sellers' market into a buyers' market in the 1980s. In particular, excess demand was 
turned into excess supply for many consumer goods, such as clocks and textiles, (Byrd 
1987). Even enterprises making producer goods faced a situation of excess supply in the 
1980s: machiner>' producers, for instance (Byrd p. 255). Chinese economists have used 
the Komai index to measure the nature of the market and the degree of market 
competition in the 1980s. Du et al. (1990) calculated the Komai index for 403 state 
enterprises of various sizes for 1980 and for the period 1983-87 (Table 3.11). 
A comparison of Tables 3.10 and 3.11 shows that the Chinese economy in the 1980s 
was more a buyers' market than East European economies in the 1960s and 1970s, 
though all were still quite unlike typical industrial market economies. Table 3.11 does 
show, however, that the Chinese economy was in the process of changing from a sellers' 
market into a buyers' market in the 1980s. 
Figure 3.1 Average Kornai Index and Market Share of Output 
Kornai index 
10.7 T 
1980 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Koniai Index (1) Kornai I n d a (2) Market Share 
Market share (%) 
T 33 
1988 
Noie\ Because data for 1981-82 are not available in E>u et al. (1990) or in the sur\ey data. 
caution is needed in interpreting the trend of Komai index between 1980 and 1983. 
Source: Survev data. 
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In this thesis, I use the Komai index to represent the degree of market competition. 
Calculations for enterprises in the survey sample reveal that the Komai index fell from 
9.9 in 1980 to 6.01 in 1988. The decline in the index is quite consistent over the time 
period (Figure 3.1). 
In order to illustrate the relationship between market-oriented reform, market 
competition and behavioural adjustment among state enterprises, the weighted average 
market share is plotted in Figure 3.1 together with the Komai index. Figure 3.1 shows 
that the market share of sample enterprises moved in the opposite direction to the Komai 
index. This trend confirms our earlier findings that, while the large-scale entry of non-
state enterprises created an increasingly competitive market environment in the economy, 
marketisation effectively exposed state enterprises to market competition and state 
enterprises in the sample began to adjust their behaviour to the challenges of the 
marketplace. 
A comparison of these results with those of Komai (1987) shows that in 1980 sample 
enterprises were comparable with those in the former Soviet Union and other Eastem 
European countries: a sellers' market still predominated. However, as reform continued 
to affect the state sector and with the development of a non-state sector in subsequent 
years, state enterprises had to adjust their behaviour to cope with intensifying 
competition. This led to a significant drop in the Komai index after 1980. If we compare 
out results with those of Du et al. (1990), we find that our Komai index is consistently 
and considerably higher than that of Du et al. This implies that the large and medium-
sized state enterprises in our sample operated in a less competitive environment than 
enterprises in Du et al.'s sample, about a quarter of which was small enterprises. This 
confirms the previous finding that the degree of marketisation is inversely related to the 
size of the state enterprise, and is consistent with observations made by Gao (1993).^^ 
Table 3.12 gives the Komai index for enterprises in eight selected sectors and six 
capital cities. Again, our data reveal substantial differences in market type and market 
competition between sectors and cities. Nevertheless, even though the Komai index 
fluctuates somewhat in some sectors, it assumes a decidedly downward trend in most 
sectors and in every city between 1980 and 1988. 
Figure 3.1 reflects the relationship between marketisation of state enterprises and 
market competitiveness. To further confum this relationship, I calculated the correlation 
between market share and the Komai index for each year. Correlations for sample 
enterprises are shown in Table 3.13. 
^^Gao (1993) lists four characteristics of state enterprises in the Chinese domestic market in the 1980s: 
1) the commodity was far more marketised than other productive factors such as capital and labour; 2) 
markets were far better developed among small enterprises than among large and medium-sized 
enterprises; 3) market conditions differed substantially among sectors; and 4) market conditions varied 
considerably according to region. 
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Table 3.12 Kornai Index of Selected Industrial Sectors and Cities, 
1980 and 1984-88 
Sector 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Industrial Chemicals 6.42 5.35 4.03 4.78 4.52 3.29 
Construction Materials 11.31 7.72 10.19 6.78 3.75 7.06 
Machinery 4.92 4.61 4.31 4.77 4.48 4.18 
Electronical Machinery 12.48 4.14 5.53 4.83 6.39 6.69 
Electronic Communication Equipment 6.78 6.17 4.28 3.10 5.24 3.52 
Transportation Equipment 16.18 13.66 5.43 5.86 11.90 10 
Food Processing 9.32 9.60 8.82 10.48 7.17 8.66 
Textiles 18.88 6.27 5.65 4.89 4.85 3.66 
Citv 
Beijing 8.17 8.72 5.43 4.74 6.61 6.28 
Shanghai 11.07 8.43 7.69 6.90 8.10 6.30 
Wuhan 12.52 10.17 5.86 8.32 7.47 5.95 
Chongqing 8.53 4.56 7.05 6.84 7.22 5.14 
Shenyang 7.79 10.10 9.63 9.45 6.13 5.37 
Guangzhou 10.75 6.63 7.33 6.09 5.48 6.60 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 3.13 Correlation Analysis of Market Share and Kornai Index, 
1980 and 1984-88 
Year Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
1980 -0.08 
1984 -0.13 
1985 -0.19 
1986 -0.13 
1987 -0.17 
1988 -0.23 
The values in Table 3.13 show that the correlation between market share and the 
Kornai index became stronger as market share increased during the 1980s. This confirms 
the proposition that state enterprises were more exposed to market competition over 
time, which in turn forced them to adjust their behaviour to cope with intensifying 
competition. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter we reviewed the theory and policy of market reform and described the 
development of a goods market and an energy market in the 1980s. We showed that the 
development of township and village enterprises and other non-state enterprises 
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contributed significantly to the growth of competitive markets. At the same time, market 
reform of state enterprises also contributed to the development of markets. 
Previous research has suggested that economic reform policies in the urban areas 
were inconsistent (Pr>'byla 1990). that the newly developed market differed considerably 
from a free competitive market (Ishihara 1987) and that there were enormous 
irregularities in tiie behaviour of state enterprises (Dong 1987: Ishihara 1990). These 
studies implicitiy suggest that reform was a complete failure. However, our analysis of 
market concentration ratios in multiple industrial sectors shows that the Qiinese market 
became increasingly competitive tiiroughout the 1980s. .Ajialysis of market share, based 
on a sur\ey of state enterprises, showed that market and institutional reform was 
effective in forcing state enterprises to face the challenges of market competition. The 
consistent and significant decline in the Komai index during the 1980s suggests that 
market reform raised awareness among state enterprises of the penalties attached to 
ignoring market competition. Consequentiy, there was a significant change in their 
behaviour as they adapted to market competition. 
Based on the analysis in this chapter of the shift towards market competition and 
market pricing, we have good reason to believe that the budget constraint of state 
enterprises became harder. However, as taxation and the financing of capital also 
determine the degree of softness of budget constraint, we need to investigate reform in 
these nvo areas. This will be done in the next chapter. 
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4 Institutional Reform and New Incentives 
This chapter concentrates on taxation and banking reforms and how these have affected 
the financial relationship of enterprises and the government, and of enterprises and 
banks, and thus the behaviour of state enterprises. Survey data are used to assess the 
impact of major institutional reforms on enterprise behaviour, including managerial 
objectives and budget constraint 
Several institutional changes were necessary before state enterprises could be 
expected to behave in an economically rational manner. One important change that took 
place in labour management in the 1980s was the development of economic incentives to 
encourage managers and workers to run enterprises more efficientiy. This type of reform 
has clear implications for technical and allocative efficiency in the neoclassical 
framework. Reform of labour management was an important element of the institutional 
reform that took place throughout the 1980s and hence will be discussed at length. 
Unlike market reform, which progressed relatively steadily witii the development of 
non-state sectors, instimtional reform of die state sector suffered from a lack of clear, 
well-defined and consistent goals. Some of the reform measures implemented on an 
experimental basis in a limited number of enterprises later spread to state enterprises 
nationwide; otiiers simply disappeared. In this chapter I look only at major reform 
measures implemented in large and medium-sized state enterprises since 1978.1 These 
reforms took place in three areas: taxation and other obUgations to the government; 
financing of capital; and labour management The former two can be examined within 
the framework of the economics of shortage (Komai 1980); and all three have 
implications for technical and allocative efficiency. 
INSTULrriONAL REFORM: AN OVERVIEW 
In the pre-reform period, state enterprises had no decision-making powder. Asi external 
agent, either the central govemment or local govemments, made virtually ever>' decision: 
on what state enterprises would produce and how goods w^ould be made; on the use of 
capital, including short-term working capital and funds for long-term investment; and on 
the management of labour. State enterprises had to surrender all profit either to the 
central govemment or to local govemments. Even depreciation of enterprises' fixed 
assets was placed in a fund which was administered and distributed by govemments. 
Essentially, managers were caretakers without any control over finances and unable to 
make any major business decision. 
1 Discussion of small state enterprises will be confined to the footnotes. 
72 
State enterprises operated in a strictly planned system.^ They had to produce the 
product or product mix assigned to them by the central or local governments. Although 
govemments also allocated the necessary raw materials and intermediate inputs, planning 
at different levels was often badly coordinated. Often the amount of raw materials and 
intermediate inputs did not match what was needed or was inadequate for enterprises to 
fill their quotas (Byrd 1992b). Even so, state enterprises were not allowed to source 
inputs independendy. 
Capital was also controlled by the central and local governments. As with material 
inputs, state enterprises were allocated the capital thought necessary to achieve their 
quotas. Multiple levels of govemment were involved in investment in state enterprises. 
Most long-term investment funds were allocated through the state budgetary grants 
system of the central govemment, which was coordinated by the State Planning 
Commission. However, local govemments also had substantial funds, acquired during 
two decentralisation campaigns in the late 1950s and the early 1970s (Lardy 1979). They 
committed these resources to the development of local economies, investing in both 
local and state enterprises in their localities. These resources, often called ex-budgetary 
capital, played an increasingly important role in the investment activities of state 
enterprises even before economic reform (Naughton 1992). Short-term working capital, 
intended to finance inventory stock, was allocated by various levels of govemments 
through local branches of the People's Bank. 
Although labour force quotas were centrally determined, control of the allocation of 
labour was delegated to local govemments. The local govemment agency in charge of 
labour was responsible for allocating labour to state enterprises subject to the approval 
of the Ministry of Labour and Personnel. Due to the rigid Household Registration 
System, inter-regional migration was difficult, if not impossible, and thus there was 
virtually no mobility of labour in the pre-reform period. In contrast to the centrally 
planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, a labour market did 
not exist in China prior to reform. As a result, employment in state enterprises tended to 
reflect govemment policy rather than the needs of the enterprise. 
The system was also extremely rigid. Managers had neither the power to recmit 
workers as needed nor the right to sack surplus employees; workers were typically 
guaranteed life-time tenure and were fired only in very extreme circumstances. On the 
other hand, workers, once assigned to work in a state enterprise, were locked into a life-
time contract and faced permanent unemployment if they quit. From the economic point 
of view, this system dampened any gains in allocative efficiency that could have been 
derived from a more optimal re-allocation of labour in the economy. The system for 
remunerating workers and managers was equally rigid. The wages of workers were 
'This includes both central and local planning. It is widely acknowledged that the central planning in 
China covered a significantly narrower range of products even before economic reform than was the 
case in other centrally planned economies. 
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determined unilaterally by the central government, based on an eight-grade seniority 
system that allowed virtually no inter-enterprise variation and which did not change 
significantly over two and a half decades. While in the early years both the promotion of 
workers within the system and ex-wage pecuniary awards were possible, the former 
became increasingly less frequent, and the latter were completely abolished in the mid-
1960s. The rigidity of the system seriously dampened the entrepreneurship of managers 
and the motivation of workers, with important implications for technical efficiency and 
the growth of state enterprises. 
The implications of such a system for state enterprise behaviour were twofold. First, 
state enterprises had no independent business objectives. Managers had virtually no 
powder or financial capacity to make business decisions and they had no choice but to do 
as they were told. Xue Muqiao (1982), China's most eminent economist, dubbed state 
enterprises "appendages of the state apparatus of economic administration". Dong Furen 
(1987) shared his view. Under govemment pressure, state enterprises were likely to 
maximise physical output, which was the main objective of the govemment at the time. 
Second, the budget constraint of state enterprises was unduly soft because the 
govemment tended to penalise failure to achieve set quotas while tolerating financial 
losses. The performance of managers was assessed almost solely according to the 
enterprise's ability to fulfil quotas, which gave them the incentive to produce more 
regardless of efficiency and financial viability. Managers were thus more inclined to seek 
favourable prices and free budgetary grants than to direct their efforts at improving 
efficiency. 
The reform measures introduced since 1978 aimed to create a new set of incentives 
by delegating financial and operational decision-making power to state enterprises. 
Enterprises would henceforth be allowed greater decision-making power in such areas as 
products, planning, investment and technological development and in the management of 
productive factors including labour, capital and intermediate inputs. The ultimate goal of 
reform was to transform state enterprises into operationally independent and financially 
accountable entities. 
It should be noted that, while marketisation was unprecedented in the Chinese 
economy in the late 1970s, the concept of decentralisation was not entirely new. In fact, 
the govemment had moved to decentralise decision-making power twice before, in late 
1958 and in early 1971.- Both times, decentralisation failed to make headway and the 
former centralised system was soon partially restored. The difference between 
decentralisation in the pre-reform and post-reform eras was that in the former case 
devolution of autonomy took place from the central govemment to provincial, 
prefectural and county governments, and not from govemment to enterprises; even more 
-Similarly a profit retention scheme, a major thrust of reform in 1978-81, was adopted in 1957-62 
(Donnithome 1967. pp. 390-1) . 
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importantly, none of the elements necessary for the development of a free market and 
market-oriented enterprise behaviour was injected into the decentralisation process. 
Thus the institutional reform that has taken place smce the late 1970s differs 
fundamentally from previous attempts at decentralisation. 
The outcome of earlier attempts at reform had been to make the operation of state 
enterprises even more unwieldy than before. The incomplete restoration of centralisation 
placed state enterprises under an extremely complicated system of multiple control by 
different levels of governments, each with a claim on state enterprises and often issuing 
contradictory directives.-^ 
EXPANSION OF ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY 
The starting point of institutional reform was in the area of financial independence, 
which the central govemment seemed to have identified as the key factor in improving 
the efficiency of state enterprises. From 1978 until the late 1980s, enterprises were given 
increasingly more control over planning, production, marketing and the management of 
productive factors. 
From an operational point of view, institutional reform in large and medium-sized 
state enterprises can be divided into three stages. In the first two stages (1978-82 and 
1983-85), reform was guided by the idea of "making concessions on power and benefits" 
{rangquan fangli). There was no substantial change in the fundamental relationship 
between govemment and enterprises; the govemment was in principle still the owner, 
operator and decision-maker. What was conceded was a share of the profits generated in 
the production and marketing process, which would have been submitted to the 
govemment under the former system. This concept was institutionalised in two stages. 
In stage one, the govemment instituted a profit retention scheme. In stage two, a tax 
system was introduced into large and medium-sized state enterprises in an attempt by the 
central govemment to regularise the altered financial relationship of enterprises and the 
state. 
In the third stage (1986-88), the govemment tried to redefine and institutionalise its 
relationship with enterprises under the Contract Management Responsibility System. 
Under this system, in principle the govemment retained ownership of enterprises but 
conceded the right of business operations to enterprise managers. The govemment 
charged enterprises a contract fee and collected taxes from them. 
Profit Retention Scheme 
Institutional reform began with the creation of a profit retention scheme for enterprises 
and restoration of a bonus scheme for workers. Enterprises were thus able to retain a 
••See Chen Ji\-uan et al. (1992) and B>Td (1992c) for case studies of Qingdao Forging Machinery Plant 
and Shenvang Smelter, which operated under multiple leadership before the economic reform. 
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limited amount of profits that would in fomier years have been completely surrendered 
to the govemment^ This scheme was first tried in six state enterprises in Sichuan 
province in October 1978. These pilot enterprises were allowed to retain 3-5 per cent of 
profit obtained on their quota of products and 15-25 per cent of profit obtained on 
goods produced in excess of the quota subject to achieving economic and technical goals 
in eight areas: output; product mix; quality; quantity of inputs; labour productivity; 
production costs; profit; and use of working capital (Riskin 1987, p. 344). Calculation of 
the profit sharing ratio was based on the previous year's results, and so retained profit 
could increase only if actual profit rose in the following year. In principle, enterprises 
were also required to share in losses if they ran into the red. Retained profit could be 
used by managers to fund workers' bonuses, collective welfare and capital investment. 
Under the original program, enterprises were entitled to retain 100 per cent of profit 
generated exclusively from profit retained in the previous period(s). Enterprises in the 
profit-retention scheme were able to exercise Limited autonomy over the management of 
labour and the marketing of output in excess of the quota and could retain a certain 
proportion of depreciation (Naughton 1985, pp. 226-7). They were also required to pay 
for the use of fixed capital. By the end of 1978, 100 enterprises had adopted the profit 
retention scheme. 
The profit retention scheme was officially endorsed in June 1979 and soon applied to 
thousands of state enterprises nationwide. Initially, enterprises under the new system 
were to retain 3-5 percent of total profit according to the degree to which they fulfiEed 
production, quality and cost goals. The scheme was later modified (Sun 1982) so that 
industries with high profits received a 10 per cent retention rate, industries with low 
profits qualified for a 30 per cent retention rate and other industries received 20 per 
cent. A scheme for loss-making enterprises was also introduced. Under this scheme, 
loss-makers would obtain a fixed subsidy and certain benefits for reducing their losses. 
During the first nine months of 1979, 1,366 enterprises adopted the scheme {Caiwu Yu 
Kuaiji 1979, Vol. 11, p. 1), and this had increased to over 6,600 state enterprises by 
1980, or 16 per cent of all industrial enterprises covered by the state budget. Together, 
these enterprises accounted for 60 per cent of the total output of the industry and 70 per 
cent of total profit {Renmin Ribao 2 January 1981, p. 1). It was announced at the 
National People's Congress in August that the profit-sharing scheme would be adopted 
in all state enterprises by the end of 1981 {Renmin Ribao 20 August 1980, p. 1). 
However, the new system was soon found to be seriously flawed. The rate of profit 
retention was often set arbitrarily, leaving substantial room for bargaining between 
enterprise managers and the agents of central and local governments. This had two 
consequences. First, the budget constraint of state enterprises remained soft. The 
-This practice per se was comparable to that in the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, 
where forms of profit sharing had existed since the 1950s. 
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retention rate was negotiated on a case-by-case basis rather than according to strict 
rules. The outcome was determined by the negotiating power of enterprises and was at 
the discretion of govemment agents. If enterprises perceived the flexibility of the system, 
they could manipulate the rules in their favour, resulting in a soft budget constraint. The 
second consequence was that enterprises could use their better access to information 
about production to increase their share of profits, leading to a significant decline in 
govemment revenue from state enterprises. According to Naughton (1985), the total 
profit retained by state enterprises increased from 2.1 billion yuan in 1978 to 17 billion 
yuan in 1982, an annual growth rate of 177.38 per cent. This far exceeded the growth 
rates of output and total profit.® After June 1980, profit remitted to the govemment fell 
significantiy below the previous year is level. In particular, in August remittance 
decreased by 17 per cent compared with a year earlier. 
The new system also left considerable room for local governments to intervene in the 
operation of state enterprises. Local govemment intervention intensified with the 
adoption of the financial contract system by central and local govemments and by local 
govemments and enterprises (Naughton 1985, pp. 236-7). Under this hierarchical 
system, enterprises negotiated profit targets with local govemments and local 
govemments entered into contracts with the central govemment. While the process of 
negotiation between enterprises and local govemments could favour enterprises, it also 
allowed revenue-maximising local govemments to interfere in the operation of 
enterprises in their locality (Naughton 1992). This not only ran contradictory to the idea 
of an expansion in the autonomy of enterprises and resulted in irregularities in the 
operation of state enterprises, it also further strengthened local power at the expense of 
central financial capability. 
The new system also failed to produce a clear improvement in efficiency. Statistics at 
the aggregate level for 1978-82 show a mixed picture. The gross value of industrial 
output per 100 yuan of fixed assets declined by 8 per cent while output per 100 yuan of 
working capital rose by 8 per cent {China Statistics Yearbook 1984, p. 263). In view of 
the fact that this change took place in the context of a shift towards less capital-intensive 
^The output of state enterprises was worth 341.64 billion yuan in 1978 and 434.03 billion yuan in 1982 
{China Statistics Yearbook 1983, p. 215). This represented an annual growth rate of 6.76 per cent for 
the four years from 1978 to 1982. Data on the profit of state enterprises for 1978 are not available, but 
the growth rate of profit in 1979-82 can serve as a rough approximation. The profit of state enterprises 
was 56.28 billion yuan in 1979 {Annual Economic Report of China 1981, pp. vi-18) and 59.77 billion 
yuan in 1982 {China Statistics Yearbook 1984 p. 292), representing an annual growth rate of 2 per cent 
during this three-year period. Combined profit and tax from state enterprises amounted to 79.07 billion 
yuan in 1978 and 97.22 billion yuan in 1982 {China Statistics Yearbook 1983, p. 7), an annual growth 
rate of 5.73 per cent Thus the growth rates of output, profit and combined profit and tax fell far short of 
that of retained profit. 
^Refer to Collection of Industrial Economic Management [Gongye Jingji Guanli Congkan] 1981, No. 
2. p. 6. 
77 
light industry,8 Field (1984, pp. 751-6) estimated that output per 100 yuan of fixed 
assets fell by 14.5 per cent during the period.^ With levels of efficiency failing to improve 
and an increasing share of profit being claimed by enterprises, the central government's 
revenue base was eroded rapidly. This resulted in a financial crisis in 1982, which 
brought reform to a halt.i® 
Table 4.1 Distribution of Profit Retention Rates, 1980 
Per cent No. of Enterprises Per cent Cumulative Percentage 
0 < and < 5 43 19.46 19.46 
5 <= and < 10 54 24.43 43.89 
10 <= and < 20 72 32.58 76.47 
20 <= and < 30 28 12.67 89.14 
30 <= and < 40 13 5.88 95.02 
40 <= and < 50 3 1.36 96.38 
50 <= and < 60 2 0.90 97.28 
60 <= and < 70 1 0.45 97.74 
70 <= and < 80 2 0.90 98.64 
80 <= and < 90 3 1.36 100.00 
Total 221 100.00 100.00 
Source: Survey data. 
Of the 296 enterprises in the sample studied in this thesis, 230 (77.7 per cent) 
adopted the profit-sharing scheme in 1980. Of these 221 were operating in the black. 
The average profit retention rate of profitable enterprises was 15.14 per cent. The 
distribution of profit retention is presented in Table 4.1. As shown in Table 4.1, most 
enterprises retained less than 30 per cent of their profits: 44 per cent under 10 per cent, 
76 per cent under 20 per cent, and nearly 90 per cent under 30 per cent. 
^Light industry's share in gross material product value increased from 31.1 per cent in 1978 to 32.1 per 
cent in 1983 (China Statistics Yearbook 1984, p. 27). 
^This is also confirmed by other studies, such as World Bank (1985a), Chow (1985), Tidrick (1986), 
Chen (1986), Chen and Sang (1986) and Pan (1986). 
the profit retention scheme was being implemented in large enterprises, a profit contract system 
began to emerge in small state enterprises. In April 1981, the government formalised the profit sharing 
system in a new institution called the "Economic Responsibility Contract", which soon evolved into a 
profit contract system. The multiple obligations of state enterprises under the original profit retention 
scheme were simplified, so that making a profit became the only criterion for these enterprises to receive 
a share of profit. The retention rate for above-quota profit, which was subject to negotiation with the 
government, varied from 40-100 per cent. By the end of 1981, 80 per cent of state enterprises had 
entered into profit contracts (Wong 1986, p. 367). According to Naughton (1985), the contract system 
mainly applied in small state enterprises. In this study, the focus is on large and medium-sized state 
enterprises and so this system is not discussed. 
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The ad hoc and irregular nature of the profit retention scheme is revealed by the 
survey data, which show a considerable variation in retention rates across sectors, across 
localities, and even across enterprises within one sector and in the same locality. 
Surprisingly, in the latter case, the retention rates were negotiated with the same 
government agent. Profit retention rates in selected industries and different localities are 
presented in Tables 4.2a and 4.2b. 
Table 4.2a Profit-Retention Rate by Industry, 1980 (%) 
Sector Beijing Shanghai 
Firm No. Mean Minimum Maximum Firm No. Mean Minimum Maximum 
Food Processing 3 9.42 8.28 10.95 2 5.08 0.27 9.88 
Textiles 3 10.38 9.16 12.14 9 3.37 1.65 7.08 
Pnnung and Publishing 3 32.22 16.67 60.00 1 33.56 33.56 33.56 
Construction Materials 4 31.52 6.49 71.23 2 24.11 8.22 40.00 
Machinen' 7 27.48 13.16 74.14 12 10.95 0.77 31.64 
Oearoic Communication Equipment 5 15.95 10.39 21.61 3 6.81 2.38 12.31 
Industnal Chemicals 3 9.CM 7.90 11.14 3 11.39 2.57 25.08 
Medicine 2 5.50 2.75 8.26 3 1.58 0.90 2.36 
Table 4.2b Profit-Retention Rate by Locality, 1980 (%) 
City Textile Machinery 
Firm No. Mean Minimum Maximum Firm No. Mean Minimum Maximum 
Beijing 3 10.38 9.16 12.15 7 27.48 13.16 74.14 
Shanghai 9 3.37 1.66 7.08 12 10.95 0.77 31.64 
Wuhan 4 15.01 6.90 18.82 4 24.10 10.96 48.86 
Chongqing 2 10.08 8.51 11.65 6 32.17 5.90 82.98 
Shenyang 2 14.85 5.14 24,55 3 12.10 4.50 26.35 
Guangzhou 2 17.16 12.50 22.12 3 14.95 10.00 18.58 
Source: Survev data. 
Table 4.2a shows the profit retention rates of enterprises in eight sectors in Beijing 
and Shanghai. The rates differ considerably according to sector. The average retention 
rate in Beijing varies from 5.5 per cent for the pharmaceutical industry to 32.2 per cent 
for the printing and publishing industry. Similarly, the rates range from 1.6 per cent for 
the pharmaceutical industry to 33.6 per cent for the printing and publishing industry in 
Shanghai. The inter-industry difference in retention rates may partly be explained by 
distortion in administrative prices, which were often one of the criteria used to determine 
the profit share. However, the data also reveal substantial intra-industry differences in 
retention rates. For example, of 12 enterprises in the machinery industry in Shanghai, the 
minimum retention rate is 0.8 per cent and the maximum is 31.6 per cent. This means 
that the rate could vary enormously within the same industry and locality. Even among 
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enterprises producing fairly homogeneous products in Shanghai, there is a large 
difference betv^een enterprises: the highest profit retention rate for the textile industry 
was over four times greater than the lowest rate. The data show a substantial variation in 
retention rates in all industries except the food processing and textile industries in 
Beijing. This implies that the profit retention scheme was a fairly ad hoc system, which 
enterprises exploited in order to soften their budget constraints. 
Table 4.2b shows the profit retention rates of textiles and machinery manufacturers 
in six cities. Again there are substantial differences between and within cities for both 
industries. For example, the average retention rate for the textile industry is 17.2 per 
cent in Guangzhou but only 3.4 per cent in Shanghai. On average, enterprises in 
Shanghai seemed to have had the lowest retention rates and those in Wuhan the highest 
The substantial difference between cities again implies that there were considerable 
irregularities in die implementation of the scheme. 
At this stage of reform, the central government instituted two measures to facilitate 
enterprise autonomy. First, it created two categories of "enterprise funds" for fixed 
assets and working capital in the accounting system. Our data suggest that very few 
enterprises placed retained profit in these funds. Out of 296 enterprises, only 35 used the 
fund for fixed assets and 11 the fund for working capital. This suggests that the majority 
of enterprises were using retained profit rather to pay bonuses and provide collective 
welfare. .Among sample enterprises, bonuses already made up about 15 per cent of 
workers' incomes in 1980. 
Second, state enterprises were allowed to use bank loans to finance working capital. 
In the sample, 255 enterprises (86.15 per cent) took out bank loans. The proportion of 
funds from bank loans in enterprises' total working capital averaged 39.4 per cent; 22.6 
per cent of enterprises depended on bank loans for 50 per cent or more of their working 
capital. Banks also started to play a role in the investment strategies of state enterprises. 
In 1980, 282 enterprises undertook new investment projects, and of these 79 used bank 
loans to fund them. On average, bank loans accounted for 45.8 per cent of total 
investment funds. The bank loan played a crucial role in some projects, including seven 
projects funded totally by banks. ^ ^ 
Tax-for-Profit Scheme 
In 1983 tiie govemment introduced a second wave of reform by changing the traditional 
profit remittance system to a system of taxation on enterprises (// gai shui)}- As early as 
1979, a tax system had been implemented on an experimental basis in a few local 
enterprises in Hubei province. In 1980 the base was expanded to 191 enterprises 
'^The bonus system and the role of banks will be discussed later in the chapter in the section on reform 
of the management of labour and capital. 
I'The new ta.'^  was levied on the profit of enterprises. It is different from the existing Industrial and 
Commercial Tax which all enterprises pay regardless of profit. 
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(Naughton 1985), including a few large state enterprises such as Capital Steel Mill. 
During 1981-82, the tax system was further extended to 456 enterprises. At the end of 
1982, the central government signalled its readiness to institute the tax system in all large 
state enterprises by openly advocating its implementation in the press. The new financial 
system was officially endorsed in July 1983, with all enterprises to pay tax.^^ 
Initially, the tax system consisted srniply of a uniform 55 per cent income tax levied 
on profit, and the existing industrial-commercial tax was kept in place. The new system 
allowed enterprises to keep aU their profits after paying state taxes; enterprises would in 
principle be responsible for their own losses. However, the uniform tax system was 
found to place an unfair burden on some enterprises. State enterprises had to sell most of 
their output to the govemment at an administratively determined price. A uniform tax 
obviously led to an unfair distribution of income among state enterprises, with some 
benefiting from distortions in the price system and others placed at a disadvantage. 
Moreover, the physical conditions of state enterprises also differed gready. In the years 
before the economic reform, depreciation funds were collected by the central or local 
govemments from state enterprises and then redistributed according to the order of 
priority deemed appropriate by government. As these funds were a major source of 
finance to maintain the value of capital stock, this system led to substantial differences in 
capital intensity between state enterprises. It was considered unfair to apply the same tax 
rate on enterprises with different capital intensities, in view of the fact that these were 
not of the enterprises' own making.'"' 
Problems such as these made further change necessary. In October 1984, the central 
govemment implemented a modified tax system. While keeping the income tax intact, 
the industrial-commercial tax was broken down into product tax, value-added tax, 
business tax and salt tax. An adjustment tax was also added to the s y s t e m . T h e product 
tax applied to all products of the same type. This was designed to correct unfair income 
distribution caused by distortion in the administrative prices of different products. The 
adjustment tax was levied on profit and was enterprise-specific. It was intended to skim 
off profits derived from extemal factors such as administrative prices, capital intensity, 
locality and resource endowment, which might give an enterprise an unfair advantage. 
The essence of the adjustment tax was to reward enterprises exclusively for their 
efficiency. 
'^According to Cai Zheng (1983, Vol. 2, pp. 23-4), while large and medium-sized state enterprises 
were undergoing a tax-for-profit reform, small state enterprises, which accounted for more than half of 
the 87,000 state enterprises, were leased to private contractors who would pay income tax and capital 
charges. Local enterprises administered by county govemments did not switch from the contract system 
to a tax system (Wong 1986). 
•''The Chinese govemment also made a few unsuccessful attempts to impose charges on the capital of 
state enterprises at various stages of economic reform (Naughton 1985; Wong 1986). 
A resource tax was levied on state enterprises in the mining industry. 
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The new system constituted a significant attempt by the central government to 
regularise the financial relationship of government and enterprises. Under the system, 
enterprises had a full claim on residual profit after the application of various taxes, and 
managers had greater autonomy over investment, production and the management of 
productive factors. Following the implementation of the tax-for-profit scheme, the 
central govemment undertook further reform of the goods market {Jingji Ribao 4 
March 1983), labour management (Renmin Ribao 15 March 1983) and capital 
{Guowuyuan Gongbao 1983, No. 15). The major ideas behind these reforms were 
summarised in the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 
on Reform of the Economic Structure", which was endorsed by the Central Committee 
in October 1984 {Renmin Ribao 21 October 1984). In part, the decision read: 
Subject to state plans and control, the enterprise has the power to adopt flexible 
and diversified forms of operation; plan its production, supply and market 
products; keep and budget funds it is entitled to retain; appoint, remove, employ 
and elect its own personnel according to relevant regulations; decide how to 
recruit and use its work force, and on wages and rewards; set the prices of its 
products within the limits prescribed by the state, and so on. In short, the 
enterprise should become a relatively independent economic entity ... responsible 
for its own profits and losses ... as a legal person with certain rights and duties 
(Renmin Ribao 21 October 1984, p. 2). 
The new tax system still inherited some defects of the profit retention scheme, 
making enterprises' budget constraint unduly soft and hindering the efforts of the central 
govemment to make enterprises operationally independent. The tax system, by 
regularising the financial system, was implicitly intended to harden enterprises' budget 
constraint, but the enterprise-specific adjustment tax was arbitrarily determined and 
made the marginal tax rate flexible. This tax was again determined after negotiation with 
enterprises and was set at the discretion of the tax office. The problem lay not only in the 
existence of the adjustment tax but also in the excessive flexibility of the tax system as a 
whole. External factors, such as administrative prices and differing capital endowments, 
could be used by enterprises to claim a lower tax rate and exemption from adjustment 
tax and even, in some cases, from income tax. These problems effectively softened the 
budget constraint of state enterprises. 
Local governments were responsible for collecting tax on behalf of the central 
authority and were the agents responsible for negotiation of the tax rate. The flexibility 
of the tax system allowed them to interfere in the operation of enterprises, thus 
hampering the efforts of the central govemment to turn state enterprises into 
operationally independent and financially accountable entities. Because of these 
problems, the new system encountered resistance from both local govemments and 
enterprises (Lee 1990; Yin and He 1988;). 
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Table 4.3 Enterprises' Average Taxes and Retained Profit, 1984-88 (%) 
Year 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
(Number of Observations) (277) (279) (272) (269) (268) 
Income Tax 45.91 43.63 40.47 35.38 32.92 
(277) (279) (272) (269) (268) 
Adjustment Tax 21.95 13.46 11.89 9.01 9.08 
(150) (148) (116) (81) (70) 
Retained Profit 23.90 33.39 35.63 35.66 37.71 
(277) (279) (272) (269) (263) 
Note\ In each year there are some erroneous data. These include missing values and 
obvious errors; for example, taxes or retained profit exceeding total profit by, in 
some cases, nearly 100 times. These have been omitted from the calculation. 
Source: Survey data. 
Our survey data cover the income tax and adjustment tax paid by enterprises in 
1984-88.1^ Average income tax, adjustment tax and retained profit as a percentage of 
the total profit of sample enterprises for the period 1984-88 are presented in Table 4.3. 
According to the table, the average amount of income tax paid by enterprises in 
1984 was 45.91 per cent, falling to 32.9 per cent in 1988. Over the period under study, 
the average amount of income tax paid by enterprises was below the official rate of 55 
per cent, and it assumed a consistent downward trend. There are two possible reasons 
for this. First, as suggested previously, the payment of income taxes in full was often not 
strictly enforced by the govemment due to irregularities in collection practices. The 
payment of income tax could be postponed, and the amount was subject to reduction or 
even exemption. With local govemment permission an enterprise could direct funds set 
aside to pay taxes towards new investment, instead of applying for a bank loan. Only 
slightly more than one-third of the sample enterprises paid income taxes of around 55 
per cent between 1984 and 1986 (Table 4.4), with most paying far less than the official 
rate. Second, the adoption of the Contract Management Responsibility System in 1986 
may have resulted in a lower average tax rate. 
More than half of the enterprises in the sample paid positive adjustment taxes in 
1984. In the following years, not only did the tax base shrink from 150 in 1984 to 70 in 
1988, the average adjustment tax rate also declined from 22 per cent to 9.1 per cent 
(Table 4.3). This trend is in part explained by the increase in the share of output sold at 
the market price and the decline in the role of government-set prices. It is also possible 
that enterprises were successful in negotiating to have the tax waived or reduced during 
the period. 
'^Product tax, value-added tax, business tax and salt tax were not levied on profit, but were classified as 
operational costs. These taxes are not reported separately in the survey data. However, they should not 
affect the marginal incentive of enterprises as they were usually collected in full and were not subject to 
manipulation by enterprises. 
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Table 4.4 Distribution of Income Tax Rate Among Sample Enterprises, 
1984-88 
Tax Rate (%) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
0 < = and <=10 48 56 56 62 80 
(17.3%) (20.1%) (20.6%) (23.0%) (29.9%) 
10 < and <=20 8 13 21 33 25 
(2.9%) (4.7%) (7.7%) (12.3%) (9.3%) 
20 < and <=30 10 18 21 32 37 
(3.6%) (5.6%) (7.7%) (11.9%) (13.8%) 
30 < and <=40 39 36 47 54 44 
(14.1%) (12.9%) (17.3%) (20.1%) (16.4%) 
40 < and <=50 59 57 50 49 46 
(21.3%) (20.4%) (18.4%) (18.2%) (17.2%) 
50 < and <= 60 113 99 77 39 36 
(40.8%) (35.5%) (28.4%) (14.5%) (13.5%) 
Source: Survey data. 
Retained profit as a share of total profit increased from 15.1 per cent in 1980 to 23.9 
per cent in 1984 and to 37.7 per cent in 1988. In the eight years from 1980 to 1988, it 
had more than doubled. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 suggest that the budget constraint of sample enterprises was soft, 
the outcome of the ad hoc nature of adjustment tax and irregularities in income tax 
collection. Although nearly half of the sample enterprises paid an average of 21.95 per 
cent in adjustment tax in 1984, the average rate paid declined rapidly in the following 
years. The relatively moderate increase in market share (chapter 3) does not fully explain 
the drastic decline in the adjustment tax rate, suggesting that irregularities in the taxation 
system also played an important role. The income tax rates also differed substantially 
among enterprises (Table 4.4). In 1984 and 1985, more than half of the enterprises paid 
less than 50 per cent in income tax and a large number paid substantially less than the 
official rate of 55 per cent All these are strong indications of the soft budget constraint. 
The Contract Management Responsibility System 
The third stage of reform, which began in 1986, was characterised by the 
institutionalisation of enterprise autonomy^"^ and of the relationship between enterprises 
and the state in the Contract Management Responsibility System. ^ ^ The system was frrst 
"^^ One of the goals in implementing the contract system was to protect state enterprises from 
interference by local governments (Lee 1990, p. 387). 
i^In fact, a set of contracts was simultaneously adopted in many enterprises. These were the Contract 
Management Responsibility System, Managerial Responsibility System and Internal Contract System 
(Lee 1990). While the Contract Management Responsibility System separated the management and 
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tried in 1984 and was implemented widely after 1986. By 1988, it had been extended to 
more than 90 per cent of state industrial and commercial enterprises and to 95 per cent 
of large and medium-sized state enterprises {Economic Yearbook of China, 1989). 
Under the Contract Management Responsibility System, state enterprises signed a 
contract with the state defining their responsibilities and rights and the benefits 
associated with the management of enterprises. The contract delineated the enterprises' 
right to manage the means of production. Enterprises were also supposed to take 
responsibility for both profit and loss. The Contract Management Responsibility System 
was not, however, a uniform and weU-defined institution. The focus of the contract 
could differ among enterprises and at different times, Initially, most contracts 
emphasised the remittance of profit to the state; in time, the focus tended to be on 
investment for technical advancement and wage control mechanisms (Wang 1987). 
Later, new contracts linked managerial bonuses to the fulfilment of contracts and 
included penalties for managers who failed to realise the terms of the contract. 
The financial relationship between enterprises and the state could be defined in a 
number of ways under the Contract Management Responsibility System. The system was 
designed to invigorate state enterprises by granting them more non-financial autonomy 
and increasing the marginal rate of profit they could retain. Under the system, enterprises 
were supposed to take responsibility for the financial consequences of their decisions, 
good or bad. The basic elements of this relationship were that the contribution made by 
enterprises to government, in the form of either taxes or contract fees, would be fixed 
according to the level of profit in the previous year,^ ® and that enterprises would retain 
aU or a share of any increment in profit made in the years after the contract was signed. 
ownership of state enterprises, the Managerial Responsibility System was intended to separate 
management from politics. Enterprises were under the de facto control of the Party secretary in the 
former system (Chamberlain 1987). Decentralisation and marketisation created a new economic 
environment in which management by the Party committee became an inappropriate means of achieving 
economic efficiency. Under the new system, the Party no longer held supreme power over enterprises, 
and managers assumed full responsibility for economic and managerial decision-making in such areas 
as production, marketing, purchasing, investment, wage and bonus policies, workers' training and use of 
enterprise funds. In cases of conflict between management and the Party committee, the former were 
empowered to override the committee. This system was fu^t introduced in May 1984 in six cities on an 
experimental basis (Lee 1990, p. 388). The Internal Contract System covered the multi-tier contracts 
between enterprise management and lower level working teams and between the heads of working teams 
and workers. Although the bonus system was re-adopted as early as 1978, the distribution of bonuses in 
early years was based mainly on egalitarian principles rather than on performance for various political 
and economic reasons (Lee and Mark 1989; Tidrick 1987; Walder 1987). Economists argue that the 
bonuses distributed in this way were no more than a wage supplement and failed to encourage woricers 
to improve efficiency. The Internal Contract System facilitated enterprises' internal accounting and 
cultivated a spirit of responsibility among working teams. Under this system, bonuses were distributed 
according to the degree of fulfilment of the target specified in the contract. Though all of the above have 
implications for the efficiency of enterprises (Lee 1990), my interest is in exploring how the relationship 
between enterprises and the state affects the budget constraint of state enterprises and thus technical and 
allocative efficiency. Thus I do not focus on the Managerial Responsibility System and Internal Contract 
System in this study. 
i^SeeDu (1987) for details. 
^®For loss-making enterprises, the government subsidy is fixed at the level granted in the previous year. 
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Enterprises' share of margmal profit varied depending on the negotiating power of 
the enterprise and on the structure of the contract. There were different ways in which 
enterprises', and government's, share of marginal profit could be defined. One was to 
specify in the contract the rate of increase in the contribution to be paid to the 
government, with the balance being retained by enterprises {dizeng baogan). A second 
and by far the more popular way was to specify a base charge in the contract and then to 
divide any surplus profit between enterprises and the state in a pre-determined 
proportion {jishu baogan chaoshou fencheng). The rate agreed upon was often less than 
the official rate of 55 per cent, which on average reduced the amount of income tax paid 
by enterprises adopting this kind of contract. The third way of splitting profit was for 
enterprises to pay a lump-sum contribution to the govemment each year for the term of 
the contract, with enterprises retaining the balance of profits regardless of amount 
{dinger baogan). Among the enterprises studied, 94 per cent adopted the Contract 
Management Responsibility System. Of these, 30.9 per cent used the first method, 42.5 
per cent the second and 15.4 per cent the third. The remaining 11.2 per cent used other 
unspecified methods. The contract term also varied considerably, ranging in our sample 
from one to 15 years. A typical contract ran between 3 and 5 years, with 92.4 per cent 
of enterprises falling within this range. 
In view of the way the financial relationship between govemment and enterprises 
was defined, the Contract Management Responsibility System may again have 
contributed to the soft budget constraint in state enterprises. Under the system, tax on 
marginal profit was determined by negotiation between govemment and enterprises. The 
uniform 55 per cent income tax, which had been intended to regularise the relationship 
of enterprises and the govemment, was replaced by a charge on profit, which was again 
determined on an irregular case-by-case basis — through negotiation and at the 
discretion of govemment agents. Komai (1986b) was highly critical of the contract 
system as well as of the adoption of adjustment tax in China, believing that they 
"exemplified" the soft budget constraint 
Of enterprises surveyed, five adopted the Contract Management Responsibility 
System before or in 1984.21 During the period 1985-86, another 24 enterprises adopted 
the system. In 1987 and 1988, 81.4 per cent of the 296 enterprises had signed contracts 
with the govemment. In 1989, only 17 enterprises (5.7 per cent) still operated outside 
the system. 
It is interesting to assess the impact of the new system on the marketisation and 
autonomy of state enterprises, both of which have implications for budget constraint. 
Although the data do not give a systematic and rigorous picture of the impact of the 
system, they can provide a qualitative assessment. I divided data on enterprises for 1987 
and 1988 into two groups. Group A consists of enterprises which had already adopted 
These enterprises may have been among those chosen to test the system. 
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the contract system, group B of those which had not yet done so. In 1987, the average 
market share of enterprises in group A was 61.2 per cent, while that of enterprises in 
group B was 48.94 per cent. These figures were 57.2 per cent for group A and 41.7 for 
group B in 1988. Qearly there was a substantial difference in the degree of 
marketisation of the two groups, possibly arising from adoption of the new system. 
Although these figures cast some hght on the impact on marketisation of the 
Contract Management Responsibility System, it is also possible that those enterprises 
which were allowed to adopt the new system akeady enjoyed a higher degree of 
marketisation than those which were not. It would be misleading to suggest on the basis 
of the figures that the Contract Management Responsibility System was effective in 
promoting the marketisation process. In order to be more assertive about the effect of 
the system on the marketisation process, I calculated the average market shares in 1987 
of enterprises in and outside the system. The average market shares of both groups in 
1986 and 1987 were also calculated. The share of the first group increased from 58 per 
cent in 1986 to 61.8 per cent in 1987; the share of the second from 46.4 per cent to 48.6 
per cent. The net increase was 3.8 per cent for the first group and 2.6 per cent for the 
second. 
The observations for 1988 were re-grouped and average market shares calculated in 
the same way. The result was that the average market share of the first group increased 
by 2.3 per cent (from 55.5 per cent to 57.8 per cent) and that of the second by 0.6 per 
cent (from 41.1 per cent to 41.7 per cent). The information suggests that enterprises 
with a higher degree of marketisation may have been given priority in adopting the new 
system, as the market shares of the first group were already higher than those of the 
second group, before they entered into contracts. It also seems that the new system 
intensified the degree of marketisation, as the market share of the first group increased 
more rapidly than that of the second in both 1986-87 and 1987-88. 
The indicator of enterprise autonomy represented by retained profit did not, 
however, reveal any systematic difference between enterprises in and outside the system. 
Average retained profit for group A was 34.6 per cent in 1987 and 37 per cent in 1988; 
for group B it was 34.8 per cent in 1987 and 38.1 per cent in 1988. These figures 
present a contradictory picture of the impact of the new system on marketisation and 
financial autonomy, and it is not possible to draw any firm conclusion from the data 
presented here. As the Contract Management Responsibility System itself is not the 
focus of this thesis and cannot be analysed in detail here, I can at present only make a 
rough assessment of its impact on enterprise autonomy and marketisation. 
Summary 
In the 1980s the central govemment initiated various programs to increase enterprises' 
autonomy and make them operationally independent and financially accountable. It 
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attempted to regulate its financial relationship with enterprises, in the expectation that 
this would promote independence and financial viability. Over the decade, enterprises 
gained increasingly greater financial autonomy and control over business operations. 
However, two problems critically important for hardening the budget constraint of state 
enterprises were not adequately dealt with. First, the govemment was unable to 
regularise the rules of its financial relationship with enterprises in such a way as to 
harden budget constraint. At every stage of reform, the new measures conferred ad hoc 
mechanisms which allowed enterprises to bargain their way out of their financial 
obligations. The fact that enterprises knew that they could get away with behaving in an 
economically irrational manner undermined the budget cons t ra in t .Second, state 
enterprises were rarely made bankrupt. The reforms were typically designed in such a 
way that the "carrot" was offered without the threat of the "stick". In 1986, the National 
Congress of People's Deputies passed a bankruptcy law, which was never seriously 
implemented. According to Gao and Zhao (1990, p. 28), 17 per cent of state enterprises 
covered by the state budget operated in the red in 1985, their total losses amounting to 
3.64 billion yuan. Even so, bankruptcy was rarely d e c l a r e d . ^ ^ without any real threat of 
bankruptcy, reform lacked an important sanction for disciplining state enterprises. 
REFORM OF CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 
In the pre-reform period, both investment funds (long, medium and short-term) and 
working capital were allocated through state budgetary grants and were interest-free. 
The amount of capital available to state enterprises was specified in the govemment plan 
and channelled through the People's Bank of China, the country's only financial 
institution. In the area of capital allocation, the problems associated with enterprises' 
soft budget constraint were obvious and resulted in the wastage of scarce resources. In 
addition, the system caused conflict among state enterprises and encouraged extensive 
growth through capital expansion rather than through intensive strategies to improve 
technology and efficiency (White 1988). Against this background, the central 
govemment decided to partially commercialise the allocation of capital. 
The change began in 1979 when the central govemment tackled reform of the 
banking system. According to Byrd (1983), the essence of bank reform was first to 
reassert the independent status and organisational integrity of the banking system. 
Specialised banks and other financial institutions operating under the auspices of the 
Bank of China— such as the Agricultural Bank of China, People's Insurance Company 
--The case study on Chongqing Clock and Watch Company by Byrd and Tidrick (1992) provides a good 
example of a state enterprise skilfully manipulating tax rules and successfully turning bank loans into 
free govemment grants. This imphes that our argument about how budget constraint could be rendered 
soft was not hypothetical but very real for state enterprises. 
--The Chinese media reported with great fanfare a case of bankruptcy m Shenyang City in 1986. This 
was, however, a small state enterprise with fewer than 80 workers. All the workers were later assigned 
to other enterprises (Bowles and White 1989). 
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of China, Bank of China, General Administration of Foreign Exchange Control — were 
set up at different times and took over some of the business formerly conducted by the 
People's Bank of China. At the same time, the People's Construction Bank of China, 
managed by the Ministry of Finance on behalf of the State Council, began to take charge 
of the allocation of investment capital in the form of either budgetary grants or loans to 
state enterprises. Banks were also given more discretion to mobilise and allocate their 
financial resources, with the intention of weakening the influence of the powerful 
Ministry of Finance and of local governments; 
Second, banking reform aimed to establish a new relationship between banks and 
enterprises — their main clients. Provision was made for "economic levers", such as 
interest rates and terms of repayment, to guide money lending activities away from 
reliance on administrative fiat Banks were obliged to enter into a contractual 
relationship with clients; they were empowered to monitor the utilisation of loans and 
make independent judgements on the efficiency, managerial competence and 
creditworthiness of enterprises. They could then refuse a loan application if necessary. 
Interest rates on loans of various types were raised in an attempt to make users aware of 
the cost of capital. 
A third goal was to decentralise the intemal organisation of banks by granting 
conditional autonomy to local branches. Branches were given the authority to engage 
independently in short and medium-term lending, using a proportion of their savings 
above specified targets to fund purchases of equipment by enterprises. Finally, banking 
reform aimed to professionalise banking and bank staff. 
In the early 1980s, the People's Construction Bank was responsible for the 
allocation of long-term investment funds, while the People's Bank of China continued to 
administer the working capital of state enterprises. In 1983, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank was established to handle deposits of urban residents and to distribute 
working capital and medium-term loans for technical innovation to state enterprises. At 
the same time, the People's Bank of China was transformed into a kind of central bank 
dealing mainly with macro issues and supervising the operation of the special banks, 
while the People's Construction Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank emerged 
as the two major financial institutions in charge of supplying funds to state enterprises. 
This structure continued until 1993.2"* 
With structural reform of the banking system, the way in which funds were allocated 
to state enterprises also experienced substantial change. Free state budgetary grants gave 
way to interest-bearing loans to finance enterprises' long-term and short-term needs. 
This had implications both for the management of capital in state enterprises and for 
budget constraint. In late 1979, the State Council authorised the People's Construction 
2-^ In late 1993, the central government announced further major reform to the banking system. The form 
the new institutions will take has not yet been established. 
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Bank of China to allocate funds from the state budget to certain state enterprises for 
capital investment in the form of loans and to charge interest of 3 per cent per annum 
{The China Economic Almanac 1981, p. ii-138).25 The duration of the loan was limited 
to 15 years for enterprises in heavy industry and 10 years for others. Moreover, the 
interest rate could be adjusted at the discretion of the bank. A reward in the form of 
lower interest rates could be given for prompt repayment, and a penalty rate as high as 6 
per cent applied to overdue loans. Under the new system, state enterprises were required 
to apply to banks for interest-bearing loans for working capital rather than receiving 
interest-free funds from state grants. In this way, the government hoped to "raise the 
efficiency of capital utilisation by introducing more caution and cost consciousness into 
managers' calculations about the acquisition and use of capital" (White 1988, p. 11). In 
1984, China's 54,000 large and medium-sized state enterprises could acquire bank loans 
for working capital at an interest rate of 7.92 per cent per annum, and credit for 
investment projects at an interest rate of 8.4 per cent for a 1-3 year term and 10.05 per 
cent for a 5-10 year term. In June 1983, the State Council approved a People's Bank 
report on the unified management of working capital for state enterprises (Guowuyuan 
Gongbao 1983, No. 15). State enterprises would no longer receive financial allocations 
for working capital from superior administrative authorities; instead, they would receive 
these in the form of loans from banks. As a result, fiscal appropriation as a proportion of 
total provision of funds for production, construction and working capital dropped from 
76.6 per cent in 1978 to 31.6 per cent in 1986 while bank credit increased from 23.4 per 
cent to 68.4 per cent (Bowles and White 1989, p. 487). White (1988) beUeves that 
reform of the finance sector had a significant impact on China's urban-industrial 
economy. 
For enterprises in our sample, bank loans took on an increasingly important role in 
financing both working capital and investment Table 4.5 shows that the average share 
of working capital financed by bank loans increased from 32.43 per cent in 1980 to 48.5 
per cent in 1988, while credit as a share of total investment increased from 14.59 per 
cent in 1980 to 36.36 per cent in 1988. This made bank loans the most important source 
of funds for working capital among large and medium-sized state enterprises. In the case 
of investment funds, bank credit became the second most important source of funds after 
1984, and their importance in financing investment by enterprises increased steadily 
throughout the period under study. 
At the same time, the share of grants in both working capital and investment in fixed 
assets declined, from 49.02 per cent in 1980 to 18.26 per cent in 1988 in the case of 
working capital. Investment in fixed assets consisted of central budgetary grants, local 
^^There were, however, criteria which projects had to meet to qualify for loans from this bank. These 
were 1) that the product was marketable; 2) that resources such as energy and raw materials had either 
been guaranteed or were readily available; 3) that the return on the project was sufficiently high to 
ensure repayment of the loan; and 4) that land, labour and equipment had been properly arranged. 
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budgetary grants and project-specific grants. The purpose of the former two was to 
expand production capacity. Project-specific grants could only be used to fund 
government-approved projects, usually those high on the list of priorities for the 
development program. The share of general purpose budgetary grants from central and 
local govemments declined throughout the 1980s, from 28.1 per cent in 1980 to 12 per 
cent in 1988. The share of project-specific grants also declined significantly, from 52.2 
per cent to 46.5 per cent, while the share of other unspecified sources of investment 
funds remained constant. It is clear that bank loans increasingly replaced state grants as 
the primary source of funding for enterprises. 
Table 4.5 Sources of Working Capital and Investment Funds 
in 1980 and 1984-88 (%) 
Working Capital 1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Bank Loans 32.4 41.2 41.6 47.7 49.4 48.5 
State Grants 49.0 37.2 30.7 25.1 22.4 18.3 
Enterprise Funds 1.0 0.5 1.3 1.6 2.2 2.6 
Investment Funds 
Bank Credit 14.6 24.6 32.5 35.1 38.4 36.4 
Central Budgetary Gran 13.4 9.8 10.4 7.5 7.5 6.3 
Local Budgetary Grants 14.7 11.4 9.0 8.2 6.1 5.8 
Project-specific Grants 52.2 50.4 44.0 44.4 43.3 46.5 
Other 5.1 3.8 4.1 4.9 4.7 5.1 
Notes-. l)In the accounting system, items listed as working capital are: (a) state grants; (b) 
enterprise funds; (c) borrowings for building infrastructure; (d) investment from other 
enterprises; (e) bank loans; (f) receipts in advance for sale of product(s); and (g) delayed 
payment for purchases. Only (a), (b) and (e) are shown in this table. State grants, bank 
loans and enterprise funds which together account for 71.6 per cent of the total working 
capital of enterprises over these six years, are the major sources of fmance and the most 
important determinants of budget constraint in state enterprises. 
2)"Investment funds" refers to actual funds invested in the current year in both new and 
ongoing projects. 
3)Investment funds include some interest-bearing loans from the central and local 
govemments which had previously been interest-free grants. The allocation of these loans 
was determined by the government and the interest rate on them was low and fixed. 
TTierefore, they differ in their effect on the marginal incentive to economise on the use of 
capital through bank loans. In this survey, this type of loan is not listed separately. 
Source: Survey data. 
Also of interest is the mcrease in the share of enterprise funds in working capital, 
from 1 per cent in 1980 to 2.56 per cent in 1988. Although still insignificant as a share of 
the total, this represented a steady rise throughout the period and can be attributed to 
such financial reforms as the introduction of the profit retention scheme and new tax 
procedures. 
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Even though large and medium-sized state enterprises tended to rely increasingly on 
bank loans throughout the 1980s, a number of sample enterprises continued to depend 
entirely on state grants for their working capital and, in particular, to fund investment in 
fixed assets. For example, 295 out of the 296 enterprises in the sample received some 
form of state grant to use as working capital, and state grants were an important source 
of working capital for many enterprises. Enterprises depended even more on state grants 
to fund investment The distribution of sample enterprises by source of working capital 
and investment is presented in Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in Appendix 4. 
The problems that emerged in the management of capital were no less serious than 
those faced in the management of financial obligations to the state. Despite the fact that 
interest-free state grants increasingly gave way to bank loans as a source of financing 
both working capital and investment, economists have cast doubt on the success of the 
reform in hardening the budget constraint of state enterprises. They blame the legacy of 
former institutions, interference by local govemment in banking activities and the 
behaviour of banks themselves for this failure. 
Bowles and White (1989) identified a number of factors jointly contributing to the 
failure of the new institution to harden budget constraint. First, although institutional 
reform gave state enterprises more decision-making power and created the incentive for 
profit maximisation, it made no provision for bankruptcy and thus had no effective way 
of dealing with loss-making enterprises. In the case of the small number of enterprises 
that consistently made losses and were declared bankrupt, it was the govemment and not 
the banks that made the declaration. Meanwhile, banks had to continue to provide funds 
to loss-making enterprises. 
Second, the independence of banks was not guaranteed in the reform package. 
Although banking system reform made the headquarters of special banks exclusively 
responsible for professional business conducted by local branches, local govemments 
had the right to be involved, and often were involved, in the appointment, transfer and 
promotion of local branch managers. Local govemments were thus able to exercise 
considerable influence over the loans policies of banks within their jurisdictions, and 
banks were often pressured to issue loans to loss-making enterprises in the locality. 
According to one estimation (Bowles and White, p. 489), of 70 billion yuan issued to 
state enterprises as loans in 1980-86, only 4.6 per cent (3.2 billion) of the principal was 
repaid on time. 
A third factor was that banks continued to identify governmental goals as their own 
and themselves operated under the soft budget constraint. Like enterprises, banks were 
institutions owned by the state and suffered from a similar failure to respond to new 
economic incentives. Although they obviously had a stake in increasing their operational 
profit, they were not subject to market rules under which continued losses would have 
cost their survival. In addition, the role of banks in the economy had always been 
ambiguous. They were at least in principle supposed to be independent and profit-
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oriented financial intermediaries, but they also had a duty to finance state enterprises and 
promote national economic development. The former role required them to establish a 
strictly contractual relationship with state enterprises, and the latter to support state 
enterprises in need, including those in financial difficulty. These two functions often 
conflicted, making it difficult for banks to act consistently and in an economically 
rational manner. In some cases, banks knowingly provided financial assistance to high-
risk enterprises.^^ 
LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
Reform of labour management in China was a poUtically sensitive issue, posing 
particular problems for reformers. Since, according to Marxist theory, labour is the 
exclusive factor generating the value of a good, workers are seen as the "masters" or 
owners, rather than the employees, of state enterprises. Labour is not regarded as a 
tradeable commodity, unlike raw material inputs or energy. Decentralisation of the 
allocation of labour would have meant that the labour input would be determined by 
enterprises on the basis of demand and supply, and that incompetent workers could be 
sacked. This was unacceptable to many Marxists and those worried about the possibility 
of social instability due to massive unemployment Progress of labour market reform was 
therefore slow. The allocation of labour was still firmly controlled by the govemment, 
and most workers in state enterprises enjoyed tenureship, "which reformers identified as 
a major impediment to improving labour productivity" (White 1988, p. 14). A true 
labour market did not evolve until the late 1980s. 
Despite the difficulties, two major changes took place in the management of labour. 
First, managers were granted the power to allocate non-wage income such as bonuses 
and other welfare measures to workers. This system was first instituted concomitantly 
with the profit retention scheme, under which profit retained by enterprises was used to 
fund workers' bonuses, collective welfare and investment It was expected that 
managers would use their discretion over bonus payments to reward good workers and 
penalise the ill-behaved and thus achieve improved productivity. The bonus system 
remained intact under the tax-for-profit scheme and the Contract Management 
Responsibility System. Initially the govemment imposed a celling on bonuses of 20 per 
cent of wages. In 1985 this ceiling was abolished. Economists found that the reward 
system was not completely successful, particularly in the early years of reform, owing to 
managers' limited authority over employees. Bonuses often became simply 
supplementary wages allocated on an egalitarian basis (Lee 1990). 
The second major change was that enterprises were granted the right to employ a 
small percentage of temporary and contract workers. Although in principle this reform 
allowed managers greater flexibility in the use of labour, its effectiveness was limited by 
26Refer to examples in Bowles and White (1989, p. 492). 
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the difficulty of sacking temporary workers (White 1988); consequently, overstaffing 
was common in state enterprises. It has been suggested that 20-30 per cent of the work 
force in state enterprises is superfluous (White 1988, p. 15). 
Table 4.6a shows the average remuneration of workers and bonuses as a share of 
total income in sample enterprises for 1980 and 1984-88. The data indicate that total 
remuneration, including wages and bonuses, increased from 913.18 yuan per worker per 
year in 1980 to 2,237.31 yuan in 1988, an increase of 143 per cent in eight years. This is 
in contrast to the situation in the pre-reform period, when wages rose very gradually. In 
1952, the average income of a worker in a state enterprise was 446 yuan per year. This 
had increased to 644 yuan in 1978 (Byrd 1983, p. 151), an increase of only 44 per cent 
in 26 years. 
Table 4.6a Remuneration Structure in Sample Enterprises, 1980 and 1984-88 
1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Remuneration (yuanAvorker/year) 917.18 1,127.57 1,338.32 1,542.11 1,764.95 2,237.31 
Wages (yuan/worker/year) 777.10 887.84 1,047.68 1,174.18 1,294.09 1,594.64 
Bonuses (yuan/worker/year) 140.08 239.73 290.86 367.94 470.86 642.67 
Bonuses in Total Remuneration (%) 15.27 21.26 21.73 23.86 26.68 28.73 
Table 4.6b Employment Structure in Sample Enterprises, 1980 and 1984-88 
1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Total Workers (no./entCTprise) 3,523 3,831 3,914 3,974 3,995 4,061 
WorkCTS on Contracts (no./entCTprise) 8 70 114 171 209 289 
Proportion of Woiicers on Contracts (%) 0.23 1.83 2.91 4.30 5.23 7.12 
Note: Total number of workers does not include seasonal workers in either table. 
Source: Survey data. 
Throughout the 1980s, wages (which were determined mainly according to 
seniority) formed the largest proportion of income. Bonuses, which were more closely 
related to the performance of workers, rose at a faster pace than wages during the 
period. Whereas wages increased by 100.5 per cent — from 777.1 yuan in 1980 to 
1,594.64 yuan in 1988 — the average bonus increased by 358.82 per cent from a mere 
140.07 yuan per worker in 1980 to 642.67 yuan in 1988. Bonuses as a proportion of 
workers' total remuneration rose from 15.3 per cent in 1980 to 28.7 per cent in 1988. 
At the same time, more workers were being recruited on a contract basis. According 
to Table 4.6b, the proportion of workers on contracts increased from 0.2 per cent in 
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1980 to 7.2 per cent in 1988, and it was still rising. The adoption of the labour contract 
system did not necessarily mean, however, that state enterprises were always in a 
position to employ workers according to need. More often than not, they succumbed to 
pressure from govemment to employ more workers and to internal pressure from 
workers to provide employment for their children and relatives (Byrd and Tidrick 1987). 
Table 4.7 Degree to Which Managers Considered Enterprise 
to be Overstaffed, 1988 
Degree of Enterprises No. of New Recruits 
Surplus Labour Number Percentage Mean Minimum Maximum 
0 115 38.85 670 0 6,717 
0 < and <= 10% 46 15.54 314 0 1,740 
10% < and <= 20% 70 23.65 133 0 2,864 
20% < and <= 30% 56 18.92 88 0 589 
30% < and <= 40% 6 2.03 36 8 72 
40% < and <= 50% 1 0.34 13 13 13 
50% or more 2 0.68 417 79 754 
Source: Survey data. 
When managers of the 296 sample enterprises were asked whether any of their 
labour force was superfluous, their replies indicated that 183 enterprises were indeed 
overstaffed. Answers to a foUow-up question showed that many managers considered 
the degree of overstaffmg to be very high. Table 4.7 provides a summary of these 
answers. In the table, enterprises are grouped according to degree of surplus labour. The 
first panel shows the number and percentage of enterprises in each group and the second 
panel the number of new recruits. 
The table reveals a significant degree of overstaffing. Nearly half of the managers 
believed that over 10 per cent of their labour force was superfluous, and managers of 
nine enterprises acknowledged an excess of over 30 per cent. What is more surprising is 
that 179 of the 183 enterprises that were overstaffed took on employees in 1988. Even 
the two enterprises that were overstaffed by more than 50 per cent recruited 79 and 754 
new workers respectively in that year (Table 4.1)?'^ 
2'^ It should be noted that the seemingly irrational behaviour of state enterprises in the employment area 
should not be interpreted in the framework of Komai's economics of shortage. In Komai's (1980) 
framework, shortage not only takes place in goods and services, but also in productive factors including 
labour, and so enterprises tend to hoard raw materials as well as labour. In reality, the Chinese economy 
has never run shon of labour. On the contrary, the govemment is from time to time under pressure to 
create jobs for the newly emerging labour force. Therefore these figures are unlike to indicate any 
voluntary action on the part of enterprises to hoard labour. 
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It would seem from these figures that the employment decisions of enterprises were 
not made according to actual need based on the balance between productivity of labour 
and its costs. The table suggests that, after one decade of reform, managers of large and 
medium-sized state enterprises had little control over work force numbers. The inability 
of managers to determine employee numbers would obviously have an effect on the 
allocative efficiency of state enterprises. Combined with the guarantee of lifetime 
employment, it would also hamper any attempt by managers to bring about technical 
efficiency by exerting discipline in the workplace. 
BEHAVIOUR OF STATE ENTERPRISES 
The behaviour of state enterprises is a complex topic. Institutional reform was intended 
to create and strengthen a profit-oriented managerial objective and to harden budget 
constraint. After more than one decade of institutional reform, it is still difficult to make 
a definitive statement about state enterprises' managerial objectives or about budget 
constraint. Officially, the managerial objective of state enterprises is "to fulfil the 
people's ever-increasing material and cultural needs" {manzu renmin qunzhong buduan 
zengzhang de wuzhi wenhua shenghuo xuyiao), and this has been widely cited by 
academics in China, This definition is, however, too vague to be useful in serious 
academic research. Economists outside China typically refer to the managerial objective 
of state enterprises as being "to become more profit-oriented", usually in the context of 
budget constraint being soft at various stages of economic reform (Naughton 1985; 
Wong 1986; Komai 1986b; Dong 1987; Bowles and White 1989). So far, no study has 
been able to identify managerial objectives and the budget constraint with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. The survey data provide a rare opportunity to examine managerial 
objectives and budget constraint after one decade of reform. 
The Soft Budget Constraint 
As explained in chapter 2, there are three main sources of the soft budget constraint in 
state enterprises: administrative prices; soft tax; and interest-free state grants from 
govemment or soft credit from banks. In chapter 3, it was demonstrated that reform of 
the goods market hardened budget constraint. This was reflected in the Komai index, 
which declined significantiy over time. But the discussion in this chapter has indicated 
that the other two areas remain problematic. Due to the irregularity and lack of 
enforcement of rules set down by the state, enterprises had substantial room for 
bargaining their way out of their financial obligations. This is evident in the wide 
distribution of income tax rates and rates of retained profit among enterprises in the 
sample. 
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The survey data contain three sets of information that can be used to test indirectly 
for the hardness or softness of budget constraint: the approval rate of applications for 
capital investment projects; the success rate of applications for woridng capital; and the 
response of enterprises to a change in interest rates. The first two are measures of ease 
of access to capital. A comparison of profitable and unprofitable enterprises with respect 
to these measures will serve as an indirect test of the hardness (softness) of budget 
constraint. In a well-developed market economy, banks and other financial institutions 
lend on the basis of creditworthiness or, in other words, the ability of borrowers to repay 
the principal plus interest. For an independent private firm, profitability is a major 
criterion in assessing creditworthiness, and the enforcement of this principle results in a 
hard budget constraint among firms. In centrally planned economies, govemments tend 
to be patemalistic towards enterprises, allocating funds to enterprises with low 
profitability or even to those operating in the red. This is a major cause of the soft 
budget constraint among state enterprises in such economies. In Komai's framework, 
the softer (harder) the budget constraint, the easier (more difficult) it is for unprofitable 
enterprises to obtain finance and the less (more) responsive enterprises are to the cost of 
finance. The responsiveness of enterprises to changes in interest rates is, of course, a 
more direct gauge of the hardness of budget constraint. The softer the budget constraint, 
the less responsive enterprises will be to a change in interest rates. 
In our sample, data on the allocation of investment funds present an obscure picture, 
and no clear-cut conclusions are possible. In 1986-88, of 232 enterprises (78 per cent) 
that applied for investment funds, 140 (60.3 per cent) received approval. Of the 1,765 
projects for which funding was requested, 1,474 were approved. This translates into an 
approval rate of 83.9 per cent. 
Sample enterprises were divided into three groups: those making a profit (group A); 
those making a loss due to unfavourable govemment poUcies^^ (group B); and those 
making a loss due to mismanagement (group C). Group A consisted of 268 enterprises, 
group B of 19, and group C of eight^^ Of 1,593 projects applied for by 211 enterprises 
in group A, 1,361 were approved, an approval rate of 85.4 per cent. Of 145 applications 
made by 14 enterprises in group B, 103 were approved, an approval rate of 71 per cent. 
Of 18 applications by seven enterprises in group C, 10 were approved, an approval rate 
of 55.6 per cent. According to the data presented here, the approval rate of all loss-
making enterprises (groups B and C) was 69.3 per cent. 
The difference in the approval rate of profitable and unprofitable enterprises is 
substantial and is consistent with the principle of creditworthiness. This suggests that 
^^Unfavourable govemment policies included low govemment prices for products, excessively high 
quotas etc. 
290ne enterprise could not be placed in any of the three groups. 
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government and banks had begun to discriminate in favour of profitable enterprises when 
allocating investment funds, which would lead to a hard budget constraint. The 
difference in the approval rates of groups B and C can possibly be explained by 
govemment policy: the govemment could be blamed for losses incurred in group B, but 
enterprises in group C were fully responsible for their losses. The principle of 
creditworthiness was not, however, followed strictly. Although it is possible that some 
of the projects approved in groups B and C were financially viable or even profitable, in 
the context of previous discussion in this chapter and other literature on the issue of 
budget constraint, it is more likely that these approval rates denote a certain degree of 
govemment benevolence. 
Table 4.8 Success Rate of Enterprises Applying for Working Capital, 1987-89 
Degree of Success 1987 1988 1989 
Whole Sample No. ofEntCTprises % No. of Enterprises % No. of Entaprises % 
75-100% 185 65.6 122 43.0 58 20.4 
50-75% 61 2L6 108 38.0 104 36.5 
25-50% 22 7.8 32 11.3 72 25.3 
20% and less 14 5.0 22 7.7 51 17.9 
Profitable Enterprises 
75-100% 170 66.1 112 43.2 53 20.4 
50-75% 54 21.0 98 37.8 94 36.2 
25-50% 21 8.2 29 11.2 67 25.8 
20% and less 12 4.7 20 7.7 46 17.7 
Loss-makers (group B) 
75-100% 9 52.9 6 35.3 3 17.6 
50-75% 6 35.3 7 41.2 6 35.3 
25-50% 1 5.9 2 11.8 4 23.5 
20% and less 1 5.9 2 11.8 4 23.5 
Loss^nakers (group Q 
75-100% 6 60.0 4 40.0 2 22.2 
50-75% 1 10.0 3 30.0 5 55.6 
25-50% 2 20.0 1 10.0 1 11.1 
20% and less 1 10.0 2 20.0 1 11.1 
Loss-makers (groups B, C) 
75-100% 15 60.0 10 40.0 5 20.0 
50-75% 7 28.0 10 40.0 10 40.0 
25-50% 1 4.0 3 12.0 5 20.0 
20% and less 2 8.0 2 8.0 5 20.0 
Note: Enterprises not answering this question were excluded from the calculation. 
Source: Survey data. 
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Table 4.9 Planned Changes in Loan Policies of Sample Enterprises in 
Response to a Rise in Interest Rates 
Interest Rate Rise of 5% Interest Rate Rise of 10% 
No. % No. % 
No Change 235 80.5 180 61.6 
Reduction of 10-20% 19 6.5 42 14.4 
Reduction of 20-30% 15 5.1 17 5.8 
Reduction of 30-50% 2 0.7 14 4.8 
Reduction of 50% or more 6 2.1 21 7.2 
Other 15 5.1 4 5.1 
Source: Survey data. 
A similar situation applied with bank loans for working capital (Table 4.8). Profitable 
enterprises were again more likely to have their loan applications approved, but the 
distribution of successful applications in 1987-89 suggests that the difference was 
marginal and even less apparent than that evidenced in the approval rate of applications 
for investment funds. 
A more direct approach to testing the softness of budget constraint is to measure the 
response of enterprises to a change in interest rates. Table 4.9 sets out managers' 
responses to a 5 and 10 per cent rise in annual interest rates. 
The information contained in Table 4.9 indicates a degree of rationality among 
managers of state enterprises, with some intending to take out fewer loans if interest 
rates rose by 5 per cent more. But the price elasticity of demand for capital as revealed 
in this table is extremely low. More than 80 per cent of enterprises indicated they would 
not make any change in the use of capital if annual interest rates rose by 5 per cent, and 
over 60 per cent would make no change even if the rate rose by 10 per cent. This means 
that demand for capital in these latter enterprises was perfectly inelastic at an interest 
rate margin of as high as 10 per cent. 
The reasons for this low elasticity are complicated, and it is unfair to point the finger 
only at the soft budget constraint. Even had budget constraint been hard, the price 
elasticity of demand for capital could still have been low, for two reasons. Fu-st, interest 
rates had always been fixed by govemment at excessively low levels. The World Bank 
(1988) estimated the shadow price of capital in Qiina to be 12 per cent, but interest 
rates on loans to industrial enterprises did not rise above 9 per cent until 1989 {Almanac 
of China's Finance and Banking 1990, p. 166) and were below 2.52 per cent in 1980-
82. There was, therefore, a substantial gap between the official interest rate and real 
opportunity cost. Second, the bulk of capital was still allocated to state enterprises as 
interest-free state budgetary grants (Table 4.5). Combined with low interest rates on 
loans, this led to payments of interest forming an unusually small proportion of 
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enterprises' production costs. Interest payments of sample enterprises accounted for 
0.84 per cent of production costs in 1980 and 2.34 per cent in 1988. This rise is 
attributable to reform in the area of capital management; it brought about little change in 
the overall structure of production costs (Table 4.10). 
The data given here support Byrd (1983, p. 77), who was only able to provide 
anecdotal evidence to support his argument that interest rates in the early 1980s were 
too low to force state enterprises to take the cost of capital seriously. The simation has 
since changed, with interest rates ahnost tripling between 1981 and 1988 {Almanac of 
China's Finance and Banking 1990, p. 166) and the share of bank loans also increasing 
markedly (Table 4.5). But the data in Table 4.10 suggest that these increases were not 
enough to bring about a significant change in the total production costs of state 
enterprises. 
Table 4.10 Production Cost Structure of Sample Enterprises 
1980 and 1984-88 (%) 
1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Interest Payments 0.84 1.32 1.64 1.98 2.24 2.34 
Raw Materials 70.55 70.88 71.12 68.99 68.38 68.00 
Energy 5.84 5.98 5.84 6.18 5.83 5.52 
Wages and Bonuses 10.75 10.27 9.87 10.43 10.18 10.59 
Depreciation 6.61 6.7 6.25 6.52 6.57 6.12 
Source: Survey data 
The existence of these two problems in state enterprises does not fully explain the 
low price elasticity of demand for capital. According to neoclassical theory, a rational 
decision-maker would use capital such that capital return is equal to the cost at the 
margin, no matter what that cost might be. In a similar situation economists have proved 
that price subsidies have no effect on the marginal decision (Sicular 1988; Byrd 1991). 
Therefore low interest rates and state grants do not fully explain why most sample 
enterprises would not change their borrowing pattems in the face of a substantial rise in 
interest rates. The true explanation for this seemingly irrational behaviour is that the 
budget constraint of state enterprises was unduly soft. 
Problems in the management of capital discussed earlier were certainly a major 
factor in the soft budget constraint. Irregularities in the financial relationship of 
enterprises and the state were another possible cause of the low price elasticity of 
^^Sicuiar (1988) and Byrd (1991) proved that official prices in an economy with both a market and 
planning system do not affect the marginal decisions of economic agents, because market prices are 
higher and thus become marginal prices. 
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demand for capital since, from an enterprise's point of view, any concession on financial 
obligations to the state was the equivalent of a grant. Compromise with the govemment 
on tax rates and the submission of profit was in fact still possible. Of the managers in our 
sample, more than 10 per cent believed that this type of negotiation was an important 
way of getting out of business difficulties (Table A4.3 in Appendix 4). 
Profit-oriented Managerial Objective 
The typical managerial objective of state enterprises in a centrally planned economy is to 
maximise physical output. Komai (1980) suggests that such enterprises have two 
resilient characteristics: 1) due to chronic shortages, state enterprises have a weak sense 
of market competition and thus little motivation to improve product quality or develop 
new products; and 2) state enterprises tend to be more expansionary than firms in 
market economies. The former leads to limited product differentiation in the marketplace 
and the latter to chronic shortages of goods and services. 
Table 4.11 Ranking of Managerial Objectives in Sample Enterprises, 1989 
Objeaives 
Ranking 
No. 1 Priority (%) No. 2 PriOTity (%) No. 3 Priority (%) 
Raising Output 11.2 7.8 5.1 
Increasing Profit 49.5 22.7 16.7 
Increasing Workers' Incomes 0.4 14.2 34.5 
Expanding Production 5.4 5.4 5.5 
Developing N e w Products 21.0 31.9 13.3 
Upgrading Technology 10.8 17.3 21.5 
Other (not specified) 1.7 0.7 3.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes'. The question asked was: "What are your three most important managerial objectives?' 
Two managers did not respond to the question. 
Source: Survey data. 
However, it is widely perceived that market and instimtional reform significantly 
strengthened profit-orientation (Byrd and Tidrick 1987; McMillan and Naughton 1992). 
This view is confirmed by the responses of managers to a survey question about 
managerial objectives (Table 4.11). 
It is evident from Table 4.11 that the pursuit of profit is by far the most important 
objective of state enterprise managers. Nearly 90 per cent of managers considered 
"increasing profit" to be one of their three main objectives and 49.5 per cent ranked it 
fu-st. While it is not possible to make a direct comparison with the simation in the pre-
reform era, the figures in the table, in the context of previous discussion in this and the 
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preceding chapter, suggest that one decade of reform had indeed transformed state 
enterprises from being "appendages of the state apparatus of economic administration" 
into profit-motivated enterprises. 
"Developing new products" ranked second overall, while "expanding production" 
was clearly considered a low priority. These rankings have two implications for 
enterprise behaviour. First, they show that enterprises were responding to market 
demand and becoming more market-oriented. This is confirmed by the response of 
managers to another question: "What are the most urgent measures you plan to take 
under current operational conditions?" Of the 13 options, "improving product quality" 
and "upgrading existing products and developing new products" were chosen most often 
(Table A4.3 in Appendix 4). Second, the rankings suggest that state enterprises were no 
longer typical of enterprises in centrally planned economies, but were exhibiting profit-
maximising behaviour closer to that of decentralised free market economies. 
As Table 4.11 indicates, there was in fact a wide range of managerial objectives even 
though "increasing profit" was the dominant one. This is consistent with the results of 
case studies by Byrd and Tidrick (1987, p. 63), who argued that state enterprises have 
five "motives": family, expansion, engineering, compliance and profit. Byrd and Tidrick 
state that the "dominant motive of workers in every Chinese enterprise is to maximise 
their family income". Workers demanded that retained profit be used to improve welfare 
measures and to employ family members rather than being re-invested, and no manager 
could afford to ignore this demand. Expansion of the enterprise was another important 
business motive, particularly among adventurous or ambitious managers. Third, 
managers were motivated to use more advanced engineering techniques, to produce 
high-quality goods and to compete for prizes and awards. Although Byrd and Tidrick 
point out that this was one way in which managers could hope to receive favoured 
treatment, this objective is not inconsistent with market-oriented behaviour. Fourth, 
managers wanted to be seen as "good bureaucratic citizens" by complying with the 
demands of govemment departments. This was probably another way of obtaining 
favoured treatment, although Byrd and Tidrick found that the more autonomy managers 
had, the weaker the compliance motive tended to be. Finally, the profit-oriented 
behaviour of state enterprises increased noticeably after the reforms. Profit became 
something no manager could afford to ignore, as the responses of managers in the 
sample (Table 4.11) attest. 
What then was the relationship between profit and other goals? According to Byrd 
and Tidrick (1987, p. 65), "the link of profit retention with plan fulfilment and the use of 
retained profits for workers' benefits or for investment means that enterprises will be 
profit-oriented whatever their underlying objective — plan fulfilment, work benefits or 
expansion". In other words, profit had become the intermediary for achieving other 
goals. If this was the case, managerial objectives would have been realised through a 
multiple-step process in which the enterprise maximised operational profit and then used 
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the retained portion to fulfil other goals. The unique role of profit implies that other 
motives were not substitutable for profit. The managerial objective of post-reform state 
enterprises would not, therefore, differ fundamentally from those of profit-maximising 
firms in a free market economy, if they were not subjected to tight extemal control from, 
for example, the government. Thus the neoclassical profit-maximisation model provides 
the best approximation of the business behaviour of post-reform state enterprises. 
This proposition needs to be tested. Although the survey data do not facilitate a 
rigorous test of the relationship between profit and other objectives, we can still use the 
available information to shed some light on this. 
Table 4.12 Degree of Internal Pressure from Workers to 
Raise Incomes and Collective Welfare, 1989 
Degree No. of Enterprises % Cumulative No. Cumulative % 
Very Strong 89 30.27 89 30.27 
Fairly Strong 126 42.86 215 73.13 
Reasonably Strong 61 20.75 276 93.88 
Not Strong 15 5.10 291 98.98 
No Pressure 3 1.02 294 100.00 
Note: Responses to the question: "What degree of pressure do your workers exert on policy-making 
in such areas as wages, bonuses, housing conditions and collective welfare?" 
Source: Survey data. 
Only 0.4 per cent of managers listed "increasing workers' incomes" as the first 
objective, a very low percentage indeed. This contradicts the common perception that 
bonuses and collective welfare are high on the managerial agenda in Chinese state 
enterprises. In Lin Yixiang's (1990)^1 model, state enterprises were even assumed to be 
maximisers of workers' income. Byrd and Tidrick (1987) also put this objective ahead of 
others. 
In answer to a question gauging the pressure from workers to increase bonuses and 
welfare, nearly all — 276 or 93.9 per cent — replied that they felt a strong degree of 
pressure ("very strong", "fairly strong" or "reasonably strong"), while only 18 (6.1 per 
^^Lin Yixiang (1990) was of the view that state enterprises aim to maximise workers' total incomes 
(wages and bonuses). Since the bonus was assumed to be a fixed proportion of profit, enterprises were 
assumed to maximise the sum of wage and profit. In this model, enterprises face a choice between 
raising income directly, by increasing wages, or indirectly, by increasing total profit. I believe this 
abstraction of the behaviour of post-reform state enterprises to be somewhat misleading. Wages were in 
fact exogenously determined by government and therefore should not be used as an argument in the 
behavioural equation. So long as wages are exogenous, Lin's model will lead to an optimal solution 
identical to that of the standard profit maximisation model. I beUeve that Byrd and Tidrick (1987) 
provide a more balanced and realistic view of this issue. 
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cent) felt Uttle or no pressure (Table 4.12). It would be impossible for managers to 
ignore such overwhelming pressure. 
However, pressure from workers is not explicitly reflected in managers' ranking of 
their managerial objectives. Most managers who did not list "increasing workers' 
incomes" as an objective indicated that they were under a varying degree of intemal 
pressure from workers. Of the 151 managers in this group, 45 (29.8 per cent) were 
under "very strong" intemal pressure, 66 (43.7 per cent) under "fairly strong" intemal 
pressure and 35 (23.2 per cent) under "reasonably strong" intemal pressure. In all 146 
managers (96.7 per cent) in this group were under a relatively high degree of intemal 
pressure (Table A4.6 in Appendix 4). 
On the other hand, most managers under strong intemal pressure to increase wages 
and welfare indicated that profit was a more important managerial objective than 
"increasing workers' incomes". Only 1 manager (0.4 per cent) indicated that "increasing 
workers' incomes" was the most important objective (Table 4.11). Of the 89 managers 
who considered intemal pressure to be "very strong", 46 (51.7 per cent) put "increasing 
profit" as their first choice (Table A4.4 in Appendix 4). Again, of the 276 managers who 
were under "very strong", "fairly strong" or "reasonably strong" intemal pressure, 246 
(89.1 per cent) placed "increasing profit" among their top three priorities (Table A4.5 in 
Appendix 4). Finally, of the 146 managers who were under intemal pressure but who did 
not select the welfare objective, 134 (91.8 per cent) Usted "increasing profit" as a 
priority (Table A4.7 in Appendix 4) and 55 (37.7 per cent) gave it top priority (Table 
A4.8 in Appendix 4). 
The preceding analysis offers insights into why most managers ignore the welfare 
objective despite being under intemal pressure from workers to improve welfare, namely 
that this objective can be achieved through increasing profit. This offers indirect but 
strong support for the proposition that profit is the intermediary for achieving other 
goals in post-reform state enterprises. 
As has already been noted, 11.8 per cent of managers did not in fact rank profit 
among their three priorities. A detailed investigation of the reasons for this lies beyond 
the scope of this thesis. Still, in view of the irregularities in the system described earlier 
and the soft budget constraint of state enterprises, it is not surprising that the degree of 
profit-orientation varied widely. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter reviewed and investigated reform policies in three areas: the financial 
relationship of state enterprises with the government including taxation; the financing of 
state enterprises; and the management of labour. We used survey data to show that 
important changes that took place in all these areas in the 1980s had a significant impact 
on managerial incentives and the environment in which state enterprises operated. 
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However, as far as the budget constraint of state enterprises was concerned, policies 
governing enterprise-government financial relationships and the financing of state 
enterprises in particular, were seriously flawed. Specifically, in all three new institutions 
(the profit retention scheme, tax for profit scheme and Contract Management 
Responsibility System), the rules were ad hoc and irregular and were not strictly 
enforced. Similarly banking reform was also unsatisfactory. Both the interference of 
local govemments in banking and inconsistent bank behaviour greatly reduced the 
pressure on managers to economise on the use of both short-term working capital and 
long-term investment funds. This constitutes another source of the soft budget 
constraint. 
The results of the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 indicate a mixed picture in terms of 
budget constraint: market reform seemed to be relatively successful, but institutional 
reform suffered serious problems. Although the previous qualitative analysis is important 
in assessing reform policies, we now need to investigate the changes in the efficiency of 
state enterprises, which, in the final analysis, is a key objective of economic reform. 
From the next chapter, attention shifts to the estimation of economic efficiency and the 
evaluation of reform policies. 
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Appendix 4 
Table A4.1 Distribution of Working Capital 
and Enterprise Funds, 1980, 
by Loans, Government Grants 
1984-88 (%) 
1980 \m 1985 
Wxking Capital Loans Grants Ent's Funds Loans Grants Ent's Funds Loans Grants Ent's Funds 
0 11.54 1.73 %.54 6 i 5 068 55.87 3.41 i m 30.95 
0 < a n d = < 1 0 5.59 035 069 4 1 4 5.80 4? 75 6.49 9.18 65.99 
10<=and<20 1049 5.19 069 8.62 1092 141 6.83 16.33 238 
2 0 < ^ a n d < 3 0 18.53 11.76 069 11.38 19.11 OOO 13.31 2245 0.00 
3 0 < = a n d < 4 0 18.53 15.92 069 16l21 19.80 OOO 1468 21.09 034 
40<=a ix l<50 15.03 16.26 OOO i a 6 2 20.48 OOO 20.82 16.57 OOO 
5 0 < ^ a n d < 6 0 1014 OOO 13.45 1229 OOO 11.60 9.18 OOO 
60 <= and <70 7.69 16i26 035 1241 6.49 OOO 13.31 1.70 OOO 
7 0 « ^ a n d < 8 0 1.75 7.27 035 532 3.07 0.47 5.46 1.02 034 
80<=aix l<90 070 3.46 OOO 1.38 0S4 OOO 3.07 034 OOO 
90<5=aal<100 OOO 3.46 0.00 1.72 1.02 OOO 1.02 OOO OOO 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table A4.1 (continued) 
1986 1987 1988 
W i l d n g C ^ Lous Gbrts Bit's Finds Loans Q h i s Bit's Finds Loans O a l s BrfsFinds 
0 2 7 2 2 0 3 13.75 2 0 6 l . D 7.14 0 3 4 1.72 6 0 8 
0 < A I I = < 1 0 2 3 8 13.90 2 0 6 15.31 9 0 4 8 4 0 5 24.74 8 9 J 3 
10<^a re i<20 7.14 23.73 1.37 5.14 34.01 1.70 5.07 4 0 8 9 4 0 5 
20<I=and<30 1 0 3 I 28.14 OOO 8.90 23.13 0 3 4 10.47 17.18 OOO 
30<^arel<40 15.31 15.59 OOO 16.10 16.61 OOO 1453 9.28 OOO 
40<i=ai l<50 1497 1153 0 3 4 16.44 4.42 0 3 4 17.91 4 1 2 0 3 4 
50<J=arei<60 17.35 3.39 OOO 17.12 3.06 OOO 1757 L37 OOO 
6 0 < ^ f i i i < 7 0 13.95 L36 OOO B.IO 0 6 8 OOO 13.85 0 6 9 OOO 
7 D < = a i i < 8 0 8.16 0 3 4 OOO 1233 0 6 8 OOO &11 OOO OOO 
80<^and<90 5.78 OOO 000 2 7 4 0 3 4 000 6L08 OOO OOO 
90<=aai<100 1.73 OOO OOO 3.43 000 OOO 2 0 3 000 OOO 
Total moo 10000 moo moo 10000 moo moo moo moo 
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Table A4.2 Distribution of Loans, Central Grants, Local Grants and Project-
Specific Grants in Fixed Investment Funds, 1980,1984-88 (%) 
1980 1984 
Investment Fund Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other 
0 74.92 79.66 72.88 28.14 83.05 56.95 0.68 68.48 21.02 86.78 
0 < and =< 10 3.39 3.39 4.75 6.78 6.10 4.75 6.44 8.81 7.80 6.10 
10 <= and <20 4.07 1.02 2.37 5.42 4.07 2.37 10.85 6.10 7.12 1.69 
20 <= and < 30 1.36 1.69 4.41 6.44 2.37 6.10 18.98 3.73 6.44 1.02 
30 <= and < 40 2.03 1.02 2.03 5.76 0.68 4.07 19.66 2.71 7.12 1.02 
40<=and<50 2.03 1.36 1.69 4.41 0.34 4.41 20.34 2.03 4.07 0.34 
5 0 < = a n d < 6 0 2.37 2.03 2.71 5.08 1.36 3.73 12.20 1.69 5.76 1.36 
60 <= and < 70 3.05 2.03 1.69 4.41 0.34 2.03 6.44 2.03 5.76 0.00 
70 <= and < 80 1.36 1.02 2.03 4.75 0.00 2.71 3.05 0.34 6.10 0.34 
80 <= and < 90 1.69 2.03 1.36 4.07 0.34 4.75 0.34 1.02 3.39 0.34 
90 <= and <100 3.73 4.75 4.07 24.75 1.36 8.14 1.02 3.05 25.42 1.02 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table A4.2 (continued) 
1985 1986 
Investment Fund Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other 
0 43.73 78.64 67.46 20.68 84.41 40.54 82.43 69.26 17.57 81.42 
0 < and =< 10 5.42 3.39 14.58 8.14 8.81 6.76 4.05 13.18 11.82 9.80 
10 <= and < 20 4.75 2.37 3.73 9.15 1.36 4.73 2.70 6.08 10.81 1.01 
20 <= and < 30 4.41 2.71 4.07 10.17 1.36 4.05 1.35 1.01 6.76 1.69 
30 <= and < 40 6.44 1.36 2.71 7.46 0.68 6.08 1.35 2.03 8.45 1.35 
40 <= and < 50 4.75 2.03 1.36 7.12 0.68 5.74 3.04 2.70 5.74 1.35 
50 <= and < 60 5.08 3.05 1.69 6.44 0.34 2.70 1.01 1.35 5.74 0.68 
60 <= and <70 5.42 0.34 0.68 5.76 0.00 5.07 0.34 1.35 6.42 0.34 
70 <= and < 80 5.42 2.37 1.02 4.41 0.00 4.73 1.35 0.34 2.36 1.35 
80 <= and < 90 5.42 1.36 0.68 2.37 0.34 6.76 0.68 0.68 4.05 0.00 
90 <= and <100 9.15 2.37 2.03 18.31 2.03 12.84 1.69 2.03 20.27 1.01 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Table A4.2 (continued) 
1987 1988 
Investment Fund Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other Loan C.G. Grart LG. Grart P.S. Grart Other 
0 36.40 81.97 76.53 18.03 81.63 39.19 85.14 7939 17.57 80.74 
0 < a n d = < 10 5.78 4.42 10.20 11.22 9.18 2.70 3.72 9.12 8.45 9.46 
10 <= and < 20 2.72 3.06 3.40 10.88 3.06 4.39 2.36 3.72 9.12 2.36 
20 <= and < 30 5.78 2.04 3.40 8.84 1.02 6.08 1.01 1.69 8.11 2.03 
30 <= and < 40 6.46 0.68 1.02 7.82 0.34 4.39 1.01 1.35 7.43 0.68 
40 <= and < 50 3.74 1.02 1.02 6.80 0.68 8.45 1.35 0.68 6.76 0.68 
50 <= and < 60 6.46 2.38 0.34 3.40 0.68 6.76 1.35 0.34 7.09 1.01 
60 <= and < 70 6.12 0.68 1.36 5.44 1.36 5.41 0.68 0.68 5.41 I.Ol 
70 <= and < 80 7.48 1.02 1.36 6.46 0.68 7.43 0.68 0.68 6.08 0.00 
80 <= and < 90 7.82 1.02 0.68 2.38 0.68 5.07 0.34 1.35 3.72 1.01 
90 <= and <100 11.22 1.70 0.68 18.71 0.68 10.14 236 1.01 20.27 1.01 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table A4.3 Most Appropriate Measures under Current Business Conditions 
Objectives 
Priority Three Priorities Combined 
# 1 (%) # 2 (%) # 3 (%) Frequency Percent Raising Output 8.20 6.40 4.40 56 19.03 Lowsring Output 1.00 2.70 0.30 12 4.08 Improving Product Quality 36.90 29.50 8.20 220 74.75 Upgrading Existing Produrls & Eteveloping New Products 35.90 27.10 10.90 218 74.07 Improving After-sales Service 0.30 3.10 6.10 28 9.51 Reducing Production Costs 6.50 17.30 24.20 141 47.90 Injecting More Investment 0.30 1.00 1.80 9 3.06 
Importing New Technology from Abroad 170 5.10 7.10 44 14.95 
Improving Business Managenttnt 3.40 140 1120 53 18.01 
Intensifying Training of Workers 0.00 3.10 14.60 52 17.67 
Raising Price of Products 1.40 0.70 3.50 16 5.44 
Requesting Reduction or Exemption from Taxes and Profit Submission 2.40 1.70 6.10 30 1019 
Other (unspecified) 1.00 0.00 0.60 4 1.35 
Total 100.00 100.10 100.00 883 300.00 
Table A4.4 Distribution of First Choice of Business Objective (horizontal) 
vs Degree of Internal Pressure (vertical) 
Frequency 
(Per cent) Very Strong Fairly Strong Reasonably Strong Not Strong No Pressure Total 
[Row Per cent] 
{Colume Per cent} 
Raising Output 9 16 6 0 1 32 
(3.06) (5.44) (2.04) (0.00) (0.34) (10.88) 
[28.13] [50.00] [18.75] [0.00] [3.13] 
{10.11} {12.7} {9.84} {0.00} {33.33} 
Increasing Profit 46 60 28 11 1 146 
(15.65) (20.41) (9.52) (3.74) (0.34) (49.66) 
[31.51] [41.1] [19.18] [7.53] [0.68] 
{51.69} {47.62} {45.9} {73.33} {33.33} 
Increasing Workers' Income 1 0 0 0 0 1 
(0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) 
[100] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
{1.12} {0.00} {0.00} {0.00} {0.00} 
Expanding Enterprise 2 10 3 1 0 16 
(0.68) (3.4) (1.02) (0.34) (0.00) (5.44) 
[12.50] [62.50] [18.75] [6.25] [0.00] 
{2.25} {7.94} {4.92} {6.67} {0.00} 
Renovating Products 19 26 14 3 0 62 
(6.46) (8.84) (4.76) (1.02) (0.00) (21.09) 
[30.65] [41.94] [22.58] [4.84] [0.00] 
{21.35} {20.63} {22.95} {20.00} {0.00} 
Upgrading Technology 10 13 8 0 1 32 
(3.40) (4.42) (2.72) (0.00) (0.34) (10.88) 
[31.25] [40.63] [25.00] [0.00] [3.13] 
{11.24} {10.32} {13.11} {0.00} {33.33} 
Other (Unspecified) 2 1 2 0 0 5 
(0.68) (0.34) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (1.70) 
[40.00] [20.00] [40.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
{2.25} {0.79} {3.28} {0.00} {0.00} 
Total 89 126 61 15 3 294 
(30.27) (42.86) (20.75) (5.10) (1.02) ;ioo.oo) 
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Table A4.5 Distribution of Profit Objective in Three Choices (vertical) 
vs Internal Pressure for Welfare (horizontal) 
Frequency 
Per cent 
Row Per cent 
V. Strong F. Strong R. Strong Not Strong No Pressure Total 
Column Per cent 
Profit Objective Ignored 11 12 7 3 1 34 
(3.74) (4.08) (2.38) (1.02) (0.34) (11.56) 
[32.35] [35.29] [20.59] [8.82] [2.94] 
{12.36} {9.52} {11.48} {20.00} {33.33} 
Profit Objective Chosen 78 114 54 12 2 260 
(26.53) (38.78) (18.37) (4.08) (0.68) (8.44) 
[30.00] [43.85] [20.77] [4.62] [0.77] 
{87.64} {90.48} {88.52} {80.00} {66.67} 
Total 89 126 61 15 3 294 
(30.27) (42.86) (20.75) (5.10) (1.02) (100.00) 
Note-. V. Strong stands for Very Strong; F. Strong stands for Fairly Strong; and R. Strong stands 
for Reasonably Strong. 
Table A4.6 Distribution of Workers' Welfare Objective in Three Choices (vertical) 
vs Internal Pressure for Welfare (horizontal) 
Frequency 
Peroent V. Strong F. Strong R Strong N a Strong NoFYessure Total 
Row F^ cent 
Cdumn Per cent 
Welfare O t ^ t v e Ignored 45 66 35 3 2 151 
(15.31) (?,?,45) (11.90) (1.02) (0.68) 51.36 
[29.8] [43.71] [23.18] [1.99] [1.32] 
{50.56} {52J8} {57 J8} {20.00} {66.67} 
Welfare Objective Chosen 44 60 26 12 1 143 
(14.97) (20.41) (8.84) (4.08) (0.34) (48.61) 
[30.77] [41.96] [18.18] [8.39] [0.70] 
{49.44} {4762} {4262} {80.00} {33.33} 
Total 89 126 61 15 3 294 
(30.27) (4186) (20.75) (5.10) (1.02) (100.00) 
Note: V. Strong stands for Very Strong; F. Strong stands for Fairly Strong; and R. Strong stands for 
Reasonably Strong. 
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Table A4.7 Distribution of Profit Objective (vertical) vs Strong Internal 
Pressure for Welfare (horizontal) 
among Those Ignoring the Welfare Objective in 3 Choices 
Frequency 
Per cent Very Strong Fairly Strong Reasonably Strong Total 
Row Per cent 
Column Per cent 
Profit Objective Ignored 4 6 2 12 
(2.74) (4.11) (1.37) (8.22) 
[33.33] [50.00] [16.67] 
{8.89} {9.09} {5.71} 
Profit Objective Chosen 41 60 33 134 
(28.08) (41.10) (22.60) (91.78) 
[30.60] [44.78] [24.63] 
{91.11} {90.91} {94.29} 
Total 45 66 35 146 
(30.82) (45.21) (23.97) (100.00) 
Table A4.8 Distribution of First Choice of Objective (vertical) vs 
Strong Internal Pressure for Welfare (horizontal) 
among Those Choosing Profit Objective in 3 Choices 
Frequency 
Per cent Very Strong Fairly Strong Reasonably Strong Total 
Row Per cent 
Column Per cent 
Raising Output 7 10 3 20 
(4.79) (6.85) (2.05) (13.7) 
[35.00] [50.00] [15.00] 
{15.56} {15.15} {8,57} 
Increasing Profit 19 23 13 55 
(13.01) (15.75) (8.90) (37.67) 
[34.55] [41.82] [23.64] 
{42.22} {34.85} {37.14} 
Expanding Enterprise 1 6 2 9 
(0.68) (4.11) (1.37) (6.16) 
[11.11] [66.67] [22.22] 
{2.22} {9.09} {5.71} 
Renovating Products 10 19 10 39 
(6.85) (13.01) (6.85) (26.71) 
[25.64] [48.72] [25.64] 
{22.22} {28.79} {28.57} 
Upgrading Technology 7 7 5 19 
(4.79) (4.79) (3.42) (13.01) 
[36.84] [36,84] [26.32] 
{15.56} {10.61} {14.29} 
Other (unspecif ied) 1 1 2 4 
(0.68) (0.68) (1.37) (2,74) 
[25.00] [25.00] [50.00] 
{2.22} {1.52} {5.71} 
Total 45 66 35 146 
(30.82) (45.21) (23,97) (100.00) 
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5 Estimation of Technical Efficiency: 
A Stochastic Approach 
Since the pioneering work of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van 
den Broeck (1977) economists have developed various models to estimate enterprise-
specific technical efficiency within the framework of the stochastic production frontier. 
Each method devised was based on unique specifications and different assumptions 
which served the purposes of the study. For the purpose of this thesis, it will be 
necessary to modify existing models and devise appropriate specifications so as to obtain 
reliable estimates. Due to the unusual methods of compiling statistics in Oiina, the book 
value of some economic indicators does not fit comfortably with economic analysis. It is 
therefore necessary to make adjustments to the raw data, in order to obtain indices of 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency that will accurately reflect the true 
performance of sample enterprises. Some information important for economic analysis is 
not available in the survey data, and wiU need to be derived from other sources. 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EFFICIENCY OF POST-REFORM 
STATE ENTERPRISES 
Economists are divided in their assessment of the impact of economic reform on the 
efficiency of state enterprises in the early years of reform. Yizi Chen et al. (1987) argued 
that economic reform was successful. However, Du et al. (1990), based on a sample of 
403 state enterprises of varying sizes, showed that average total factor productivity 
declined. They concluded that "the expansion of autonomy as a reform measure to 
improve the efficiency of state enterprises in the traditional economic model did not bring 
about significant improvement in efficiency as hoped for, but is associated with 
deterioration in total factor productivity" (p. 5). Reynolds (1987a) believed that total 
factor productivity declined sharply in the four years after 1978. Wong (1986) argued 
that "reform in Chinese state-owned industry can be judged a failure through the first five 
years". The World Bank (1985a) also failed to find an increase in total factor 
productivity in state enterprises in the first few years of economic reform. 
However, more recent empirical studies have provided strong evidence to support 
the hypothesis that economic reform had a positive effect on the efficiency of state 
enterprises over the longer term. For example, Lau and Brada (1990), Kuan Chen et al. 
(1988a), Dollar (1991), Chen Zheng (1990) and Jefferson, Rawiski and Zheng. (1992) 
found that the total factor productivity or efficiency of state enterprises was higher in the 
period after the economic reform until the mid-1980s than in previous years. On the basis 
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of change in total factor productivity between the pre-reform and post-reform periods, 
they unanimously concluded that the effect of economic reform on state enterprises was 
to improve efficiency. Kalirajan and Cao (1993) based on iron and steel industry data and 
Kalirajan and Zhao (1992) using provincially aggregated data on state enterprises also 
found evidence to suggest that technical efficiency had improved significandy. 
Although these studies make an important contribution to the evaluation of the 
impact of economic reform on the performance of state enterprises, there is room for 
improvement in at least five respects. First, none of the studies mentioned above takes 
energy as an independent productive factor in the estimation of the production function 
and productivity of state enterprises. Energy in the context of Chinese economic reform 
certainly deserves more attention than the current literature gives it, both because of its 
importance in the production process and because of its scarcity in China. According to 
survey data in this thesis, energy made up on average 5.87 per cent of total production 
costs throughout the 1980s. This was 3.4 times higher than interest payments on capital 
and nearly half of the wage biU (Table 4.10 in chapter 4). 
All studies except those of Lau and Brada (1990), Kalirajan and Cao (1993) and 
Kalirajan and Zhao (1992) use total factor productivity to measure the efficiency of state 
enterprises. The index of total productivity is a combination of technological progress 
and technical efficiency at the micro or enterprise level if we assume constant returns to 
scale (Brada 1989; Nishimizu and Page 1982; Lau and Brada 1990). Conceptually, the 
former results from the adoption of new technology or know-how and the latter from 
improvements in productivity given a certain level of technology (Kalirajan and Shand 
1993). We cannot be sure whether variation in total factor productivity is caused by 
technological progress or firm-specific technical efficiency. 
A third concem is that the total factor productivity index is a deterministic estimate, 
and thus sensitive to outliers, which may be caused by measurement errors. If the survey 
data used is subject to data collection errors, this could be a significant problem. 
Fourth, all studies except these of Dollar (1991) and Kalirajan and Cao (1993) use 
data at a high level of aggregation. The total factor productivity or efficiency index at the 
national or provincial level of aggregation can be a mixture of technical efficiency at the 
enterprise level and allocative efficiency at a higher level, since the index will increase if 
resources are transferred firom less productive to more productive enterprises or sectors, 
other conditions remaining constant (Dollar 1991). This characteristic makes it difficult 
to identify the impact of individual reform measures on productivity and thus to evaluate 
the effectiveness of economic reform on enterprise-specific efficiency. 
Finally, the index of total factor productivity assumes that all enterprises are applying 
the given technology with the same level of technical efficiency. It does not provide 
criteria for gauging the potential for further improvements in productivity at the current 
technological level and thus for predicting potential improvements in productivity. That 
is another difficulty for researchers to work out the impact of reform measures on 
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productivity. Aware of the limitations of existing studies, Jefferson (1990b) and Kuan 
Chen et al. (1988a) suggested measuring the impact of specific reforms at the enterprise 
level. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In the estimation, our production function consists not only of labour and capital but 
energy as well. A proper estimation of technical efficiency hinges crucially on the correct 
model specification, which in turn depends on the characteristics of enterprises covered 
by the data. This section therefore focuses on model specification and the adjustment of 
data. 
Defining Technical Efficiency in the Stochastic Production Frontier 
Let the deterministic frontier production function be written as follows: 
y*„=f(x,) (5.1) 
where fix J is the appropriate production function, y^ represents the production level 
of the firm in the time period and x-, is a vector of core inputs used in production. 
In the production firontier model, y/, is understood to be the maximum possible output 
the firm can obtain in the period from the input set using the best techniques 
available; in other words, it is output at the production frontier. In the case of the 
stochastic production fi-ontier, equation (5.1) can be written as follows: 
r „ = m , ) e x p ( v , ) (5.2) 
where v^ , is a random variable which is assumed to be normally distributed as N(0,aj) 
independently of input vector x-,. This variable does not differ from the statistical white 
noise attached to the conventional production function (Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze 
1966). The last variable is supposed to capture the influence of factors outside the 
control of enterprises that cause the actual output of enterprises to vary around some 
mean level (chapter 2). 
If the production process were purely the engineering relationship between a set of 
inputs X,, and observed output J,,, then a well-defined production function would 
describe the process accurately and any variation in inputs would result in a 
corresponding change in output. In reality, observed output is often the result of a series 
of economic decisions which are realised through the production function, and so the 
variables associated with the relevant economic institution will also play an important 
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part in an enterprise's output. For this reason alone, some enterprises may be producing 
not on but inside the frontier defined by equation (5.2) as a result of non-price or 
organisational factors. For example, in pre-reform Chinese state enterprises, lack of 
incentive, the soft budget constraint, the inefficient transmission of information about 
production processes to government decision-makers and ineffective govemment control 
over enterprises! could all cause deviation of realised output from the frontier level. 
Hence we can model the realised production frontier as follows: 
= / ( x , ) e x p ( £ J = / ( x , ) e x p ( v „ - u , ) (5.3) 
where is a non-negative random variable representing specific productive 
characteristics of the enterprise influencing the technical aspects of production in the 
rth period.2 The enterprise fully realises its potential or produces at the production 
frontier in the period if and only if u-, equals zero. This specification implies that 
enterprises cannot produce more than a theoretically possible level and is more consistent 
with economic theory than the average production frontier approach. The greater the 
observed value of u-^ , the further is the enterprise from the production frontier and the 
less efficiently it produces. An objective of economic reform was to motivate state 
enterprises to achieve the optimal technical relationship between inputs and output or, in 
other words, to achieve maximum output at any input level. If reform had been effective, 
firms would be operating increasingly closer to their frontiers. This means that as t 
increased, u-, would decline. If the reform was fully successful in the enterprise, then 
we should observe u-, = 0 for all f's. 
Now, the level of technical efficiency in the enterprise in the t^ ^ period can be 
measured using equation (5.4): 
TE, = % (5.4) 
J . 
where y.^  is observed or realised output level and yl is in theory maximum output 
evaluated at input vector x-,. This measure is consistent with the definition of technical 
efficiency illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.3 in chapter 2. Given the stochastic production 
function (5.3), the technical efficiency of the firm in the period can be expressed 
as: 
^The last two problems were proposed under the so-called "command economy hypothesis" (Danilin et 
al. 1985). 
^For convenience of presentation, u is defmed so as to be non-negative in equation (5.3), which is 
different from equation (2.3) in chapter 2. 
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TE„ = e x p ( - « J = r (5-5) 
/ ( x , ) e x p ( v „ ) = >'„ 
An interesting feature of this definition of technical efficiency is that technical efficiency 
is evaluated at the stochastic frontier. In the stochastic model, the random variation of 
output captured by v., is excluded from the technical efficiency index. In both the 
deterministic frontier model and the total factor productivity approach, such variation is 
included in the efficiency index. 
Distribution of Technical Efficiency 
In order to estimate the stochastic production frontier, our approach is to assume a 
distribution for the random variable w,,. Specifying an appropriate distribution depends 
not only on the form of the data (for example time series, cross-sectional or panel), but 
on the question being investigated. 
In the early literature, the stochastic production frontier was mainly applied to cross-
sectional data (Meeusen and Van den Broeck 1977; Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt 1977; 
Kalirajan and Flinn 1983); Jondrow et al. 1982). In applying the stochastic production 
frontier approach to panel data, it is necessary to consider the assumption of technical 
efficiency and specification of the model on a time-series dimension. We can imagine the 
following three cases for u-, in equation (3): 
a. u^/s remain constant over time or are time-invariant This means that 
the technical efficiency of enterprises follows a particular distribution 
during a particular period of time. This distribution carries over to 
other periods and remains unchanged over time. Furthermore, the 
efficiency level of each enterprise remains constant over time. Any 
deviation from the production function results from random shock 
rather than inefficiency. 
b. 's are correlated over time for a particular enterprise. Technically we 
can express this as ) = a „ for all i and ) = 0 
for aU j . Under this specification, any variation from technical 
efficiency follows a traceable pattern. 
c. 's are uncollated with other units across enterprises at any point in 
time as well as over time for any particular enterprise. In the latter 
case, levels of technical efficiency are determined by the specific 
production or instiuitional characteristics of the enterprise during 
the r^ ^ period of time, and differ not only across enterprises but also 
over time. 
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In the case of (a), can be expressed as U^  without losing any information in the 
technical efficiency index. This model was used by Pitt and Lee (1981) in their estimation 
of the average technical efficiency of the Indonesian weaving industry (model I). The 
authors adopted the maximum likelihood estimation method on the assumption that v, 
and follow respectively normal and half-normal distribution. Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) proposed three approaches, namely the within estimator. Generalised Least 
Square Estimation and Hausman-Taylor Estimator, for estimating panel data. They 
discussed the statistical properties of each of these methods when applied to panel data 
of different lengths either in their longitudinal or cross-sectional dimensions. Battese, 
Coelli and Colby (1989) estimated panel data for Indian farms using maximum likelihood 
estimation and a relaxed assumption for the distribution of u.^ , which was still normally 
distributed but not necessarily truncated at zero. However, despite the numerous 
advantages of this model from the statistical point of view (Schmidt and Sickle 1984), 
this time-invariant model is clearly inappropriate for examining the impact of economic 
reform on the technical efficiency of enterprises in our sample, because efficiency is, by 
definition, invariant over time. 
Case (b) is a generalisation of case (a) that attracts considerable interest from 
economists. The criticisms of the time-invariant model concem its implicit violation of 
economic rationality and its inability to deal with dynamic institutional change. 
Economists argue that it is not possible for firms to be unaware of inefficiency if the 
period of investigation is sufficientiy long. If inefficiency is detected, then it would be 
economically irrational and unrealistic for a profit-maximising decision-maker not to 
attempt to deal with it (Kumbhakar 1990). Again, if an economy undergoes institutional 
change — during the course of deregulatory transition, for example — the time-invariant 
model would inevitably fail to reflect the consequences for efficiency (ComweU, Schmidt 
and Sickles 1990). To deal with these problems, a time-variant model for is necessary. 
So far, three time-variant models have been proposed. In the simplest and most 
straightforward specification, proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992), w, is assumed to 
be an exponential function of time. Specifically: 
= = {exp[-r |(^ - T)]}u^ (5.6) 
where T is length of time and t refers to the t^^ period. In this specification, it is implicidy 
assumed that variation of all firm effects (technical efficiency) is monotone throughout 
time periods and that one rate of change applies to all firms in the sample. Technical 
efficiency either increases, remains constant or decreases depending on whether Tj > 0 , 
r | = 0 or r | < 0 . This is, as the authors rightiy point out, "a rigid parameterisation" (p. 
154). 
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In a relatively flexible model was proposed by Comwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), 
is assumed to be a quadratic function of time. Specifically, the frontier production 
function is defined as: 
+ and + (5.7) 
where t is time trend. Similarly Kumbhakar (1990) proposed the following time-variant 
model for u : 
u,=y{t)x^ and yit) = [l + cxp{bt + ct')Y\ (5.8) 
The latter two models are mathematically superior to the first in the sense that, in 
addition to the direction of the time trend, the concavity or convexity of the behaviour of 
technical efficiency over time can also be determined, by the parameter in (5.7) and c 
in (5.8). In both cases, is a monotonic function of time. 
But serious problems still remain even in the latter two models, particularly in 
situations in which economic institutions have changed very rapidly, as was the case with 
Chinese state enterprises in our sample. First, the functional forms in equations (5.7) and 
(5.8) lack a theoretical foundation to explain why the dynamics of technical efficiency 
should behave monotonically and continuously. Second, and probably more serious, it is 
unrealistic to assume that the technical efficiency of different enterprises would vary over 
time following exactiy the same locus. This point is particularly pertinent if we are trying 
to work out the impact of institutional change on efficiency at enterprise level in (Zhina's 
context. We cannot rule out the possibility that the response of one enterprise to new 
institutions will differ from the response of others. Early study on economic decision-
makers' responses to institutional change suggested that its effects were likely to be 
discontinuous.^ In chapters 3 and 4 we discussed the fact that economic reforms were 
introduced into different state enterprises at different times and that policies were not 
adopted uniformly in enterprises in different localities or in different sectors. In addition, 
our data showed tiiat tiie intensity of the implementation of reform varied enormously 
among sample enterprises (chapters 3 and 4), and that this may well have caused 
enterprises to respond to reform in vastiy different ways. Against this background, case 
(b) can be considered inappropriate for our purpose. Our interest lies not only in 
comparing technical efficiency across enterprises during a particular period and in 
-Refer to Lin (1987) for farmers' responses to the newly instituted Household Responsibility System in 
the late 1970s. In that paper, the author found a significant jump in the productivity of Chinese 
agriculture as it moved towards quasi-privatisation. 
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gauging overall efficiency trends but also in observing the behaviour of each enterprise 
within its somewhat unique policy environment during the reform period. 
To capture the dynamic and varying quality of reform, the distribution of technical 
efficiency is assumed here to follow case (c). The specification of w,, in this study differs 
widely from its specification in all the previous studies. Specifically, the non-negative 
component of equation (5.3) is assumed to vary across all enterprises in any of the six 
time periods and during the years 1980 and 1984-88 according to the specifications of a 
multivariate distribution. Moreover, technical efficiency («,,) follows a truncated half-
normal distribution, and the point of truncation is not pre-determined at zero. All the 
related assumptions are given in equation (5.9.1 to 5.9.7): 
U, - and > 0 (5.9.1) 
- N{0,(5]) (5.9.2) 
Eiu^^u.^.) = 0 for all i ^ i' and t ^ ^ t' (5.9.3) 
) = g] for i = and t = f (5.9.4) 
£ ( V. V. ) = 0 for /' or t^r (5.9.5) 
v^ v^, ) = a ' for / = i and t = t' (5.9.6) 
Eiu^^v. ) = 0 , for aU i and t, (5.9.7) 
where r=l, 2, ...,6 and /=1, 2, ..., N and N is the number of enterprises in a particular 
industrial sector, |i is the mean of the half-normal distribution and a j and o j are 
respectively the variances of the distributions of and v ,^. 
This specification differs from that of Jondrow et al. (1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn 
(1983) in the sense that the mean of the truncated half-normal distribution is not 
restricted to zero-^  and the distribution is defined on panel rather than cross-sectional 
data. It is more general than those of Pitt and Lee (1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984) 
and Battese, Coelli and Colby (1989) in that technical efficiency is allowed to vary not 
only across firms in a particular time period but also over time for a particular firm. 
Unlike the specifications of Battese and Coelli (1992), Kumbhakar (1990) and Comwell, 
•^Kumbhakar (1991) made a similar attempt to relax this restriction for the point (instead of average) 
estimates of technical efficiency using different model specifications. 
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Schmidt and Sickle (1990), it does not impose a unifomi pattern of change over time in 
technical efficiency for all firms in the sample. Since no such model exists in the 
literature, it is necessary to derive formulas for estimation. The following model is a 
modification of those described in the literature on the stochastic production frontier 
approach.5 
The density function of u^ ^ can be expressed as: 
v ^ a [ l - / ( - | i / a ) 
for u > 0 (5.10) 
where / ( * ) is the distribution function for a standard normal variable. It can be shown 
that the mean and variance of U . are: 
E{u„) = n + [f{-\i / )/[! - / )]} (5.11) 
Var{u,) = C5l{\-
/ ( - ^ / a j u , / ( - ^ / a j + 
) a l - F ( - n / a J 
(5.12) 
where ) is the density function of a standard normal distribution. 
It is weU known that the best (minimum square error) predictor of an unobservable 
random variable, conditional on the value of a known random variable, is the conditional 
expectation of the first random variable, conditional on the value of the second random 
variable. Therefore the best predictor of the technical efficiency of the firm in the r^ ^ 
period, e x p ( - ^ , ) , conditional on the value of the random variable ^ 
£ [ e x p ( — / e j . We define e^ ^ = v^ , The joint density function for u.^  and e.^  
can be expressed as: 
= (5.13, 
By integrating equation (5.13) with respect to U.^ , where > 0 , we obtain the 
following density function for e^ :^ 
^This model was also applied in a working paper by Zhao (1993b). 
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(5.14) 
where f i ' = - + and a ' = + a ' ) . The density 
function of conditional on ^ is then as follows: 
(5.15) 
Equation (5.15) looks exactly the same as the expression of density function of the 
positive truncation of normal distribution with as its mean and a ' as variance. The 
expected technical efficiency expressed by equation (5.5) can be obtained by 
straightforward integration of equation (5.15): 
TE, = e x p ( - M , ) = j e x p ( - M , ) / ( « , / e , ) d u . 
- ( i i ' / g ) 
(5.16) 
In this study, we use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the production 
frontier. If / ( x . ^ ) in equation (5.3) is in Cobb-Douglas or translog form, the density 
function of y.^  can be obtained by substituting (y.^ for ^u in equation (5.14). The 
log-likelihood function is then expressed as (5.17): 
Ud'-,y) = -HN. X T) Xln(27c) -i[(7V, xTX^^l + o])] - (N, x 7:)ln[l - F(-\x / c j 
N T 
+ (N, X 7:)ln[l - F{-ii' / G')] - ^ ^ [ ( J , , - x„py (y, -x„(3) / a,^) 
- H N , X 7:)(^ / a j ^ +HN, xTM' / a ) (5.17) 
where 6 ' = (p' , a J ,a^ , |L l ) ' , N, refers to the number of enterprises in the t^^ period, T 
is the number of periods for enterprise / and therefore N^xT is total observations in the 
estimation.^ Following the parameterisation of Battese and Corra (1977), we fmd: 
^If the panel is unbalanced in the sense that the lengths of time series differ among enterprises, then 
( N ^ x T ) in equation (5.17) and equations thereafter should be replaced by , where N.^ is 
number of observations in the t'^ period and T is the total number of periods. 
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+ (5.18.1) 
Y = (5.18.2) 
Equation (5.17) can be rearranged as follows: 
L\Q\y) = -HN, xT,)(]n2n + \na')-(N, x7;)ln[l-F(-z)]- i (N, x T y F{-zl)] 
I r 
+ i i i - i i i (J. - ^.P)' (}'„ - / (1 - Y)o^ (5.19) 
where 
= [|Li(l - Y) - Y ( X , - - y)c', (5.19.1) 
e = (p^a^Y,|n) ' (5.19.2) 
z = [ L / 4 W (5.19.3) 
The parameter 7 has interesting significance in the stochastic frontier model. By 
definition, it is the ratio of the variance of the truncated normal distribution to the 
variance of the residual term E^ ^ in equation (5.3) and varies between 0 and 1. If this 
parameter turns out to be zero or close to zero, then this means that the residual terms 
are dominated by the true random noise v.^ . This suggests that the random variable u^^ 
and the full frontier model has little explanatory power over the technical efficiency of 
individual enterprises in the sample. Conversely, if the parameter is close to 1, then the 
residual is dominated by the random variable U.^ , which implies that the model has strong 
explanatory power. 
Given that both U.^  and V, are independent of X, in the stochastic production 
function (5.3), a system equation can be formed by taking the partial derivatives of 
equation (5.19) with respect to 9 and making them equal to zero (see Appendix 5.1). 
Although the system has an equal number of parameters and equations, it is impossible to 
work out a numerical solution. We therefore use the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell algorithm 
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recommended by Pitt and Lee (1981) to approximate the solution to the system and 
calculate the maximum likelihood estimates. 
Using the estimated parameters and substituting ( x ^ - x ^ p ) for in |J.', the 
technical efficiency of each enterprise in each period of time can be obtained readily by 
straightforward calculation using equation (5.16). To estimate above model specification 
in this study, I use TEALEC, a Fortran program developed by the Division of Economics 
in the Research School of Pacific Studies of the Australian National University. 
Functional Form 
Sample enterprises are divided into two industrial sectors, namely light industry and 
heavy industry, for which separate estimations are made. The former sector comprises 
122 enterprises and the latter 174. 
The following unconstrained Cobb-Douglas type of model is used in the estimation 
of enterprise-specific technical efficiency for the years 1980 and 1984-1988: 
= a + p, l n ( L J + p , + P3 l n ( £ „ ) + p , ( / y „ ) 
2 9 5 (-5 20^ 
:=1 ;=5 
where /=1, 2 (enterprises); r=1980, 1984,..., 1988; j=l, 2, 3 ,4 ,5 (city); and 
5=2,...,S (industries). The variables y^ ,^ L^, K^ ^ and E^ ^ represent output, and inputs of 
labour, capital and energy in the enterprise and the r^ ^ period of time. The variable 
/ y is investment in the upgrading of technology accumulated since 1980 of the 
enterprise in the r*^ ^ period of time. D^ is a size dummy variable: 1 for large and zero for 
medium-sized enterprises. This variable is intended to capture the effect on productivity 
of scale (see chapter 2). DJ ' s are locality dummies for Shanghai, Wuhan, Chongqing, 
Guangzhou and Shenyang. D / ' s are dummy variables for industries in light or heavy 
industrial sectors, with 5 representing the total number of industries in each sector (12 in 
the former and 16 in the latter). The purpose of incorporating two series of dummy 
variables will be discussed shortly. 
Several functional forms such as the Cobb-Douglas, CES and translog production 
functions can be used to simulate the industrial production process. Since Christensen, 
Jorgenson and Lau (1971, 1973), the translog was been the most general functional form 
in both the average production function approach and the full frontier production 
approach. In this study we adopt the Cobb-Douglas function, for the following two 
reasons. First, the Cobb-Douglas production function is considered to be more robust 
than the translog functional form in the stochastic production frontier approach. Second, 
previous studies, including Chen Kuan (1988), have shown that Cobb-Douglas is the 
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preferred form for Chinese state enterprises. Finally, when a translog-form was estimated 
and the estimates were used to test the "complete global separability" assumption, the 
results indicated that the assumption of Cobb-Douglas functional form could not be 
rejected. This means that the underlying production technology may reasonably be 
represented by Cobb-Douglas form. 
Cumulative investment is intended to capture the effects of technical progress on the 
productivity of sample enterprises. Technical progress results from the adoption of new 
or superior technology and know-how (chapter 2). In the literature, economists have 
normally used the time trend as a proxy for technical progress in the estimation of both 
time series and panel data.^ The problems with such a proxy are obvious, particularly in 
its application to panel data at enterprise level and in study of the impact of dynamic 
institutional changes on enterprise-specific efficiency. 
Specifically, two serious problems arise in this particular study in taking the time 
trend as a proxy for technical progress. First, the time trend is a very rigid proxy for 
technical progress as it allows for no inter-enterprise difference among sample 
enterprises. This is, of course, unrealistic. If technical progress does differ according to 
enterprise, the time trend will bias the residual of the production function, and thus the 
index of technical efficiency, in the following two ways. In the case of enterprises with 
greater than average progress in applying new technology, the index of technical 
efficiency will include the residual effect of technical progress which the time trend fails 
to capture completely. These enterprises may, based on the estimated index of technical 
efficiency, appear to be more efficient than they actually are because time represents an 
average trend and is uniform for all enterprises. Conversely, enterprises with less than 
average technical progress may appear to be less efficient than they actually are, because 
the time trend has captured more than it should. This point is very similar to the 
argument put forward by Hock (1962) to explain factors influencing scale efficiency. 
The second problem with usmg the time trend as a proxy is that technical progress is 
unlikely to be the same in aU time periods under study for a particular enterprise or for 
the sample as a whole. If variation in inter-temporal technical progress occurs then, 
following the previous argument, estimated technical efficiency will look more efficient 
than it really is during periods of greater technology progress and less efficient during 
times of less progress. By introducing time dummies, variation in inter-temporal technical 
progress can be introduced in the model. However, this procedure still leaves in place the 
assumption that technical progress is uniform across enterprises within a particular time 
period. The above bias make the index of technical efficiency an unreliable measure of 
the performance of enterprises, both within a given period and inter-temporally. 
^There are so many empirical smdies in which the time trend has been used as a proxy for technological 
progress in the estimation of time-series data that I have not bothered to cite them. The time trend is also 
used for panel data. Fan (1991), for example, used the time trend as a proxy for non-Hicks-neutral 
technical progress in the estimation of the efficiency of Chinese agriculture. 
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In this study, the proxy chosen is cumulative investment in technology. This variable 
is enterprise-specific and allows for variation over time. Also, because this type of 
investment is targeted exclusively at upgrading technology, it can be considered a far 
better proxy than the time trend. In the specification of equation (5.20), the effect of 
technological progress on productivity is assumed to be Hicks-neutral, despite the fact 
that investment is supposed to be made in capital. This is, however, a strong assumption. 
Two series of dummy variables are incorporated into the production function in 
equation (5.20). The fu-st series is intended to capture geographical differences in human 
capital, physical capital and possibly industry-specific experience. In pre-reform China, 
inter-regional migration of labour was strictly restricted by the government, although 
govemment often transferred large amounts of skilled labour from one region to another 
through administrative fiat in order to carry out national economic development plans.^ 
Thus inter-locality differences in physical and human capital could become permanent 
characteristics of state enterprises in different localities. Partly because of these 
restrictions, some enterprises had also accumulated greater on-the-job experience in the 
period preceding the years covered by the survey data. 
After the reform, these inter-locality differences were not likely to disappear quickly. 
In the process of decentralising decision-making power from the central govemment to 
state enterprises, local governments retained a substantial portion of power that should 
have been delegated to enterprises. Wong (1988) believes that local govemments 
expanded their power at the expense of both the central govemment and enterprises. The 
first set of dummy variables in equation (5.20) takes this factor into account. It is used to 
estimate enterprise-specific technical efficiency across the six localities based on a 
common and comparable production frontier. 
The second series of dummy variables contains industry dummies intended to capture 
the effects of inter-industry differences in technology in the two sectors — light and 
heavy. In this study, efficiency in the two sectors is estimated separately. Two 
assumptions underlie this treatment of the sample enterprises. First, inter-industry 
technological difference is assumed to be Hicks-neutral. Second, the two sectors are 
considered to differ in both factor intensity and intercepts in the production function. 
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the coefficients of the frontier 
production function — including the size dummy and two series of dummy variables — 
and the parameters of the distributional form of technical efficiency. The maximum 
likelihood function is estimated according to the formula derived in the preceding 
section. 
^For example, in the early 1950s the govemment transferred 28,000 technicians and 177,000 skilled 
workers from Shanghai to work on projects assigned to inland areas in the first Five-Year-Plan (Lardy 
1979, p. 154). In the 1970s, over half a million skilled workers were again transferred to other provinces 
(p. IM). 
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I need now to reiterate an important point with respect to the index of technical 
efficiency, namely that it is a relative index. If we find , for example, that the efficiency 
rate of the /th enterprise in the r^ h period is 100, then this means that the enterprise is on 
the production frontier in this period. This should not be interpreted, however, as 
meaning that all the resources of the enterprise are being utilised with perfect efficiency. 
Rather it represents the best or most efficient utilisation achieved by sample enterprises in 
that period. We still do not know how efficiently the firm's resources are allocated and 
utilised relative to the absolute standard of Pareto efficiency. 
Data 
Data on both output and input factors contained in the accounting balance sheets of 
sample enterprises are used in the estimation. Some modification of the variables was 
necessary to obtain reliable and consistent estimates for both output and inputs. 
Output 
In this study, value-added is used for output; that is, gross output net of non-energy 
material inputs. As the Oiinese economy experienced unprecedented inflation in the 
1980s, the use of value-added at current price may well result in an overestimation of 
efficiency. To overcome this problem, equation (5.21) is used to construct value-added 
at the 1980 constant price level. 
= (5.21) 
yliy: 
where yl is gross output of the enterprise in the period evaluated at current price, 
y ^ is gross output at 1980 price, and thus y^ ^ / y^ is the price index for output. The 
variable m^ ^ is non-energy material inputs and y'^  - ml stands for value-added at current 
price. By deflating value-added by the enterprise-specific price index yl / y ^ , we obtain 
y l , the variable for value-added at 1980 constant price. 
Capital and Labour 
Net fixed assets are used for capital. Economists (Kuan Chen et al. 1988b) have found 
two problems with direct use of this variable for capital. First, in Chinese accounting 
practice, net fixed assets are calculated by adding new capital investment at current price 
to existing assets evaluated at their original price and then subtracting depreciation. As 
capital goods were subject to high inflation in the 1980s, the accounting value of capital 
stock would certainly be higher than the actual use of capital. The second problem is that 
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the book value of capital stock included a variety of service facilities, such as housing, 
schools, health clinics, canteens and retail oudets. Large enterprises might even have 
facilities for social functions and sporting activities. According to Kuan Chen et al., these 
facilities are "non-productive" and their inclusion again results in an overestimation of 
capital stock for production purposes. Following the argument of Kuan Chen et al. 
(1988b), capital stock should be deflated by the appropriate price index and "non-
productive" capital excluded from estimation.^ 
Two sets of price deflators for capital stock are found in the literature, one calculated 
by Kuan Chen et al. (1988b) and the other by Zheng Yuxin of the China Academy of 
Social Science and published in Perkins, Zheng and Cao (1992). The latter is used in this 
study because it contains price deflators for different industries, which better serve the 
multi-sector estimation. The application of this deflator is explained in Appendix 5.2. 
For consistency with the measurement of capital and following Kuan Chen et al. 
(1988a), I also exclude non-productive workers from the labour force using the 
following formula: 
L = L l x ( C : , I C l ) (5.22) 
where is the total labour force and C "^ / C l is the ratio of fixed assets for production 
purposes to total fixed assets. The latter also serves as a proxy for the ratio of non-
productive labour to total labour. The variable L, is thus labour for production 
purposes. 
Energy 
In the data set, the value of expenditure on energy is given only at current price. This is 
indeed a major concern. In the 1980s, pricing practices for energy in particular were 
complicated by the official two-tier price system and the direct involvement of 
governments in the allocation and pricing of energy complicated matters. As well energy 
prices were affected by inflation. For state enterprises, the aUocation of energy by 
government, often at a subsidised price, could make the difference between monetary 
expenditure on energy and real energy input. The direct use of monetary expenditure in 
this study would certainly generate inaccuracy and bias. 
Unlike capital stock, no price deflator for the energy input is available in the 
literature, I have therefore constructed a deflator for the purposes of the thesis. In the 
1980s, the following factors could make monetary expenditure a biased indicator of the 
real energy input for a particular enterprise: inflation of energy prices; price differentials 
^Most studies of the productivity of state enterprises in the 1980s follow Kuan Chen et al. (1988b): for 
example, Lau and Brada (1990), Dollar (1991) and Perkins, Zheng and Cao (1992). 
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among localities; deviation between the officially regulated price of energy and the 
market price; differences in the sources of energy (for example, coal, petroleum 
products, gas etc.) used in the total input of energy; and finally variations in the 
proportion of energy subsidised by the government among enterprises and in different 
time periods. 
Assume that monetary expenditure on energy of the enterprise in the r^ h period 
can be expressed as: 
4 = X P, (5.23) 
where is expenditure on energy, is real energy input in a standard unit, for 
example BTU or tonnes of standard coal equivalent, and is the price of energy per 
standard unit. Our data set contains only E.^ , which is evaluated at current price. The 
real energy input can be expressed as = E.JP.^. We therefore, need to work out P.^  in 
order to find e.^ . However, both and E.^  are composite variables. They are 
determined by the proportions of energy purchased at the market price and energy 
supplied by the govemment at a subsidised price. The equation can then be expressed as: 
- " I 
E, = e lpl + e : p : = e, + p ; ) (5.24) e e 
It It 
where e° is real energy input supplied by the government, pi is the govemment 
subsidised price, is real energy input purchased on the market and is market price. 
Both prices should be expressed on the basis of a standard energy unit. If s.^  = Kl^u^ 
which is the proportion of energy supplied by govemment, then 1 - s., is the proportion 
of energy purchased on the market. Since equation (24) can be 
expressed as: 
<5.25) 
where + (1 can be interpreted as the composite energy price for the 
enterprise in the period of time. The composite price is in fact the average of the 
market and official prices weighted by the share of energy allocated by govemment and 
the share purchased on the market. Real energy input can readily be obtained by re-
arranging equation (5.25) as follows: 
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Table 5.1 Market Price and Planned Price of Energy, 1980,1984-88 
(Unit: Yuan per tonne of standard coal equivalent) 
Market Price 
Year Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 93.45 113.75 114.41 103.76 134.75 129.36 
1984 112.16 134.59 135.48 123.19 159.71 153.58 
1985 132.44 166.57 158.57 143.37 197.73 205.50 
1986 131.74 165.77 160.21 145.25 196.90 189.31 
1987 151.37 185.52 173.84 161.26 235.34 209.86 
1988 176.15 218.36 198.35 175.00 267.75 245.13 
Official Price 
1980 81.58 77.76 104.65 82.18 127.00 79.20 
1984 93.81 86.72 117.62 90.71 147.43 88.54 
1985 99.33 91.27 122.80 94.38 156.37 107.02 
1986 105.11 99.20 133.38 101.17 172.79 99.92 
1987 119.52 108.36 140.98 110.74 202.15 107.16 
1988 129.57 116.30 146.76 109.04 203.71 113.15 
Source: Survey data. 
= (5.26) 
Both the market price and government subsidised price of energy in the six cities in 1980 
and 1984-88 are provided in Table 5.1. Their derivation is explained in Appendix 5.3. 
In order to obtain the composite energy price, we have to make the following two 
assumptions: 
1) Enterprises in any locality pay the same market price and government 
subsidised price in any particular year; and 
2) The proportion of energy allocated by the government at a subsidised 
price to a particular enterprise depends upon the amount of output 
contributed, by that enterprise to the govemment.'® 
Using these assumptions, we apply the same market price and official price to all 
enterprises in a city and use the market share of output as the proxy for in equation 
(5.26). Real energy input e., for each enterprise can then be readily calculated. 
i^This assumption may not always be realistic. At times of low demand for products, the commitment to 
purchase products may be a burden for the government. The government may then try to discourage 
production by reducing subsidies. When there is high demand for products, the reverse may be the case. 
I beUeve that this sort of manipulation of subsidies is uncommon, and is unlikely to cause serious 
problems in oiu* estimation results. 
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These two assumptions seem reasonable and realistic. First, state enterprises in any 
particular city deal with the same govemment and trade energy on the same market. It is 
therefore unlikely that either the market or official price would differ greatiy for 
enterprises in a city, although prices do differ substantially between provinces (Table 
A5.3.1 in Appendix 5.3). Second, as the govemment was unable to fill demand for 
energy both before and after economic reform, it would not be surprising if scarce energy 
resources were rationed on the basis of output supplied by enterprises to the govemment 
at a price lower than the market price. The second assumption is, then, realistic. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The summary of variables used in the estimation is presented separately in Table 5.2, 
which shows variations in both output and three factor inputs during the time period 
covered by the data. According to this table, the mean value-added of both industrial 
sectors increased significantiy. In the case of heavy industry, it increased from 24.38 
million yuan in 1980 to 50.67 million yuan in 1988, an annual rate of growth of 10.8 
percent; in the case of light industry, it increased from 23.55 million yuan to 49.57 
million yuan, an annual growth rate of 9.8 per cent.ii The three input factors rose 
moderately compared with value-added. In heavy industrial sector, the average number 
of workers increased from 24.82 in 1980 to 26.49 per enterprise in 1988, a growth rate 
of 6.7 per cent during the eight years under study or 0.8 per cent annually, while in light 
industrial sector, it increased from 16.31 to 19.28 per enterprise, a growth rate of 18.2 
per cent or 2.1 per cent annually. In both sectors, the inputs of capital and energy grew 
at a faster rate than labour. In the heavy industrial sector, average net fixed assets 
increased from 31.73 million yuan in 1980 to 49.88 million yuan in 1988, an annual 
growth rate of 5.8 per cent, and energy increased from 20.62 thousand tonnes to 31 
thousand tonnes, an annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent. In the light industrial sector, net 
fixed assets increased from 9.96 million joian in 1980 to 30.96 million yuan in 1988, 
equivalent to a 15.2 per cent annual growth rate, and energy increased from 9.97 
thousand tonnes to 15.93 thousand tonnes, an annual growth rate of 6 per cent. The 
trends at industry level are given in Appendix 5.4 and they are largely similar in relative 
terms to those found in Table 5.2. 
A comparison of the trends for output and factor inputs provides prima facie 
evidence of efficiency in heavy and light sectors in the 1980s. Value-added in both 
sectors grew more quickly than any of the three productive factors in the heavy industrial 
sector, which suggests that technical efficiency improved during the period. In light 
industry, growth of value-added was much higher than growth of labour employment and 
Growth rates in this paragraph are exponential growth rates calculated from the first to last years of 
the period. 
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Table 5.2. Summary of Variables Used in Estimation 
Variables Year Heavy Industry Light Industry 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Value-Added (unit: million yuan) 1980 24.38 656.36 1.12 23.55 364.58 1.21 
1984 30.67 792.31 1.24 31.30 531.58 1.63 
1985 36.17 911.40 1.43 35.14 527.23 1.47 
1986 39.91 923.36 1.29 38.99 575.52 2.16 
1987 44.50 949.42 1.53 43.11 618.44 2.98 
1988 50.67 1024.67 1.55 49.57 781.48 3.11 
Labour (unit: 100 persons) 1980 24.82 166.13 3.52 16.31 84.19 1.69 
1984 25.54 155.67 2.69 18.56 87.78 2.81 
1985 26.48 158.16 3.72 18.50 85.49 3.00 
1986 26.65 157.20 3.96 18.77 85.72 3.06 
1987 26.27 157.08 3.80 19.20 87.01 3.13 
1988 26.49 160.64 4.12 19.28 86.67 3.37 
Net Fixed Assets (unit: million yuan) 1980 31.73 368.65 1.73 9.96 45.81 1.10 
1984 35.13 448.76 0.96 17.93 639.01 1.75 
1985 37.95 467.55 2.11 22.00 7(H.08 1.90 
1986 40.00 499.62 1.91 25.41 752.59 1.92 
1987 46.23 692.93 2.36 29.78 747.44 3.99 
1988 49.88 733.59 3.37 30.96 712.26 3.72 
Energy 1980 20.62 261.63 5.16 9.97 191.69 0.14 
(unit: 1,000 tonnes of coal equivalent 1984 23.59 507.56 5.16 10.85 167.27 0.42 
1985 29.20 601.13 5.32 14.55 229.51 0.63 
1986 31.59 657.17 5.45 16.81 299.40 0.64 
1987 30.12 672.11 5.51 16.47 330.94 0.71 
1988 31.00 694.32 5.43 15.93 287.14 0.46 
Notes-. l)Some enterprises failed to enter information on either outputs or input or entered 
apparently erroneous figures such as zero or negative numbers, upsetting the balance of 
the panels for both heavy and light industrial sectors. These observations are excluded 
from this table and from the estimation. Specifically, in the panel for heavy industry, the 
number of observations after excluding some data is 149 in 1980, 161 in 1984, 156 in 
1985, 155 in 1986, 160 in 1987 and 161 in 1988; in the panel for light industry the 
number is 103 in 1980,109 in 1984,110 in 1985,1986 and 1987, and 111 in 1988. 
2)It should be noted that six enterprises (ferrous metal forging and melting industries) in the 
heavy industrial sector are considerably larger than others. The inclusion of these 
enterprises in the calculation would significandy enlarge average value-added and inputs 
in the heavy sector, giving, I beUeve, a distorted picture of the situation. This sector is 
therefore excluded from this table. Similarly, one enterprise in the light industrial sector 
is considerably larger than others and the observation for this enterprise in 1980 is 
missing. As the inclusion of this observation would distort the trend for the light 
industrial sector, it is also excluded from the calculation. A similar table using the entire 
data set is presented in Table A5.4.1 in Appendix 5.4. 
3)Figures are the outcome of the adjustments described in the previous section. 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
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Table 5.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Parameters of the 
Stochastic Production Function 
Heavy Industrial Sector Light Industrial Sector 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.7060 1.2097 1.2360 Constant 0.2303 1.0901 1.0033 
(0.3256) (0.3432) (0.3296) (0.2577) (0.2646) (0.2389) 
log (Labour) 0.4250 0.4014 0.3841 log (Labour) 0.4518 0.3872 0.3790 
(0.0602) (0.0604) (0.0576) (0.0476) (0.0454) (0.0428) 
log (Capital) 0.2457 0.2654 0.2784 log (Capital) 0.1974 0.2356 0.2381 
(0.0406) (0.0416) (0.0398) (0.0390) (0.0372) (0.0355) 
log (Energy) 0.2229 0.2136 0.2039 log (Energy) 0.2495 0.2288 0.2267 
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0333) (0.0306) (0.0300) 
log (Investment) 0.0868 0.0854 0.0856 log (Investment) 0.0078 0.0046 0.0050 
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0033) 
Size Dummy 0.0105 0.0165 0.0238 Size Dummy 0.2294 0.2371 0.2386 
(0.0501) (0.0494) (0.0489) (0.0477) (0.0442) (0.0430) 
Shanghai 0.5073 0.4971 0.4808 Shanghai 0.3286 0.3652 0.3775 
(0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0552) (0.0522) 
Wuhan 0.1576 0.1508 0.1335 Wuhan 0.0349 0.0562 0.0588 
(0.0691) (0.0680) (0.0673) (0.0260) (0.0419) (0.0386) 
Chongqing -0.1055 -0.1286 -0.1485 Chongqing -0.1242 -0.1304 -0.1051 
(0.0708) (0.0703) (0.0691) (0.0712) (0.0656) (0.0632) 
Guangzhou 0.3392 0.3319 0.3257 Guangzhou 0.1104 0.1490 0.1543 
(0.0814) (0.0798) (0.0792) (0.0633) (0.0604) (0.0573) 
Shenyang -0.1336 -0.1360 -0.1283 Shenyang -0.3781 -0.3584 -0.3261 
(0.0686) (0.0673) (0.0666) (0.0728) (0.0668) (0.0644) 
Sigma Square 0.4944 3.6917 Sigma Square 0.3885 3.7867 
(0.0607) (0.9659) (0.0377) (1.0523) 
Gamma 0.4945 0.9378 Gamma 0.7971 0.9764 
(0.1167) (0.0191) (0.0483) (0.0079) 
Mu -9.9851 Mu -11.0043 
(3.0584) (3.4398) 
Notes: 1) Values in brackets are standard deviations. 
2) Shanghai, Wuhan. Chongqing, Guangzhou and Shenyang are regional dummy variables 
for the corresponding cities. 
3) Sigma Square and Gamma are defined in equations (5.18.1) and (5.18.2), and Mu is the 
mean of the truncated half-normal random variable representing technical efficiency. 
4) Estimates of complete variables are given in Appendix 5.5. 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
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energy but substantially lower than growth of the capital input. The technical efficiency 
of light industry thus depends on the elasticities of labour and energy relative to capital. 
If the former are sufficiently high, then technical efficiency is likely to improve; otherwise 
it may decrease. 
The stochastic production function defined by equation (5.20) contains three core 
explanatory input variables, namely labour, capital and energy, one cumulative 
investment variable for technological upgrading, one size dummy, and five regional 
dummies for both heavy and light industrial sectors. There are 12 industry dummy 
variables for the heavy industrial sector and 16 for the Ught industrial sector. 12 
Altogether, the stochastic production function contains 22 p's for the heavy industry and 
26 p 's for light industry. 
In maximum likelihood estimation, the variables y and |J. can be estimated 
jointly or selectively with other variables. The following three models are estimated for 
both sectors based on equation (5.20): 
Model 1. Both y and |J. are restricted to zero (y = |J. = 0) : (average production 
function). 
Model 2. Variable jJ. is restricted to zero (|Ll = 0): (half-normal disturbance of the 
efficiency related term). 
Model 3. AU three variables, y and |J., are joindy estimated without imposing any 
restricts: (general model discussed here). 
Maximum likelihood estimates of the core variables and five regional dummies for 
the three models are presented in Table 5.3. 
Model 1 is clearly the conventional production function model. Model 2 is the 
stochastic production frontier model considered by KaUrajan and Flinn (1983) and 
Jondrow et al. (1982), and it is a restricted version of model 3. The last model can easily 
be converted into the model of Battese and Coelli (1992) if is re-specified following 
equation (5.6), into that of Comwell, Schmidt and Sickle (1990) if is re-specified 
according to equation (5.7) and into that of Kumbhakar (1990) if is re-specified 
following equation (5.8). 
Before examining the production function and variations in technical efficiency, it is 
necessary to check the validity of the modelling of the frontier production function in 
equation (5.20). The statistical significance of introducing the enterprise-specific 
technical efficiency variable in its half-normal distribution (model 2) into the frontier 
production function (5.20) can be examined by testing |i using the asymptotic /-statistics 
'^The industry of one enterprise in the heavy industrial sector could not be identified. This enterprise 
was taken as the base in assigning industry dummy variables to industries. In other words, the value of 
all industry dummy variables is zero for this enterprise. 
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or equivalently generalised likeUhood ratio. If the efficiency-related variable 'm' is not 
included in the model equation (5.20), then the OLS estimates of the remaining 
parameters of equation (5.20) are maximum likelihood estimates. In this situation, model 
1 is most appropriate for this data set. The null hypothesis is equivalent to testing 7=0 in 
model 2. The ^-statistics are 4.24 for the heavy industrial sector and 16.51 for the Ught 
industrial sector evaluated for the values of Gamma in the two sectors respectively, 
These are significant at the 99 per cent confidence interval. Furthermore, the 
appropriateness of the generalised stochastic production frontier where the random 
variable 'w' follows a truncated half normal distribution (with an unrestricted mean) can 
be tested jointly on 7 and |i using a generalised likelihood ratio. In this case, the null 
hypothesis is 7=|i=0. The negative of twice the logarithm of the generalised likelihood 
ratio has approximately i } with a parameter equal to 2. The x^-statistics is 20.03 for the 
heavy industrial sector and 57.89 for the light industrial sector, far exceeding 9.21, the 
critical value of y} statistics at the 99 per cent confidence interval. These tests suggest 
that both null hypotheses are rejected decidedly, making models 1 and 2 inappropriate 
specifications for this data set 
In model 3, an asymptotic r-test is carried out for the significance of both O^ and 
The r-statistics of 7 are 4.91 for the heavy industrial sector and 12.36 for the light 
industrial sector; the ^-statistics of |i. are 3.27 and 3.199 respectively. The results for both 
parameters are statistically significant at the 99 per cent confidence interval for both 
sectors. The results of the test suggest that observed output is significantly different from 
potential output as defined by the coefficients of the frontier production function, and 
that this difference can be attributed to differences between enterprises in a particular 
period of time and also differences within a firm from one period to another. 
The value of 7 is 0.93 for the heavy industrial sector and 0.98 for the Ught industrial 
sector, suggesting that variation in residuals in the corresponding production functions is 
mainly explained by variation in enterprise-specific technical efficiency and not by 
random chance factors. However, this conclusion is not valid if the estimated model is 
subject to substantial heteroscedasticity. In order to test heteroscedasticity, a White's test 
is carried out by regressing the disturbance term (V,,) on the core explanatory variables, 
their squares and cross products. The R^ is 0.0084 for the heavy industrial sector and 
0.0104 for the light industrial sector, and f-statistics are insignificant for all variables in 
the two sectors at a conventionally accepted confidence interval. This means that we 
^^Equivalently, we can use the maximum likelihood ratio for this test. The negative of twice the 
logarithm of the generalised likelihood ratio has approximately with parameter equal to 1. The x^-
statistics are 4.29 for the heavy industrial sector and 32.62 for the light sector, but the critical value of % 
^-statistics at the 95 per cent confidence interval with one degree of freedom is 3.84. This suggests that 
the null hypothesis of 7=0 is rejected decisively. 
•'•it can be argued that the /-test is not appropriate in a situation in which the random variable follows a 
half-normal distribution. However, no other statistical technique is superior to the /-test, and we 
therefore have to rely on the strong assumption that the mean of technical efficiency follows normal 
distribution asymptotically. The test was carried out on this assumption. 
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cannot reject the hypothesis that V,, is homoscedastic. Detailed results of the White's test 
are presented in Appendix 5.6. 
Model 3 is used in the estimation of the technical efficiency of both heavy and Ught 
industrial sectors. Table 3 shows that the coefficients of labour, capital and energy are 
positive. A f-test of the three core input factors suggests that the coefficients of the 
mputs of labour, capital and energy are significant at the 99 per cent confidence level. 
The sum of the coefficients of labour, capital and energy is 0.8664 for the heavy 
industrial sector and 0.8138 for the light industrial sector, suggesting that both sectors 
are likely to exhibit decreasing returns to scale. In both sectors, while the output 
elasticity of energy and capital are comparable in size, the output elasticities of labour is 
much larger. 
The signs for cumulative investment are positive in both sectors, indicating that both 
sectors are likely to experience technological progress or an upward shift in the 
production frontier. However, technical progress in the two sectors differs significantly. 
Technical progress caused by new investment was 8.6 per cent for the heavy industrial 
sector but only 0.5 per cent for the light industrial sector. The r-statistics are 8.73 for 
cumulative investment in the case of the heavy industrial sector and 1.51 in the case of 
the light industrial sector. These figures suggest that technical progress is statistically 
significant at the 99 per cent confidence interval in the heavy industrial sector and 
marginally significant at the 90 per cent confidence interval in the light sector, 
The size dummy variables in the production function are positive for both sectors. 
This is consistent with economic theory — which suggests that large enterprises enjoy 
increasing returns to scale due to their large fixed costs — and with empirical findings on 
Chinese industrial enterprises (Cao 1992). However, while the size dummy is statistically 
significant for the light industrial sector, it is insignificant for the heavy industrial sector. 
This is unexpected as heavy industry is more likely to exhibit increasing returns to scale 
than light industry. Although a thorough investigation of the causes is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, other studies do shed some light on this anomaly. For example, Cao (1992) 
argues that market segregation could be a factor in the failure of large enterprises in 
China's iron and steel industry to exploit their advantage in size. As stated in chapter 3, 
larger enterprises were more subject to government control than medium-sized 
enterprises. It is therefore equally possible that an imperfect market hindered the efforts 
of large enterprises in the heavy sector to exploit their advantage over medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The sign and magnitude of the dummy variables representing locality suggest that the 
production frontier differs from one city to another. In particular, the production 
fi-ontiers of enterprises in Shanghai and Guangzhou are significantly higher than Beijing's 
i^The critical value falls between 1.645 and 1.658 at the 95 per cent confidence interval with a degree of 
freedom of between 120 and infinity, and between 1.289 and 1.282 at the 90 per cent confidence interval 
with a degree of freedom of between 120 and infinity. 
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production frontier, and the frontiers are significantiy lower in Chongqing and Shenyang 
for both industrial sectors. The production frontier is significantiy higher for Wuhan for 
the heavy industrial sector but the result is indecisive in the case of the light industrial 
sector. The ranking of the magnitudes of the locality dummy suggests that state 
enterprises in Shanghai have the highest production frontier followed by those in 
Guangzhou, Wuhan and Beijing. Chongqing has the lowest frontier for the heavy 
industrial sector and Shenyang the lowest for the light industrial sector. 
Equation (5.16) is used to calculate the technical efficiency of each enterprise in the 
six years under study. We look first at the trend in technical efficiency in the period 
covered by the data. This tells us whether efficiency tended to improve during the years 
of economic reform. This is followed by an assessment and comparison of the technical 
inefficiency of individual enterprises, which gives us an idea of the amount of economic 
loss experienced by enterprises, for which only technical inefficiency is accountable. 
Table 5.4 Technical Efficiency of Heavy and Light Industrial Sectors 
Heavy Industry Light Industry 
Year Frequency Mean Minimum Maximum Frequency Mean Minimum Maximum 
1980 141 66.02 90.10 20.76 103 75.05 93.20 22.14 
1984 141 69.17 85.78 . 34.71 103 77.91 91.10 30.67 
1985 141 70.02 86.85 33.20 103 78.48 91.83 36.15 
1986 141 69.47 86.78 37.33 103 78.66 92.11 37.87 
1987 141 71.83 86.85 25.25 103 80.36 92.35 55.00 
1988 141 74.04 86.58 35.73 103 81.88 93.19 52.35 
Source: Survey data. 
Table 5.4 shows the technical efficiency of sample enterprises in two industrial 
sectors in 1980 and 1984-88. The mean technical efficiency suggests that state 
enterprises in both sectors became increasingly efficient in the 1980s. The average 
technical efficiency of the heavy industrial sector increased by 8 per cent during the 
period, from 65 per cent in 1980 to 74 per cent in 1988, and that of the light sector 
increased by 6.8 per cent from 75.1 per cent to 81.9 per cent. According to Table 5.4, 
mean technical efficiency in both sectors increased smoothly and consistentiy during the 
period, with the exception of 1986, when it dropped slightiy in the heavy sector. The 
index of minimum technical efficiency suggests that less efficient enterprises made 
impressive progress in improving efficiency, particularly in the light industrial sector, 
where minimum technical efficiency increased by over 30.2 per cent from 22.1 per cent 
to 52.4 per cent. 
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Table 5.5 Technical Efficiency by Industry, 1980 and 1984-88 
Year Petrochemicals* (3) Coal Products* (5) Industrial Chemicals* (17) Umdenufied* (1) 1980 63.75 64.41 66.05 76.83 1984 68.76 64.35 70.27 79.07 
1985 70.56 65.75 69.26 71.64 
1986 69.92 64.23 69.50 67.02 
1987 67.93 64.43 71.45 61.86 
1988 74.04 64.94 73.63 72.36 
Construction Materials* (11) Ferrous Melting* (6) Non-ferrous Melting* (5) Metal Products* (7) 
1980 69.40 68.46 60.13 67.25 
1984 71.60 70.67 61.67 70.21 
1985 73.30 70.76 62.13 71.15 
1986 72.30 72.44 63.35 70.05 
1987 73.20 71.42 59.08 74.06 
1988 73.79 72.83 60.56 74.00 
Machinery* (46) Transport Vehicles* (13) Electric Machinery* (12) Electronics & Conimunication*(9) 
1980 65.72 66.00 65.65 63.59 
1984 67.75 70.09 70.85 71.02 
1985 69.34 71.87 72.61 69.10 
1986 68.33 69.63 72.55 69.85 
1987 72.67 73.74 72.12 74.93 
1988 75.45 75.93 73.91 76.88 
Instrument* (6) Food (9) Soft Drink (7) Tobacco (5) 
1980 68.13 75.71 71.37 69.30 
1984 70.61 81.83 72.26 79.27 
1985 71.04 75.48 74.77 78.51 
1986 71.86 77.08 77.73 78.04 
1987 72.78 79.50 81.12 79.95 
1988 77.07 78.80 84.28 80.66 
Animal Feed (1) Textiles (24) Qothing (3) Leather Products (5) 
1980 53.59 77.67 68.84 82.34 
1984 84.09 77.97 76.88 66.74 
1985 89.10 78.71 71.55 69.26 
1986 87.63 79.48 83.41 83.27 
1987 68.39 79.18 83.83 81.56 
1988 81.80 83.07 80.35 74.92 
Wood & Bamboo Products (5) Furniture (1) Paper Products (7) Printing (9) 
1980 74.14 72.17 78.72 69.71 
1984 81.13 87.32 80.18 79.91 
1985 81.55 81.96 81.54 81.54 
1986 75.61 46.92 77.55 81.40 
1987 81.43 77.63 78.93 82.88 
1988 83.23 86.07 83.96 82.92 
Sports Equipment (1) Handicrafts (1) Medicine (10) Chemical Fibres (3) 
1980 81.76 84.29 70.12 78.82 
1984 84.06 82.96 78.26 79.00 
1985 87.61 77.97 78.84 79.45 
1986 86.38 68.23 77.41 78.37 
1987 86.55 86.16 80.87 82.54 
1988 83.51 86.68 81.90 83.03 
Rubber Products (7) Plastic Products (5) 
1980 71.59 68.58 
1984 76.74 73.83 
1985 80.82 79.43 
1986 80.15 77.39 
1987 80.74 77.71 
1988 82.90 77.05 
Note-. 
Source: 
Numbers in the brackets are number of observations in the industry; asterisk shows that 
industry is classified as heavy industry. 
Calculated from survey data. 
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The trends presented in Table 5.4 are consistent with the findings of similar studies. 
Dollar (1991), for example, showed that the average total factor productivity of 20 state 
enterprises surveyed by the World Bank increased by 4.7 per cent annuaUy during the 
period 1975-82, accelerating after 1979. Kuan Chen et al. (1988a) found that total factor 
productivity increased by 1.9 per cent annually based on Cobb-Douglas weights and 2.7 
per cent annuaUy based on translog weights during the period 1978-83, and that it 
increased by 5.4 per cent annually based on Cobb-Douglas weights and 6.3 per cent 
annually based on translog weights during the period 1980-85.^^ 
Mean technical efficiency at industry level is presented in Table 5.5, which illustrates 
trends in efficiency at a more disaggregated level. 
Disaggregated data reveal a similar trend towards technical efficiency over time. In 
10 of 13 industries in the heavy industrial sector, technical efficiency improved. These 
industries are petrochemicals, industrial chemicals, construction materials, ferrous metal 
forging and melting, metal products, machinery, transport vehicles, electric machinery, 
electronic and communications equipment and measuring instruments and apparatus. 
Although there is a wide variation in the rate of improvement of technical efficiency — 
ranging from less than 5 per cent for ferrous metal forging and melting to over 13 per 
cent for electronic and communications equipment — the improvement is consistent and 
significant. Of the other three industries, efficiency declined in the unidentified enterprise 
and fluctuated in the coal products and non-ferrous metal melting and forging industries. 
Nine of 17 industries in the light industrial sector show consistent improvement in 
technical efficiency, namely soft drinks, tobacco, textiles, clothing, paper products, 
printing, pharmaceutical, chemical fibres and rubber products. The technical efficiency of 
the leather products and plastic products industries declined, while that of other 
industries tended to increase between 1980 and 1988 even though the improvement was 
not consistent on a year-to-year basis. 
It should be noted that the data used for estimation is unbalanced in the sense that 
observations are missing from some series. In order to make a consistent inter-temporal 
comparison. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show only efficiency indexes based on complete series of 
data. The technical efficiency of all enterprises (unbalanced) is presented in Appendk 5.7 
and shows similar trends to those presented in the tables. 
Despite a significant improvement in efficiency during the 1980s, the mean efficiency 
of each enterprise in the six-year period reveals poor overall performance. On average, 
the heavy industrial sector realised only 70.1 per cent and the light industrial sector only 
76.9 per cent of potential output in 1980-88. Some enterprises in both sectors realised 
'^The growth rates of total factor productivity are calculated according to total factor productivity levels 
in Kuan Chen et al. (1988a, Table 4). These are exponential rates calculated from the fu-st to the last 
years of the period of interest 
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Figure 5.1 Cost of Technical Inefficiency in Heavy Industrial Sector 
Cost of Technical Inefficiency = 29.95% 
(No. ofEnUrprises) 
Figure 5.2 Cost of Technical Inefficiency in Light Industrial Sector 
Cost of Technical Inefficiency = 23.10% 
(No. of Enterprises) 
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less than 50 per cent of their potential. To obtain a better idea of loss attributable solely 
to technical inefficiency, I calculated the mean technical efficiency of each enterprise in 
each sector. The results are shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. 
In each of these figures the vertical axis represents the index of technical efficiency 
(expressed as a percentage) and the horizontal axis the index of enterprises (expressed as 
number of enterprises). Each of these figures consists of two areas. The shaded area 
represents technical efficiency and the unshaded area technical inefficiency. The sizeable 
unshaded area in both figures suggests that enterprises in both sectors, and particularly in 
the heavy industrial sector, suffered enormous losses due to technical inefficiency. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter, we used the stochastic production frontier model to estimate separately 
the technical efficiency of state enterprises in both heavy and light industrial sectors. In 
order to predict variation in enterprise-specific technical efficiency with reasonable 
precision, and thus pave the way for testing the impact of economic reform on the 
efficiency of state enterprises in the chapter to foUow, I developed a model based on a 
new specification. This was a modification of the latest developments described in the 
literature on the stochastic production fi-ontier. The new model was, as various statistical 
tests showed, superior to existing models for this data set. 
In the estimation, I incorporated the energy input into the production function as an 
independent factor so as to examine changes in the productivity of energy. This has not 
been done in previous studies of the productivity or efficiency of Chinese state 
enterprises. Due to the lack of an energy price deflator in the available literature, I 
constructed a set of market and planned price deflators for six cities. These deflators 
were used to obtain consistent estimates of technical efficiency. 
Since both capital goods and energy were subject to unprecedented inflation in the 
1980s, the value of capital goods and energy was in danger of being overstated. In order 
to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates for capital stock, net fixed assets, used as 
proxies for the capital input, were purged by the available capital price deflator. 
The estimation results showed that the technical efficiency of state enterprises in both 
heavy and light industrial sectors improved significandy between 1980 and 1988. The 
results provided strong evidence that economic reform since 1980 had been effective in 
improving technical efficiency, a point strongly contested by McMillan and Naughton 
(1992) and Yizi Chen et al. (1987), and supported by Lau and Brada (1990), Dollar 
(1988), Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng (1992), Kalirajan and Cao (1993) and Kalirajan and 
Zhao (1992). At the same time, technical progress was also significandy positive: a sign 
that total productivity was improving. 
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The study also showed that, although on average technical efficiency improved 
significantly over time, this improvement was less evident in a few industries, particularly 
in the light industrial sector. Efficiency even deteriorated in some industries. Worse still, 
the index of technical efficiency suggested that there was substantial overall inefficiency 
among state enterprises in the 1980s. This means that there was still considerable room 
for improvement in efficiency and productivity. 
At this point, one would naturally ask whether the improvement in technical 
efficiency was caused by economic reform policies, and if so, which policies effectively 
enhanced the efficiency of state enterprises. These questions will be answered in the next 
chapter. 
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Appendix 5.1 
The partial derivatives of the log-likelihood function of equation (5.19) in chapter 5 with 
respect to 0 are given in the following four equations, where 0 = ((3' ,a\Y, |Liy and |3 is 
a vector of parameters in the core production function (equation 5.3): 
^ = t t ^ . i y . - / (1 - + i t + z : . Vya-y)^' 
(A5.1.1) 
= - / (1 - + 3 3 r r \ - F { - z , ) • + Z V y O - y ^ 
(A5.1.2) 
dy 2y l-F(z) , , l - F ( - z , , ) dy . , 
(A5.1.3) 
where dy a V y a - y ) a [ Y ( l - y ) ] 
K x T , f { - z ) 1-y f { - z : ) , 
V ^ 1 - Fi-z) V y d - y ) ^ ' ' i - " 
(A5.1.4) 
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Appendix 5.2 
The Chinese capital stock deflators for the period 1980-89 are presented in Table A5.2, 
following Perkins et al. (1992, Appendix 4). 
Table A5.2 Chinese Capital Stock Deflators, 1980-89 
Year Metallurgy Chemical Machinery Construction Forest Products Food Products 
1980 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1981 1.1107 1.0979 1.1011 1.1209 1.0893 1.1014 1982 1.1106 1.1436 1.1231 1.1352 1.1255 1.1151 
1983 1.2369 1.2493 1.2423 1.2986 1.2530 1.2281 
1984 1.3479 1.3475 1.3105 1.4044 1.3683 1.3589 
1985 1.4709 1.4372 1.4122 1.5304 1.4771 1.4480 
1986 1.5817 1.5390 1.5010 1.5926 1.6608 1.5451 
1987 1.7119 1.6282 1.5574 1.6767 1.6756 1.6227 
1988 1.8410 1.7547 1.6785 1.8988 1.8259 1.7596 
1989 2.0571 1.9093 1.8056 2.0639 2.1918 1.9512 
Textiles Garments Leather Products Paper & Printing Art &Education Other 
1980 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1981 1.1025 1.0970 1.0956 1.0959 1.0964 1.0952 
1982 1.1228 1.1188 1.1085 1.0911 1.0940 1.1056 
1983 1.2306 1.2269 1.2209 1.2255 1.2332 1.2226 
1984 1.3149 1.4609 1.3790 1.3010 1.3034 1.3798 
1985 1.4173 1.4043 1.3194 1.3978 1.3965 1.4806 
1986 1.4487 1.6215 1.5664 1.4821 1.4766 1.6314 
1987 1.5325 1.5603 1.5861 1.5714 1.4642 1.8375 
1988 1.6668 1.6860 1.7122 1.6895 1.5624 2.0096 
1989 1.9265 2.1934 1.9525 1.9664 1.8190 2.3319 
Since there are more categories in our data set than in Perkins et al.'s, we re-
classified the enterprises in our sample to fit them into Perkins et al.'s categories. In the 
heavy industrial sector, the capital deflator for metallurgy in Table A5.2 is used for 
ferrous metal forging and melting, non-ferrous metal forging and melting, and metal 
products; the deflator for chemicals is used for industrial chemicals, coal products and 
petrochemical industries; the deflator for machinery is used for machinery, electric 
machinery, transport vehicles, electronics and communications equipment, and measuring 
instruments and other apparatus; and the deflator for construction is used for 
construction materials. The average of the four categories in Perkins et al. is used for the 
unidentified industry. 
In the light industrial sector, the deflator for forest products in Table A5.2 is used for 
wood and bamboo products and furniture; the deflator for food products is used for 
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food, soft drinks, tobacco and animal feed; the deflator for textiles is used for textiles and 
chemical fibres; the deflator for garments is used for the clothing industry; the deflator 
for leather products is used for leather products; the deflator for paper and printing is 
used for paper products, and printing; the deflator for art and education is used for 
handicrafts and sports equipment; and the deflator for chemicals is used for rubber 
products and plastic products. Since the pharmaceutical industry does not fit into any of 
Perkins et al.'s categories, I used the deflator for "other" to deflate this industry. 
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Appendix 5.3 
This appendix discusses market and energy prices. We should note that both are 
composite prices. Market price in each city is a variable of the prices of various types 
of primary and secondary energy. For simplicity, we classify energy into three 
categories: coal-based products, including raw coal, coke, bituminous and various 
prepared coals (hereafter coal); petroleum-based products, including petrol, kerosene, 
diesel, heavy oil and natural gas;i and electricity. The energy price is therefore a 
variable of the prices of coal, oH and electricity. The composite market price of energy 
can then be expressed as: 
Pt, - jiPi, ^Pu ^Pi,,) (A5.3.1) 
where p " , is the composite market price of energy in the locality and the r^ h period, 
and p ' ^ , and p ' ^ are respectively the prices of coal, oil and electricity. The 
official price of energy can be expressed in a similar way: 
P l = f i P : % P : % P u ) (A5.3.2) 
where g stands for the official govemment price. 
Since no systematic information about market and official prices is available, we 
have had to rely on information released in various publications to form our series of 
market and official prices. There were three principles to consider when forming the 
two price series. First, as both the market and official prices of energy differ 
considerably between provinces (Table A5.3.1), sometimes by as much as 11 times, the 
energy content of each yuan spent on energy in different localities must also have 
differed greatly. This inter-regional difference needs to be corrected so that we can 
obtain a consistent and unbiased energy input for enterprises in different regions. 
Second, the price of primary energy increased considerably in 1980 due to the opening 
up of a free market as well as increases in official prices. Inter-temporal change in the 
marginal energy price is too large to ignore if we are to obtain a consistent energy input 
over time. Third, in the years following market reform in the energy sector, the market 
price and officially stipulated price of energy diverged even further. This divergence 
^Gas accounted for around 2 per cent of total energy consumption in the 1980s, according to China 
Statistics Yearbook (1989, p. 186). This is very small compared with the share of coal, oil and 
electricity. Gas can therefore be included with oil-based products without serious risk to the accuracy 
of the composite price of energy. 
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inevitably causes the aggregate expenditure on energy of individual enterprises to differ 
depending on how their energy supply is sourced, and needs to be corrected for. 
In this appendix this correction is performed as accurately as possible. However, 
due to the limited availability of information and the practical complications of forming 
a composite energy price, we cannot expect to arrive at perfectly accurate market and 
official energy prices for every city and every year. Our intention is simply to derive the 
most realistic relative market and official energy prices for six cities over six years 
based on reasonable assumptions. Our premise is that the estimation of relative 
technical efficiency will be unbiased so long as relative, rather than absolute, prices are 
reasonably correct and accurate. 
I rely on three main sources. The first is price information either given or inferred in 
various issues of the China Statistics Yearbook. The second is the information 
contained in market surveys carried out by the State Price Bureau and published in 
reports and articles in various issues of the journal China Price. My third source is the 
General Industrial Survey conducted and published by the State Council of China in 
1985. 
Price of Coal 
It is particularly important to obtain a relatively reliable price for coal when 
constructing a composite energy price because coal accounted for weU over 50 per 
cent of energy consumption in the 1980s (China Statistics Yearbook 1989, p. 186). 
Even before economic reform, the central govemment's control over the coal 
industry was relatively weak. It was responsible for the allocation of coal from large 
and medium-sized mines, with the remainder being controlled by local govemments at 
provincial, prefectural and county levels. Due to higher mining costs in some areas,^ 
marginal differentiation was allowed when pricing coal from different areas. StiU, at the 
time, the pricing system was relatively simple — official prices applied to aU coal 
produced by mines controlled by central or local govemments. 
Since economic reform, coal pricing has become increasingly complex. The 
following two factors contributed to price differentials: emergence of a free market 
price and the divergence of official and market prices. A free energy market came into 
operation when township and village enterprises developed and the government gave 
state coalmines permission to sell above-quota output in the marketplace (see chapter 
3). From this point on, the market and official prices of coal increasingly diverged. 
When the central govemment allowed surcharges to be placed on the price of coal 
^According to Xu et al. (1982, p. 107), the cost of producing one unit of coal differs substantially 
between localities. Taking the unit production cost in Shanxi province as 100, it is 158 in Shaanxi, 
140 in Henan, 189 in Jiangsu, 151 in Anhui, 193 in Guizhou 180 in Sichuan and 269 Jilin province. 
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Table A5.3.1 Market and Official Prices of Coal in March 1989 and 1990 
March 1989 March 1990 
Province Market Price Official Price Market Price Official Price 
YuanAonne YuanAonne YuanAonne YuanAonne 
Tianjin 120.00 40.00 120.00 40.00 
Hebei 105.00 65.00 120.00 70.00 
Neimenggu 47.00 12.00 58.00 12.00 
Liaoning 250.00 33.02 250.00 33.02 
Jilin 165.00 50.00 150.00 45.00 
Shanghai 210.00 39.89 230.00 42.91 
Zhejiang 259.00 105.60 253.00 109.34 
Anhui 250.00 70.40 215.00 70.40 
Fujian 280.00 63.00 311.00 63.00 
Hubei 150.00 60.05 180.00 61.55 
Hunan 86.48 42.24 96.21 43.24 
Guangdong 252.00 118.00 242.00 125.00 
Yunnan 50.00 24.00 50.00 24.00 
Shaanxi 84.00 38.00 115.00 38.00 
Gansu 63.00 34.00 63.00 33.74 
Qinghai 80.00 51.00 80.00 51.00 
Xinjian 35.10 24.50 35.10 24.50 
Guangxi 180.00 110.00 180.00 110.00 
Average 139.81 56.16 150.16 55.70 
Source: Liu Shujie 1991, p. 30. 
from state coalmines crossing provincial borders, a significant gap in official coal prices 
between provinces also emerged. It is therefore important to make a distinction 
between both energy prices in different localities as weU as between the market and the 
official prices. Official and market prices for March 1989 and 1990 are shown in Table 
A.5.3.1. 
The strategy used to derive series of market and official energy prices was to 
establish prices in 1988 in each city and then to work out two deflators, one for market 
price and the other for official price. As it is virtually impossible to work out a separate 
deflator for every city, the two deflators are applied to prices in all six cities. This 
assumes that variations in market and official energy prices followed a similar pattern in 
these cities. 
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Market Price of Coal 
According to the State Price Authority (Table A.5.3.1), the market price of coal in 
March 1989 was 250 yuan/tonne in Liaoning province, 252 yuan/tonne in Guangdong 
province, 150 yuan/tonne in Hubei province and 210 yuan/tonne in Shanghai.^ The first 
three are considered approximate market prices for Shenyang, Guangzhou and Wuhan, 
the capitals of these provinces. Although the price of coal in Beijing is not stated in 
Table A.5.3.1, we can use the price in Tianjin as a proxy for the price in Beijing, as 
they are geographically close to each other and their market prices are thought to be 
similar. 
In 1988 inflation quickly pushed up prices, including the price of coal. For example, 
according to the State Price Bureau (1989), the market price of coal, which was 103 
yuan/tonne in Shanghai in early 1988, increased to 130 yuan/tonne in July, 170 
yuan/tonne in October and 210 yuan/tonne in December. The price thus more than 
doubled in only 12 months. This happened in other provinces as well and to other 
capital goods. Hence, a direct use of price in March 1989 will overstate the price in 
1988; and prices need therefore to be scaled down. This is done based on information 
about market coal prices in Shanghai. According to the State Price Bureau, the average 
market price of coal in Shanghai was 153.25 yuan/tonne in 1988. This means that the 
average price of coal in 1988 was about 72.98 per cent that of March 1989. Prices in 
the other four cities in 1988 are obtained by scaling down March of 1989 prices by a 
factor of 0.7298. We can use the coal price in Chengdu in 1988 as a proxy for the price 
in Chongqing, since they are the two largest cities in Sichuan province and 
geographically close to each other. The average market price of coal in Chongqing was 
thus 92 yuan (State Price Bureau 1989, p. 60). 
Table A.5.3.2 Market Prices of Coal in Original Unit, 1980 and 1984-88 
(Unit: yuan/tonne) 
Year Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 35.95 62.92 44.94 37.77 75.50 74.90 
1984 44.43 77.75 55.53 46.67 93.30 92.56 
1985 64.22 112.39 80.28 67.47 134.87 133.80 
1986 61.72 108.01 77.15 64.84 129.61 128.58 
1987 70.89 124.07 88.62 74.48 148.88 147.70 
1988 87.58 153.26 109.47 92.00 183.91 182.45 
^The coal price, as noted in Liu Shujie (1991), is the composite price of various kinds of coal. We do 
not know how the was weighted by types of coal. 
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After ascertaining the relative market price of coal in six cities in 1988, we need to 
find a price index over time. According to the State Price Bureau {China Price 1989, 
No. 5, p. 59), the nationwide average market price of bituminous coal was 77 
yuan/tonne in 1985, 74 yuan/tonne in 1986, 85 yuan/tonne in 1987 and 105 yuan/tonne 
in 1988. These prices are transformed into a price index normalised by the price in 
1988, which is then applied to six cities to obtain the corresponding series of market 
prices for the period 1985-87. The underlying assumption is that the relative market 
price of coal among the six cities changed over time in a similar way. According to 
General Industrial Survey: Coal Industry (1985, p. 51), the average market price of 
various kinds of coal"^  increased from 33.53 yuan/tonne in 1984 to 48.46 yuan/tonne in 
1985. The composite prices of coal in 1984 for the six cities are obtained using this 
index. It should be noted that these are mine-mouth prices and therefore lower than 
those found in the State Price Bureau's 1985 survey. In this study, it is assumed that 
transportation costs did not change significandy during 1984-85, so that the market 
price for consumers follows a similar trend. 
The mixed average retail price of coal was 31.4 yuan/tonne in 1980 and 38.8 
yuan/tonne in 1984 {China Statistics Yearbook 1985, p. 546). These prices are a 
mixture of the planned price, above-quota price and market price. As we cannot obtain 
an index of the market price of coal between 1980 and 1984, the mixed average price is 
used as a proxy for market price. It should be noted that this could understate 
(overstate) the market price trend if the market price increased faster (more slowly) 
than the planned and above-quota prices. However, as Qiina's coal market was rather 
limited until 1984, this proxy should be relatively free of distortion. A panel of market 
prices for coal obtained by following the procedure described above is presented in 
Table A5.3.2. 
Official Price of Coal 
Table A.5.3.1 gives us the official price of coal in March 1989 for Beijing, Shanghai, 
Wuhan, Guangzhou and Shenyang. The average official price in Yunnan is used as a 
proxy for that in Chongqing, since Yunnan and Sichuan^ are neighbouring provinces 
and both are coal importers.^ The similarity in the energy prices of these two provinces 
is confirmed by China Statistics Yearbook (1989, p. 266), which shows that the fuel 
price index was 119.8 in Sichuan and 120.3 in Yunnan. 
"^Included in the calculation in the General Industrial Survey were raw coal, brown coal, bituminous 
coal, coke, washed coal, washed fine coal and washed coke. 
^ Chongqing is located in Sichuan. 
^Refer to the balance sheets for coal in various issues of Almanac of Coal Industry. 
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Table A5.3.3 Official Price of Coal in Original Unit, 1980 and 1984-88 
(Unit: yuan/tonne) 
Year Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 22.65 22.59 34.01 13.59 66.83 18.70 
1984 29.81 29.73 44.75 17.89 87.94 24.61 
1985 32.40 32.31 48.64 19.44 95.58 26.75 
1986 37.60 37.50 56.45 22.56 110.92 31.04 
1987 40.45 40.34 60.72 24.27 119.32 33.39 
1988 40.00 39.89 60.05 24.00 118.00 33.02 
According to China Statistics Yearbook (1988, p. 93; 1990, p. 282), the average 
price of coal was 54.1 yuan/tonne in 1987 and 53.5 yuan/tonne in 1988. Using these to 
form a price index for 1987-88, the official price in 1987 in six cities can be calculated. 
According to Xu, Huang and Zhang (1989, p. 43), the average purchasing price of coal 
used in state-run power stations was 40.39 yuan/tonne in 1980, 53.15 yuan/tonne in 
1984, 57.77 yuan/tonne in 1985, 67.04 yuan/tonne in 1986 and 72.12 yuan/tonne in 
1987. Since the electricity industry has always been strictly regulated, energy inputs for 
electricity production were mainly supplied by government. These prices can, then, be 
expected to reflect accurately variations in the official price of coal. A price index 
based on these prices is used to construct official coal prices for 1980 and 1984-86. 
These are presented in Table A5.3.3. 
Market Price and Official Price of Oil Products 
According to the State Price Bureau (1990, No. 4, p. 61), the market price of petrol 
was 1,435 yuan/tonne in Beijing, 1,667 yuan/tonne in Shanghai, 2,120 yuan/tonne in 
Wuhan, 1,930 yuan/tonne in Chongqing, 1,890 yuan/tonne in Guangzhou and 1,700 
yuan/tonne in Shenyang in March 1990."^ As the price of petroleum increased 
significantly in 1988-90 (Liu Qimin 1991), we need to adjust the price accordingly. The 
average petrol price was 1,772.71 yuan per tonne in 1990 according to this source, but 
880 yuan in 1988 (Zhang 1989). Based on this price differential, the petrol price in the 
six cities is scaled down by a factor of 0.4964 to obtain the 1988 price. According to 
the State Price Bureau {China Price 1989, No. 2, p. 60), the average market price of 
petroleum products increased by 11.22 per cent between 1987 and 1988 nationally. 
Using this index, we obtain the price for 1987. 
The prices of oil purchased by state-run power companies between 1984 and 1988 
(Xu, Huang and Zhang 1989) are used to form the oil price index. According to Xu, 
^The price for Chongqing and Shenyang is not available in the original source. We use the price in 
Chengdu as a proxy for that in Chongqing and Huhehaote for Shenyang. This will not cause serious 
distortion because they are geographically close to each other. 
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Huang and Zhang, oil cost 116.46 yuan/tonne in 1984, 122.33 yuan/tonne in 1985, 
130.68 yuan/tonne in 1986 and 134.90 yuan/tonne in 1987. This index could in fact 
reflect the trend in official prices in this period, and thus understate variation in the 
marketplace. However, as discussed in chapter 3, the market was not fully operational 
until early 1991, and so any bias wiU not be significant. Moreover, since oil products 
accounted for around 16-17 per cent of total energy consumption (Table A5.3.9), any 
bias in the figures would not seriously affect the composite energy price after following 
the weighting procedures described in this appendix shortly. 
According to Liu Qimin (1991), the average petrol price was 628.27 yuan/tonne in 
1984 and the official price for petrol was 597.48 yuan/tonne in 1980. Once again, both 
are official price. However, since a free market did not exist until 1985 these could 
have been actual prices for state enterprises during the period. An index based on these 
prices is used to calculate prices in 1980. 
Table A.5.3.4 Prices of Oil Products, 1980 and 1984-88 
Origial Price 
(Yuan/tonne) 
Conversion Rate 
(tonnes in S. C.) 
Converted Price 
(Yuan/tonne of S.C.) 
Petrol 779.87 1.471 530.16 
Kerosene 526.05 1.471 357.61 
Diesel 450.24 1.571 286.59 
Heavy Oil 165.89 1.429 116.09 
Liquified Gas 379.69 1.714 221.52 
Average 302.40 
Note: S. C. stands for standard coal equivalent. Thus the unit of conversion 
in the third column is tonnes of standard coal equivalent per tonne of 
petroleum products, and the converted price is in yuan per tonne of 
standard coal equivalent. 
Source: The conversion rate is provided in State Material Bureau 1984 (p. 145). 
Liu Qimin (1989) found two major distortions in the pricing of petroleum products 
in the 1980s. First, crude oil was under-priced relative to oil products such as petrol, 
kerosene and diesel compared with international prices. Second, petrol was over-priced 
relative to other petroleum products. In this context, the composite price of oil 
products could be overstated if the petrol price is used as a proxy, and prices need to 
be adjusted if we are to derive a composite energy price for oil products in each year. 
We need first to find a reasonable composite price for oil products in a particular year 
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Table A.5.3.5 Composite Market Price of Oil Products in Six Cities 
1980 and 1984-88 (yuan/tonne) 
Year Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 297.40 345.48 439.36 399.98 391.69 352.32 
1984 312.72 363.28 462.00 420.59 411.88 370.47 
1985 328.48 381.59 485.29 441.79 432.64 389.14 
1986 350.91 407.64 518.41 471.95 462.17 415.71 
1987 362.24 420.80 535.15 487.19 477.09 429.13 
1988 406.32 472.01 600.28 546.48 535.16 481.36 
Mar-90 818.52 950.85 1209.23 1100.86 1078.04 969.67 
Table A.5.3.6 Composite Official Price of Oil Products in Six Cities 
1980 and 1984-88 (yuan/tonne) 
Year Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 297.29 345.36 439.21 399.85 391.56 352.20 
1984 261.82 304.14 386.79 352.13 344.83 310.16 
1985 275.01 319.47 406.29 369.88 362.21 325.80 
1986 293.78 341.28 434.02 395.12 386.93 348.04 
1987 303.27 352.30 448.04 407.88 399.43 359.28 
1988 340.18 395.18 502.57 457.52 448.04 403.00 
and hence the ratio between the composite oil products price and the petrol price. 
Then, by scaling down the petrol price by this ratio, we can find an approximate price 
for composite petroleum products. The prices of various petroleum products in 1990 
are given in the second column of Table A.5.3.4. 
Based on this table, the composite price for oil products is found to be roughly 
57.04 per cent (=302.40/530.16) of the petrol price. This ratio is multiplied by the 
petrol price to obtain the composite price of oil products. The results are presented in 
Table A5.3.5. 
Because we do not know the official prices for all these cities, we have to construct 
the price series relying on some strong assumptions. According to Liu Qimin (1991, p. 
30), the average official price of petrol was 737 yuan/tonne in 1988 but the market 
price was 880 yuan/tonne (Zhang 1989). The official price in the six cities is thus 
obtained by multiplying the market price by 0.8375, the ratio of average official price 
and market price, on the assumption that the two prices differ by the same magnitude. 
Official prices for 1984-87 are constructed in the same way as market prices. Market 
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prices for 1980 are the same as official prices because a market did not exist until 1984. 
Official prices are given in Table A5.3.6. 
Price of Electricity 
The electric power industry is heavily regulated by the govemment and no market 
mechanism has been introduced as yet into this industry. Both enterprises and residents 
pay for their consumption of electricity at govemment regulated prices, although at 
different rates. We therefore do not have to differentiate the market from the official 
price. 
Table A.5.3.7 Gross Output Value and Output of Electricity Industry, 1984-88 
Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Qiongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
Output Value (million yuan) 
1984 750 1220 1300 1318 952 1947 
1985 782 1327 1463 1492 1109 2227 
1986 744 1383 1531 1577 1211 2126 
1987 941 1678 1862 2024 2299 2583 
1988 1094 1858 2077 1918 2541 2853 
Output (million KW*hour) 
1984 10390 24540 19740 19980 15480 32390 
1985 10370 25630 22050 22140 17520 25300 
1986 10430 26760 23370 23700 18980 34770 
1987 10580 27630 26870 26290 23020 38440 
1988 11109 28059 29921 29761 26797 41361 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989. 
Derivation of electricity prices is relatively straightforward. Table A5.3.7 shows the 
gross value and amount of output of the electric power industry for six cities in 1984-
1988. Prices can thus be obtained by dividing gross value by the amount of output. The 
figures are in fact for both industry and residents. Although prices for industry were 
lower than those for residents in the 1980s, industry was by far the larger consumer, 
and so these prices are reasonably reliable. 
Data on output in 1980 are not available in China Statistics Yearbook, and we 
therefore have to resort to other sources to obtain the 1980 price. According to Xu, 
Huang and Zhang (1989), the average sale price of electricity increased by 121.08 per 
cent nationally from 32.83 yuan per thousand kilowatt hours in 1980 to 39.75 yuan per 
thousand kilowatt hours in 1984. In the same way as we constructed the price for coal 
and oil products, we can apply this index to the six cities and derive the price of 
electricity in 1980. The final result is presented in Table A5.3.8. 
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Table A5.3.8 Price of Electricity in Six Cities, 1980 and 1984-88 
Unit: Yuan/tonne of 
standard coal equivalent 
Beijing Shanghai Wuhan Chongqing Guangzhou Shenyang 
1980 146.48 100.88 133.64 133.86 124.80 121.98 
1984 177.36 122.15 161.81 162.08 151.10 147.69 
1985 185.28 127.21 163.02 165.58 155.53 216.27 
1986 175.26 126.98 160.96 163.49 156.77 150.23 mi 218.53 149.22 170.26 189.16 245.38 165.10 
1988 241.96 162.70 170.56 158.35 232.98 169.48 
Unit: Fen/KW*hour 
1980 5.96 4.11 5.44 5.45 5.08 4.96 
1984 7.22 4.97 6.59 6.60 6.15 6.01 
1985 7.54 5.18 6.63 6.74 6.33 8.80 
1986 7.13 5.17 6.55 6.65 6.38 6.11 
1987 8.89 6.07 6.93 7.70 9.99 6.72 
1988 9.85 6.62 6.94 6.44 9.48 6.90 
Note: 1 Fen=0.01 yuan. 
Composite Energy Price 
The prices of coal, oil and electricity are still expressed in different units: yuan per 
tonne of composite coal, yuan per tonne of composite oil and yuan per tonne of 
standard coal equivalent To find a composite energy price, we have to convert these 
into a common unit, yuan per tonne of standard coal equivalent is the unit chosen. 
Table A5.3.9 Composition of Coal, Oil & Electricity in Total Consumption 
and Conversion Rate, 1980 and 1984-88 (%) 
Y e a r C 0 a 1 0 i l E 1 e c t r i c i t y 
1 9 8 0 6 4 . 0 4 1 6 . 2 0 1 9 . 7 6 
1 9 8 4 6 1 . 3 8 1 7 . 0 9 2 1 . 5 4 
1 9 8 5 6 1 . 3 2 1 6 . 4 5 2 2 . 2 3 
1 9 8 6 6 0 . 1 6 1 6 . 7 1 2 3 . 1 3 
1 9 8 7 5 9 . 5 9 1 6 . 5 6 2 3 . 8 5 
1 9 8 8 5 9 . 2 1 1 6 . 4 7 2 4 . 3 2 
Notes: 1) Power generated from thermal heat is excluded. 
2) All figures for 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 are directly available in the standard 
unit; figures for naniral gas and town gas for 1980 and 1984 are in 100 million 
cubic metres; figiu-es for electricity in 1980 and 1984 are in 100 kilowatt*hoiu-s 
in the original table. These are converted into standard units based on the 
conversion ratio provided by State Material Supply Bureau (1984, p. 145). 
Source: China Energy Statistics Yearbook 1989, p. 186, pp. 228-9, pp. 236-7. 
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We need then to find a conversion ratio for composite coal and oil products. The 
conversion ratios of various coals and oil products are provided in State Material 
Supply Bureau (1984, p. 145). The average ratio for coal is 0.7175 and the average 
ratio for petroleum products is 1.4855. These two ratios are used to calculate the 
composite price of coal and oil products. 
Finally the composite energy price is calculated by taking the average of three kinds 
of energy weighted by their shares in total energy consumption in the economy in each 
year. These shares are shown in Table A.5.3.9, and the final price of energy is given in 
Table 5.1. 
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Appendix 5.4 
Table 5.4.1. Summary of Variables Used in Estimation (complete data set) 
Variables Year Heavy Industry Light Industry 
Mean Maxumm Miiiimiim Mean Maximum Minimiim 
Value-Added (unit milliDn yuan) 1980 35.70 1063.36 1.12 1255 364.58 1.21 
1984 46.75 172118 1.24 36.71 620.67 1.63 
1985 55.11 2053.00 1.43 40.53 627.90 1.47 
1986 60.28 Till.67 1.29 44.82 680.67 116 
1987 67.22 2768.29 1.53 50.03 804.54 198 
1988 75.51 3077.37 1.55 56.47 815.37 3.11 
Labour (unit 100 persons) 1980 34.53 993.00 3.52 16.31 84.19 1.69 
1984 35.24 1074.94 269 21.86 378.09 181 
1985 36.40 1068.22 3.72 21.79 379.64 3.00 
1986 36.49 1069.68 3.96 21.6b 447.01 3.06 
1987 35.63 1048.87 3.80 13.09 447.18 3.13 
1988 35.72 1017.71 4.12 13.66 505.95 3.37 
Net Hxed A.s,srt.s (unit: million yuan) 1980 78.41 609200 1.73 9.96 45.81 1.10 
1984 78.85 6196.27 0.96 37.86 2190.05 1.75 
1985 &4J3 ^15.83 111 44.33 2478.71 1.90 
1986 86.74 Mm.49 1.91 58.10 3621.95 1.92 
1987 91.27 6339.66 136 6119 3594.90 3.99 
1988 93.13 5898.34 3.37 60.95 3360.09 3.72 
Energy (unit 1,000 tonnes 1980 41.05 2161.12 5.16 9.97 191.69 0.14 
of standard cx^ al equivalent) 1984 4757 2439.28 5.16 22.33 126166 0.42 
1985 63.05 3400.48 5.32 28.87 1589.52 0.63 
1986 65.26 3587.15 5.45 32.58 1750.47 0.64 
1987 59.37 3148.54 5.51 26.80 1151.44 0.71 
1988 67.97 4124.15 5.43 28J9 1420.50 0.46 
Source: Estimated from survey data 
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Table A5.4.2.1 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry 
I^tro-dsdcals OnaiPrakjcts FnrtiKdial Cheiricais 
VanaUes Year \ f o i n i i n Mninun Mm •Vfoiinin Vtmrrun IVfcai 
Vah^yAdded 1980 266.97 656.36 31.66 4240 7040 4.95 29.40 98.96 262 
(iiiit;nillian>uan) 1984 339.83 79231 8.02 43.67 73.50 1.24 4238 138.04 4.11 
1985 388.94 911.40 1007 49.98 89.02 1.43 44.27 133.62 297 
1986 416.37 923.36 1283 5080 85.33 1.29 49.10 168.78 228 
1987 402.47 949.42 14.6; 51.91 95.75 1.53 53.46 163.00 239 
1988 474.40 1024.67 24.41 6288 118.80 1.55 5684 17246 4.04 
l a h a r 1980 49.92 111.84 3.52 33.26 7873 4.44 1735 41.23 3.78 
(unt: lOOposon) 1984 5624 127.87 6.23 37.60 94.53 5.62 19.64 49.46 3.76 
1985 57.« 133.53 5.75 41.29 10002 5.62 2057 53.87 3.72 
1986 6244 148.52 6.73 45.49 114.80 5.24 2Q12 53.34 3.96 
1987 65.63 156.56 7.83 4726 116.24 4.61 19.43 5233 4.16 
1988 68.47 159.89 8.26 49.41 121.15 4.98 19.76 54.04 4.12 
NetHxedAsseCs 1980 185.95 368.65 6.34 9277 204.28 7.41 3206 135.23 252 
(mt: mllicn >uan) 1984 2aa84 44&76 lOM 11242 311.84 1858 37.91 133.93 3.73 
1985 221.01 467.55 1044 126.19 351.20 1819 39.46 125.08 3.45 
1986 235.33 499.62 1819 125.50 345.07 1797 4206 118.42 3.55 
1987 281.16 618.32 3031 231.95 69293 17.65 4012 111.58 5.09 
1988 307.37 644.96 37.01 263.30 733 J 9 19.25 44.97 116.05 5.63 
Biergy 1980 101.09 261.63 5.44 8045 228.90 5.16 4545 19026 6.26 
(iirit: 1,000 ton® 1984 18221 507.56 9.97 9255 267.92 5.40 5625 224.88 7.55 
cf staKfard ooaJ equivalal) 1985 213.19 601.13 102C 115.36 346.63 5.64 6643 76085 6.80 
1986 23256 657.17 1219 109.64 347.09 5.77 73.82 297.33 7.86 
1987 236.49 67211 11.56 118.73 404.78 5.81 7081 284.07 8.54 
1988 25047 694.32 11.88 16218 575.37 5.74 6&45 28228 697 
Table A5.4.2.2 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
UidMified Gnstmliai Vfetoiais RmusIVtellVtidng 
Vanadffi Year Ntai N&dmm Mnimrr Ntai Nfeximm Mnimrr Ntai Nteimin Mnimm 
Vah»A+iTl 1980 4.48 4.48 4.48 11.58 44.25 1.65 30536 105336 615 
(init rrillknyuan) 19&4 13) 13) 7J9 1582 7Q30 141 46105 172118 7.92 
1985 5.55 55S 555 1&C8 750) 3.19 528.67 7053.00 719 
1986 4.63 4.63 4.63 1767 7520 3.15 56621 1321.67 1073 
1987 4M m 4.81 1&C6 69.06 3.69 65039 Z76R79 1044 
1988 640 640 64C 1&84 6627 4.93 71734 307737 3632 
Labor 1980 4.43 4.43 4.43 l a ® 61.46 4J7 265.79 993.00 1068 
(unit lOOpascns) 1984 5.77 5.77 5.77 1918 5848 534 285.87 1074.94 931 
1985 &01 &01 8.01 1929 61.31 5.49 284.40 105822 983 
1986 151 151 752 1925 6Q89 5.77 280.67 1099.68 7.87 
1987 111 771 771 1902 5&76 3.8C 275.95 101&87 1180 
1988 7.88 788 788 1936 59.03 5.66 274.17 101771 1197 
NfetHxedAfrts 1980 158 158 158 2004 43L42 3.02 1190.92 609101 11.81 
(unit: rri]]icn>uan) 4.47 4.47 4.47 24.71 57.06 4.73 1208.40 619627 1127 
1985 6L28 628 628 2605 6355 514 i m 8 9 6415.83 1135 
1986 &41 &41 &41 2605 62.47 520 124739 6104.49 9.';D 
1987 14.85 14.85 14.85 2&38 6&40 626 04729 6339.66 14.41 
1988 1599 1599 1599 3086 6&05 692 121037 589835 2177 
Enagy 1980 5.93 5.93 5.93 73^9 1356 7.08 528.01 2161.12 1761 
(uDE 1,000 tonnes \98A 651 652 652 24.58 81.96 7.74 66723 20928 2029 
cf stancbd cm] eqjiNalal) 1985 651 651 652 31.44 11197 8.98 90920 3400.48 29.08 
1986 7.03 7.03 7.03 3505 133.48 9.69 90153 3587.15 1881 
1967 692 692 692 31.S 109.11 9.07 809.97 314834 3687 
1988 663 663 663 31.30 11179 9.99 1023.09 4121.15 3156 
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Table A5.4.2.3 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
Non4«rraus MeltiiK MetailVakEts IVfacUnEiT Vaoades Year fvfan Nfexinum Miinuri \fcai Xteimin Miimin Nfen \taiinjm Niiinum 
Value^ AtirW 1980 3447 79.00 8.11 1218 3458 5.22 1462 4850 430 (nit: rri]]icn>uan) i<m 4471 148.« 1.32 13.19 3879 629 17.70 59.62 286 
1985 62.91 233.88 3.62 13.81 3844 7.16 21.84 61.06 412 
1986 69.34 253.61 5.oe 15.^ 45.61 8J0 2690 13157 288 
1987 6&&4 229.56 5.65 1827 45.81 7.14 31.57 120.80 457 
1988 5261 169.28 7.19 1&81 47.40 890 3850 116.70 6.63 
Labor 1980 1Q21 1774 426 13.89 31.88 5.10 25.47 71.84 685 
(ait: lOOpascns) 1984 1Q55 18.08 269 1429 32(2 439 2643 6802 5.78 
1985 11.12 1&37 4.55 13.71 3277 414 27.30 83.83 5.61 
1986 11.22 17.15 467 1417 33.74 495 2697 8219 6.46 
1987 11.^ 17.55 6.55 13.12 33.61 480 2636 81.36 489 
1988 11.54 15.24 6l10 1296 33.96 470 2683 83.23 5.02 
Nfet fixed Assets 1980 13.56 3806 1.73 11.80 23.43 3.75 27.51 186.04 435 
(nit: iiillicnyuan) 1984 13.40 3Q75 0.96 1269 23.77 5.37 29.82 169.37 3.51 
1985 1421 31.16 211 1209 23.54 5S2 31.99 16617 3.31 
1986 1439 3Q88 1.91 13.47 22.75 5.67 3226 160.83 463 
1987 23.17 4615 11.15 1258 21.44 5.09 3 4 ^ 14139 5.19 
1988 2651 4649 1612 1285 23.17 5.01 3646 161.22 5.98 
Biergy 1980 1421 29.22 5.44 9.94 19.35 5.73 11.76 87.51 551 
(int: 1,000 tonnes 1984 13.M 19.99 5.16 1Q33 18(2 5.65 11.30 71.-^ 5.24 
cf stayfanl coal equi\dert) 1985 iai6 2870 670 1202 2Q71 5J9 1440 99.55 5.60 
1986 20.71 3606 7.&1 1268 2431 5.51 15.05 17? ?9 5.75 
1987 21.63 3226 9.48 11.16 2271 5.93 1437 10B.09 551 
1988 21.18 35.19 IQffl 9.97 1815 606 1402 10920 553 
Table A5.4.2.4 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
'I>ansp(TtVeliedes DedricNfadinay Bedi t i ic & Onmncal ic iB 
Vaiades Yar Nfcm Nfoimm Mnimir Nfen Ntximm Mnimrr Nfan MiximjmMnimm 
Value-AJded 1980 2112 5039 4.99 2875 79.48 1.12 B2A 2696 666 
(unit rrilliai yuan) 19&4 35.98 9750 9.00 31.15 107.51 3.95 1897 8832 114 
1985 4176 14155 696 3895 12144 618 1887 5156 439 
1906 38.02 11681 932 4667 1-G45 652 1719 6167 5.47 
1987 4679 133.51 1123 5352 17Q58 868 3750 221.47 659 
1988 5737 15896 11.19 55.18 18354 1022 4677 25071 673 
Labor 1900 51.47 16613 7.83 78 56 83.63 4.47 1606 4269 5.73 
(unit: KBpasms) 1984 5131 15567 859 27.45 7104 5.74 1719 40.60 7.01 
1985 5158 15816 7.82 28.(B 7429 6 a 1920 3857 7.49 
1906 5055 157.20 7.49 29.(B 7889 638 1678 3520 691 
1987 5055 157.(B 651 31.07 78.01 67C 1731 40.66 624 
1988 50.72 16Q64 667 3120 87.10 6Jt 1731 37.87 639 
NerFwedAssas 1900 5526 16176 4.85 25.79 8645 3.02 10.93 27.60 3.64 
(unit nilbcn yuan) 1984 6131 169.78 5.68 2615 %92 3.78 13.82 48.10 640 
1985 61.75 17Q78 639 30.00 10177 3.95 1888 5455 650 
1986 6&07 17522 687 33.62 11783 571 1932 56?1 635 
1987 68.61 183.78 677 40 i l 12662 737 2559 78.46 628 
1988 75.60 237.04 672 42C8 1Z7.95 7.9e 2687 85.62 633 
fiHgy 1980 15.79 37.43 612 1164 2678 530 6 ^ 769 5.41 
(imc 1,(XX) tones 19&4 20.19 5893 629 1236 24.04 531 662 9.06 536 
(f standard obI equi\dent) 1985 2334 6023 727 15.77 3553 5.42 7.73 10.85 5.49 
1906 25.68 6634 7.14 1847 48.75 5.45 750 1 2 ^ 5.45 
1987 24.62 &5i 601 17.68 3921 639 719 11.74 551 
1988 24.(37 79.00 678 1673 3932 601 714 1536 5.43 
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Table A5.4.2.5 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
IiEtninEils and j^ppErstus Fajd ftncessne ScftDriBks 
Vai i ies Year Vfeaa Vfainiin Mi imi r Ntai \ t a i i i u n Nirinum \feai Vfednun M n m i n Value-Aided 1980 aoo 21.47 130 11.14 5Q13 1.60 680 1665 1.35 (nil; rriflicnjuan) 1984 9.44 1&53 217 1299 3005 2.58 1Q46 21.12 1.63 
1985 11.30 25.72 177 12S4 23.43 1.81 13.67 27.98 77? 
1986 1472 2484 470 1489 2226 216 1639 29.49 7.63 
1987 1434 2488 3.80 15.43 2603 298 25.20 7213 9.93 
1988 1&-C 3Q92 3.90 17.52 29.99 3.52 3209 9280 1Q78 
Labour 1980 1221 19.23 475 11.13 21.37 260 822 25.01 1.69 
( i n t lOOpetscns) 1984 11.35 23.CW 488 13.62 23.27 5.73 1Q96 3Q46 430 
1985 1Q83 21.79 469 1424 25.10 5.47 11.68 28.91 494 
1986 1?¥i 20.1? 5.03 1430 2699 5.87 11.87 27.75 7.(M 
1987 11.66 2 Q ^ 523 1414 2471 3.69 13.08 2867 7.95 
1988 11.08 2Q95 5.44 1418 2623 601 13.39 3Q50 7.87 
NetRxed Assets 1980 7.43 1463 3.92 520 11.52 1.10 5.46 I16i 1.49 
(irit; nillian>uan) 1984 7.96 17.05 2.97 7.01 11.71 218 9.71 \9.64 257 
1985 8.24 1639 287 IQOe 19.16 417 15.66 3223 249 
1986 11.76 17.M 486 1240 31.73 4.23 25.01 7475 8.72 
1987 11.89 19.73 136 1580 38.13 617 27.86 83.73 8.15 
1988 13.85 2248 3.37 1968 41.96 9.83 31.72 m i l 8.20 
Biagy 1980 6l41 9.88 538 439 1599 1.71 3.05 7.82 0.87 
(Hit; 1,0)0 tOTTES 1984 6.30 9.65 523 5.82 1562 1.18 445 1212 0.71 
cf aanctuil coal equivalart) 1985 6.47 9.65 532 7J2 2215 200 5.66 15.59 0.83 
1986 6.87 1Q49 5.60 8.93 2656 271 7 i l 1616 1.77 
1987 6.76 1Q55 5.53 7.75 2Q20 1.69 722 15.68 157 
1988 654 9 i 2 5.47 832 2423 1.87 651 13.36 1.83 
Table A5.4.2.6 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
TGIULIU A i M R e d Tradks 
\kiatles Yea Nfen Nfeimm Miimrr Ntai Nfeimm Miimrr Ntan Mrarrtrn Miirrirn 
Wu&-Atfad 1980 124.02 36458 13.23 1.21 1.21 1.21 8874 201 
(uic rriUimyHn) 531.58 47.® 4J7 437 437 3119 10139 4.64 
1985 2B.95 527.23 47.80 698 698 &9e 37.71 11530 434 
1986 7^10 S552 51.95 565 5.65 5.65 4251 12S85 475 
1987 278.78 61&44 6290 3.72 3.72 3.72 4387 12518 5.60 
1968 331.25 781.48 6540 517 517 517 5490 123.47 452 
Tainr 1980 19.99 47.01 &8C 1.75 1.75 1.7J nj^ 8419 4.61 
(ait 100 paeons) 1984 23.V 52 D 11.01 3.84 3.84 3.8^  3238 87.78 681 
1985 23.38 5Q25 1Q71 3.89 3.89 3.89 3234 85..€l 691 
1986 2489 51.02 1Q23 3.60 3.60 3.60 3116 85.72 764 
1987 2595 5473 IQ^ 523 523 523 33.44 87.01 1Q23 
1988 U.?9 57.69 9.71 465 4.65 4.6S 33.30 8567 860 
is^fijBdAsets 1980 1Q75 19.95 3.15 932 932 932 11.77 M33 1.21 
(unit rrilbcnyHri) 1984 1&5) 3692 l l i 5 &46 846 846 1703 5800 1.75 
1985 23.89 4282 1218 1218 1218 2115 6440 1.90 
1986 3212 57.7) 19.27 1464 1464 1464 2237 63.19 1.92 
1987 -640 6695 27.38 1810 laio 1810 1119 6612 5.66 
1988 57,89 m97 2577 1732 1732 1732 29.71 7467 816 
&Ergy 1980 4.46 833 1.68 054 054 051 11.60 3874 0.85 
(uric LOOOtames 1984 6L94 11.82 275 1.09 1.09 1.09 1290 4663 0.89 
cf stanckd del eqralert) 1985 835 1591 3.15 1.16 1.16 1.16 1798 5521 1.23 
1985 aao 16LQ2 3.81 0.64 a64 0.61 3199 7433 1.76 
1987 9.78 17.D 3.92 1.22 1.22 1.22 2197 6629 1.62 
1988 13.99 29.74 5.03 0.84 0.84 0.81 19.91 6478 1.83 
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Table A5.4.2.7 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
OotUiC LeattH-Rtducts Wnd and Bantoo Rxxkcts 
Vaiaties Year Nfan Nfeinun Miinun \ tan Ntudiiiin Mnmm Ntai Nfodirum Miimin 
1980 1130 3228 1.67 9.47 13l43 484 1135 29.04 125 
(irii; nilhonyYian) 19&4 1619 4Q19 295 583 9.33 1.95 1601 31.82 488 
1985 165t 39.41 221 7.10 1238 1.47 1814 3478 502 
1966 2523 81.15 439 9.93 1566 404 1591 1128 152 
1987 29.57 93.48 5.62 9.49 1607 446 19.66 39.41 496 
1988 29.C4 8899 451 804 1295 3.11 2409 57.15 469 
Labor 1980 ia?5 2829 443 816 1224 538 1591 3214 1Q22 
(nil; lOOpoOTs) 19&1 ncf7 26M 468 m 1696 3.54 1644 31.75 1Q43 
1965 1254 23.75 486 838 17.11 3.61 1664 31.02 1Q41 
1966 1221 2547 505 824 1616 3.49 IdS) 31.^ 893 
1987 13.19 27.28 549 833 1491 3.61 1693 HT) 851 
1968 1433 31.30 585 im 9.04 3.62 1618 3233 885 
Nfet fixed Assfts 1960 7.52 1690 1.80 576 852 3.83 la-e 1814 803 
(ait: nUlicr \uan) 1984 6l63 1197 235 493 680 3.19 1122 21.82 691 
1985 832 17.67 289 d85 9.09 423 1487 2139 7.79 
1966 &92 19.54 3.12 735 9.59 490 17.02 3243 7.92 
1987 1217 21.80 582 885 16S2 473 21.76 47.61 859 
1988 12® 2522 592 860 1439 3.92 3a77 4164 9.17 
Biergy 1980 273 7.25 033 288 699 1.06 853 2a62 421 
(nil; 1,000 tores 1984 241 5.82 a64 111 640 1.08 9.89 2441 444 
cf stancbrd coal ecfivakit) 1965 3.14 739 0.91 3.71 9.25 1.29 1237 3Q47 449 
1966 3.28 7.98 1.02 419 874 1.53 1491 39.40 535 
1987 3.71 9.02 135 3.80 7.54 1.58 1418 3838 558 
1988 435 11.40 1.12 3.41 7.82 0.46 11.16 29.51 166 
Table A5.4.2.8 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
Rni t i re I^xrlVodkEts IViiiiu^ 
\kiaaes Ye® Nfeai Mramm Mrimrr Man Nteimm Mrimm N t o NfedmmMiimm 
V ^ A i f e d 1980 335 335 335 1895 5Q97 3.68 1053 2594 143 
(nit rriDicnjuai) 19&4 607 796 417 2171 59.44 117 1524 29.87 5.01 
1985 5.94 932 257 2152 7222 513 1744 3698 7.67 
1986 6i(55 11.15 216 2532 6889 4.47 1847 35.21 830 
1967 &61 1281 4.42 2132 49.(B 423 19.56 40(D 911 
1968 875 11.04 6l46 2859 5474 5:51 19.04 37.58 882 
l a tn r 1980 &22 &22 822 1&95 ^ 1 7 82] 7.95 11.81 295 
(iiitKDpasre) 19&4 9.10 \m 511 \9.SB 4691 618 935 1672 412 
1985 &63 1285 441 2107 48(57 627 9.25 1612 424 
1985 9.98 12-^ 716 2Q34 51.14 5.58 9.42 1633 464 
1967 IQll 1107 715 2Q68 4844 6 6 9.07 1602 3.99 
1988 1007 1271 7.41 732 890 1610 404 
NfaHsedAfPfs 1980 4.27 427 4.27 1769 ^ 8 1 290 845 2534 250 
(ni t rnllicn>uan) 19W 4.73 630 l i e 1483 3691 2 a 9.90 21.52 530 
19E5 490 669 111 27.71 114.44 240 11.68 21.67 640 
1985 &63 IQ® 663 3228 110.84 261 1602 2560 899 
1967 9.83 1Q22 9.4^  3504 10597 3.99 1925 4001 9.58 
1968 9.75 9.93 95t 36.J) 11204 3.72 1898 3802 1Q(B 
Biffgy 1960 3.43 3.-6 3.43 5877 602 0.92 3 i l 014 
(ni t l.ODtcnnes 19&4 1.96 229 1.62 2&C8 •^.16 134 415 053 
cf starekdnml acjivalat) 1985 1.81 281 081 3&QB 93i8 1232 1.68 417 0.63 
1986 241 292 1.9C 3&75 9435 952 204 4.44 0"^ 
1967 239 265 114 3127 67.84 9.25 1.85 5.78 0.71 
1968 223 245 Id 3530 6265 9.22 l i 6 3.97 0.71 
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Table A5.4.2.9 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
S ^ E w m x t HandcraAs \l iddlK 
Vaii les Year Vfeai VfeKunmi Mninuin Ntan \foiniim Mnmunn Ntai Vfaxiniim Mmnum 
Value-/»dded 1980 2030 20.30 20.30 8.73 a73 &73 19.10 4527 1.90 
(nil: mUhcnyuan) 19^ 1739 24.34 10.85 11.75 11.75 11.75 29.96 49.04 3.06 
1985 23.44 34.82 1107 laco 10.00 laoo 36.72 73.12 4.62 
1986 23J3 33.03 14.03 &47 8.47 8.47 39.29 9756 4.82 
1987 26.91 38.70 15.13 14.69 14.69 14.69 « .72 ioa89 655 
1988 22.68 29.52 15.85 13.84 13.84 13.84 49.18 138.80 693 
Labor 1980 8.60 8.60 8.60 11.16 11.16 11.16 1154 1856 3.12 
(ail: 100 persons) \<m 1286 16.85 8.87 13.71 13.71 13.71 1423 1358 181 
1985 11.62 14.78 8.46 11.98 11.98 11.98 14.46 23.81 3.62 
1986 11.77 14.49 9.05 1146 1146 1146 14.47 2194 4.09 
1987 1157 13.86 9.28 1169 1169 1169 14.30 13.13 457 
1988 ia78 1198 857 11.90 11.90 11.90 15.73 40.71 454 
Net ftxed Assets 1980 9.10 9.10 9.10 130 130 130 7.49 19.95 1.18 
(nil: rri]]icn>uan) 19»4 8.30 1122 5.37 4.11 4.11 4.11 1022 2153 117 
1985 9.71 14.40 5.02 4.68 4.68 4.68 13.00 2197 197 
1986 11.09 1521 6L96 533 5.33 5.33 15.15 29.17 3.73 
1987 1157 1652 6.61 539 5.39 5.39 15.80 31.60 6.68 
1988 ia77 15.06 &48 4.69 4.69 4.69 16l13 3062 a 10 
Biergy 1980 3.13 3.13 3.13 1.68 1.68 1.68 ia44 35.26 1.38 
(iril: 1,000 tomes 1984 117 3.12 122 3.17 3.17 3.17 14.25 44.43 
cf standard ooal etpvakit) 1985 151 3.89 1.14 4.41 4.41 4.41 18.82 56i68 3.10 
1986 183 3.95 1.71 dOl 6.01 6.01 2120 69.97 3.71 
1987 4.16 6.90 1.43 3.19 3.19 3.19 2a48 6194 166 
1988 3.77 5.80 1.74 174 174 174 19.79 6a08 133 
Table A5.4.2.10 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
Chemical Fibres (1) Chemical Fibres (2) 
Variables Year Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Value-Added 1980 34.37 36.37 32.38 34.37 36.37 32.38 
(unit million yuan) 1984 70.15 107.77 32.53 253.66 620.67 32.53 
1985 82.85 122.76 42.93 264.53 627.90 42.93 
1986 90.25 133.30 47.21 287.06 680.67 47.21 
1987 103.29 158.66 47.92 337.04 804.54 47.92 
1988 120.12 196.68 43.57 351.87 815.37 43.57 
Labour 1980 52.12 79.69 24.55 52.12 79.69 24.55 
(unit 1(X) persons) 1984 51.58 78.16 25.00 160.42 378.09 25.00 
1985 52.24 80.74 23.74 161.37 379.64 23.74 
1986 52.67 82.27 23.08 184.12 447.01 23.08 
1987 52.85 82.49 23.20 184.29 447.18 23.20 
1988 53.80 84.57 23.03 204.51 505.95 23.03 
Net Hxed Assets 1980 26.69 30.34 23.04 26.69 30.34 23.04 
(unit: million yuan) 1984 132.44 639.01 25.87 951.64 2190.05 25.87 
1985 265.28 704.08 26.47 1069.75 2478.71 26.47 
1986 389.81 752.59 27.03 1467.19 3621.95 27.03 
1987 391.52 747.44 35.60 1459.31 3594.90 35.60 
1988 373.04 712.26 33.82 1368.72 3360.09 33.82 
Energy 1980 107.77 191.69 23.84 107.77 191.69 23.84 
(unit 1,000 tonnes 1984 95.42 167.27 23.58 484.50 1262.66 23.58 
of standard coal equivalent) 1985 130.14 229.51 30.78 616.60 1589.52 30.78 
1986 167.92 299.40 36.43 695.43 1750.47 36.43 
1987 180.79 330.94 30.63 504.34 1151.44 30.63 
1988 160.41 287.14 33.69 580.44 1420.50 33.69 
Note: The values under chemical fibres (1) are calculated without including the large enterprise 
mentioned in the note of Table 5.2, chapter 5 and those under chemical fibres (2) are 
calculated including this enterprise. 
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Table A5.4.2.11 Summary of Variables Used in Estimation by Industry (Continued) 
Rubber Products Plastic Products 
Variables Year Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Value-Added 1980 31.26 128.46 4.08 13.80 43.59 1.53 
(unit: million yuan) 1984 39.82 162.76 7.81 15.96 44.68 2.78 
1985 45.37 172.41 11.25 22.62 50.89 3.90 
1986 49.22 202.35 12.09 24.85 59.26 4.11 
1987 53.01 205.69 12.06 22.97 61.29 4.27 
1988 55.91 200.08 12.73 20.22 59.03 5.06 
Labour 1980 12.72 26.85 7.11 7.95 16.67 4.44 
(unit: 100 persons) 1984 14.81 29.81 6.99 8.00 18.41 2.89 
1985 14.41 30.35 6.54 8.12 18.44 3.00 
1986 15.18 32.48 6.70 7.91 17.54 3.06 
1987 15.71 33.76 7.65 8.32 20.44 3.13 
1988 16.35 38.19 8.15 8.36 20.15 3.37 
Net Fixed Assets 1980 11.57 35.59 5.33 9.29 17.81 2.90 
(unit: million yuan) 1984 15.20 47.27 3.57 9.58 20.38 4.07 
1985 17.98 52.32 5.94 12.21 23.11 4.49 
1986 20.89 57.92 5.93 12.26 23.09 4.82 
1987 25.65 65.25 7.73 22.69 78.42 5.00 
1988 24.67 63.13 7.28 23.57 74.54 5.19 
Energy 1980 7.19 18.74 3.68 4.46 10.17 0.43 
(unit: 1,000 tonnes 1984 9.56 22.22 4.82 4.64 11.09 0.76 
of standard coal equivalent) 1985 13.48 39.80 5.25 6.45 14.25 1.45 
1986 15.47 45.71 6.23 7.03 17.34 2.17 
1987 15.16 45.12 5.75 7.25 22.70 2.05 
1988 16.00 57.08 6.66 7.02 23.99 1.82 
Source: Estimated from siirvey data. 
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Appendix 5.5 
Table A5.5.1 Complete Estimates of Stochastic Production 
Heavy Industrial Sector 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Models Variable Model 1 Model 2 Models 
Constant 0.7060 1.2097 1.2360 Constant 0.2303 1.0901 1.0033 
(0.3256) (0.3432) (0.3296) (0.2577) (0.2646) (0.2389) 
log (Labour) 0.4250 0.4014 0.3841 log (Labour) 0.4518 0.3872 0.3790 
(0.0602) (0.0604) (0.0576) (0.0476) (0.0454) (0.0428) 
log (Capital) 0.2457 0.2654 0.2784 log (Capital) 0.1974 0.2356 0.2381 
(0.0406) (0.0416) (0.0398) (0.0390) (0.0372) (0.0355) 
log (Energy) 0.2229 0.2136 0.2039 log (Energy) 0.2495 0.2288 0.2267 
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0295) (0.0333) (0.0306) (0.0300) 
log (Investment) 0.0868 0.0854 0.0856 log (Investment) 0.0078 0.0046 0.0050 
(0.0102) (0.0101) (0.0098) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0083) 
Size Dummy 0.0105 0.0165 0.0238 Size Dummy 0.2294 0.2371 0.2386 
(0.0501) (0.0494) (0.0489) (0.0477) (0.0442) (0.0430) 
Shanghai 0.5073 0.4971 0.4808 Shanghai 0.3286 0.3652 0.3775 
(0.0595) (0.0583) (0.0578) (0.0580) (0.0552) (0.0522) 
Wuhan 0.1576 0.1508 0.1335 Wuhan 0.0349 0.0562 0.0588 
(0.0691) (0.0680) (0.0673) (0.0660) (0.0619) (0.0586) 
Chongqing -0.1055 -0.1286 -0.1485 Chongqing -0.1242 -0.1304 -0.1051 
(0.0708) (0.0703) (0.0691) (0.0712) (0.0656) (0.0632) 
Guangzhou 0.3392 0.3319 0.3257 Guangzhou 0.1104 0.1490 0.1543 
(0.0814) (0.0798) (0.0792) (0.0633) (0.0604) (0.0573) 
Shenyang -0.1336 -0.1360 -0.1283 Shenyang -0.3781 -0.3584 -0.3261 
(0.0686) (0.0673) (0.0666) (0.0728) (0.0668) (0.0644) 
Petro-chemical 0.6577 0.6847 0.7426 Soft Drink 0.1491 0.0891 0.0976 
(0.2922) (0.2876) (0.2950) (0.0899) (0.0863) (0.0815) 
Ught Industrial Sector 
Note-. Values in brackets are standard deviations. 
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Table A5.5.1 Complete Estimates of Stochastic Production (Continued) 
Heavy Industrial Sector Light Industrial Sector 
Van able Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coal Products -0.8058 -0.7400 -0.6316 Tobacco 2.0535 1.9648 1.9798 
(0.2780) (0.2743) (0.2793) (0.1048) (0.1012) (0.0938) 
Industrial Oiemicals 0 .2102 0.2278 0.2602 Animal Feed 0.0247 -0.1329 -0.1178 
(0.2593) (0.2541) (0.2601) (0.2108) (0.1967) (0.1882) 
Construction Materials -0.3131 -0.3209 -0.3049 Textile 0.2233 0.2079 0.2164 
(0.2608) (0.2552) (0.2613) (0.0740) (0.0703) (0.0681) 
Ferro-metal Melting 0.2235 0.2653 0.3240 Clothing 0.5228 0.6591 0.7241 
(0.2783) (0.2734) (0.2757) (0.1159) (0.1125) (0.1117) 
Non-ferrous Metal Melting 0.4342 0.5512 0.6654 Leather Products 0.1165 0.0758 0.0766 
(0.2725) (0.2753) (0.2765) (0.1032) (0.0976) (0.0946) 
MetaJ Products 0.1568 0.1588 0.1784 Wood & Bamboo Products -0.3155 -0.3790 -0.3708 
(0.2629) (0.2571) (0.2621) (0.1009) (0.0957) (0.0919) 
Machinery -0.0102 0.0068 0.0374 Furniture -0.2918 -0.3939 -0.3722 
(0.2504) (0.2449) (0.2494) (0.1520) (0.1415) (0.1325) 
Transport Vehicles -0 .0423 -0.0246 0.0144 Paper Products -0.2051 -0.2720 -0.2523 
(0.2584) (0.2526) (0.2574) (0.1007) (0.0945) (0.0911) 
Electric Machinery 0.4043 0.4061 0.4234 Printing 0.6155 0.4676 0.4930 
(0.2577) (0.2520) (0.2882) (0.0987) (0.0992) (0.0889) 
Electronic & Communications 0.2383 0.2666 0.3089 Sports Equipment 0.7604 0.6033 0.6160 
(0.2582) (0.2529) (0.2577) (0.1543) (0.1455) (0.1347) 
Instruments & Apparatus 0.2169 0.2220 0.2501 Handicraft 0.4324 0.3715 0.3945 
(0.2635) (0.2574) (0.2634) (0.2007) (0.1847) (0.1777) 
Medicine 0.5060 0.5044 0.5194 
(0.0840) (0.0780) (0.0759) 
Chemical Fibres -0.1981 -0.2184 -0.2055 
(0.1560) (0.1394) (0.1352) 
Rubber Products 0.5922 0.5366 0.5512 
(0.0909) (0.0865) (0.0828) 
Plastic Products 0.2311 0.1808 0.2215 
(0.1005) (0.0943) (0.0906) 
Sigma Square 0.4944 3.6917 Sigma Square 0.3885 3.7867 
(0.0607) (0.9659) (0.0377) (1.0523) 
Gamma 0.4945 0.9378 Gamma 0.7975 0.9764 
(0.1167) (0.0191) (0.0483) (0.0079) 
Mu -9.9851 Mu -11.0043 
(3.0584) (3.4398) 
Note: Values in brackets are standard deviations. 
Appendix 5.6 
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Table A5.6 Results of White's Test 
Dependent Variable: Residual of Frontier Production Function. 
Variables Heavy Sector Light Sector 
Constant -2.04E+00 2.00E-H00 
(-80.504) (92.386) 
Labour 2.76E-05 2.03E-05 
(1.030) (1.006) 
Capital -0.000006227 -2.54E-06 
(-0.814) (-0.406) 
Energy -0.005814 -4.13E-03 
(-1.142) (-0.449) 
Labour * Labour -1.80E-09 -3.66E-09 
(-0.765) (1.254) 
Capital * Capital -5.87E-11 -1.45E-10 
(-0.804) (-0.565) 
Energy * Energy -1.87E-05 -1.02E-05 
(-0.714) (-0.067) 
Labour * Capital 6.57E-10 1.42E-09 
(1.394) (0.879) 
Labour * Energy 4.64E-07 1.61E-07 
(1.282) (0.071) 
Capital * Energy -8.42E-08 1.42E-09 
(-1.25) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.0084 0.0104 
Adjusted R-squared -0.0012 -0.0034 
F-Value 0.8770 0.7520 
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Appendix 5.7 
Table A.5.7.1 Technical Efficiency of Heavy and Light Industrial Sectors 
(Unbalanced Data) 
Heavy Industry Light Industry 
Year Frequency Mean Minimum Maximum Frequency Mean Minimum Maximum 
1980 149 65.64 27.93 84.53 103 72.59 20.60 95.51 
1984 161 69.62 21.91 85.20 109 74.50 33.38 91.12 
1985 156 70.35 34.65 86.22 110 75.15 26.37 91.25 
1986 155 70.46 40.58 86.15 110 75.41 32.08 91.67 
1987 160 72.43 26.89 86.23 110 77.44 42.37 91.67 
1988 161 74.86 36.98 90.18 111 79.03 34.84 92.31 
Table A.5.7.2 Technical Efficiency by Industry 
(Unbalanced Data) 
Year Petro chemical Coal Products Industrial Chemicals 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 3 56.76 5 71.81 17 66.85 
1984 3 68.98 5 71.82 18 70.26 
1985 3 70.27 5 71.73 18 69.60 
1986 3 69.81 5 69.91 18 70.83 
1987 3 68.23 5 70.49 18 72.89 
1988 3 74.25 5 70.46 18 73.79 
Year Unidentified Construction Materials Ferrous Metal Melting 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 64.52 11 70.02 6 68.97 
1984 65.77 11 71.84 6 71.07 
1985 72.21 11 71.36 6 71.06 
1986 67.11 11 72.33 6 72.56 
1987 62.50 11 73.11 6 71.35 
1988 72.86 11 73.00 6 72.95 
Year Non-ferrous Metal Melting Metal Products Machinery 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 5 58.16 7 63.37 48 63.93 
1984 5 65.28 7 70.53 54 69.12 
1985 5 63.42 7 70.87 52 70.06 
1986 5 64.11 7 69.91 53 70.56 
1987 5 60.03 8 72.56 53 73.25 
1988 5 61.92 8 72.66 53 75.84 
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Table A.5.7.2 Technical Efficiency by Industry (continued) 
(Unbalanced Data) 
Year Transport Vehicles Electric Machinery Electronics & Communicat ions 
1980 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
14 67.14 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
12 67.43 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
13 65.25 
1984 14 67.79 14 70.97 15 69.07 
1985 14 71.85 14 71.89 12 69.30 
1986 14 69.82 14 72.28 12 68.62 
1987 14 73.69 14 71.91 15 74.40 
1988 14 75.97 14 73.79 15 81.81 
Year Apparatus Food Soft Drinks 
1980 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
7 66.52 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
10 73.96 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
7 69.67 
1984 8 70.59 11 76.02 8 73.34 
1985 8 71.05 11 70.83 8 73.76 
1986 6 71.16 11 72.28 7 70.25 
1987 7 72.51 10 75.42 8 76.69 
1988 8 75.24 11 76.93 8 82.87 
Year Tobacco Animal Feed Textiles 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 5 76.10 1 49.23 24 75.11 
1984 5 76.49 1 81.24 25 74.54 
1985 5 76.58 1 88.19 25 75.32 
1986 5 76.48 1 86.42 25 75.87 
1987 5 77.85 1 67.03 25 75.54 
1988 5 77.74 1 81.56 25 77.66 
Year Clothing Leather Products Wood and Bamboo Products 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 3 59.60 5 81.68 5 74.31 
1984 3 65.62 5 68.76 5 79.88 
1985 3 61.37 5 66.16 5 80.85 
1986 4 63.20 5 81.54 5 74.42 
1987 4 66.46 5 80.27 5 77.15 
1988 4 71.36 5 72.94 5 77.89 
Year Furniture Paper Products Printing 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 1 69.59 7 69.75 9 66.88 
1984 2 80.93 7 70.54 9 77.21 
1985 2 79.55 7 70.59 9 79.37 
1986 2 65.81 7 76.25 9 79.79 
1987 2 81.95 7 77.75 9 81.76 
1988 2 85.44 7 81.52 9 81.67 
Year Sports Equipment Handicrafts Pharmaceutical 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
1980 1 74.48 1 75.98 10 71.19 
1984 2 73.85 1 79.52 10 75.48 
1985 2 80.31 1 73.22 10 76.89 
1986 2 80.00 1 62.61 10 75.85 
1987 2 82.38 1 85.00 10 79.35 
1988 2 80.87 1 85.57 10 80.89 
Year Chemical Fibres Rubber Products Plastic Products 
1980 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
2 74.23 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
7 69.82 
Frequency Tech. Efficiency 
5 79.83 
1984 3 77.00 7 73.26 5 70.87 
1985 3 78.22 7 78.18 6 78.69 
1986 3 77.82 7 78.21 6 77.36 
1987 3 82.53 7 78.62 6 77.87 
1988 3 82.93 7 81.91 6 76.15 
Source: Estimation from Survey data. 
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6 Impact of Economic Reform on Technical 
Efficiency 
In this chapter we come to a core question of the thesis: what are the factors 
contributing to improvements in efficiency in the context of economic reform? Can we 
rigorously measure the contribution of each economic reform policy to improvements in 
technical efficiency? 
The relationship between state enterprise productivity and economic reform has 
never been clearly identified. Empirical work on the productivity of state enterprises has 
generated differing and even contradictory results. The effectiveness of economic reform 
in state enterprises has become a controversial topic much discussed by researchers 
(chapter 5). 
The reasons for this can be found in the way the argument is approached in the 
literature. Assessment of the impact of economic reform on productivity or efficiency has 
been based on indirect inference rather than rigorous tests. It is common practice for 
studies to carry out a two-stage exercise. Productivity or efficiency in pre-reform and 
post-reform periods is first estimated, and then the impact of economic reform is inferred 
on the basis of the differences between the two periods. This method is inadequate for 
two reasons. First, economic reform in state enterprises, as detailed in chapters 3 and 4, 
is an extremely complex and multi-dimensional process realised both in the external 
market environment and in the operational mechanisms of enterprises. Different reform 
packages were used in different enterprises and the intensity with which reform policies 
were pursued varied greatly. Moreover, as shown in chapters 3 and 4, certain reform 
policies were seriously flawed. It is inappropriate, then, to generalise about "economic 
reform" without further discriminating between policy packages and the intensity of 
reform. 
The relationship between efficiency and economic reform is further complicated by 
the difference in response of state enterprises to reform policies. This was influenced by 
such factors as the soft budget constraint and the intervention of local govemments. 
Enterprise-specific and region-specific characteristics are important determinants of 
efficiency, as we saw earlier (chapter 4). Hence the estimates of efficiency themselves 
depend on the sample chosen for estimation. The estimation will show improvements in 
efficiency only if the sample contains enterprises that have appropriate reform policies in 
place and that are exhibiting a reasonable degree of rational response. Consistent 
measures for assessing the impact of specific reforms at the enterprise level are therefore 
needed (Jefferson 1990b; Kuan Chen et al. 1988a). 
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In this study, we are reluctant to conclude immediately that observed improvements 
in technical efficiency were due to economic reform. The analysis will be furthered by 
rigorously testing and quantifying the impact of reform in many areas on the efficiency 
index. The hypothesis underlying this exercise is that we will then be able to pinpoint 
quantitatively the impact of all reform policies on technical efficiency; the impact will be 
statistically significant if overall economic reform was successful. If reform was partially 
successful, we can expect to find a statistically significant correlation between the 
efficiency index and some reform measures, and improvements in efficiency wWl be 
attributable to reform in these areas. The implications for policy can then be assessed. If 
no reform measure is statistically significant, then improvements can only be attributed to 
autonomous changes in efficiency, an idea underlying time-variant models in the 
literature on the stochastic production frontier (Kumbhakar 1990). 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Three issues are dealt with in this section: methodology, representation of heterogeneity 
in intercepts and slopes, and model selection. The advantage of the stochastic production 
frontier approach is its ability to discriminate between observed output and potential 
maximum output and to provide a measure of the gap (technical efficiency) for each 
observation. These measures indicate loss of efficiency suffered by firms due to non-price 
and organisational factors, which are often called socio-economic variables. The 
determination of an appropriate method for quantitatively identifying the relationship 
between technical efficiency and socio-economic variables is again at issue. The 
availability of panel data gives economists the opportunity to analyse economic problems 
more consistently and efficiently (Hsiao 1989, pp. l-Sy than can be done with cross-
sectional and time-series data. The challenge in using panel data is to detect and correct 
heterogeneity in intercepts and/or slopes of the function used in estimation. This will be 
discussed further in this section. 
A Methodological Issue 
In the literature on production efficiency, in general two methods are used to measure 
the impact of socio-economic or institutional variables on efficiency. The first is to treat 
socio-economic variables as independent inputs and incorporate them into the production 
function (equation 5.20 in chapter 5) for joint estimation. This approach can be used in 
the full production fi-ontier fi-amework (Reischneder and Stevenson 1991; Battese and 
Coelli 1993) and in the average production frontier (Lin 1992). 
In the full production frontier framework, this approach has intrinsic problems of 
interpretation, both economically and econometrically, despite its merits. The argument 
iRefer to Hsiao (1989, pp. 1-5) for a summary of advantages of panel data in economic analysis. 
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for this approach is that the exclusion of inefficiency effects will affect the parameters of 
the core variables of the production function, and that it is therefore desirable to 
incorporate socio-economic variables explicidy into the production function for joint 
estimation. In the original framework of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), the reason for attaching the additional truncated 
distribution to the production function was to capture the effects of all the socio-
economic variables. Giving socio-economic variables the explicit form does not seem to 
add any superiority to the full frontier model. 
The second problem is potentially more serious. Production theory in neoclassical 
economics requires a specific functional form to approximate the production process,^ 
which should determine the technical relationship between output and inputs only 
(Johnson 1967). Following the neoclassical approach it becomes necessary to impose an 
arbitrary relationship on output and socio-economic variables, and on the core inputs and 
socio-economic variables. The inclusion of these variables into the stochastic production 
frontier will most likely lead to biased estimates of coefficients of the production frontier 
and efficiency index. Moreover, since the socio-economic variables and core input 
factors are jointiy estimated in the production function, it is very difficult to use other 
econometric techniques to estimate the relationship between efficiency and socio-
economic variables in a situation in which the relationship exhibits a high degree of 
complexity due either to data or institutional characteristics. 
The second approach is usually associated with the full production frontier approach 
and has two steps. In the first step, the stochastic production frontier model is specified 
and its validity tested. In the second step, the estimates of technical efficiency obtained in 
the first step are used as a dependent variable for second-round estimation. In this step, 
socio-economic variables are used as explanatory variables to estimate their effect on 
firm-specific efficiency. This approach was first used by Kalirajan (1981, 1982, 1989 and 
1990), and later by Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) and Kalirajan and Shand (1986) among 
others. By using this approach, the above-mentioned theoretical problems can be 
avoided. Moreover, sophisticated econometric methods can be applied in the second step 
of the estimation. Based on the preceding discussion, we choose to use the second 
approach. The technical efficiency index obtained in chapter 5 gives us our dependent 
variables, and a set of indices representing various reform measures are used as 
explanatory variables to estimate the impact of reform on technical efficiency. 
^For a functional form to be able to represent a production process, it needs to satisfy certain required 
regularity conditions, such as monotonicity, convexity and differentiability. Hence the variables used in 
the production function should also be reasonably compatible with these conditions. Refer to Kreps 
(1990, pp. 235-9) for details of the regularity condition of the production function. 
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Problems of Heterogeneity 
The simplest econometric method for carrying out an estimation is, of course, OLS 
regression. However, the validity of OLS estimates depends critically on the 
homogeneity of the disturbance term of the equation. If the regression is run on panel 
data, the estimates are likely to be biased due to heterogenous intercepts and slopes. 
To illustrate this problem, let us consider technical efficiency to be a linear function 
of the indicators of reform in the goods market, labour management, capital management 
and the tax system. The econometric model can then be written as: 
Te, = a + ^ x , + u , (6.1) 
where X, = is a vector of socio-economic variables representing four 
reform measures, (3 = (Pp[32,^3,^4) is the vector of corresponding coefficients, and 
is an error term with mean zero and variance O^. In the literature, this is caUed a 
pooled regression model. 
A theoretical assumption underlying the OLS estimation is that the data are 
generated fi-om well-controUed experiments and the outcomes are random variables with 
a probability distribution that is a function of variables describing the conditions of the 
experiments. In our case, this means that the technical efficiency of each enterprise is 
generated by a parametric probability distribution function p{Te.^ / 0) , where 9 is a 
four-dimensional vector, identical for all enterprises and in all six periods. The equation 
of the pooled regression model implies that the observations of variables are drawn from 
an identical probability distribution for each enterprise in each period, since all 
enterprises share the same parameters. 
This assumption does not seem to be valid for this study. Two factors undermine the 
assumption. First, government policy towards state enterprises differs according to 
locality, which may in turn lead to a differing response from state enterprises to 
economic reforms (chapters 4 and 5). Second, the initial conditions for sample 
enterprises in 1980, such as their physical capital intensity or human capital, could vary 
greatiy among enterprises. The parameters of the probability distribution for different 
enterprises are therefore unlikely to be identical. In fact, our estimation results for 
technical efficiency revealed substantial inter-enterprise variation (Figures 5.1 and 5.2) in 
both heavy and light industrial sectors over the whole time period as well as in 1980 
(Table 5.5). If we ignore such heterogeneity, we may come up with inconsistent and 
misleading estimates of the parameters of interest. This is called heterogeneity bias in the 
literature on panel data analysis. 
In the case of panel data, heterogeneity bias can take place both among cross-
sectional units in a particular time period and among observations in different time 
periods. In this study we call the former intra-temporal heterogeneity bias and the latter 
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inter-temporal heterogeneity bias. For simplicity, only the former case is illustrated here; 
inter-temporal bias can be understood in the same way. In the following discussion, it 
should be noted that inter-temporal homogeneity is implicitly assumed. 
Three types of heterogeneity bias may occur when Te.^  is regressed on all other 
variables using the OLS method.^ 
Type 1: Intercept Heterogeneity and Slope Homogeneity 
In this case, equation (6.1) will be written as: 
+ for (6.2) 
where / = 1,..., N is the index of enterprises. In the literature, equation (6.2) is called the 
individual-mean or ceU-mean corrected regression model. The coefficients of this 
equation are called within-group estimates. 
Given that technical efficiency is consistently and positively correlated to the 
indicators of economic reform, the heterogenous intercept bias includes four cases. 
These are illustrated in Figures 6.1-6.4. In these figures, the broken-line circle represents 
the scatter point for an individual enterprise over time, and the broken line represents the 
true underlying relationship between technical efficiency and the indicators of economic 
reform (this wiU be the OLS regression line if we estimate observations for individual 
enterprises separately). The solid line represents the OLS regression line based on 
equation (6.1). 
In case 1 (Figure 6.1), the OLS estimates understate the true coefficient, since the 
solid line is flatter than the broken lines. If the solid line were steeper, then the OLS 
estimates of (3 would overstate the true relationship between technical efficiency and 
reform indicators. In both situations, the estimates of p are biased. 
In case 2 (Figure 6.2), the OLS estimates of (3 are unbiased since solid and broken 
lines have the same slope. They are not, however, efficient The estimates may turn out 
to be statistically insignificant, while the true relationship between efficiency and its 
explanatory variables is consistent across enterprises. 
The two cases presented in Figures 6.3 and 6.4 cause even more serious concern. In 
the former case, the OLS estimate predicts that technical efficiency bears no relationship 
to economic reform measures; in the latter case, it points in the wrong direction. If the 
null hypothesis is that technical efficiency is positively correlated to economic reform 
posited in these figures, then from the statistic point of view, type I error will occur 
based on the OLS estimation. The OLS estimation will certainly lead to false inference in 
both cases. 
^Kuh (1963) presents more complex cases which will not be considered in this study. 
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Figure 6.1 Bias Due to Heterogenous Intercepts (case 1) 
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Figure 6.3 Bias Due to Heterogenous Intercepts (case 3) 
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Figure 6.4 Bias Due to Heterogenous Intercepts (case 4) 
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Figure 6.5 Bias Due to Heterogenous Slopes 
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Figure 6.6 Bias Due to Heterogenous Intercepts and Slopes (case 1) 
Te 
0 
I I ' S I I 
/ 
r 
•s - i 
r 
174 
Figure 6.7 Bias Due to Heterogenous Intercepts and Slopes (case 2) 
Te 
0 
It should be noted that the heterogenous intercepts in all four cases will make the 
estimate of the intercept term statistically insignificant, or that of the slope biased or 
inefficient. It is therefore necessary to make the appropriate corrections. 
Type 2: Intercept Homogeneity and Slope Heterogeneity 
In this situation, equation should (6.1) be written as: 
Te = a + B jc. + u. I It It f o r f t ^ P , (6.3) 
This case is presented in Figure 6.5. In this figure, the broken-line circle is not shown 
and the straight broken lines represent OLS regression lines if we estimate the 
observations of each enterprise separately. In this case, the structure of the estimates of 
3 is unstable, and the regression line of the pooled regression model is simply 
unpredictable. Although the intercept term can be consistently estimated, the coefficient 
of slope is likely to be statistically insignificant. From the economic point of view, this 
model is not very interesting because no clear-cut policy implications can be drawn 
unless technical efficiency and the reform indicators display a reasonable degree of 
consistency and stability. 
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Type 3: Intercept and Slope Heterogeneity. 
In this situation, we can use the following equation to represent the model: 
Te. = a , + + for a , ot^  and p, P^ (6.4) 
Intercepts and slopes are allowed to vary across units in each time period. We call this 
the intra-temporal unrestricted model as distinguished from the unrestricted model based 
on both inter-temporal and intra-temporal heterogeneity. 
This type of bias can be divided into two cases, shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.7. In the 
first case (Figure 6.6), a straightforward poohng of all observations in the panel and the 
assumption of identical parameters for all enterprises leads to nonsensical results for 
both intercept and slope. The OLS estimates, the average of the coefficients, are also 
difficult to predict. However, the intercepts and slopes are likely to be statistically 
significant in this case, and so the results are inconclusive. 
The second case (Figure 6.7) is dangerously misleading. While the underlying 
relationship between technical efficiency and reform indicators is inconsistent, the OLS 
estimates predict a positive correlation. If observations of enterprises scattered around 
the OLS regression line are sufficiendy large, the OLS estimate may turn out to be 
statistically "significant". Inference based on those results would lead to misleading 
poUcy implications. In this case, type II error occurs, if we hypothesise that technical 
efficiency is positively related to economic reform. 
As stated earlier, heterogenous bias may also occur with observations along the 
longitudinal dimension of the panel data or inter-temporally. Although the three types of 
heterogeneity could be presented in graphic form (analogous to Figures 6.1-6.7), it is 
enough to note here that the subscript i of a and (3 in the models (equations 6.2-6.4) 
should be replaced by t in the inter-temporal cases, where t is the index of time periods. 
Functions with both intra- and inter-temporal heterogeneity are called the two-way fixed 
effect model in the literature. 
Model Selection 
According to the analysis so far, it is clearly necessary to test whether parameters 
characterising the random outcome variable Te.^  remain constant across all enterprises 
and over time. Hsiao (1989) suggested using an analysis-of-covariance test to identify 
variation in intercepts and slopes. This is the method used most widely in panel data 
analysis. We will again illustrate the test procedure for intra-temporal cases, assuming as 
before inter-temporal homogeneity. 
The analysis-of-variance test consists of three steps: 
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Step 1: simultaneously testing the homogeneity of slopes and intercepts 
among sample enterprises; 
Step 2: testing the homogeneity of slopes of sample enterprises as a 
whole; and 
Step 3: testing the homogeneity of intercepts of sample enterprises as a 
whole. 
From a statistical point of view, the first step can be separated from the other two. It is 
obvious that if we accept the hypothesis of homogeneity in both intercepts and slopes, no 
further tests are necessary. We would use simply equation (6.2) and run the OLS 
regression straightforwardly on the panel data. If the hypothesis is rejected, we will need 
to consider other possibilities and to proceed with steps 2 and 3. 
The tests in steps 2 and 3 are statistically independent and can be carried out in either 
order. However, the test in step 3 is meaningful only when the structure of the 
relationship between efficiency and economic reform indicators is reasonably stable. For 
this reason it is better to carry out the test in step 2 first. 
Based on the assumption that W, is a random variable independently and normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance c ] , an F-test is used in each step of 
the procedure. The rationale underlying this joint test is that variation in individual 
enterprises of intercepts and slopes is not important, but that collectively significant 
heterogeneity of a group of individuals is of concem and should be corrected. For the 
first step, we impose a set of linear restrictions on all intercepts and slopes and test 
statistically whether the restrictions hold. The hypothesis can be formulated as: 
(6.5) 
s.t. Hi: a, =a, =...= a, 
In this case there are (k + 1){N -1) restrictions, where N is the total number of 
enterprises and K is the number of socio-economic variables. Let us define the residual 
sum of square of the unrestricted model (equation 6.5) as E^ and that of the pooled 
regression model as E^. Under hypothesis H^, the explained sum of square of the model 
decreases by (E^- EJ due to the restrictions imposed on intercepts and slopes. The 
unrestricted residual sum of square (E^) divided by the variance ( o ] ) has a Chi-square 
distribution with NT - N ( K +I) degree of fi-eedom; the difference in the two values of 
the residual sum of square ( E ^ - E J divided by the variance has a Chi-square 
distribution with + degree of freedom. Given that the two random 
variables are independently distributed, an F-statistic can be calculated as follows: 
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EJ[NT-N{K + \)] 
where T is the number of periods covered by the data.'^ If the F value is statistically 
insignificant we stop the testing procedure and use the pooled regression model. 
Otherwise, we go on to steps 2 and 3. 
For step 2, the hypothesis can be formulated as: 
r e „ = a , + p , x , , + M „ 
We calculate the f-statistic in the same way as shown in equation (6.6), except that the 
numerator has K{N — 1) degree of freedom. In this step, we have two alternative ways 
of conducting the test: one conditional on homogenous intercepts, and the other an 
unconditional test. But we do not know a priori whether or not the intercepts are 
homogenous and so need to do both tests. If the null hypothesis (H^) is not rejected, we 
proceed to test intercepts on the condition of homogenous slope; if it is rejected, we 
carry out the unconditional test. 
Step 3 is equivalent to testing the linear restriction on the intercepts alone and can be 
formulated as: 
sJ. Hi a, =a. =...= a. 
(6.8.1) 
or 
SJ. H": a, =...= a. 
(6.8.2) 
depending on the results of the test in step 2. In this case the F-statistic calculated using 
equation (6.6) has N degree of freedom in the numerator. As noted earlier, the test for 
homogeneity of intercepts is only economically interesting when the structure of the 
relationship between technical efficiency and reform indicators is reasonably stable, both 
i 
"•in the case of unbalanced panel data NT should be replaced by ^ N.^. 
r=l 
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qualitatively and quantitatively. Based on this observation, we will only proceed with the 
test in step 3 if only hypothesis {H]) is not rejected. 
If H] is rejected, the decision about model selection will be made on the basis of the 
results of steps 2 and 3. If the null hypothesis is rejected in both steps, then the 
unrestricted model (equation 6.4) should be used for estimation; if the null hypothesis in 
step 2 {H]) is rejected but that in step 3 is not, the model represented by equation (6.3) 
would be used; if the null hypothesis in step 2 is not rejected but that in step 3 is rejected, 
then the cell-mean corrected regression model (equation 6.2) should be used to estimate 
the impact of economic reform on technical efficiency. 
It should be noted that two uncomfortable situations may emerge. In the first, the 
hypothesis H^ is rejected in step 1 but, if we go on with the testing procedure, not in the 
other two steps. In other words, while the overall test suggests that intercepts and slopes 
are not collectively homogenous and that we should use the intra-temporal unrestricted 
model, individual tests indicate that they are not heterogeneous and therefore that the 
intra-temporal unrestricted model is not an appropriate specification. The opposite 
situation may also crop up, in which hypothesis H] passes the F-test in step 1, but fails 
individual tests in steps 2 and 3. The former case suggests that the pooled regression 
model should be used, and the latter that models with homogenous intercepts and slopes 
are inappropriate. These contradictory results may be due to differences in null 
hypotheses in overall and individual tests. If they do occur, they may make it difficult for 
us to come to a meaningful and useful conclusion. 
The test procedure for inter-temporal homogeneity is analogous to the three-step 
procedure set down for intra-temporal homogeneity. The only differences lie in the 
degree of freedom in the formulation of the F-statistic (6.6), and some notations. In the 
inter-temporal case, the subscript i wiU be replaced by t, and N by T, where t is the index 
for time periods and T is total number of periods. 
In this study, the significance of the inter-temporal test lies in our interest in whether 
the response of efficiency to economic reform measures is consistent over time. Inter-
and intra-temporal testing procedures can be carried out separately. In the testing 
process, we first conduct the inter-temporal test without imposing any mtra-temporal 
restrictions on intercepts and slopes. Intra-temporal tests are then carried out based on 
the selected inter-temporal model. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Earlier in the study we identified two areas of economic reform: market reform and 
institutional reform. In chapter 3, our survey data confumed that govemment-determined 
prices for goods were increasingly replaced with market prices; consequently, the share 
of both inputs and output traded on the market increased significantly during the 1980s. 
Chapter 4 described institutional reform in state enterprises in three key areas: 
financial autonomy, financing of working capital and fixed assets, and remuneration of 
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workers. The expansion of enterprises' financial autonomy was instimtionalised in the 
profit retention scheme, a tax system and the Contract Management Responsibility 
System. Despite numerous modifications and amendments, the share of profit retained by 
state enterprises in total profit increased substantially from 1980 to 1988 (Tables 4.1-4.3 
in chapter 4). 
The major instrument of reform in the financing of state enterprises was to replace 
free government grants with interest-bearing bank loans, to fund both working capital 
and fixed assets. Again, we used survey data to demonstrate that the share of bank loans 
in total working capital increased consistendy (Table 4.5 in chapter 4). However, the 
share of bank loans in investment in fixed assets was relatively small. 
Reform of the labour management system was carried out in two ways: by restoring 
the bonus system, and by recruiting workers on a contractual and seasonal basis. While 
the bonus system represented a significant change (because bonuses were related to the 
performance of workers) and constituted an important attempt to break away from the 
egalitarian tradition of remuneration, employment of contract and seasonal workers was 
found to have had little impact on the management of labour due to various forms of 
govemment intervention. 
In terms of the above review of reform policies, our test of the impact of economic 
reform is equivalent to estimating quantitatively the relationship between the technical 
efficiency index and share of goods traded on the market in total output {market share), 
the share of retained profit in total profit {share of retained profit), the share of bank 
loans in total working capital {share of bank loans) and the share in total remuneration 
of performance-related bonuses {bonus share). 
This gives us the following equation: 
Te, = fiMkt,, Bon,, Pr o f , , Loan,) (6.9) 
where Te,, Bon,, Prof and Loan, are respectively technical efficiency index, 
market share, bonus share, share of retained profit and share of bank loans for the /t^ 
enterprise in the t^^ period. This is the general form of the various functions described in 
our discussion of testing procedures. 
The hypothesis tested in this model is that the four explanatory variables on the right-
hand side will be positively and significantly correlated with technical efficiency if 
economic reform as a whole was successful; some of the variables will be significantiy 
positive if reform was partially successful; and otherwise economic reform has been a 
complete failure. According to the proposition, the four coefficients are believed a ^r/on 
to be positive. 
In the estimation, technical efficiency is an independent variable obtained from the 
estimation of the stochastic production frontier model in chapter 5. The market shares of 
each enterprise in the six periods are used as a proxy for the process of market reform. 
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This variable was summarised in Tables 3.5-3.7 in chapter 3. The share of retained profit, 
the share of bank loans and the bonus share in equation (6.9) are proxies for reform in 
the areas of financial autonomy, financing of state enterprises and labour management. 
There are three types of variable causing variation in intercepts and slopes in the 
panel data: individual time-invariant, period individual-invariant and individual time-
varying variables. All the variables representing economic reform may a priori be any of 
these three types. To test the significance of their impact on the stability of the 
coefficients of the model, economists use either fixed effect models or random effect 
models. In the former, the effects of variables on intercepts and slopes are treated as 
constants; in the latter, they are assumed to follow certain distributions.^ 
Both fixed effect and random effect models are widely applied in economic analysis. 
For example, Hausman (1978b) used both models in estimating wage equations for US 
data, and Lin (1992) applied a fixed effect model to the estimation of the impact of 
economic reform on the productivity of Chinese agriculture. Both models have pros and 
cons. In this study we choose a fixed effect model for estimating and testing the 
homogeneity of intercepts and slopes, for two reasons. First, the model represented by 
equation (6.9) is based on Komai's soft budget constraint hypothesis, which is a 
conceptual rather than mathematically formulated model. Specific functional forms based 
on equation (6.9), Uke Cobb-Douglas or translog functions, always impose a certain 
degree of arbitrariness on the relationship between the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables. The random-effect model requires that we impose an arbitrary 
distribution on the residual term. It is therefore better to avoid the unnecessary 
arbitrariness the random effect model may possibly bring about. Second, a simple 
procedure is required in fixed effect models to test for model selection. These models are 
therefore straightforward to estimate and the results are easier to interpret. 
When using a fixed effect model, it is common practice to introduce a dummy 
variable for each cross-sectional unit and each period. Model selection is based on the 
result of an F-test on the linear restriction of the most general model following the three-
step procedures for intra and inter-heterogeneity described earlier. 
A linear functional form is used in the estimation of equation (6.9). Variables of 
economic reform expressed as a percentage are entered into the equation for estimation. 
This functional form is chosen because the coefficients thus estimated are easy to 
interpret. Since variables on both sides of the equation are percentages, coefficients are 
the elasticities of technical efficiency in response to changes in economic reform 
measures. A two-way fixed effect model is represented by equation (6.10): 
^The stochastic production frontier model used in chapter 5 for estimating technical efficiency can be 
classified as a random effect model. 
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T e , = a + p . M ^ r , + + P3 P r o / , + 
N 4 N T 4 T (6 10) 
'•=2 k=l 1=2 1=2 k=l 1=2 
where D p " and Dpf are dummy variables and k is the index of four 
indicators of economic reform. The following are the specifications of these variables: 
^ f i^ — ^ft^ — 1 for all observations of the enterprise; 
= 0 for other observations. 
Dp'^ = Dp^ = 1 for all observations of in the r^ ^ period; 
= 0 for other observations. 
Equation (6.10) is equivalent to the overall unrestricted model and serves as a 
starting point for the testing procedure and model selection. As in the estimation of 
technical efficiency in chapter 5, the testing procedure was carried out separately for 
heavy and light industrial sectors. The results of the analysis of covariance and associated 
information are presented in Table 6.1. 
In Table 6.1, six alternative models are shown for each of the two industrial sectors. 
Analysis of covariance is carried out for each model by testing the linear restriction on 
dummy variables associated with intercept and/or slope. Model selection is based on 
these tests. The first model (H^ and Lj) is an unrestricted model equivalent to equation 
(6.10). A test is carried out on the restrictions on both intercepts and slopes along cross-
sectional and longitudinal dimensions. The F-statistic is 4.30 for the heavy industrial 
sector and 3.32 for the light industrial sector. Both are significant at the 99 per cent 
confidence interval, and the null hypothesis is decidedly rejected. These results indicate 
that the pooled regression model is not appropriate for either sector; in other words, 
heterogeneity does exist in both panels of data. 
Given the existence of heterogeneity, the next question is whether it occurred intra-
temporally among cross-sectional units or inter-temporally among observations in 
different time periods. The tests of the linear restriction (H2 and L2) suggest that 
intercepts and slopes are not heterogenous inter-temporally, since the F-values in both 
sectors are not sufficiendy large to reject the null hypothesis. The results imply that the 
same intercept and slope coefficients should be applied to enterprises inter-temporally. 
The results are not surprising given that, under the Chinese gradualist approach to 
reform, technical efficiency on the left-hand side of the equation and reform indicators 
Table 6.1 Results of Analysis of Covariance for Heavy and Light Industrial Sectors 
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Heavy Industrial Sector 
Code Model Null Hypothesis Degree of Freedom F-statistic Decision 
(Numerator) (Denominator) 
H i Te, = a , + + a , + p ' . x , a , = c x , = p , = p , = 0 for all i atid i 7 5 4 139 4 . 2 9 6 6 * Rejected 
H2 Te„ = a , + p . x , + a , + p ; x , a , = p , = 0 for all t 25 139 0 . 8 2 9 1 Not Rejected 
H3 Te„ =a,+ p ' . x , + M, a , = p , = 0 for all i 7 2 9 164 3 . 8 8 9 6 * Rejected 
H4 P , = o for all i 568 325 3 . 3 0 7 1 * Rejected 
H5 Te, = a, + p . x , + u,, P , = o for all /• 586 164 1 .0340 Not Rejected 
H6 a , = 0 for all i 161 7 3 2 9 . 3 9 0 5 * Rejected 
Light Industrial Sector 
Code Model Null Hypothesis Degree of Freedom F-statistic Decision 
(Numerator) (Denominator) 
L l Te, =a,+ p : x , + a , + p ; x , for all / and i 511 104 3 . 3 2 2 9 * Rejected 
L2 Te, - a , + + ot, + p ; x , for all t 25 104 1 .3220 Not Rejected 
L3 Te, = a, + p.jc,, + o c - P - 0 for all / 4 8 6 129 3 . 2 2 4 6 * Rejected 
U P - 0 for all i 377 238 3 . 3 1 9 3 * Rejected 
L s Te, = a, + p . x , + u. P - 0 for all i 377 129 1 .2003 Not Rejected 
L6 = a + p x , + «„ a = 0 for all i 109 506 8 .1599* Rejected 
Notes: 
Source: 
1) In the testing process, perfect coUinearity arose among dummy variables due to the fact that certain reform measures were either completely implemented or not 
implemented at all in some enterprises. Correction is made by deleting the perfectly correlated variables, and this is reflected in the degrees of freedom. 
2) Asterisk indicates the decision of rejection is evaluated at the 99 per cent confidence interval. Others are evaluated at the 95% confidence interval. 
Estimated from survey data. 
183 
changed only marginally from year to year, and therefore the structure of their 
relationship was not likely to have experienced drastic variation during the period under 
study. The results do indicate, though, that the response of enterprise-specific technical 
efficiency to economic reform was fairly consistent over time. 
Given that intra-temporal heterogeneity is the major concern, we proceed with the 
three-step testing procedure described earlier in this chapter, based on homogenous 
inter-temporal intercepts and slopes. In the first step for overall homogenous intercepts 
and slopes (H3 and L3), we obtain an F-statistic of 3.89 for heavy industry and 3.22 for 
light industry. Both are highly significant, far exceeding the critical value evaluated at the 
99 per cent confidence interval. This suggests that the heterogeneity already indicated by 
the test on the fnst model (H^ and L^) does exist, but intra-temporally. 
The next question, corresponding to step 2 of the testing procedure, concerns 
naturally the whereabouts of heterogeneity: in intercepts, or in slopes? Since 
heterogeneity in slope is far more important from an economic point of view, we start by 
testing homogenous slopes conditionally on homogenous intercepts (H4 and L4) and 
unconditionally (H5 and L5). The null hypothesis of the restricted models (H4 and L4) 
are rejected for both sectors. This does not necessarily mean that slopes are 
heterogeneous; rather, the result may have been caused by inappropriate restrictions on 
intercepts. This is confirmed by the unconditional test. The F-statistics for the 
unconditional model are 1.03 for the heavy industrial sector and 1.20 for the light 
industrial sector. These are not sufficiently large for us to reject the null hypothesis that 
the slopes of explanatory variables are jointly homogenous in both sectors. These results, 
taken together with tests in previous models (H^ and L^; H3 and L3), suggest that the 
cell-mean corrected regression model (equation 6.2) is most likely to be the appropriate 
specification. 
Finally, the linear restriction is imposed on the intercepts of the cell-mean corrected 
regression model (H5 and L5), given homogenous slopes. The F-statistics for both 
sectors are very large, far greater than the critical value at the 99 per cent confidence 
interval. The results of this test have two implications. First, they confirm that we should 
use the cell-mean corrected regression model for estimating equation (6.9) and, as earlier 
tests also indicated, that the pooled regression model is extremely unlikely to be the 
correct specification; second, the uncomfortable situation described in the preceding 
section does not arise for this data set, and the estimates are likely to be reliable and 
believable. 
Based on the results of our analysis of covariance and testing procedures for model 
selection, the following equation will be used to estimate the impact on technical 
efficiency of reform in the areas of marketing, government-enterprise financial 
relationships, financing of enterprises and labour management: 
Te ,^ = a + + + P3 Pr of^ ^ + f>,Loan„ + 1 D f ; 
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(6.11) 1=2 
A summary of the estimation results for this cell-mean corrected regression model for 
both heavy and light industrial sectors is given in Table 6.2. Full estimates are presented 
in Tables A6.1 and A6.2 in Appendix 6. 
Table 6.2 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
Heavy Industrial Sector Light Industrial Sector 
Coefficient S. Error T-ratio Coefficient S. Error T-ratio 
Intercept (a) 60.7800 4.5172 13.4550 61.8956 3.3138 18.6780 
Market share ((3^) 0.1035 0.0515 2.0110 0.1964 0.0979 2.0060 
Bonus share (P^) 0.3118 0.0698 4.4670 0.2644 0.1030 2.5670 
Retained Profit Share (pj) -0.0118 0.0128 -0.9210 0.0189 0.0206 0.9180 
Bank Loan Share (p^) 0.0096 0.0186 0.5170 0.0073 0.0253 0.2890 
F-Statistic 10.6950 8.0410 
R-squared 0.7068 0.6623 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6407 0.5624 
Source: Estimated from survey data. 
According to this table, the F-statistic has a value of 10.70 for the heavy industrial 
sector and 8.04 for the light industrial sector. Both are significant at the 99 per cent 
confidence interval. These results suggest that the indicators of economic reform in the 
model collectively have strong explanatory power for technical efficiency in both sectors. 
The value of the adjusted R-squared in both sectors exceeds 0.55, which is reasonably 
high for the estimation of panel data. 
Of the four important explanatory variables, two have reasonably large estimated 
coefficients and are statistically highly significant The magnitude of the coefficients of 
market share in the light industrial sector is nearly 0.2, double the value in the heavy 
industrial sector. Both, though, are significant at the 95 per cent confidence interval. The 
coefficients of the share of workers' bonus in total remuneration have values of 0.31 and 
0.26 respectively and are significant at the 99 per cent confidence interval. 
However, the coefficients of share of retained profit and share of bank loans in 
working capital for both industrial sectors are not significant when evaluated at 
conventionally accepted confidence levels. The magnitudes of the coefficients are very 
small, typically less than 10 per cent of those for market share and even less when 
compared with those of the bonus share. 
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The combined results shown in Table 6.2 show that economic reform in state 
enterprises was only partially successful, a proposition put forward earlier. 
Generalisation about the success of reform based solely on the finding of improvements 
in the efficiency index will fail to take account of the highly complex nature of the 
process and may, therefore, be both imprudent and unrealistic. 
The results echo the findings of chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, market reform was 
highly successful in enhancing the technical efficiency of state enterprises. The 
marketisation process was realised through the development of a competitive goods 
market, in which state enterprises were allowed or forced to take part. The intense 
market competition faced by state enterprises — together with various other institutional 
changes that made managers pursue the profit objective — had a double-edged effect. 
On the one hand, state enterprises had to develop strategies to sell their products, such 
as improving quality and offering the lowest possible price, because customers were now 
free to choose among alternative goods and suppliers;^ on the other hand, as govemment 
protection in the form of price subsidies and guaranteed purchase of output gradually 
weakened (or, according to Komai, budget constraint became harder), they had to look 
at their production costs. It was in the interest of enterprises to decrease production 
costs and increase efficiency so that they could achieve profit and other objectives. As a 
result, they not only started to bring out new and improved products and services but 
also showed continual improvements in efficiency over time. 
Although state enterprises rarely faced bankruptcy and in that sense were not 
compelled to improve efficiency, the material incentives generated by the reform process 
seem to have been strong enough to translate the effects of market competition into 
increased efficiency. This proposition is strongly supported by our estimation results, 
which indicate that the impact of marketisation on the efficiency of both heavy and light 
industrial sectors was strong, consistent and statistically significant 
Share of bonus in total remuneration also has a statistically significant coefficient In 
the neoclassical framework, there is a straightforward interpretation for this result. Since 
the distribution of bonuses is closed related to the effort and performance of workers, the 
restoration of the bonus system simply incorporated one more variable into the utility 
function of workers: it gave workers the chance to choose between working harder for 
increased material gain or working less hard for a dwindling basic wage. When properly 
implemented, the bonus system was likely to alter the equilibrium position of the 
workers' utility function established in the traditional egalitarian income distribution 
system and induce workers to make a greater effort in return for material rewards. 
Despite earlier studies in this area arguing that the bonus system was seriously flawed 
because bonuses simply became a wage supplement (Byrd and Tidrick 1987, pp. 73-4) 
^This effect can easily be derived from neoclassical economic theory and is evident in international and 
Chinese experience. Analysis of this effect is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed 
further. However, our analysis of the business objectives of state enterprises (chapter 4) does shed some 
light on it: developing new products ranked high among economic and non-economic objectives. 
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or that there was a tacit alliance between managers and workers to retain more profit 
(Walder 1987), our study shows that the bonus system was not only effective but the 
most important factor in the observed improvement in the technical efficiency of state 
enterprises. In view of the overall institutional changes taking place when the bonus 
system was restored, our results are consistent with those of Lee Kuen (1990), who 
argued that improvements in efficiency were due to the combined effect of various 
institutional reforms and that any one-dimensional advance in labour management was 
unlikely to be successful. 
Institutional reform in the areas of financial autonomy and the financing of state 
enterprises was a complete failure as far as technical efficiency is concerned. In Table 
6.2, the coefficients of the share of retained profit in total profit and the share of bank 
loans in total working capital are very small in magnitude for both sectors and 
statistically insignificant. Hence, these two variables have no correlation with variations 
in technical efficiency, implying that reform in these two areas made no contribution 
whatsoever to improvements in efficiency. The estimate of the retained profit share for 
heavy industry turns out to be negative. However, the T-ratio is smaU, indicating that we 
should not conclude that the profit retention scheme, profit-based taxation system and 
Contract Management Responsibility System had a negative impact on technical 
efficiency. 
These results are unsurprising and consistent with earlier discussion (chapter 4). The 
ad hoc and irregular nature of various new institutions and weak enforcement of rules 
left enormous room for state enterprises to negotiate their way out of their financial 
obligations. This was an easier way to achieve profit targets than improving managerial 
and production efficiency. As a result, economic incentives failed to direct the efforts of 
enterprise managers to changing input-output relationship and to improving technical 
efficiency. To compound the problem, reform of capital management was far from 
complete. Constant government intervention in loans policies and the inconsistent 
behaviour of banks resulted in the inability of banks to forge a strictly contractual 
relationship with state enterprises. Moreover, the failure of the central govemment to 
implement the bankruptcy law seriously allowed inefficient state enterprises to continue 
to operate. In short, the soft budget constraint in these two areas continued to erode the 
technical efficiency of state enterprises. 
As explained in chapter 2, the degree of softness or hardness of an enterprise's 
budget constraint is determined jointly by the pricing of goods, taxation and the financing 
of capital. Sofmess in any of these three areas may weaken efforts to improve efficiency 
in others. In this case, the lack of a bankruptcy threat and problems in taxation and 
financing may have undermined the impact of market reform. Although we cannot 
determine the degree to which the soft budget constraint in taxation and capital financing 
weakened the impact of market reform, such a cross-effect is certainly a possibility. In 
Table 6.2, the coefficients and T-ratios of market share are both significantly smaUer than 
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those of bonus share, particularly for the heavy industrial sector. This indicates that the 
impact of market reform is considerably weaker in magnitude and the correlation is not 
as strong as reform in labour management This may have been one manifestation of the 
cross-effect. 
Finally, we can make a rough quantitative assessment of the contribution of 
economic reform to improvements in technical efficiency. The market share of output of 
aU enterprises increased on average by 10.5 per cent from 1980 to 1988 (Table 3.5 in 
chapter 3). Dividing the sample into heavy and light industrial sectors, we find that 
market share increased by 12.9 per cent in the heavy industrial sector and 8.1 per cent in 
the light industrial sector. In the same period, the bonus share in total remuneration 
increased by 13.4 per cent on average (Table 4.6a in chapter 4). In the heavy industrial 
sector it increased by 12.8 per cent and in the light industrial sector by 12 per cent. In the 
meantime, technical efficiency increased by 8 per cent in the heavy industrial sector and 
6.8 in the light sector (Table 5.4 in chapter 5). 
The coefficients in Table 6.2 are elasticities. They represent the change of technical 
efficiency in response to a percentage change in the market share in total output or the 
bonus share in workers' income. Thus, the coefficient of the market share for heavy 
industry (0.10) can be interpreted as representing an increase of 0.1 per cent associated 
with a 1 per cent increase in market share. The contribution of market reform in heavy 
industry to improvements in technical efficiency is then 1.33 per cent (12.9 x 0.1035). 
The contribution of other reforms can be calculated accordingly. The contribution of 
labour management reform to technical efficiency in the heavy industrial sector is 3.98 
per cent (12.77 x 0.3118). Therefore, 66 per cent (5.3 per cent out of 8 per cent) of the 
increment in technical efficiency in this period is attributable to market reform and 
reform in the management of labour and the rest is due to unknown factors. 
Similarly, in the light industrial sector the contribution of market reform and labour 
management reform are 1.6 per cent (8.14 x 0.19) and 3.16 per cent (11.95 x 0.2644) 
respectively. Altogether 70 per cent (4.8 per cent out of 6.8 per cent) of the 
improvement in technical efficiency was due to economic reform in the light industrial 
sector. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economic reform of the state industrial sector lagged far behind agricultural reform and 
is widely believed not to have been as successful. As described in the previous chapter, 
the reform process encountered enormous difficulties. A far greater number of factors 
influence the efficiency of state enterprises than is the case with agriculture, and thus 
reform of the state industrial sector is correspondingly more complex. The soft budget 
constraint, for example, is not a problem in household production in the agricultural 
sector but is prevalent in state industry. Measuring and assessing the impact of reform on 
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efficiency is, therefore, difficult and researchers in this area have found it hard to come to 
a consensus. 
Despite this, we find that it is possible to measure the impact of reform on efficiency. 
Based on Komai's soft budget constraint hypothesis and an examination of the actual 
reform process, we divided reform into four separate specific measures: marketing, 
taxation, financing of capital and labour management. The estimation process suggested 
that this was an appropriate approach for analysing the efficiency problem of state 
enterprises and that it was superior to the method of simple inference popular in the 
existing literature. 
The chapter has two major findings. First, economic reform in state enterprises was 
only partially successful, despite the fact that the average technical efficiency of sample 
enterprises improved continuously during the reform period. Market reform and labour 
management reform were both significantly effective, jointly contributing over 65 per 
cent of the total improvement in technical efficiency from 1980 to 1988. Taxation and 
capital financing reform was nowhere near as successful. 
Second, the estimation results dovetailed nicely with analysis in chapters 3 and 4. 
The results supported the proposition put forward in chapter 4 that the soft budget 
constraint is still a serious problem undermining the efficiency of state enterprises. We 
also found that Komai's theory of soft budget constraint was appropriate for analysing 
the efficiency problems of state enterprises in transition from a centrally planned to a 
market economy. 
The chapter also looked at problems of heterogeneity bias which often arise in the 
estimation of panel data. Possible inconsistency in estimates due to these problems was 
analysed and the analysis-of-variance procedure used to test the existence of various 
biases in intercepts and slopes for our sample data. A properly corrected model was then 
used for the estimation. The results of the testing process suggested that correction of 
heterogenous bias was necessary for our data set. 
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Appendix 6 
Table A6.1 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Heavy Industry 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Intercept 60.7800 4.5172 13.4550 
Maricet Share 0.1035 0.0515 2.0110 
Bonus Share 0.3118 0.0698 4.4670 
Retained Profit Share -0.0118 0.0128 -0.9210 
Bank Loan Share 0.0096 0.0186 0.5170 
Enterprise (1) -15.2540 5.0671 -3.0100 
Enterprise (2) 10.9964 5.0737 2.1670 
Enterprise (3) 15.8324 5.1400 3.0800 
Enterprise (4) 15.8725 5.0459 3.1460 
Enterprise (5) 13.6743 5.0618 2.7010 
Enterprise (6) -4.8825 5.1150 -0.9550 
Enterprise (7) -8.6568 7.4232 -1.1660 
Enterprise (8) 10.9435 4.9470 2.2120 
Enterprise (9) 13.3680 5.5688 2.4010 
Enterprise (10) 0.9849 5.0502 0.1950 
Enterprise (11) 6.3891 5.1104 1.2500 
Enterprise (12) 17.4360 5.0660 3.4420 
Enterprise (13) 6.9880 5.0265 1.3900 
Enterprise (14) 2.9027 5.0996 0.5690 
Enterprise (15) -14.2719 4.8307 -2.9540 
Enterprise (16) 3.6570 4.8563 0.7530 
Enterprise (17) 7.0764 4.8715 1.4530 
Enterprise (18) 2.3504 4.8874 0.4810 
Enterprise (19) -2.6738 4.9018 -0.5450 
Enterprise (20) 4.7432 5.1467 0.9220 
Enterprise (21) 0.5198 4.9783 0.1040 
Enterprise (22) -3.4487 6.1078 -0.5650 
Enterprise (23) 12.7878 4.8857 2.6170 
Enterprise (24) 10.8539 4.8502 2.2380 
Enterprise (25) -8.6711 4.9282 -1.7590 
Enterprise (26) 6.1238 4.9331 1.2410 
Enteiprise (27) 11.3608 5.0930 2.2310 
Enterprise (28) 2.7246 4.9794 0.5470 
Enterprise (29) 3.9454 5.1439 0.7670 
Enterprise (30) 4.4748 5.0724 0.8820 
Enterprise (31) 9.4833 4.9566 1.9130 
Enterprise (32) 14.7860 4.9952 2.9600 
Enterprise (33) 9.7367 5.0150 1.9420 
Enterprise (34) 0.8257 4.8397 0.1710 
Note: "Enterprise" in the table refers to the dummy 
brackets are the index of enterprises. 
Source: Estimated from Survey data. 
variable for an individual enterprise; numbers in 
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Table A6.1 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Heavy Industry (Continued) 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Enterprise (35) 3.6924 4.8428 0.7620 
Enterprise (36) 6.7091 4.9833 1.3460 
Enterprise (37) 11.9905 4.9971 2.3990 
Enterprise (38) 9.7487 5.0587 1.9270 
Enterprise (39) 5.6737 5.0386 1.1260 
Enterprise (40) 6.7528 5.0200 1.3450 
Enterprise (41) 4.0121 5.0161 0.8000 
Enterprise (42) -11.0025 4.8464 -2.2700 
Enterprise (43) 16.7530 5.0819 3.2970 
Enterprise (44) -12.3635 4.9074 -2.5190 
Enterprise (45) -23.3028 4.9484 -4.7090 
Enterprise (46) 20.2728 4.8833 4.1510 
Enterprise (47) 8.6592 5.1029 1.6970 
Enterprise (48) -37.0638 4.8230 -7.6850 
Enterprise (49) 7.3450 4.8965 1.5000 
Enterprise (50) -1.2893 5.1069 -0.2520 
Enterprise (51) 14.3411 6.0154 2.3840 
Enterprise (52) 11.2413 5.0025 2.2470 
Enterprise (53) -4.1944 4.8795 -0.8600 
Enterprise (54) -0.2283 4.9101 -0.0470 
Enterprise (55) 9.0150 5.0006 1.8030 
Enterprise (56) 10.4362 4.9093 2.1260 
Enterprise (57) -3.1006 ' 4.9137 -0.6310 
Enterprise (58) 11.4225 4.9203 2.3210 
Enterprise (59) 6.9517 4.8703 1.4270 
Enterprise (60) 13.2740 4.8751 2.7230 
Enterprise (61) 4.8334 4.9641 0.9740 
Enterprise (62) -9.8244 4.8864 -2.0110 
Enterprise (63) -10.8662 5.1433 -2.1130 
Enterprise (64) 1.4490 4.9176 0.2950 
Enterprise (65) 15.2903 4.9577 3.0840 
Enterprise (66) 5.7097 4.8995 1.1650 
Enterprise (67) 17.7797 5.1214 3.4720 
Enterprise (68) -3.6634 4.9242 -0.7440 
Enterprise (69) -8.6522 4.9365 -1.7530 
Enterprise (70) 8.9158 5.0386 1.7700 
Enteiprise (71) 6.8263 4.8541 1.4060 
Enterprise (72) 10.9506 5.1042 2.1450 
Enterprise (73) -3.2978 4.9841 -0.6620 
Enterprise (74) -0.8246 5.0181 -0.1640 
Enterprise (75) -6.1295 4.9884 -1.2290 
Enterprise (76) -1.8605 4.9955 -0.3720 
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Table A6.1 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Heavy Industry (Continued) 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Enterprise 77) 13.5648 4.9928 2.7170 
Enterprise 78) 17.8555 6.0632 2.9450 
Enterprise 79) 4.1668 4.9019 0.8500 
Enterprise 80) 0.5141 5.0995 0.1010 
Enterprise 81) 9.2093 5.1802 1.7780 
Enterprise 82) 11.3700 5.0081 2.2700 
Enterprise 83) -0.0744 4.9797 -0.0150 
Enterprise 84) 0.2817 4.8267 0.0580 
Enterprise 85) 5.3794 4.8853 1.1010 
Enterprise 86) 6.6041 4.8698 1.3560 
Enterprise 87) 2.2824 4.9541 0.4610 
Enterprise 88) 2.7672 4.8681 0.5680 
Enterprise 89) 5.6271 4.8793 1.1530 
Enterprise 90) 11.1107 4.9010 2.2670 
Enterprise 91) 11.2658 4.8754 2.3110 
Enterprise 92) 7.1929 4.9646 1.4490 
Enterprise 93) 5.6227 4.8872 1.1500 
Enterprise 94) 10.3831 4.8462 2.1430 
Enterprise 95) 8.4341 4.9589 1.7010 
Enterprise 96) 5.9562 4.8835 1.2200 
Enterprise 97) 9.3123 5.0024 1.8620 
Enterprise 98) 8.7351 5.1491 1.6960 
Enterprise 99) 3.3375 4.9155 0.6790 
Enterprise 100) -8.7924 5.0084 -1.7560 
Enterprise 101) 14.0136 5.2150 2.6870 
Enterprise 102) 7.2957 4.8890 1.4920 
Enterprise 103) 14.9941 4.9587 3.0240 
Enterprise 104) 6.9669 5.0147 1.3890 
Enterprise 105) 12.3823 4.8857 2.5340 
Enterprise 106) 6.6270 5.1334 1.2910 
Enterprise 107) 5.7874 4.9977 1.1580 
Enterprise 108) 5.5503 4.8515 1.1440 
Enterprise 109) 3.3090 4.8764 0.6790 
Enterprise 110) 5.2976 4.8276 1.0970 
Enterprise 111) 12.6568 5.0276 2.5170 
Enterprise 112) 14.8788 5.0118 2.9690 
Enterprise 113) 8.1590 5.0633 1.6110 
Enterprise 114) -0.2872 5.0392 -0.0570 
Enterprise 115) 6.3541 5.4506 1.1660 
Enterprise 116) 3.1917 5.0009 0.6380 
Enterprise 117) 2.7027 4.9106 0.5500 
Enterprise 118) 3.0684 5.0098 0.6120 
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Table A6.1 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Heavy Industry (Continued) 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Enterprise 119) 13.4526 4.9586 2.7130 
Enterprise 120) 11.6429 4.9114 2.3710 
Enterprise 121) 11.3154 6.0562 1.8680 
Enterprise 122) 6.4817 4.9923 1.2980 
Enterprise 123) -4.1248 4.9294 -0.8370 
Enterprise 124) 4.9106 5.5527 0.8840 
Enterprise 125) 10.2624 4.9357 2.0790 
Enterprise 126) -0.2529 4.9485 -0.0510 
Enterprise 127) 6.7826 4.9726 1.3640 
Enterprise 128) 9.6645 4.9442 1.9550 
Enterprise 129) 5.9328 5.0530 1.1740 
Enterprise 130) 2.5463 5.0451 0.5050 
Enterprise 131) 0.6630 4.9236 0.1350 
Enterprise 132) -10.4645 4.8439 -2.1600 
Enterprise 133) 12.4628 5.0213 2.4820 
Enterprise 134) 1.4955 4.9709 0.3010 
Enterprise 135) 7.6860 4.9766 1.5440 
Enterprise 136) 10.1131 5.0712 1.9940 
Enterprise 137) 11.4665 5.0065 2.2900 
Enterprise 138) 7.4412 4.8393 1.5380 
Enterprise 139) -1.0992 4.9239 -0.2230 
Enterprise 140) 11.5365 4.9693 2.3220 
Enterprise 141) 1.7456 4.9802 0.3510 
Enterprise 142) 6.4575 4.8885 1.3210 
Enterprise 143) 1.3941 4.9536 0.2810 
Enterprise 144) -1.4603 4.9320 -0.2960 
Enterprise 145) -12.8184 5.0195 -2.5540 
Enterprise 146) 16.9218 5.0742 3.3350 
Enterprise 147) 7.1141 5.2244 1.3620 
Enterprise 148) 6.2448 5.1175 1.2200 
Enterprise 149) -3.1741 5.1765 -0.6130 
Enterprise 150) 10.5217 4.9014 2.1470 
Enterprise 151) 5.1196 4.9353 1.0370 
Enterprise 152) 0.7736 5.1410 0.1500 
Enterprise 153) -0.9358 4.7874 -0.1950 
Enterprise 154) 12.9255 4.9091 2.6330 
Enterprise 155) 4.6773 4.8587 0.9630 
Enterprise 156) -0.3493 4.8687 -0.0720 
Enterprise 157) 11.2124 4.9302 2.2740 
Enterprise 158) 8.7010 4.9540 1.7560 
Enterprise 159) 4.5394 4.9243 0.9220 
Enterprise 160) 10.4781 5.4573 1.9200 
Enterprise 161) 2.3769 4.9543 0.4800 
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Table A6.2 Summary of Estimation Results of Ceil-mean Corrected Model 
for Light Industry 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Intercept 61.8956 3.3138 18.6780 Market Share 0.1964 0.0979 2.0060 Bonus Share 0.2644 0.1030 2.5670 Retained Profit Share 0.0189 0.0206 0.9180 Bank Loan Share 0.0073 0.0253 0.2890 
Enterprise (163) 11.4535 4.3897 2.6090 
Enterprise (164) 7.3416 4.5061 1.6290 
Enterprise (165) 6.4926 4.6448 1.3980 
Enterprise (166) 2.8588 4.2378 0.6750 
Enterprise (167) 3.0721 4.6713 0.6580 
Enterprise (168) 20.6101 4.2051 4.9010 
Enterprise (169) 18.1661 4.5589 3.9850 
Enterprise (170) 7.3605 4.4006 1.6730 
Enterprise (171) -6.8292 4.4061 -1.5500 
Enterprise (172) 18.1064 4.3622 4.1510 
Enterprise (173) -0.1350 4.9673 -0.0270 
Enterprise (174) 6.0984 4.2181 1.4460 
Enterprise (175) 16.3189 4.3694 3.7350 
Enteq)rise (176) -22.9141 4.3646 -5.2500 
Enterprise (177) 15.4081 4.3344 3.5550 
Enterprise (178) 18.6038 4.4692 4.1630 
Enterprise (179) 17.1222 4.9988 3.4250 
Enterprise (180) 15.4977 4.6245 3.3510 
Enterprise (181) 15.4678 4.4134 3.5050 
Enterprise (182) -21.7026 4.2545 -5.1010 
Enterprise (183) 13.9070 4.3212 3.2180 
Enterprise (184) 7.3356 4.3369 1.6910 
Enterprise (185) 11.3235 6.3061 1.7960 
Enterprise (186) 12.1209 5.3505 2.2650 
Enterprise (187) 8.0502 4.7266 1.7030 
Enterprise (188) 15.2412 4.3226 3.5260 
Enterprise (189) 8.7418 4.2611 2.0520 
Enterprise (190) 11.0432 4.1413 2.6670 
Enterprise (191) 14.7693 4.2601 3.4670 
Enterprise (192) -0.0508 4.2354 -0.0120 
Enterprise (193) 23.4201 4.3799 5.3470 
Enterprise (194) 19.5259 4.2646 4.5790 
Enterprise (195) 15.0084 5.3011 2.8310 
Enterprise (196) -12.5260 4.2499 -2.9470 
Enterprise (197) 3.5441 4.2506 0.8340 
Enterprise (198) -8.4010 4.4852 -1.8730 
Enterprise (199) 15.6652 4.1878 3.7410 
Enterprise (200) 7.9600 4.5382 1.7540 
Enterprise (201) 13.0585 4.5108 2.8950 
Enterprise (202) 4.3494 4.5522 0.9550 
Enterprise (203) 9.7422 4.6941 2.0750 
Note-. "Enterprise" in the table refers to the dummy variable for an individual enterprise; numbers 
in brackets are the index of enterprises. 
Source: Estimated from survey data. 
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Table A6.2 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Light Industry (continued) 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Enterprise (204) 20.3677 4.5551 4.4710 Enterprise (205) 13.2594 4.1852 3.1680 Enterprise (206) 3.4794 4.4442 0.7830 Enterprise (207) 5.7056 4.3703 1.3060 Enterprise (208) 12.8684 4.6044 2.7950 
Enterprise (209) 4.0565 4.3303 0.9370 Enteiprise (210) 20.2843 4.4033 4.6070 
Enterprise (211) 16.7697 5.0686 3.3090 
Enterprise (212) -9.8064 4.5637 -2.1490 
Enterprise (213) 11.3443 4.3115 2.6310 
Enterprise (214) 18.9757 4.1673 4.5530 
Enterprise (215) -9.8032 4.1947 -2.3370 
Enterprise (216) -7.2933 5.3271 -1.3690 
Enterprise (217) 4.5016 4.2766 1.0530 
Enterprise (218) 6.6021 4.2907 1.5390 
Enterprise (219) -4.9313 4.5488 -1.0840 
Enteq)rise (220) 12.5020 4.6560 2.6850 
Enterprise (221) 23.6577 4.7579 4.9720 
Enterprise (222) 19.4641 4.5165 4.3100 
Enterprise (223) 13.5771 4.2223 3.2160 
Enterprise (224) -2.9320 4.2672 -0.6870 
Enterprise (225) 12.4238 4.4187 2.8120 
Enterprise (226) 18.5169 5.5895 3.3130 
Enterprise (227) 8.4130 4.3722 1.9240 
Enteiprise (228) 14.1235 4.3766 3.2270 
Enteiprise (229) 16.2067 4.1757 3.8810 
Enterprise (230) -7.8269 4.3256 -1.8090 
Enterprise (231) 12.0799 4.2792 2.8230 
Enterprise (232) 9.4978 4.1771 2.2740 
Enterprise (233) 14.6256 4.4131 3.3140 
Enterprise (234) 9.1498 4.1773 2.1900 
Enterprise (235) 17.1463 4.6013 3.7260 
Enterprise (236) -12.7006 4.1979 -3.0250 
Enterprise (237) 18.6695 4.3138 4.3280 
Enterprise (238) 13.8955 4.2250 3.2890 
Enteiprise (239) 14.9823 4.4689 3.3530 
Enterprise (240) 10.8204 4.3714 2.4750 
Enterprise (241) 15.4232 4.5194 3.4130 
Enteiprise (242) 16.1361 4.4277 3.6440 
Enterprise (243) 6.1246 4.4555 1.3750 
Enterprise (244) 17.8972 4.4393 4.0320 
Enterprise (245) 14.4778 4.2600 3.3990 
Enterprise (246) 6.8363 4.6372 1.4740 
Enterprise (247) 8.9032 4.2287 2.1050 
Enterprise (248) 18.2024 4.1423 4.3940 
Enteiprise (249) 10.9301 4.2990 2.5430 
Enterprise (250) -6.6807 4.2725 -1.5640 
Enterprise (251) -14.1854 4.2620 -3.3280 
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Table A6.2 Summary of Estimation Results of Cell-mean Corrected Model 
for Light Industry (continued) 
Variable Coefficient S. Deviation T-ratio 
Enterprise (252) 9.1573 4.2888 2.1350 
Enterprise (253) 8.4930 4.2321 2.0070 
Enterprise (254) 15.3586 4.3231 3.5530 
Enterprise (255) 9.4963 4.1641 2.2810 
Enterprise (256) 19.6693 4.3938 4.4770 
Enterprise (257) 4.9594 4.1584 1.1930 
Enterprise (258) 4.5130 4.4301 1.0190 
Enterprise (259) 15.3386 4.1962 3.6550 
Enterprise (260) 9.1912 4.2537 2.1610 
Enterprise (261) 7.9045 4.2397 1.8640 
Enterprise (262) 17.8540 4.2666 4.1850 
Enterprise (263) -11.1221 4.2428 -2.6210 
Enterprise (264) 9.1617 4.5537 2.0120 
Enterprise (265) 17.5173 4.3974 3.9840 
Enterprise (266) -0.5481 4.2522 -0.1290 
Enterprise (267) 17.5077 4.4173 3.9630 
Enterprise (268) 16.1922 4.2475 3.8120 
Enterprise (269) 14.4775 4.9929 2.9000 
Enterprise (270) 11.1830 4.2427 2.6360 
Enterprise (271) 5.8423 4.4324 1.3180 
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7 Estimation and Analysis of Allocative 
Efficiency 
This chapter focuses on another important determinant of economic efficiency: 
allocative efficiency. From a theoretical point of view, technical efficiency and allocative 
efficiency are closely inter-related concepts that jointly determine the profitabihty of an 
enterprise. Allocative efficiency is an even more interesting and important indicator than 
technical efficiency for countries making the transition from a planned to a market 
economy. A major problem experienced in planned economies is the impossibility of 
collecting and processing enough information to allow central planners to make optimal 
decisions for the entire economy (Hayek 1935 pp. 201-43). The allocation of resources 
in a centrally planned economy is therefore less than optimal, in the neoclassical view. 
In both the partial and general equilibrium framework of neoclassical economic 
theory, efficiency of resource allocation is a major concern. The chief advantage of a 
market system is its efficiency in directing an economy's resources towards the most 
efficient equilibrium, a process realised through market competition among firms. In a 
free market economy, firms independendy decide the allocation of scarce resources 
based on price information available in the marketplace and following the principle of 
profit maximisation. The point of equilibrium associated with allocative efficiency is 
Pareto optimal in the sense that all input factors are utilised in the most economical 
manner and profits of firms are hence maximised. Allocative efficiency thus becomes 
another important criterion for evaluating the success of market-oriented economic 
reform. 
In free market economies, the most common cause of allocative inefficiency is 
government interventionist policies. The empirical literature has found that, in the 
manufacturing sector, allocative inefficiency is an issue in industries heavily regulated by 
government, such as electric power generation (Schmidt and Lovell 1979, 1980), 
railroad transportation (Kumbhakar 1987b, 1988), and civil aviation (Sickle, Good and 
Johnson 1986). Economists do not focus on allocative inefficiency in unregulated 
industry in the belief that private enterprises will automatically maximise profits in a 
competitive market environment by optimising the combmation of factor inputs. Any 
deviation from the optimum is caused by casual or an individual's mistakes, and these 
do not constitute a systematic economic phenomenon. Only inappropriate govemment 
policy can create the distortions in economic institutions that result in the systematic 
non-optimal allocation of resources by firms. 
In the case of state enterprises making the transition from a planned to a market 
economy, concern over efficiency of resource aUocation obviously runs in the opposite 
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direction. In a process of comprehensive deregulation, the Chinese government 
gradually abolished barriers preventing non-state enterprises from entering the market, 
renounced financial and operational control over state enterprises, partially 
commercialised the allocation of productive factors and actively promoted market 
competition. The critical question is, of course, whether these policies were successful 
in creating the kind of competitive environment in which state enterprises would 
allocate resources optimally. 
Govemment policies devised for carrying out the difficult and complex process of 
economic reform were in many respects inconsistent and inappropriate. Chapters 3 and 
4 discussed some of the flaws in the new policies on taxation, finance and labour 
management Analysis in subsequent chapters confirmed the view that there were 
serious problems with reform policies. In the circumstances, it seems unlikely that post-
reform state enterprises would have begun allocating resources with maximum 
efficiency. 
This chapter will also examine a specific resource allocation issue: the efficiency 
with which state enterprises utilised energy. As discussed in the preceding two chapters, 
there was an improvement in technical efficiency in the period under study, which means 
that all three input factors, labour, capital and energy, became collectively more 
productive. It is possible, then, that the efficiency of energy utilisation also improved 
during the period of economic reform. This conclusion is only justified, however, if we 
can verify this through analysis of allocative efficiency. This is because the improvement 
noted in technical efficiency could have been associated with substitution of energy for 
other factors rather than an improvement in the efficiency of energy utilisation. The 
foregoing discussion suggests that govemment policy is again the major determinant of 
how efficiently energy is utilised. 
This chapter asks first whether state enterprises responded to market competition 
and economic incentives by allocating their resources so as to maximise profit. We will 
examine whether reform policies helped drive the three factor inputs towards a new 
equilibrium associated with improved efficiency in the utilisation of energy. Second, the 
chapter investigates whether govemment policies, which as we saw failed to correct the 
soft budget constraint, also had a negative impact on allocative efficiency. 
Three points need to be noted here. First, since technical and allocative efficiency 
are inter-related, the estimation results for the coefficients of the frontier production 
function and technical efficiency index (chapter 5) will be used for the estimation of 
allocative efficiency. Second, in this chapter the impact of economic reform policies on 
allocative efficiency will not be estimated separately as was done for technical efficiency 
in chapter 6 due to limitations in the sample data. Third, since economic efficiency is 
simply the product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency and the estimation of 
this index is easy to carry out, we will also show economic efficiency in this chapter. 
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In the literature, the estimation techniques used differ substantially depending on 
researchers' assumptions about the behaviour of firms and market structure. In this 
chapter, I describe the two simple models I will use to estimate allocative efficiency in 
sample enterprises. Discussion of the estimation results will focus on two specific issues: 
the impact of economic reform on trends in allocative efficiency with emphasis on the 
efficiency of energy utilisation; and the implications of the soft budget constraint for the 
utilisation of capital, energy and labour. 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
In estimation of allocative efficiency, economists adopt either the primal or dual 
approach, and use a single equation or a simultaneous equation system (chapter 2). In 
this study, we use the primal approach and the single equation estimation method. The 
three critical assumptions of the model are: 1) enterprises maximise expected profit 
rather than real profit, following Zellner, Kmenta and Dreze (1966); 2) prices of output 
and inputs are exogenously determined; and 3) technical and allocative efficiency are 
uncorrected. The second assumption needs further qualification. This assumption 
implies that marginal output and the energy input are determined on markets shown to 
be reasonably competitive (chapter 3). Competitive capital and labour markets, 
however, simply did not exist in the 1980s. In these circumstances, this assumption 
reflects the fact that interest rates were strictly regulated by government, and that wages 
were also subject to a certain degree of govemment control and were thus exogenous. 
The correlation between technical and allocative efficiency is not a major concem of this 
study and will not be addressed here.i 
The following two sections introduce two kinds of allocative efficiency indices that 
wiU be used in the estimation. These indices are both derived from the first-order 
conditions defined in equations (2.9) and (2.10) in chapter 2. 
Factor Pair-wise Index 
Since the condition of optimal allocation of resources can be defined for any pair of 
factors by equations (2.9) or (2.10) in chapter 2, the allocative efficiency of factor k and 
j for the I'th enterprise in the t^^ period is defined as: 
e x p ( a , . ) = (7.4) / Wj 
iRefer to Schmidt and Lovell (1980) for estimation on the assumption of non-zero correlation 
between technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. 
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where a^ is allocative efficiency, which is essentially deviation of the actual allocation 
of resources from the optimal combination. For simplicity, I have suppressed the indices 
for enterprise i and period t in equation (7.4) and in other equations for the factor pair-
wise index. If the production function is expressed in the Cobb-Douglas form, allocative 
efficiency can be expressed neatiy in natural logarithm as: 
a,. = In - In + l n ( a , / a ^ ) + In w. - In (7.5) 
where a , and a^ are respectively estimates of the coefficients of factors k and j in the 
production function and a , / x^  and a^ / are respectively the marginal product of 
factors k and j . 
The interpretation of allocative efficiency as defined by equation (7.5) is 
straightforward. The allocation of factors k and j is efficient only if = 0 and is 
inefficient otherwise. Furthermore, allocative efficiency can be either positive or 
negative depending on the relative magnitude of marginal products and the price ratios. 
A positive sign indicates that the ratio of the marginal product of factor k relative to that 
of factor j is greater than the price ratio. This implies that factor k is under-utilised and 
factor j is over-utilised or, in other words, that simply substituting factor k for j at the 
margin will increase profit, given the output level. The opposite is the case if the sign is 
negative. 
The attraction of this index is that it can provide some information about the 
direction of allocative efficiency. Qiina with its under-developed market system is 
certain to have varying degrees of distortion in the pricing system for different factor 
inputs. These pair-wise indices are particularly informative about the way institutional 
problems affect the allocation of scarce resources and should therefore be useful in the 
formulation of govemment policy in this area. 
Estimation of the pair-wise index is straightforward. On the right-hand side of 
equation (7.5), X^, Xj, and Wj refer to economic variables. (In this study, there are 
three x's, namely labour, capital and energy.) These have already been used in the 
estimation of technical efficiency in chapter 5. Wages are available in our survey data. 
We can use the prices for capital and energy obtained in chapter 5 for estimation. In 
equation (7.5), the a ' s are the coefficients of the frontier production function expressed 
in equation (5.20) in chapter 5 and these are all available for direct use. Allocative 
efficiency is, hence, simply a matter of calculation. 
It should be noted that, unlike the modelling of technical efficiency, which was 
defined on a half-normal distribution, we do not need to assume any statistical 
distribution for allocative efficiency. This is not, of course, the only approach: other 
studies have made various assumptions about the distribution of allocative efficiency in 
order to test hypotheses of interest, such as the existence of allocative efficiency under 
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government regulation. In some circumstances, statistical tests are desirable and 
necessary to ensure reliable and consistent estimates. In this study, allocative 
inefficiency is known to exist and we are only interested in whether and how resource 
allocation improved over time. To ensure that our results are consistent, we will show 
the estimates in detail at a disaggregated level. 
Overall Index 
The drawbacks of the pair-wise index are as apparent as its advantages. First, if more 
than two factors are under investigation, then we need to evaluate indices of allocative 
efficiency in multiple phases. In our case, for example, we would have to analyse three 
indices for labour/capital, capital/energy and labour/energy. If the indices appear to be 
complex or inconsistent with each other, researchers will be unable to come to any 
conclusions about trends in allocative efficiency. In addition, pair-wise indices do not 
provide direct information about economic loss caused by allocative inefficiency, an 
equally interesting indicator for researchers. Finally, we are not able to calculate 
economic efficiency based on the index of factor pair-wise allocative efficiency. 
An overall allocative efficiency index is also derived from the profit maximisation 
conditions. Since allocative inefficiency is usually understood to stem from a firm's 
inability to maximise profit by equating firm-specific marginal value product with firm-
specific marginal cost, it must be consistent with the difference between realised and 
potential profit. Following Kalirajan and Shand (1992b), overall allocative efficiency for 
output is obtained by comparing the potential profit of each firm with its realised profit 
for the level of inputs actually used, given its apphcation of technology and prices of 
inputs and output. The ratio of the actual and potential profit of each enterprise is 
defined as overall allocative efficiency. 
Allocative inefficiency is often found in the agricultural sector of developing 
countries (Kalirajan and Shand 1992b), where market information may be insufficient 
for farmers to make optimal decisions about the application of factor inputs. In studies 
of the industrial sector of free market economies, allocative efficiency is often thought 
to be the result of govemment intervention in the market system.^ In contrast to the 
existing literature, overall allocative efficiency in this study measures the success or 
failure of market-oriented reform policies. 
Two measures are available in the estimation of allocative efficiency (approaches A 
and B in chapter 2). In the estimation, allocative efficiency can be evaluated either at the 
^This is not a hypothetical proposition, even in a well-developed market economy. Schmidt and 
Lovell (1979), using the stochastic production frontier model, found that 150 new privately-owned 
steam-electric generating plants in the United States were allocatively inefficient in 1947-65 and that 
the inefficiency was systematically and significantly biased towards using more capital than was 
economical. This evidence supports the "Averch-Johnson hypothesis", which states that private frnns 
subject to rate-of-remm regulation will tend to over-c^italise systematically. Cowing (1975) also 
found evidence to support this hypothesis using a different analytical framework. 
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production frontier (approach A) or at the observed production level (approach B). 
Quantitatively these two measures may not differ substantially, but economically they 
carry different implications. With approach A, the point of evaluation corresponds to q^ 
in Figure 2.3 in chapter 2; with approach B it corresponds to q^. In other words, 
allocative efficiency is defined as the ratio of profit associated with points q^ and q^ 
(Figure 2.3) in the former case and q^ and q^ in the latter case. By choosing the first 
measure, we essentially estimate allocative efficiency at a hypothetically technically 
efficient level and by choosing the second, we do it at the observed production level. 
In fact, both measures are interesting: the first makes technical and allocative 
efficiency complementary, while the second isolates the two inefficiency measures and 
focuses on finding the deviation from optimal allocation of resources conditional on a 
firm's technical inefficiency. In order to estimate "pure" allocative inefficiency, the 
second measure is chosen. 
The overall allocative efficiency of the enterprise in the period can now be 
calculated according to equation (7.6): 
4 = ¥ (7.6) 
PlfiK' ) exp(V, - M,) - X j't J" y=i 
where p^ is the product price of the enterprise in the period, X, is a vector of 
core input factors in the frontier production function (equation 5.20 in chapter 5), Wj.^  is 
the price of factor j paid by the enterprise in the t^^ period, J is the total number of 
input factors under consideration (in this study, labour, capital and energy) and £, is the 
totality of variables except the intercept and core inputs (labour, capital and energy) in 
the frontier production function. Thus the numerator is observed profit, which is the 
difference between actual revenue and total cost net of technical inefficiency U.,, 
evaluated by the actual level of inputs X,.,. The denominator contains counterparts to 
these evaluated at the optimal level of inputs x*,, which is consistent with the first-order 
condition defined by equations (2.9) and (2.10) in chapter 2. 
Actual profit in the numerator of equation (7.6) can be calculated directly by 
substituting the coefficients, technical efficiency index estimated in chapter 5 and 
economic variables (;c^/s and w^/s) into the equation. Potential output is obtained by 
simultaneously solving the firm-specific observed production function and the marginal 
productivity condition yielding the optimal output and inputs. Specifically, in this study 
we first solve the following system equations for the enterprise in the r^ ^ period. 
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Pi I n + I n + P3 I n - In j,, = -E, -a^u, (7.7.1) 
In -Xi,, - In = In P^ - In + In pl (7.7.2) 
In - In J , = In - In + In pl (7.7.3) 
^n X3,, - In = In P3 - In + In pl (7.7.4) 
This system provides us with four linear equations and four unknowns (J,,, X;,,, 
and X^J and thus has a unique solution for a set of optimal unknown variables ( j* and 
x / s ) . The calculated optimal output ( j j , optimal input factors (x*'s) and other 
economic variables are used to work out the maximum profit for the enterprise in the 
r^ h period in the denominator of equation (7.8). Calculation of A, is then a simple 
operation. 
Finally, we should note that the overall index and the factor pair-wise indices are 
mutually consistent even though they appear not to be. The former is based on deviation 
from first-order conditions which are consistent with potential profit level, and the latter 
is expressed directly as the ratio of observed profit to potential profit. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In estimation of both factor pair-wise indices (equation 7.5) and the overall index 
(equation 7.6), three input factors and their prices are the major variables. Factor inputs 
were discussed in chapter 5. In view of the differences between official and market 
prices, though, we need to take a closer look at the price variables. The relationship 
between inputs and their prices during the period covered by our sample data wiU also 
be discussed briefly. 
The price of labour is represented by average income per worker, defined here as 
the sum of basic wages and bonuses divided by number of workers. Interest rates give 
us the price of capital, a somewhat problematic indicator in the case of China. As 
mentioned in chapter 4, in the 1980s production was increasingly financed by interest-
bearing bank loans rather than govemment grants. Official interest rates on loans to 
finance the fixed assets of industrial enterprises almost doubled during 1980-88. 
However, these interest rates, akeady lower than the shadow price of capital (World 
Bank 1988), do not necessarily represent the real cost of capital to state enterprises. The 
real price of capital was lower than the official interest rate owing to the high inflation 
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experienced in China in the 1980s^ and the soft budget constraint. Frequent interference 
of local government in banks' loans policies caused the price of capital to vary from one 
locality to another. In the absence of more detailed enterprise-specific information, 
official interest rates are our best guide to trends in the price of capital. Note, though, 
that this index could overstate the real cost of capital. 
Official and market energy prices presented in Table 5.1 (chapter 5) are used in this 
chapter's estimation. For convenience, the average values of these variables are reported 
in Table 7.1. The table shows that average income per worker more than doubled in 
both sectors in the 1980s. The trend for each sector is similar despite some differences 
between sectors in income levels. In the heavy industrial sector income increased on 
average 11.7 per cent annually (from 911.84 yuan per worker in 1980 to 2,206.99 yuan 
in 1988). In the Ught industrial sector the average annual increase was 11.7 per cent 
(from 923.28 yuan in 1980 to 2,231.74 yuan in 1988). 
Table 7.1 Summary of Variables Used in the Estimation 
of Allocative Efficiency, 1980 and 1984-88 
Heav> Industrial Sector 
Year Labour Ave. Incotue Capital Interest Rate 
(official) 
Energy Ave. Energy Price 
(market) 
Ave. Energy Price 
(official) 
(workers) (yuan/year) (million yuan) (percent) (1000 tonne) (yuan/tonne) (yuan/tonne) 
1980 2482 911.84 31.73 5.04 20.62 112.72 88.33 
1984 2554 1133.31 35.13 7.20 23.59 134.01 99.19 
1985 2648 1325.34 37.95 7.92 29.20 164.41 106.87 
1986 2665 1542.93 40.00 7.92 31.59 162.41 113.14 
1987 2627 1746.68 46.23 7.92 30.12 182.22 124.49 
1988 2649 2206.99 49.88 8.28 31.00 209.67 130.11 
Light Industrial Sector 
1980 1631 923.28 9.96 5.CW 9.97 113.93 91.53 
1984 1856 1106.81 17.93 7.20 10.85 135.73 103.97 
1985 1850 1338.21 22.00 7.92 14.55 166.08 110.83 
1986 1877 1539.78 25.41 7.92 16.82 164.21 117.78 
1987 1920 1754.30 29.78 7.92 16.48 185.78 130.83 
1988 1928 2231.74 30.96 8.28 15.94 214.35 137.01 
Note: 
Source: 
The 1980 interest rate was effective from January to November, then dropped to 2.52 per 
cent. Since the latter rate was effective only for a short period of time, it is not used in the 
table. As the official interest rate was adjusted from 7.92 per cent to 9 per cent in September 
1988, the rate reported in the table is the average rate weighted by length of application. 
Official interest rates are taken from Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, 1990 (p. 
166). 
^Cao (1992, p. 38) argued that owing to inflation real interest rates even became negative in 1980, 
1985 and 1988. 
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Compared with income, increases in both the market and official prices of energy 
were moderate. In the heavy industrial sector, the market price of energy rose from 
112.72 yuan per tonne of standard coal in 1980 to 209.67 yuan in 1988, an average 
increase of 8.1 per cent per year, while the official price rose from 88.33 yuan per tonne 
to 130.11 yuan, or 5 per cent per year. The trend for the light industrial sector is 
similar.^ Average annual increments in wages surpassed those of energy prices by 3.6-
6.7 per cent. Interest rates increased more slowly during this period than either workers' 
incomes or the market price of energy, but more quickly than the official price of 
energy. Rates increased from 5 per cent in 1980 to 8.3 per cent in 1988, equivalent to 
6.4 per cent per annum.^ 
The trends for the three corresponding economic variables are in contrast to those 
for prices. Labour increased by only 0.8 per cent per year in the heavy industrial sector 
and 2.1 per cent in the light industrial sector. Energy inputs increased by 5.2 per cent 
and 6 per cent respectively. Capital increased at a faster pace: by 5.8 per cent annually 
in the case of heavy industry and by a surprising 15.2 per cent annually in the case of 
light industry. 
Impact of Economic Reform on Allocative Efficiency 
Since aU a ' s are relative indices, we need careful interpretation of both positive and 
negative estimates is required (Figure 7.1). 
In Figure 7,1, w / r is the relative price Une and q is the estimated stochastic 
frontier production function. The aUocatively efficient point is e, at which 's are equal 
to zero. Any point to the left of e, such as e', represents an inefficient allocation for 
labour/capital.^ The a^/s corresponding to these points should be positive, indicating 
over-utilisation of capital and under-utilisation of labour evaluated at the relative price 
w / r , compared with the optimal allocation point e. Of course, points to the right of e 
are associated with negative and indicate under-utilisation of capital and over-
utilisation of labour. 
Then what can cause to become positive or negative statically and dynamically? 
Suppose the allocation of labour and capital is initially at e. If prices of capital and 
labour and other variables remain constant, any increase in the input of capital relative 
to labour will move the allocation point to the left, and will become positive. If 
interest rates rise relative to wages (the price line becomes flatter), and if the allocation 
of labour and capital is not adjusted prompdy, then will also become positive. 
•^ The price of energy for the two sectors was different not because enterprises in each sector purchased 
energy on different markets but rather because their locality distribution differed (chapter 2 and 
appendix 3 of chapter 5). 
^Note that these rates are expressed as exponential increment rates based on the values in the fu-st and 
last years. 
•^ Note that the factor pair-wise index is evaluated here at the frontier production function. This should 
be fairly close quantitatively to the index evaluated at the observed output point 
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Conversely, a reduction in capital or interest rates will make a^ ^ negative if other 
variables remain constant. Following the same line of argument, a rise in labour or 
wages will make negative and a fall in these variables will make it positive. In a 
simation in which all these variables are changing simultaneously, then the sign of a^ ^ 
will be determined by the relative change between variables. 
Figure 7.1 Direction of Factor Pair-wise Allocative Efficiency Estimates 
Capital 
Laboiir 
If the prices of labour and capital are exogenously determined or their markets are 
competitive, the relative price line is fixed for the enterprise. In this situation, neo-
classical theory predicts that the observed production point of a profit maximising firm 
would be e in Figure 7.1. It is then reasonable to argue that any systematic and 
significant deviation of relative inputs away from point e is attributable to some kind of 
distortion in enterprise behaviour, if markets are competitive. If factor markets do not 
exist or are not competitive, then allocative inefficiency might reflect distortion in both 
prices and behaviour. 
According to neo-classical economic theory, the allocation of economic resources is 
determined by marginal price. The calculation of allocative efficiency is therefore based 
on market prices in this study. Based on the market price of energy, the average 
allocative efficiency for labour/capital works out to be -0.409 for heavy industry (a,^) 
and -0.566 for light industry (a,^), for the sample enterprises over the whole period 
(1980 and 1984-88). The efficiency for capital/energy is 0.388 for heavy industry 
and 0.065 for light industry (a^) . The efficiency for labour/energy is -0.021 for heavy 
industry ( a " ) and -0.502 for Ught industry (a^). 
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Sample enterprises were in general allocatively inefficient. Since all variables are in 
log form, the values suggest that there is significant deviation from the optimum in 
absolute terms. In relative terms the estimates indicate that labour was excessively over-
utilised relative to both capital and energy evaluated at their relative price ratios, since 
both 's and 's are negative. In Figure 7.1, the combination of input variables lies to 
the right of point e. The estimates are consistent for both industries in sign, and differ 
only in magnitude. Light industry is far more biased towards labour. This result may 
have been caused partly by the intrinsic difference between the two sectors in 
technology; heavy industry is more capital intensive and light industry more labour 
intensive. 
This finding is credible and can be traced to the employment policy fostered by the 
govemment in the pre-reform period. Faced with a rapidly growing population and 
limited job opportunities in non-state industrial sectors, the govemment of the time used 
state enterprises to absorb the excess labour force, thus disguising the true extent of 
unemployment Since economic reform began, the growth of collective and private 
business and foreign-funded enterprises has provided new opportunities for the growing 
labour force. However, as the estimates suggest, the heritage of the former system was 
still detracting from the efficiency of state enterprises during the decade of economic 
reform. Indeed, our survey results suggested that the govemment may have continued 
to use its influence to force state enterprises to employ more than the number of 
workers required. Although most managers complained to varying degrees about having 
surplus labour, they continued to recruit large numbers of new workers (chapter A)P 
The efficiency indices for capital/energy (a^/s) are positive for both heavy and light 
industrial sectors, indicating that energy was in general over-utilised during the entire 
period. This further confirms the view expressed in chapter 1 that energy was not used 
efficiendy by industry even after the process of economic reform began. 
The impact of economic reform on resource allocation needs to be placed in the 
context of the dynamics of allocative efficiency. An examination of trends in the factor 
pair-wise indices gives some insight into the influence of reform policies on the 
evolution and direction of resource allocation. The three allocative efficiency indices for 
both industrial sectors are presented in Table 7.2. 
All the efficiency indices, except in heavy industry, indicate that allocative 
efficiency was tending to improve. In the context of relative changes in factor inputs and 
prices in the 1980s, diis improvement again supports the view that state enterprises 
exhibited a greater degree of economically rational behaviour as the govemment 
delegated financial autonomy and operational control to them. 
^The estimates obtained here are not extraordinary; they are consistent with those obtained by Cao 
(1992), who studied the allocative efficiency of iron and steel mills in the same period. The estimate 
of varies in the range of -0.65 to -0.77 in three years in the 1980s in Cao (1992, p. 177). 
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Table 1.1 Allocative Efficiency of State Enterprises over Time, 1980 and 1984-88 
Heavy Industry 
Year ke ^le 1980 -0.548 0.546 -0.002 1984 -0.324 0.259 -0.065 
1985 -0.325 0.453 0.128 
1986 -0.395 0.404 0.009 
1987 -0.373 0.339 -0.034 
1988 -0.497 0.214 -0.154 
Light Industry 
1980 -0.945 0.240 -0.706 
1984 -0.623 -0.004 -0.626 
1985 -0.482 0.153 -0.330 
1986 -0.449 0.094 -0.355 
1987 -0.392 -0.048 -0.439 
1988 -0.529 -0.038 -0.568 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
The allocative efficiency for labour/capital (a ,J improved significantly in 1980-88. 
In both industrial sectors the efficiency index for labour/capital approached zero from 
having strong negative values. This change was particularly evident in the light industrial 
sector, where the values of rose from -0.95 in 1980 to -0.39 in 1987, although it lost 
some ground in 1988. The index for the heavy industrial sector followed a similar 
pattem, although with consistently lower values. 
This trend indicates that allocative efficiency for labour/capital was moving in favour 
of capital in the 1980s, a result that is perfectly consistent with economic rationality. As 
shown in Table 7.1, during these years increases in the cost of labour far exceeded 
increases in the cost of capital even if we use overstated estimates of interest rates. The 
departure of the two prices implies that labour became relatively more expensive and 
that the price line w / r in Figure 7.1 became steeper. The natural response of profit-
oriented enterprises facing such a change in relative prices was of course to substitute 
labour with capital. It is evident indeed from Table 7.1 that capital increased far more 
quickly than labour in both heavy and light industrial sectors in all years. 
Table 7.2 shows that labour-related allocative efficiency and a , J deteriorated in 
both light and heavy industrial sectors in 1987-88. This may have been caused by a 
sudden and substantial increase in the cost of labour in 1988. According to Table 7.1, 
the average increase in workers' income was less than 17 per cent per year in 1984-87 
and was over 26 per cent in 1987-88. Although energy and interest rates also increased 
in 1987-88, the change in these was small relative to the huge rise in workers' income. 
In 1987, production in the labour/capital space was located to the right of point e in 
Figure 7.1 since both a^/s were negative. An increase in the relative price of labour 
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meant that the price line w / r became steeper and the efficiency point e moved to the 
left. As enterprises were not able to make a quick adjustment to a rise in the cost of 
labour by increasing their use of capital, the production point moved further away from 
the new efficient point. Thus the two indices indicate a deterioration in allocative 
efficiency. 
The allocation of capital/energy gradually moved away from excessive over-
utilisation of energy towards an efficient combination of the two inputs. This trend is 
particularly evident in heavy industry, where a^ ^ decreased from 0.55 in 1980 to 0.21 in 
1988. In light industry, the same trend emerges, and from 1986 the value of a^ 
remained close to zero. In both cases, the indices for a^ ^ suggest that the allocation of 
capital/energy was moving towards an efficient equilibrium point. Relative 
(energy/capital) prices increased from 22.37 to 25.32 for the heavy industrial sector and 
from 22.61 to 25.89 for the light industrial sector in 1980-88. In the same period of 
time, the energy/capital ratio fell from 0.65 to 0.62 for heavy industry and from 1.00 to 
0.52 for light industry. The observed improvement in efficiency was then the combined 
effect of a relative increase in the use of capital and a relative decrease in the energy 
input 
The improvement in the allocation of capital/energy can be explained in terms of 
market and institutional reform. The partial opening up of the energy market, combined 
with an upward adjustment in the official energy price, gradually raised the price of 
energy from 1980 to 1988 (Table 5.1 in chapter 5), with the marginal energy price 
increasing far more quickly than interest rates. The rational response was for enterprises 
to substitute energy with capital.^ This could be achieved by investing in energy-saving 
technology and upgrading existing machinery or improving the efficiency of energy 
utilisation through better management Without the pressure of competition in the 
marketplace and without new economic incentives, substitution of capital for energy 
could not have taken place. Even so, the excessively soft budget constraint may have 
impeded the process of substitution, with enterprises compensating for cost increments 
through negotiation with govemment rather than attempting to improve energy 
efficiency in the factories. 
In 1980, the efficiency index suggests an allocation of labour/energy strongly in 
favour of labour, a bias that was gradually corrected during the years of economic 
reform, at least in the light industrial sector. The allocative efficiency index increased 
from -0.71 in 1980 to -0.57 in 1988 for light industry. This decided improvement 
indicates that enterprises had again adopted a profit maximising response in allocating 
the two resources in the face of a rise in the price of labour relative to that of energy 
I^n the rnanufacmring sector, the technical relationship between capital and energy is controversial 
owing to lack of knowledge about its namre (substitutes or complements). This problem will be 
addressed in the next section in the context of the impact of the soft budget constraint on energy 
utilisation. 
209 
(Table 7.1). As a result, efficiency in the light industrial sector improved significantly. 
The substitution of energy for labour is probably closely related to the substitution of 
capital for labour. Since both capital and energy became relatively cheaper, the two 
substitution effects reinforced each other and enterprises began to use more energy-
driven machinery at the expense of manpower. The index d^  for the heavy industrial 
sector showed a slight deterioration, although the trend is not clear or consistent. 
Two factors may have contributed to the inconsistency between light and heavy 
industrial sectors. First, as equipment in the capital-intensive heavy industrial sector 
tends to be more sophisticated than that in the light industrial sector, the substitution of 
capital and energy for labour is technically more difficult to achieve in this sector. 
Second, since the govemment retained a higher degree of control over the heavy 
industrial sector,^ its influence on the employment policies of enterprises in this sector 
was correspondingly stronger. This may have blurred the pattern of substitution 
between energy and labour. 
Overall improvement in the efficiency of energy utilisation is apparent in the 
reduction in input factors required to produce one unit of output (Table 7.3). The table, 
which is derived from Table 5.2 in chapter 5, shows the average quantity of energy, 
capital and labour used to produce one unit of output in both heavy and light industrial 
sectors. 
Table 7.3 Quantity of Energy, Capital and Labour Required to Produce 
One Unit of Output, 1980 and 1984-88 
Year Energy Capital Labour 
(unit: 1000 tonne) (unit: mil l ion yuan) (unit: 100 worker) 
Heavy Industrial Sector 
1 9 8 0 0 . 8 4 5 8 1 . 3 0 1 6 1 . 0 1 8 1 
1 9 8 4 0 . 7 6 9 0 1 . 1 4 5 4 0 . 8 3 2 6 
1 9 8 5 0 . 8 0 7 4 1 . 0 4 9 4 0 . 7 3 2 2 
1 9 8 6 0 . 7 9 1 5 1 . 0 0 2 2 0 . 6 6 7 8 
1 9 8 7 0 . 6 7 6 9 1 . 0 3 8 8 0 . 5 9 0 3 
1 9 8 8 0 . 6 1 1 8 0 . 9 8 4 5 0 . 5 2 2 9 
Light Industrial Sector 
1 9 8 0 0 . 4 2 3 3 0 . 4 2 2 9 0 . 6 9 2 6 
1 9 8 4 0 . 3 4 6 6 0 . 5 7 2 9 0 . 5 9 3 1 
1 9 8 5 0 . 4 1 4 0 0 . 6 2 5 9 0 . 5 2 6 5 
1 9 8 6 0 . 4 3 1 1 0 . 6 5 1 6 0 . 4 8 1 3 
1 9 8 7 0 . 3 8 1 9 0 . 6 9 0 7 0 . 4 4 5 2 
1 9 8 8 0 . 3 2 1 3 0 . 6 2 4 4 0 . 3 8 8 9 
.  0 . 6 9 0 7 
.  0 . 6 2 4 4 
Note: All the required input factors are evaluated at one million yuan of output. 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
^See chapter 3 for a discussion of differences in the degree of govemment control exerted over light 
and heavy industrial sectors in the process of market reform. 
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Table 7.4 Allocative Efficiency of State Enterprises by Sector, 1980 and 1984-88 
Sector Year a. 
Petrochemicals 1980 0.6124 0.1196 0.7320 1984 0.6792 0.0314 0.7106 1985 0.6269 0.1743 0.8011 
1986 0.6385 0.0519 0.6904 
1987 0.7721 -0.1461 0.6259 
1988 0.7256 0.0297 0.5553 
Coal Products 1980 0.5103 0.6352 1.1455 
1984 0.6607 0.3758 1.0364 
1985 0.6390 0.5804 1.2194 
1986 0.5102 0.3787 0.8889 
1987 0.7447 0.0772 0.8219 
1988 0.7397 0.2514 0.9911 
Industrial Chemicals 1980 -0.3321 1.2600 0.9279 
1984 0.0242 0.9549 0.9791 
1985 0.0426 1.1147 1.1573 
1986 -0.0473 1.1132 1.0659 
1987 -0.0919 1.1898 0.9979 
1988 -0.0769 1.0759 0.7990 
Unidentified 1980 -0.8915 1.6288 0.7374 
1984 -0.4717 0.9879 0.5161 
1985 -0.3122 0.7050 0.3927 
1986 -0.1080 0.5008 0.3928 
1987 0.2885 0.0219 0.3104 
1988 0.0799 -0.0573 0.0226 
Construction Materials 1980 -0.4722 1.0419 0.9697 
1984 -0.0355 0.6161 0.5806 
1985 -0.0679 0.8752 0.8072 
1986 -0.2450 0.9530 0.7080 
1987 -0.1817 0.9017 0.7200 
1988 -0.2607 0.8381 0.5774 
Ferrous Metal Melting 1980 -0.1031 0.9504 0.8473 
1984 0.1205 1.0351 1.1556 
1985 0.0846 1.4136 1.4982 
1986 -0.0653 1.3775 1.3123 
1987 -0.0377 1.3728 1.3350 
1988 -0.0848 1.3125 1.2276 
Non-ferrous Metal Melting 1980 -0.5571 1.2249 0.6677 
1984 -0.4573 1.0834 0.6261 
1985 -0.4294 1.2236 0.7942 
1986 -0.5546 1.3519 0.7974 
1987 -0.1313 0.9021 0.7709 
1988 -0.1461 0.7590 0.6128 
Metal Products 1980 -0.6538 0.7813 0.1275 
1984 -0.4639 0.5475 0.0836 
1985 -0.5296 0.8316 0.3020 
1986 -0.5675 0.6976 0.1301 
1987 -0.6892 0.6770 0.0877 
1988 -0.8306 0.6874 -0.0432 
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Table 7.4 Allocative Efficiency of State Enterprises by Sector 980 and 1984-88 
(continued) 
Sector Year 
Machinery 1980 -0.5994 0.2205 -0.3788 
1984 -0.3998 -0.0573 -0.4571 
1985 -0.4390 0.1638 -0.2753 
1986 -0.4116 0.1185 -0.3932 
1987 -0.4159 0.0989 -0.2170 
1988 -0.5066 0.1340 
Transport Vehicle 1980 -0.5994 -0.0079 -0.6073 
1984 -0.3175 -0.2097 -0.5272 
1985 -0.3344 0.0358 -0.2986 
1986 -0.4030 0.0031 -0.3999 
1987 -0.5100 0.0832 -0.4268 
1988 -0.4083 0.1071 -0.5011 
Electrical Machinery 1980 -0.8153 0.5531 -0.2623 
1984 -0.6143 0.2707 -0.3436 
1985 -0.6265 0.4955 -0.1310 
1986 -0.6827 0.4551 -0.2276 
1987 -0.5944 0.2489 -0.3455 
1988 -0.5424 0.2953 -0.4471 
Electronics & 1980 -0.7814 0.4339 -0.3474 
Communications 1984 -0.6133 0.1096 -0.5036 
Equipment 1985 -0.5100 0.0866 -0.4234 
1986 -0.5606 0.0880 -QA126 
1987 -0.2852 -0.2226 -0.5078 
1988 -0.3992 -0.1769 -0.5761 
Measuring Instruments & 1980 -0.9361 0.8089 -0.1272 
Apparatus 1984 -0.7182 0.5658 -0.1524 
1985 -0.6622 0.6474 -0.0148 
1986 -0.6374 0.2780 -0.3594 
1987 -0.7312 0.5281 -0.2031 
1988 -0.6862 0.40(H -0.2858 
Food 1980 -1.1452 0.5566 -0.5886 
1984 -0.8989 0.2958 -0.6032 
1985 -0.6533 0.3228 -0.3304 
1986 -0.5472 0.2987 -0.2485 
1987 -0.3753 0.0118 -0.3635 
1988 -0.4685 -0.0267 -0.4951 
Soft Drink 1980 -0.7546 0.2060 -0.5486 
1984 -0.4218 -0.2559 -0.6776 
1985 -0.2154 -0.3151 -0.5305 
1986 0.1158 -0.4414 -0.3255 
1987 -0.0874 -0.4761 -0.5635 
1988 -0.2859 -0.5217 -0.3076 
Tobacco 1980 -1.0234 -0.1030 -1.1263 
1984 -0.4498 -0.3802 -0.8300 
1985 -0.2590 -0.4550 -0.7139 
1986 -0.2904 -0.6604 -0.9508 
1987 -0.1301 -0.8305 -0.9606 
1988 -0.0559 -0.6133 -0.6692 
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Table 7.4 Allocative Efficiency of State Enterprises by Sector 1980 and 1984-88 
(contmued) 
Sector Year a,, 
Animal Feed 1980 1.3829 -2.2214 -0.8385 
1984 0.5976 -1.5935 -0.9959 
1985 0.4642 -1.8232 -1.3590 
1986 0.6209 -2.6082 -1.9873 
1987 0.5133 -2.0401 -1.5267 
1988 0.3415 -2.0564 -1.9149 
Textiles 1980 -1.3912 0.4671 -0.9241 
1984 -0.8892 0.1094 -0.7798 
1985 -0.8281 0.3871 -0.4410 
1986 -0.8522 0.3881 -0.4641 
1987 -0.7627 0.2138 -0.5489 
1988 -0.8787 0.1970 -0.6817 
Qothing 1980 -1.0951 -0.7287 -1.8238 
1984 -0.8584 -0.6840 -1.5424 
1985 -0.8239 -0.5151 -1.3390 
1986 -0.7329 -0.4283 -1.1612 
1987 -0.5012 -0.5804 -1.0817 
1988 -0.7229 -0.4157 -1.1385 
Leather Products 1980 -0.8757 0.1504 -0.8753 
1984 -0.6064 0.1135 -0.7199 
1985 -0.3892 -0.0310 -0.4202 
1986 -0.4878 0.0139 -0.4738 
1987 -0.5530 -0.0817 -0.6347 
1988 -0.5188 -0.2978 -0.6165 
Wood & Bamboo Products 1980 -0.6047 0.2566 -0.3481 
1984 -0.4632 0.2325 -0.2307 
1985 -0.3727 0.4322 0.0595 
1986 -0.3641 0.4640 0.0999 
1987 -0.3396 0.3305 -0.0091 
1988 -0.4623 0.1698 -0.2925 
Furniture 1980 -1.1016 0.4108 -0.1908 
1984 -0.8441 -0.2949 -1.1389 
1985 -0.8170 -0.4656 -1.2826 
1986 -0.5507 -0.6354 -1.1861 
1987 -0.5455 -0.6567 -1.2022 
1988 -0.7086 -0.6082 -1.2168 
Paper Products 1980 -0.6950 1.5124 0.6174 
1984 -0.6681 1.3430 0.6748 
1985 -0.4607 1.4979 1.0372 
1986 -0.3097 1.2373 0.9276 
1987 -0.3132 1.1249 0.8117 
1988 -0.6214 1.3094 0.6880 
Printing 1980 -0.5163 -1.5055 -2.0218 
1984 -0.3028 -1.4754 -1.7782 
1985 -0.0981 -1.2785 -1.3766 
1986 0.0287 -1.4226 -1.3939 
1987 0.1418 -1.6169 -1.4751 
1988 0.0468 -1.4251 -1.5783 
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Table 7.4 Allocative Efficiency of State Enterprises by Sector 1980 and 1984-88 
(continued) 
Sector Year 
Sports Equipment 1980 -0.5398 -0.2426 -1.7824 
1984 -0.8380 -0.6580 -1.4960 
1985 -0.7373 -0.5578 -1.2951 
1986 -0.7191 -0.5413 -1.2604 
1987 -0.8186 -0.2220 -1.0406 
1988 -0.9520 -0.0519 -1.0039 
Handicrafts 1980 -1.9173 0.3171 -1.6002 
1984 -1.3535 0.1955 -1.1580 
1985 -1.1953 0.4657 -0.7295 
1986 -1.3750 0.6414 -0.7335 
1987 -1.4419 0.1338 -1.3081 
1988 -1.7252 0.2293 -1.0958 
Pharmaceuticals 1980 -1.1186 1.0047 -0.1139 
1984 -0.7364 0.6334 -0.1030 
1985 -0.5847 0.8662 0.2816 
1986 -0.5948 0.7309 0.1360 
1987 -0.6148 0.7037 0.0889 
1988 -0.8616 0.7670 -0.0946 
Chemical Fibres 1980 -0.9261 1.7182 0.7920 
1984 0.7338 -0.1237 0.6101 
1985 0.7236 0.1947 0.9183 
1986 0.6357 0.3723 1.0081 
1987 0.6392 0.3101 0.9493 
1988 0.3792 0.4142 0.7934 
Rubber Products 1980 -0.7310 0.4269 -0.3041 
1984 -0.5833 0.2890 -0.2943 
1985 -0.4680 0.4463 -0.0217 
1986 -0.4734 0.4256 -0.0477 
1987 -0.4340 0.3001 -0.1340 
1988 -0.6196 0.2339 -0.1857 
Plastic Products 1980 -0.3179 -0.4984 -0.8163 
1984 -0.0130 -0.3809 -0.3940 
1985 0.0378 0.0001 0.0379 
1986 -0.0986 0.0733 -0.0253 
1987 0.0724 -0.1763 -0.1039 
1988 0.0136 -0.2542 -0.1406 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
It is evident from the table that energy efficiency improved consistently and 
significantly. In the heavy industrial sector, energy use per million yuan of output 
decreased from 0.85 thousand tonnes in 1980 to 0.61 thousand tonnes in 1988 and in 
the light industrial sector from 0.42 thousand tonnes in 1980 to 0.32 thousand tonnes in 
1988. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, a major problem with the model used here is 
that statistical measures cannot be used to test the consistency and significance of the 
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allocative efficiency indices. If the average values observed in Table 7.2 had in fact been 
influenced by some unusual but large observations, any economic analysis based on 
these results would be wrong and misleading. One way to deal with this problem is to 
examine the indices at a lower level of aggregation. If they are found to be reasonably 
consistent with the average index shown in Table 7.2, we can have confidence in the 
results obtained in our analysis. The allocative efficiency indices corresponding to those 
in Table 7.2 are presented in Table 7.4 at industry level. 
According to the table, the sign for is consistent with Table 7.2 in the case of 
eight out of 13 industries in the heavy industrial sector. These industries are: 
construction materials; non-ferrous metal forging and melting; metal products; 
machinery; transport vehicles; electrical machinery; electronics and communications 
equipment; and measuring instruments and apparatus. The index changed from negative 
to positive in the case of one unidentified industry, remained around zero in the case of 
ferrous metal forging and melting industry and fluctuated in the industrial chemicals 
industry. Only in two industries was the sign consistently contradictory. Similarly, the 
following eight industries showed a reasonably consistent improvement in efficiency: 
industrial chemicals; the one unidentified industry; construction materials; ferrous metal 
forging and melting; non-ferrous forging and melting; transport vehicles; electrical 
machinery; and electronics and communications equipment. The efficiency of the 
machinery and metal products industries improved initially but dropped back shghtiy 
only in the final one or two years. Only two industries, petro-chemicals and coal 
products, showed a steady dechne in the index. 
In the light industrial sector, the index is more consistent. Of the 17 industries in 
the sector, 14 had negative signs in nearly aU years and only three (chemical fibres, 
animal feed and plastic products) had positive signs in some years. In terms of the trend, 
the allocation moved in favour of labour in only two industries: animal feed and sports 
equipment 
In the heavy industrial sector, both the sign and trend of a^ ^ is positive in most 
years. In 11 industries a ^ fell consistentiy and significantiy during the period and 
efficiency improved. The exceptions were transport vehicles and ferrous forging and 
melting. The index for the former was volatile between 1980 and 1988, while that for 
the latter showed a deterioration in efficiency. 
Values for in light industry declined from positive to negative. The trend was 
clear for aU industries except animal feed, clothing, sports equipment and plastic 
products. Most industries became more efficient to a varying degree of consistency, the 
exceptions being soft drink, tobacco and furniture. 
In the case of labour/energy, the sign of was consistentiy negative in 12 
industries in the light industrial sector, and 12 of these moved in the direction of 
allocative efficiency. In the heavy industrial sector, efficiency tended to improve in eight 
industries during the period. 
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Despite a few inconsistencies in signs and trends, in general the factor pair-wise 
allocative efficiency indices at industry level are reasonably consistent with average 
indices at sectoral level. Although we can conjecture that the foUowing two factors may 
have caused this inconsistency, it is not possible within the scope of this study and based 
on survey data to establish the degree of influence of each. The first factor is the varying 
degree of government control over state enterprises. In the 1980s, managers could not 
afford to ignore govemment pressure entirely in pursuing their own goals. Resource 
allocation thus reflected govemment policy to a degree, and this may have countered 
the efforts of enterprises to improve allocative efficiency. Second, if we look closely at 
the number of observations, we find that the efficiency index in industries with a large 
number of observations — for example, the machinery industry in the heavy industrial 
sector or the textile industry in the light industrial sector — tends to be more consistent 
than is the case in industries with a small number of observations. This indicates that in 
some industries the inconsistency may have been caused by the limited number of 
observations available. There is, however, a reasonable degree of consistency in the vast 
majority of industries, suggesting that we can have confidence in the inferences drawn 
from the average indices. In fact, we will be able to show that conclusions based on 
factor pair-wise indices are in comfortable conformity with the overall index. 
Table 7.5 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency in 
Heavy and Light Industrial Sectors, 1980 and 1984-88 
Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Heavy Industrial Sector Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
1980 43.82 78.19 20.00 29.21 45.66 10.91 
1984 45.37 85.13 21.23 31.09 52.49 9.99 
1985 49.17 86.53 23.99 33.86 56.88 12.94 
1986 51.47 91.00 26.71 34.72 61.01 12.83 
1987 53.64 90.96 27.73 37.28 60.41 12.75 
1988 58.22 90.94 27.45 41.58 64.02 20.12 
Light Industrial Sector 
1980 61.99 78.63 29.00 46.50 64.04 14.88 
1984 63.86 78.96 36.84 49.01 66.33 22.69 
1985 67.24 85.57 40.47 51.47 69.51 24.47 
1986 69.22 91.45 44.36 52.60 70.95 24.46 
1987 71.50 91.83 47.47 55.34 73.45 29.11 
1988 76.10 94.00 50.24 59.58 78.56 31.55 
Note: 
Source: 
These efficiency indices are derived from a complete series of data, based on 141 
enterprises in the heavy industrial sector and 103 enterprises in the light industrial sector. 
The allocative efficiency index for the whole sample is presented in Table A7.1.1 of 
Appendix 7.1. 
Calculated from survey data. 
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Table 7.6 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency by Industry, 
1980 and 1984-88 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Petrochemicals 1980 31.11 44.89 20.15 17.58 22.28 12.98 
1984 33.00 40.67 26.51 21.83 25.45 19.83 
1985 36.21 43.25 30.24 24.64 28.44 22.71 
1986 38.75 46.82 33.48 25.76 29.59 23.25 
1987 40.45 50.22 35.08 25.52 28.56 22.94 
1988 44.17 51.02 39.65 31.42 34.15 28.06 
Coal Products 1980 59.00 78.19 50.39 36.71 45.66 28.14 
1984 66.89 85.13 58.68 40.73 52.49 27.99 
1985 72.25 86.53 65.95 44.88 56.88 30.63 
1986 78.42 91.00 65.66 46.64 61.01 25.35 
1987 80.06 90.96 68.21 47.11 54.35 27.64 
1988 85.52 90.94 76.24 50.04 64.02 23.70 
Industrial 1980 37.36 48.34 20.00 24.75 34.51 16.29 
Chemicals 1984 38.40 49.99 22.47 26.63 35.25 18.35 
1985 42.10 54.99 30.55 28.36 36.22 23.39 
1986 44.58 55.62 32.04 29.90 37.32 20.59 
1987 48.31 61.93 32.06 33.16 44.64 21.02 
1988 56.30 70.82 41.45 40.06 52.82 30.56 
Unidentified 1980 45.68 45.68 45.68 35.94 35.94 35.94 
1984 48.75 48.75 48.75 38.99 38.99 38.99 
1985 51.42 51.42 51.42 36.82 36.82 36.82 
1986 56.56 56.56 56.56 37.17 37.17 37.17 
1987 62.98 62.98 62.98 37.61 37.61 37.61 
1988 76.91 76.91 76.91 53.93 53.93 53.93 
Construction 1980 51.92 59.34 44.51 37.08 44.16 31.57 
Materials 1984 55.30 63.66 47.29 39.93 47.65 29.35 
1985 60.02 67.14 52.20 43.95 48.86 39.66 
1986 64.84 72.82 57.21 46.12 53.18 41.38 
1987 66.09 77.68 55.33 47.35 57.36 39.04 
1988 72.67 83.60 58.05 51.70 60.17 39.38 
Ferrous Metal 1980 41.44 53.69 27.39 28.40 32.80 21.01 
Melting & Forging 1984 44.54 64.71 31.44 30.56 35.69 24.14 
1985 51.06 74.90 38.65 34.62 39.39 28.81 
1986 52.24 75.37 41.29 36.53 45.87 29.32 
1987 55.14 76.33 44.01 37.62 44.73 32.26 
1988 62.81 90.84 51.06 43.72 55.51 35.27 
Non-ferrous 1980 28.87 49.20 20.05 15.61 25.76 10.91 
Metal Melting & 1984 27.07 44.37 21.23 14.69 19.51 9.99 
Forging 1985 30.84 47.81 23.99 17.05 23.36 12.94 
1986 33.69 42.39 26.71 19.16 25.68 12.83 
1987 41.47 64.19 30.55 20.20 27.60 12.75 
1988 50.61 73.22 34.14 25.46 32.17 20.12 
Metal Products 1980 41.30 51.99 33.34 28.09 33.76 21.19 
1984 43.44 55.86 32.75 30.38 37.52 24.99 
1985 46.08 51.76 34.86 32.60 38.46 26.07 
1986 48.38 58.37 39.08 33.11 42.61 28.43 
1987 50.58 58.70 43.64 36.84 44.94 32.50 
1988 55.11 63.50 48.14 39.87 50.03 34.03 
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Table 7.6 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiencv Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Machinery 1980 46.84 64.55 32.24 31.37 41.56 19.70 
1984 48.27 69.09 24.18 32.61 45.23 19.51 
1985 52.96 80.40 29.17 36.20 53.50 24.01 
1986 54.53 73.64 29.29 36.34 48.21 24.12 
1987 56.27 87.11 27.73 39.94 60.41 22.87 
1988 57.95 70.92 27.45 42.81 52.09 22.98 
Transport Vehicles 1980 44.97 58.91 34.49 30.51 41.70 23.78 
1984 48.76 72.67 38.09 33.98 42.53 28.42 
1985 50.31 59.30 42.19 36.04 42.31 30.30 
1986 52.50 62.72 45.72 35.82 43.58 21.27 
1987 53.51 63.17 48.50 38.72 46.45 30.56 
1988 56.05 67.92 48.30 41.71 50.16 35.03 
Electrical 1980 39.78 55.36 27.51 26.12 34.28 16.50 
Machinery 1984 39.09 47.86 29.74 27.84 36.43 20.08 
1985 43.55 51.61 33.43 31.46 37.89 23.90 
1986 44.19 51.97 36.01 31.71 40.22 25.15 
1987 46.59 52.06 37.05 33.07 41.19 26.47 
1988 52.89 60.83 43.70 38.23 47.00 30.77 
Electronics & 1980 43.35 59.93 37.66 27.22 33.80 12.79 
Communications 1984 42.83 53.04 33.65 30.03 38.69 23.50 
Equipment 1985 43.04 50.59 35.23 29.33 36.33 24.07 
1986 46.30 61.15 35.17 31.23 47.23 24.45 
1987 46.21 53.21 38.23 33.58 40.91 24.77 
1988 51.51 71.00 40.72 38.19 55.56 25.77 
Measuring 1980 41.56 45.72 33.88 29.03 34.63 23.09 
Instruments & 1984 39.76 46.91 31.19 28.09 32.64 23.71 
Apparatus 1985 42.14 46.69 33.82 29.65 32.20 27.02 
1986 43.78 50.31 37.97 30.94 32.08 29.22 
1987 46.46 53.99 38.48 33.07 35.39 28.80 
1988 51.24 59.69 43.52 38.73 45.02 33.10 
Food 1980 65.47 73.81 52.51 49.29 60.28 31.49 
1984 68.23 74.85 63.51 54.56 62.81 42.40 
1985 72.58 81.95 65.79 52.56 65.44 42.19 
1986 73.65 82.89 68.83 54.07 68.40 41.61 
1987 75.70 80.44 70.80 57.98 70.71 40.38 
1988 80.67 89.56 75.58 60.01 73.37 45.53 
Soft Drink 1980 63.63 74.10 55.03 46.16 56.92 25.97 
1984 70.57 78.08 63.48 49.75 62.58 22.69 
1985 73.40 79.91 64.80 53.26 66.84 26.29 
1986 74.47 81.07 67.60 56.40 66.94 38.81 
1987 77.00 85.32 70.22 60.39 72.33 41.14 
1988 82.28 90.92 75.10 67.01 78.56 46.62 
Tobacco 1980 35.35 47.89 29.00 23.91 28.13 14.88 
1984 39.88 44.99 36.84 31.01 33.28 24.26 
1985 43.34 48.92 40.47 32.94 36.23 24.47 
1986 46.92 52.07 44.36 35.14 38.84 24.46 
1987 48.79 51.45 47.47 37.79 41.36 29.11 
1988 53.53 56.00 50.24 41.43 46.54 31.55 
218 
Table 7.6 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiencv Economic Efficiencv 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Animal Feed 1980 69.40 69.40 69.40 40.89 40.89 40.89 
1984 69.49 69.49 69.49 57.98 57.98 57.98 
1985 74.62 74.62 74.62 66.25 66.25 66.25 
1986 76.45 76.45 76.45 66.33 66.33 66.33 
1987 83.71 83.71 83.71 52.38 52.38 52.38 
1988 85.54 85.54 85.54 66.95 66.95 66.95 
Textiles 1980 64.23 76.11 54.38 50.20 57.90 29.23 
1984 64.47 78.90 53.30 49.39 63.08 38.52 
1985 68.00 85.05 58.66 51.96 65.81 39.93 
1986 69.86 91.45 59.19 53.26 66.75 41.27 
1987 72.96 91.09 62.06 55.17 68.62 45.15 
1988 76.84 92.34 65.78 61.15 77.86 42.76 
Qothing 1980 62.11 66.38 59.23 43.92 50.95 31.10 
1984 59.67 66.07 55.17 45.08 47.68 42.95 
1985 65.99 74.09 58.23 45.56 54.40 33.19 
1986 64.84 70.36 57.92 52.57 55.92 48.63 
1987 66.90 70.85 60.01 54.53 56.51 51.93 
1988 71.33 76.74 64.16 54.45 61.56 44.03 
Leather Products 1980 63.87 69.02 56.81 53.87 62.57 44.55 
1984 70.89 78.91 61.99 46.18 63.22 26.69 
1985 77.14 85.57 64.35 51.95 65.37 32.57 
1986 75.22 79.52 66.26 61.34 67.65 53.12 
1987 77.20 84.54 68.49 60.64 66.31 56.64 
1988 84.03 93.92 76.53 58.55 70.09 47.31 
Wood& 1980 72.37 78.63 63.18 54.84 64.04 43.35 
Bamboo Products 1984 74.12 78.96 65.30 59.66 66.33 52.04 
1985 75.69 80.49 68.82 60.49 64.08 51.83 
1986 78.80 86.36 70.88 56.43 62.48 49.94 
1987 80.58 89.73 73.48 62.70 68.61 57.06 
1988 85.16 93.27 75.01 67.93 76.29 52.90 
Furniture 1980 68.97 68.97 68.97 51.48 51.48 51.48 
1984 68.91 68.91 68.91 60.15 60.15 60.15 
1985 74.07 74.07 74.07 59.77 59.77 59.77 
1986 85.17 85.17 85.17 40.17 40.17 40.17 
1987 79.97 79.97 79.97 59.97 59.97 59.97 
1988 80.41 80.41 80.41 67.60 67.60 67.60 
Paper Products 1980 69.66 77.39 63.04 56.31 61.85 46.71 
1984 72.52 77.58 68.30 57.70 64.96 42.18 
1985 77.08 84.05 71.97 61.85 69.51 48.35 
1986 79.99 87.02 75.69 61.12 70.95 32.47 
1987 83.01 91.83 78.87 63.48 73.45 44.36 
1988 87.91 94.00 81.99 71.41 77.11 62.78 
Printing 1980 59.64 70.51 52.48 41.75 52.37 20.51 
1984 60.27 67.88 54.69 47.72 54.73 30.55 
1985 64.03 68.76 57.83 51.42 58.41 38.08 
1986 66.92 76.98 60.23 53.33 56.83 46.58 
1987 68.15 76.74 59.96 55.00 62.39 48.38 
1988 73.19 80.29 63.63 58.13 66.95 52.63 
219 
Table 7.6 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiencv Economic Efficiencv 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum Sports Equipment 1980 53.73 53.73 53.73 45.36 45.36 45.36 1984 51.32 51.32 51.32 43.29 43.29 43.29 1985 54.73 54.73 54.73 48.24 48.24 48.24 1986 56.43 56.43 56.43 48.54 48.54 48.54 1987 59.54 59.54 59.54 51.02 51.02 51.02 
1988 62.60 62.60 62.60 50.66 50.66 50.66 
Handicrafts 1980 59.61 59.61 59.61 51.15 51.15 51.15 1984 60.41 60.41 60.41 49.95 49.95 49.95 
1985 65.88 65.88 65.88 50.26 50.26 50.26 
1986 71.33 71.33 71.33 45.73 45.73 45.73 
1987 69.36 69.36 69.36 58.30 58.30 58.30 
1988 72.43 72.43 72.43 60.64 60.64 60.64 
Pharmaceuticals 1980 56.46 66.68 51.12 40.15 46.03 31.28 
1984 56.83 62.22 47.92 44.35 52.00 32.42 
1985 58.17 65.75 49.50 45.22 52.08 29.70 
1986 60.83 70.38 51.49 45.69 53.90 33.25 
1987 63.16 73.68 55.10 49.75 59.72 36.39 
1988 67.88 81.93 57.45 53.28 63.06 35.72 
Chemical Fibres 1980 70.62 73.68 67.56 53.53 57.48 49.59 
1984 70.85 76.77 65.23 56.83 61.16 54.51 
1985 74.03 78.36 68.31 59.20 62.12 55.96 
1986 76.58 81.02 70.29 59.70 63.46 54.16 
1987 77.42 80.94 73.38 62.99 65.83 59.54 
1988 82.63 85.53 80.20 66.72 73.09 59.56 
Rubber Products 1980 58.86 67.87 51.00 42.15 49.08 26.45 
1984 60.92 65.90 54.45 45.57 50.57 35.57 
1985 62.62 67.32 57.29 49.44 54.28 40.03 
1986 64.08 66.89 58.94 49.46 54.81 41.41 
1987 66.28 69.96 63.20 51.26 55.71 40.24 
1988 69.68 73.20 66.52 55.01 62.25 41.31 
Plastic Products 1980 61.70 75.28 49.81 42.83 52.42 34.04 
1984 62.25 69.84 56.87 45.20 54.50 25.63 
1985 64.18 70.01 58.36 49.89 58.49 36.43 
1986 66.23 71.24 59.81 49.13 57.24 38.44 
1987 69.06 74.66 62.20 51.17 61.35 35.15 
1988 74.97 88.63 68.16 53.98 66.64 42.23 
Note: The table shows only enterprises with a complete series on the time dimension. The overall 
allocative efficiency of all sample enterprises is presented in Table A7.1.2, Appendix 7.1. 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
The overall allocative index is estimated based on equation (7.6). The technical 
problem that arises in using sample data is that equation (7.6) requires output prices, 
which are not available in our data set. This problem is mitigated, but not solved, by 
using an enterprise-specific price index — the ratio of output value at current price to 
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output value at 1980 constant price — for actual price. In other words, we assign a 
value, say 100, as the output price for all enterprises in 1980 and obtain the price in 
other years by multiplying the price index by this value. This allows us to identify the 
trend in overall allocative efficiency for each enterprise during the period. 
Three problems remain. First, as the overall index estimated in this way is not a 
representation of the actual allocative efficiency of an enterprise in any particular period, 
we need to be cautious about interpreting it in absolute terms or using it to make inter-
enterprise comparisons. Second, the magnitude of inter-temporal variation is will not be 
accurate because our index is unlikely to coincide with actual price variation. Third, 
actual variation in output prices among enterprises can vary widely, and the calculation 
of an index of overall allocative efficiency needs to take this into account. For 
convenience of presentation, we need to select a range arbitrarily. In this study, the 
range of technical efficiency in each sector is used as the reference point for allocative 
efficiency: 20-91 per cent for the heavy industrial sector and 29-94 per cent for the light 
industrial sector. We then try different initial values (for 1980) until the efficiency index 
is confined within the range. Because of these problems, we are unable to estimate the 
impact of reform policies on allocative efficiency as was done for technical efficiency in 
chapter 6. 
The index of average overall allocative efficiency for heavy and light industrial 
sectors in 1980 and 1984-88 is presented in Table 7.5; Table 7.6 shows the index at 
industry level. Economic efficiency was defined in chapter 2 as the product of technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. Tables 7.5 and 7.6 also present the corresponding 
economic efficiency index. Although, the index of economic efficiency, like that of 
allocative efficiency, cannot be taken to represent actual profit as a proportion of 
potential maximum profit, if both technical and allocative efficiency indices vary in the 
same direction over time, the trend of the economic efficiency index wiU be consistent 
with that of underlying true economic efficiency and indicative of the way in which 
reform policies have influenced economic efficiency. 
It is clear from Table 7.5 that allocative efficiency improved consistentiy in both 
sectors. This concords with our results for factor pair-wise allocative efficiency in 1980 
and 1984-88. It should be noted that, although the factor pair-wise index for a,^  in the 
heavy industrial sector is volatile and the efficiency of labour/energy showed some 
deterioration between 1980 and 1988, on the whole allocative efficiency undoubtedly 
increased. Economic efficiency also improved. This finding is not surprising given that 
both technical and allocative efficiency tended to move upward in this period. 
In aU industries in both sectors, the indices indicate a continuous and consistent 
improvement in resource allocation; efficiency drops in only one or two years in the 
non-ferrous metal melting and forging, electrical machinery, electronics and 
communications equipment, measuring instruments and apparatus, clothing, leather 
products, furniture, sports equipment and handicrafts industries. Although we cannot 
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determine the actual size of the decreases due to the data problems just discussed, they 
are very small indeed compared with the incremental value of the efficiency index 
between 1980 and 1988. That there was an improvement in allocative efficiency in all 
industries is beyond doubt. The trend of economic efficiency is nearly identical to that 
for allocative efficiency, confirming the validity for the inferences made on the basis of 
the factor pair-wise allocative efficiency index. 
THE SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND THE UTILISATION OF CAPITAL, 
ENERGY AND LABOUR 
Against a background of general improvement in efficiency, the sample data and the 
pair-wise allocative efficiency estimates reveal some serious problems in the allocation 
of resources. These problems are again attributable to the soft budget constraint and 
distortion in the capital and labour markets. The rapid rise in the capital intensity of state 
enterprises due to excessive capital investment is a direct result of the soft budget 
constraint. This may have produced two indirect effects. First, the bias towards capital 
may have lessened the effectiveness of energy market reforms. Obviously, this has 
adverse implications for the efficiency of energy utilisation and thus for the long-term 
development of the economy. Second, the soft budget constraint may have reinforced 
the substitution of capital for labour, a process driven by the distorted prices of the two 
factors and by enterprises' increasingly profit-oriented response to economic incentives. 
The soft budget constraint in state enterprises was earlier found to be the major 
factor in rendering reform in the areas of taxation and the financing of state enterprises 
ineffective to promote technical efficiency. The impact of the soft budget constraint on 
allocative efficiency can be inferred by comparing relative changes in the capital/labour 
and capital/energy ratios relative to changes in their prices. According to the first-order 
condition (equations 2.9 and 2.10 in chapter 2), the degree of substitution between input 
factors will equal that of change in the relative price of inputs so as to remain at an 
equilibrium associated with maximum profit. Therefore, a significant and systematic 
change in the capital/labour and capital/energy ratios in excess of changes in their 
relative prices must, according to Komai (1980), be attributable to the soft budget 
constraint. According to the sample data, state enterprises clearly over-reacted to 
changes in the relative prices of capital, labour and, to some extent, energy (Table 7.7). 
The table indicates that the price of labour relative to that of capital increased 1.47 
times, from 180.9 in 1980 to 266.5 in 1988 for the heavy industrial sector and from 
183.2 to 269.5 for the light industrial sector. During the same period, the capital/labour 
ratio rose 1.56 times in the heavy industrial sector and 2.64 times in the light industrial 
sector. Enterprises' reaction to changes in relative prices was significant in both sectors 
and consistent throughout the period. Moreover, substitution took place not only in 
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Table 7.7 Trends in Relative Prices and Capital Intensity, 1980 and 1884-88 
Year Woiicer Income/ Energy Price/ Energy Price/ Capital/Labour Capital/Energy 
Interest Rate Interest Rate Interest Rate Ratio Ratio 
(Market Price) (Official Price) 
Heavy Industrial Sector 
1980 180.9206 22.37 17.53 1.28 1.54 
1984 157.4042 18.61 13.78 1.38 1.49 
1985 167.3409 20.76 13.49 1.43 1.30 
1986 194.8144 20.51 14.29 1.50 1.27 
1987 220.5404 23.01 15.72 1.76 1.53 
1988 266.5447 25.32 15.71 1.88 1.61 
Light Industrial Sector 
1980 183.1905 22.61 18.16 0.61 1.00 
1984 153.7236 18.85 14.44 0.97 1.65 
1985 168.9659 20.97 13.99 1.19 1.51 
1986 194.4167 20.73 14.87 1.35 1.51 
1987 221.5025 23.46 16.52 1.55 1.81 
1988 269.5338 25.89 16.55 1.61 1.94 
Note: Calculations are based on values given in Table 7.1. 
Source: Calculated from survey data. 
industries in which factor pair-wise indices indicate there was an over-utilisation of 
labour, but also in industries in which capital was already over-utilised: petrochemicals, 
coal products and chemical fibres, for example. 
It should be noted that the increase in the capital/labour ratio found here is not out 
of the ordinary. Whereas labour employment in state-owned industrial enterprises 
increased by 26.8 per cent (from 33.3 million in 1980 to 42.3 million in 1988), net fixed 
assets increased by 138.9 per cent (from 252.8 billion yuan in 1980 to 604 billion yuan 
in 1988) (Table A7.2.1 in Appendix 7.2).!° As a result, the capital/labour ratio 
increased 1.9 times in this period. Official statistics show that the ratio continued to 
increase strongly after 1988 (Table A7.2.1). The profit-maximising behaviour of state 
enterprises is therefore an insufficient explanation for the rise in the capital intensity of 
state enterprises in this period. The only possible explanation is that the soft budget 
constraint caused the real price of capital to fall lower than the nominal interest rate, 
thus accelerating capital expansion. 
The problems associated with the soft budget constraint can also be conceived in 
terms of the partial index of productivity of capital. Table 7.3 shows that capital input 
per unit of output, which is basically the inverse of capital productivity, declined 
somewhat between 1980 and 1985, and then remained constant in the case of heavy 
i^Note that net fixed assets in Statistical Yearbook of China do not take inflation into account. Even 
when inflation is taken into account, the rise in the ratio can fall within the range of our calculations 
based on the sample data. (Official statistics combine light and heavy industrial sectors; the ratio will 
fall somewhere between our calculations for the two sectors.) 
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industry and consistently increased in the case of light industry. These trends suggest 
that the productivity of capital showed no improvement in the second half of the 1980s 
in the former sector and declined throughout the 1980s in the latter sector. The decline 
in capital productivity provides strong confirmation of the finding in chapter 6, that 
reform in the areas of capital management and taxation failed to increase efficiency. 
The impact of energy market reform and the soft budget constraint on energy 
efficiency can be inferred by examining inter-temporal change in the capital/energy 
ratios over the period. It is evident from Table 7.7 that trends differ for the heavy and 
light industrial sectors. This inconsistency can and has to be explained in terms of the 
nature of the relationship between capital and energy. 
After Cobb and Douglas (1928) introduced their mathematical formula for the 
production function, economists typically dropped natural resources from the 
production function in their empirical work, even though classical economists had 
considered it, along with labour and capital, to be one of the three primary productive 
factors. Energy regained the attention of economists due to Meadows (1972), and 
voluminous empirical work followed the oil crises of the 1970s. 
Perhaps because of this long period of neglect, energy's relationship with other 
factors, in particular capital, has never been clarified. Using time-series data, economists 
found evidence to support the hypothesis that energy complements capital in 
manufacturing industry (Bemdt and Wood 1975; Fuss 1977; Magnus 1979). Although 
support for this proposition is found in the simple fact that capital equipment cannot run 
without energy, the perception of many engineering economists is that capital and 
energy are substitutable rather than complementary (Bemdt and Wood 1979). This 
alternative hypothesis was tested and confirmed by Griffin and Gregory (1976), who 
used pooled intemational data to show that energy and capital are indeed substitutes.^^ 
The apparent contradiction in empirical work was, according to Griffin and Gregory, 
caused by the nature of the data. Whereas time-series data usually exhibit a short-run 
response, cross-sectional data reveal a long-run relationship. In the short run, it is very 
difficult to quickly change equipment and technology to reduce unit energy consumption 
in the face of, say, a rise in the price of energy. In the long run, though, the introduction 
of new energy-saving technology and conservation programs in response to higher 
prices can be expected to reduce the unit consumption of energy. 
In an attempt to reconcile the contradictions in empirical work, Bemdt and Wood 
(1979) found that energy and capital were gross substitutes and net complements in the 
case of US manufacturing industry. Although the model developed by Berndt and 
Wood is complicated, the concepts can be explained simply as follows. In the face of, 
for example, a relatively lower price for capital, a profit-maximising firm will substitute 
iiEvidence for the notion of substitutability was also provided by Halvorson and Ford (1979), Pindyck 
(1979), Williams and Laumas (1981), Tumovsky, Folie and Ulph (1982) and Tumovsky and 
DonneUy (1984). 
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capital for energy. This will induce the firm to use more capital and reduce the use of 
energy. Capital and energy thus become substitutes for each other, which we caU the 
first round effect. But capital also becomes cheaper relative to labour, which induces the 
firm to increase further its use of capital. This non-price-induced effect will increase the 
use of energy to an extent compatible with the expansion of capital, which we call the 
second round effect. The final outcome of demand for energy will depend on the relative 
strength of the first and second round effects. If the first round effect dominates, then 
capital and labour becomes substitutes; if the second round effect dominates, they will 
be complementary. 
Although Berndt and Wood (1979) detected both effects using time-series data for a 
particular economy, I would argue that their finding does not fundamentally contradict 
the proposition of Griffin and Gregory (1976). Adoption of new energy-saving 
technology usually takes time, and so the substitution of capital for energy is, in the 
short term, difficult That is why most studies based on time-series data have concluded 
that capital and energy are complements. The argument of short-term complementarity 
based on time-series data can then still hold. 
The previous discussion leads to two conclusions. First, the relationship between 
capital and energy in the manufacturing sector, unlike that of capital and labour, is 
purely an empirical issue and will depend on the nature of the data used for estimation. 
A substitution effect may dominate with cross-sectional data but complementarity can 
be more significant with time-series data. Second, the work of Griffin and Gregory 
(1976) implies that a set of panel data comprising both cross-sectional and time-series 
dimensions is very likely to reveal a mixture of long-run and short-run effects. Since the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form presupposes substitutabUity among input factors, 
successful estimation of the stochastic production frontier based on the Cobb-Douglas 
function will indicate that the estimates captured mainly the long-run effect. Inter-
temporal variation of capital and energy is more likely to be dominated by the 
complementarity effect 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to estimate rigorously the relationship 
between capital and energy, the previous discussion can provide a useful basis for 
looking into variation in the capital/energy ratio. According to Table 7.7, the market 
price of energy relative to the price of capital increased 1.13 times in the case of the 
heavy industrial sector and 1.15 times in the case of the light industrial sector. In the 
heavy industrial sector, the capital/energy ratio changed littie between 1980 and 1988, 
although it dropped slightiy in 1985-86. That is, during the period, the capital/energy 
ratio did not quite keep pace with changes in relative prices. This indicates a strong 
complementarity between the two factors: increases in capital were accompanied by 
proportional increases in the energy input In other words, the rise in the price of energy 
relative to that of capital did not bring about a significant substitution of capital for 
energy. 
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The situation for the light industrial sector was very different Between 1980 and 
1988, the capital/labour ratio increased 1.94 times, far in excess of changes in relative 
prices. Moreover, this trend was consistent throughout the period. This means that there 
was a rapid expansion of capital accompanied by a proportionally lower increase in 
energy, indicating a degree of substitution of capital for energy in the face of a rise in 
the relative price of energy 
Two factors may explain the different responses of the two sectors. First, the reform 
process started earlier and was more thoroughgoing in the light industrial sector. As the 
market shares of material inputs and output were higher in this sector (chapter 3), 
enterprises in this sector were more exposed to the market price of energy and to 
intense competition on the output market. Managers thus were more aware of the 
impact of higher energy costs on profits and had a stronger motivation to take energy-
saving measures. Second, enterprises in light industry are less capital intensive than their 
counterparts in heavy industry and the technology used in the production process tends 
to be relatively simple. Energy-saving measures and the substitution of capital for 
energy may therefore take a shorter time to become effective. 
Based on the findings so far, we can draw two important conclusions with respect to 
the effect of the soft budget constraint on demand for energy. First, as intemational 
studies have already demonstrated, in the manufacturing industry capital and energy are 
complements in the short-run. In a short period, excessive expansion of capital will lead 
to a higher demand for energy. This means that the soft budget constraint induces state 
enterprises to consume more energy than they would otherwise. This was clearly the 
case in the light industry, where energy consumption per unit of output decreased by a 
much smaller margin than was the case with heavy industry (Table 7.3) even though 
capital/energy substitution is easier in light industry. This suggests that efforts to save 
energy were offset by an excessive expansion of capital in this sector. Second, in the 
long run energy may be substituted with capital through the adoption of new technology 
and conservation programs, which will in turn reduce demand for energy. But, as the 
difference in the experience of the two industrial sectors indicates, there is no guarantee 
that a substitution of capital for energy will take place. Even if substitution does take 
place, demand for energy under the soft budget constraint will still be larger than it will 
be under the hard budget constraint, because capital is too cheap. This leads to the 
second round complementary effect described in Bemdt and Wood (1979) and thus to 
greater demand for energy. 
Price distortions and the soft budget constraint also have implications for the 
employment of labour. Demand for labour in state enterprises is a complex issue and 
cannot be explored comprehensively here. Discussion will therefore be confined to the 
implications of the soft budget constraint for employment and the effects of substitution 
between capital and labour on demand for labour. 
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The substitution of capital for labour in state enterprises took place against a 
background of change in nominal relative prices and the widespread soft budget 
constraint. In the 1980s, the cost of labour increased far more rapidly than did nominal 
interest rates. The rational response of state enterprises to a change in relative prices 
was, of course, to substitute capital for labour. Changes in the price of labour occurred 
in the absence of competitive market to regulate supply and demand. As a result the 
cost of labour escalated and quickly changed the pattern of relative prices of the three 
input factors under study. Most economists believe that the cost of labour increased far 
too rapidly in the reform era — the govemment itself has acknowledged that from time 
to time it lost control of the "consumption fund''^^ — and this is thought to have 
contributed to the high inflation of the 1980s. On the other hand, interest rates were 
strictiy controlled by the govemment. Moreover, the soft budget constraint made capital 
even cheaper than the nominal interest rate, which was itself already considerably lower 
than its shadow price (World Bank 1988). This further motivated state enterprises to 
substitute capital for labour. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has investigated the impact of economic reform on the efficiency of 
allocation of labour, capital and energy in state enterprises. The estimates for both 
factor pair-wise and overall allocative efficiency indicated that allocation became 
increasingly efficient under reform policy and that the enterprises studied moved from 
an equilibrium of excessive use of labour and energy towards a new equilibrium 
associated with higher profit evaluated at given relative prices. The improvement 
observed in resource allocation suggests that market-oriented economic incentives were 
indeed effective in imbuing state enterprises with a profit motive. 
Partly as a result of this process, energy was being utilised far more efficientiy in 
1988 than in 1980. This change was also attributable to energy market reform, which 
increasingly subjected energy transactions to the rules of demand and supply in the 
marketplace. With reform, the price of energy deviated quickly and significantiy from its 
original low level, maintained for decades under the govemment policy of heavy 
subsidisation. Energy efficiency improved in response to increases in the price of energy 
and was realised through better management and the adoption of energy-saving 
technology. There was a difference in the response of heavy and light industrial sectors 
to capital expansion and energy market reform. This suggests that success in improving 
energy efficiency also depends on the success of reform in other areas. Energy efficiency 
should not, then, be treated as an isolated issue; comprehensive reform in other areas is 
required if fundamental change is to take place. 
i^The consumption fund refers to the amount of money distributed to workers as wages, bonuses and 
coUective welfare in state enterprises and many other government expenditures. 
I l l 
A soft budget constraint is a serious concern in resource allocation. Although 
allocative efficiency improved in the 1980s, it was accompanied by a dramatic rise in 
capital intensity. Excessive capital expansion seems to have gained enormous 
momentum in state enterprises and poses a threat to the optimal long-term growth of 
the economy. 
A soft budget constraint has serious implications for efficiency, energy demand and 
further economic reform. The distorted behaviour of enterprises operating under the 
soft budget constraint has hampered the govemment's efforts to improve technical 
efficiency through taxation and banking reform and has offset the impact of energy 
market reform on allocative efficiency. It can reasonably be argued that a soft budget 
constraint has induced state enterprises to use excessive amounts of energy and has 
hindered govemment efforts to promote energy efficiency. 
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Appendix 7.1 
Table A7.1.1 Overall Allocative Efficiency and Economic Efficiency of 
Heavy and Light Industrial Sectors, 1980 and 1984-88 
AUocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Heavy Industrial Sector Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
1980 44.27 89.63 20.00 29.44 47.14 10.91 
1984 45.01 85.13 21.23 30.78 52.49 9.99 
1985 48.85 86.53 23.99 33.75 56.88 12.94 
1986 50.79 91.00 26.71 34.49 61.01 12.83 
1987 53.21 90.96 27.73 37.33 66.21 12.75 
1988 57.15 90.94 27.45 41.21 64.02 20.12 
Light Industrial Sector 
1980 62.06 78.63 29.00 46.51 64.04 14.88 
1984 64.06 78.96 36.84 48.99 66.33 22.69 
1985 67.27 85.57 40.47 51.48 69.51 24.47 
1986 69.28 91.45 44.36 52.50 70.95 24.46 
1987 71.54 91.83 47.47 55.16 73.45 29.11 
1988 76.24 94.00 50.24 59.54 78.56 31.55 
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Table A7.1.2 Overall Allocative and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (unbalanced data) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Petrochemicals 1980 31.11 44.89 20.15 17.58 22.28 12.98 
1984 33.00 40.67 26.51 21.83 25.45 19.83 
1985 36.21 43.25 30.24 24.64 28.44 22.71 
1986 38.75 46.82 33.48 25.76 29.59 23.25 
1987 40.45 50.22 35.08 25.52 28.56 22.94 
1988 44.17 51.02 39.65 31.42 34.15 28.06 
Coal Products 1980 59.00 78.19 50.39 36.71 45.66 28.14 
1984 66.89 85.13 58.68 40.73 52.49 27.99 
1985 72.25 86.53 65.95 44.88 56.88 30.63 
1986 78.42 91.00 65.66 46.64 61.01 25.35 
1987 80.06 90.96 68.21 47.11 54.35 27.64 
1988 85.52 90.94 76.24 50.04 64.02 23.70 
Industrial Chemicals 1980 37.36 48.34 20.00 24.75 34.51 16.29 
1984 38.66 49.99 22.47 26.78 35.25 18.35 
1985 42.22 54.99 30.55 28.52 36.22 23.39 
1986 44.74 55.62 32.04 30.10 37.32 20.59 
1987 48.44 61.93 32.06 33.46 44.64 21.02 
1988 56.31 70.82 41.45 40.17 52.82 30.56 
Unidentified 1980 45.68 45.68 45.68 35.94 35.94 35.94 
1984 48.75 48.75 48.75 38.99 38.99 38.99 
1985 51.42 51.42 51.42 36.82 36.82 36.82 
1986 56.56 56.56 56.56 37.17 37.17 37.17 
1987 62.98 62.98 62.98 37.61 37.61 37.61 
1988 76.91 76.91 76.91 53.93 53.93 53.93 
Construction 1980 51.92 59.34 44.51 37.08 44.16 31.57 
Materials 1984 55.30 63.66 47.29 39.93 47.65 29.35 
1985 60.02 67.14 52.20 43.95 48.86 39.66 
1986 64.84 72.82 57.21 46.12 53.18 41.38 
1987 66.09 77.68 55.33 47.35 57.36 39.04 
1988 72.67 83.60 58.05 51.70 60.17 39.38 
Ferrous Metal 1980 41.44 53.69 27.39 28.40 32.80 21.01 
Melting and Forging 1984 44.54 64.71 31.44 30.56 35.69 24.14 
1985 51.06 74.90 38.65 34.62 39.39 28.81 
1986 52.24 75.37 41.29 36.53 45.87 29.32 
1987 55.14 76.33 44.01 37.62 44.73 32.26 
1988 62.81 90.84 51.06 43.72 55.51 35.27 
Non-ferrous 1980 28.87 49.20 20.05 15.61 25.76 10.91 
Metal Melting 1984 27.07 44.37 21.23 14.69 19.51 9.99 
and Forging 1985 30.84 47.81 23.99 17.05 23.36 12.94 
1986 33.69 42.39 26.71 19.16 25.68 12.83 
1987 41.47 64.19 30.55 20.20 27.60 12.75 
1988 50.61 73.22 34.14 25.46 32.17 20.12 
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Table A7.1.2 Overall Allocative and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (Continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Metal Products 1980 41.30 51.99 33.34 28.09 33.76 21.19 
1984 43.44 55.86 32.75 30.38 37.52 24.99 
1985 46.08 51.76 34.86 32.60 38.46 26.07 
1986 48.38 58.37 39.08 33.11 42.61 28.43 
1987 49.78 58.70 43.64 36.66 44.94 32.50 
1988 54.27 63.50 48.14 39.79 50.03 34.03 
Machinery 1980 46.44 64.55 32.24 31.11 41.56 19.70 
1984 47.25 69.09 23.88 32.18 45.23 19.51 
1985 52.41 80.40 27.69 36.18 53.50 22.97 
1986 53.52 73.64 29.29 36.34 48.21 24.12 
1987 55.30 87.11 27.73 39.72 60.41 22.87 
1988 57.02 70.92 27.45 42.59 52.09 22.98 
Transport Vehicles 1980 45.19 58.91 34.49 30.77 41.70 23.78 
1984 47.62 72.67 32.72 33.28 42.53 24.19 
1985 49.55 59.30 39.69 35.55 42.31 29.16 
1986 51.91 62.72 44.25 35.54 43.58 21.27 
1987 55.22 77.51 48.50 39.90 55.22 30.56 
1988 55.94 67.92 48.30 41.85 50.16 35.03 
Electrical Machinery 1980 39.78 55.36 27.51 26.12 34.28 16.50 
1984 38.89 47.86 29.74 27.54 36.43 20.08 
1985 43.34 51.61 33.43 30.95 37.89 23.90 
1986 43.87 51.97 36.01 31.41 40.22 25.15 
1987 46.59 52.06 37.05 32.95 41.19 26.47 
1988 52.51 60.83 43.70 38.04 47.00 30.77 
Electronics & 1980 45.78 87.05 36.10 29.32 44.83 12.79 
Communications 1984 43.62 84.82 25.24 29.01 42.89 18.71 
1985 42.49 50.59 32.12 28.95 37.75 22.27 
1986 44.00 61.15 34.04 29.46 47.23 22.34 
1987 46.95 85.16 38.07 34.47 66.21 24.77 
1988 48.00 71.00 36.97 35.88 55.56 25.77 
Measuring 1980 48.42 89.63 33.88 31.62 47.14 23.09 
Instruments & 1984 41.99 55.68 31.19 29.11 33.34 23.71 
Apparatus 1985 44.97 62.14 33.82 31.57 40.85 27.02 
1986 43.78 50.31 37.97 30.94 32.08 29.22 
1987 47.62 54.63 38.48 34.03 39.79 28.80 
1988 53.24 60.22 43.52 40.48 49.28 33.10 
Food 1980 65.87 73.81 52.51 49.07 60.28 31.49 
1984 68.05 74.85 60.27 53.68 62.81 42.40 
1985 72.13 81.95 65.79 52.45 65.44 42.19 
1986 73.24 82.89 68.58 54.41 68.40 41.61 
1987 75.55 80.44 70.80 56.62 70.71 40.38 
1988 81.73 92.66 75.58 61.02 75.53 45.53 
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Table A7.1.2 Overall Allocative and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (Continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Soft Drink 1980 63.63 74.10 55.03 46.16 56.92 25.97 
1984 70.04 78.08 63.48 50.06 62.58 22.69 
1985 72.74 79.91 64.80 53.41 66.84 26.29 
1986 74.47 81.07 67.60 56.40 66.94 38.81 
1987 76.39 85.32 70.22 60.72 72.33 41.14 
1988 81.99 90.92 75.10 67.65 78.56 46.62 
Tobacco 1980 35.35 47.89 29.00 23.91 28.13 14.88 
1984 39.88 44.99 36.84 31.01 33.28 24.26 
1985 43.34 48.92 40.47 32.94 36.23 24.47 
1986 46.92 52.07 44.36 35.14 38.84 24.46 
1987 48.79 51.45 47.47 37.79 41.36 29.11 
1988 53.53 56.00 50.24 41.43 46.54 31.55 
Animal Feed 1980 69.40 69.40 69.40 40.89 40.89 40.89 
1984 69.49 69.49 69.49 57.98 57.98 57.98 
1985 74.62 74.62 74.62 66.25 66.25 66.25 
1986 76.45 76.45 76.45 66.33 66.33 66.33 
1987 83.71 83.71 83.71 52.38 52.38 52.38 
1988 85.54 85.54 85.54 66.95 66.95 66.95 
Textiles 1980 64.23 76.11 54.38 50.20 57.90 29.23 
1984 64.77 78.90 53.30 49.08 63.08 38.52 
1985 68.21 85.05 58.66 51.74 65.81 39.93 
1986 70.23 91.45 59.19 52.81 66.75 41.27 
1987 73.19 91.09 62.06 54.96 68.62 45.15 
1988 77.02 92.34 65.78 60.91 77.86 42.76 
Clothing 1980 62.11 66.38 59.23 43.92 50.95 31.10 
1984 59.67 66.07 55.17 45.08 47.68 42.95 
1985 65.99 74.09 58.23 45.56 54.40 33.19 
1986 66.45 71.27 57.92 49.78 55.92 41.40 
1987 68.44 73.07 60.01 51.68 56.51 43.11 
1988 71.70 76.74 64.16 53.19 61.56 44.03 
Leather Products 1980 63.87 69.02 56.81 53.87 62.57 44.55 
1984 70.89 78.91 61.99 46.18 63.22 26.69 
1985 77.14 85.57 64.35 51.95 65.37 32.57 
1986 75.22 79.52 66.26 61.34 67.65 53.12 
1987 77.20 84.54 68.49 60.64 66.31 56.64 
1988 84.03 93.92 76.53 58.55 70.09 47.31 
Wood& 1980 72.37 78.63 63.18 54.84 64.04 43.35 
Bamboo Products 1984 74.12 78.96 65.30 59.66 66.33 52.04 
1985 75.69 80.49 68.82 60.49 64.08 51.83 
1986 78.80 86.36 70.88 56.43 62.48 49.94 
1987 80.58 89.73 73.48 62.70 68.61 57.06 
1988 85.16 93.27 75.01 67.93 76.29 52.90 
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Table A7.1.2 Overall Allocative and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (Continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Furniture 1980 68.97 68.97 68.97 51.48 51.48 51.48 
1984 69.81 70.72 68.91 58.56 60.15 56.98 
1985 73.19 74.07 72.32 59.64 59.77 59.51 
1986 79.40 85.17 73.63 51.37 62.57 40.17 
1987 77.90 79.97 75.83 62.40 64.84 59.97 
1988 79.34 80.41 78.27 65.94 67.60 64.28 
Paper Products 1980 69.66 77.39 63.04 56.31 61.85 46.71 
1984 72.52 77.58 68.30 57.70 64.96 42.18 
1985 77.08 84.05 71.97 61.85 69.51 48.35 
1986 79.99 87.02 75.69 61.12 70.95 32.47 
1987 83.01 91.83 78.87 63.48 73.45 44.36 
1988 87.91 94.00 81.99 71.41 77.11 62.78 
Printing 1980 59.64 70.51 52.48 41.75 52.37 20.51 
1984 60.27 67.88 54.69 47.72 54.73 30.55 
1985 64.03 68.76 57.83 51.42 58.41 38.08 
1986 66.92 76.98 60.23 53.33 56.83 46.58 
1987 68.15 76.74 59.96 55.00 62.39 48.38 
1988 73.19 80.29 63.63 58.13 66.95 52.63 
Sports Equipment 1980 53.73 53.73 53.73 45.36 45.36 45.36 
1984 56.40 61.48 51.32 42.35 43.29 41.40 
1985 58.39 62.06 54.73 46.81 48.24 45.37 
1986 60.55 64.68 56.43 47.61 48.54 46.68 
1987 63.00 66.47 59.54 50.62 51.02 50.22 
1988 66.18 69.76 62.60 51.72 52.78 50.66 
Handicrafts 1980 59.61 59.61 59.61 51.15 51.15 51.15 
1984 60.41 60.41 60.41 49.95 49.95 49.95 
1985 65.88 65.88 65.88 50.26 50.26 50.26 
1986 71.33 71.33 71.33 45.73 45.73 45.73 
1987 69.36 69.36 69.36 58.30 58.30 58.30 
1988 72.43 72.43 72.43 60.64 60.64 60.64 
Pharmaceuticals 1980 56.46 66.68 51.12 40.15 46.03 31.28 
1984 56.83 62.22 47.92 44.35 52.00 32.42 
1985 58.17 65.75 49.50 45.22 52.08 29.70 
1986 60.83 70.38 51.49 45.69 53.90 33.25 
1987 63.16 73.68 55.10 49.75 59.72 36.39 
1988 67.88 81.93 57.45 53.28 63.06 35.72 
Chemical Fibres 1980 70.62 73.68 67.56 53.53 57.48 49.59 
1984 70.85 76.77 65.23 56.83 61.16 54.51 
1985 74.03 78.36 68.31 59.20 62.12 55.96 
1986 76.58 81.02 70.29 59.70 63.46 54.16 
1987 77.42 80.94 73.38 62.99 65.83 59.54 
1988 82.63 85.53 80.20 66.72 73.09 59.56 
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Table A7.1.2 Overall Allocative and Economic Efficiency by Industry 
1980 and 1984-88 (Continued) 
Sector Year Allocative Efficiency Economic Efficiency 
Mean Maximum Minimum Mean Maximum Minimum 
Rubber Products 1980 58.86 67.87 51.00 42.15 49.08 26.45 
1984 60.92 65.90 54.45 45.57 50.57 35.57 
1985 62.62 67.32 57.29 49.44 54.28 40.03 
1986 64.08 66.89 58.94 49.46 54.81 41.41 
1987 66.28 69.96 63.20 51.26 55.71 40.24 
1988 69.68 73.20 66.52 55.01 62.25 41.31 
Plastic Products 1980 61.70 75.28 49.81 42.83 52.42 34.04 
1984 62.25 69.84 56.87 45.20 54.50 25.63 
1985 63.13 70.01 57.87 50.00 58.49 36.43 
1986 65.14 71.24 59.69 49.73 57.24 38.44 
1987 68.16 74.66 62.20 51.28 61.35 35.15 
1988 74.05 88.63 68.16 52.89 66.64 42.23 
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Appendix 7.2 
Table 7.2.1 Labour Force and Fixed Assets in State Enterprises, 1978-92 
Year Labour Employment Net Fixed Assets 
(unit: million workers) (unit: billion workers) 
1978 31.39 222.57 
1979 32.08 237.86 
1980 33.34 252.80 
1981 34.88 270.93 
1982 35.82 291.40 
1983 36.32 316.10 
1984 36.69 339.55 
1985 38.15 398.08 
1986 39.55 454.38 
1987 40.86 524.24 
1988 42.29 604.04 
1989 42.73 703.32 
1990 43.64 808.83 
1991 44.72 950.72 
1992 45.21 109.83 
Note: The figures do not include state enterprises in the following sectors: agriculture, 
forestry, husbandry, fishery, irrigation and water management, geology and 
exploration, construction, transportation and communications, commerce, and 
warehousing. 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China 1993 (p. 107 and p. 430). 
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8 Economic Growth and Future Economic 
Reform 
The last one and half decades have seen dynamic economic growth in China. Rapid 
change in economic institutions has stimulated the growth of the national economy and 
also the development of the state sector. At the same time, improving the efficiency of 
state enterprises has proved very difficult. 
The results of this study suggest that, from an institutional point of view, economic 
reform has been only partly successful in transforming state enterprises into profit-
oriented, operationally independent and financially accountable firms. Reform poUcies 
on the whole have had a positive outcome but were at the same time seriously flawed; 
the result has been a mixture of success and failure. 
This study makes an empirical and theoretical contribution to economic analysis and 
econometric modelling. It addresses important issues, namely efficiency of energy 
utilisation and the impact of economic reform on the soft budget constraint of state 
enterprises, that have not before been examined comprehensively and rigorously in a 
consistent economic fi-amework. The major contributions of this thesis can be 
summarised as follows: 1) empirically applying Komai's soft budget constraint theory to 
a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between economic reform, a budget 
constraint and the economic efficiency of state enterprises; 2) analysing the impact of 
individual reform policies on the economic efficiency of state enterprises and the success 
or failure of four major policies; 3) estimating and analysing the impact of economic 
reform on the efficiency of energy utilisation in state enterprises; and 4) developing an 
econometric model and method of measurement for estimating efficiency that are 
suitable for panel data and for economic units experiencing institutional change. 
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY UNDER REFORM POLICIES: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
From an institutional point of view, there were two main causes of economic 
inefficiency in state enterprises in a centrally planned system. The first was that the 
system lacked a mechanism for compelling managers to pursue economic objectives, and 
the second was that budget constraint was unduly soft. Our analysis of institutional 
reform and its impact on technical and allocative efficiency has focused on the incentive 
system and the financial relationship between enterprises and external organisations 
mcluding the government and banks. 
The estimation results of the study showed that reform policies caused state 
enterprises to abandon extensive growth strategies in favour of intensive growth 
strategies. Both technical and allocative efficiency thus increased during the years of 
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economic reform. Improvement in economic efficiency can be attributed mainly to 
competition in the marketplace and economic incentives offered to workers and 
managers under the reform policy. 
This study also found that the govemment needs to have consistent and well-
coordinated policies if it is to improve the economic efficiency of state enterprises in the 
period of transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Based on Komai's 
hypothesis of a soft budget constraint, the results suggest that reform should be carried 
out in the goods market, financial market and taxation system simultaneously and 
policies in these areas should be muUially consistent and effective in hardening budget 
constraint in distinct ways. In the case of China, which unlike Eastern European 
countries has an undeveloped labour market, it is also important to make changes in the 
management of labour by offering economic incentives to managers and workers. 
New Incentives, Market Competition and Improved Economic Efficiency 
Based on a stochastic production frontier model, the study demonstrated that technical 
efficiency improved by 8.0 per cent on average in state enterprises in the heavy industrial 
sector and 6.8 per cent in the light industrial sector during the period 1980-88. Using 
estimates of the stochastic production frontier and other economic variables, we showed 
that allocative efficiency also improved by a varying margins in the two sectors, 
although we were not able to determine the degree of improvement due to limitations in 
the sample data. Analysis of the efficiency index at industry level demonstrated that this 
improvement was fairly consistent. The improvement in technical and allocative 
efficiency was accompanied by a rapid increase in the output of state enterprises. This 
was in sharp contrast to the situation in pre-reform state enterprises, where output 
growth was accompanied by a deterioration in productivity. 
These results are not surprising; they coincide with those of many other recent 
empirical studies. However, this study goes beyond others in analysing institutional 
change, the response of enterprises to major reform policies and the impact of four 
major reform policies on variation in enterprise-specific efficiency. 
To improve economic efficiency, operational profit must be increased and costs 
reduced. In the case of state enterprises once in a centrally planned economy, this can 
only be achieved through the reform of economic institutions. The new institutions need 
to create the economic and managerial incentive for efficient management and discipline 
and to place pressure on managers to increase profits and reduce costs. 
In China, new incentives were instituted in a series of financial arrangements 
between the govemment and enterprises. In 1979, the govemment introduced a profit 
retention scheme which offered enterprises the right of control over some of the profits 
generated in the production process. The scheme entitled enterprises to a share of 
profits, which would formally have been submitted to the govemment, and the use of 
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these funds was placed at the discretion of managers. This system was soon replaced 
with a profit-based taxation system when the central government realised that the profit 
retention scheme was too ad hoc and flexible. In 1985, the government again reshaped 
its financial relationship with enterprises by introducing the Contract Management 
Responsibility System. Analysis of the ratio of retained to total profit showed that 
managers had gained increasingly more power over the financial resources under the 
reform policy. Government also decentralised decision-making power by delegating 
more control over investment, production, marketing, procurement of input materials 
and management of productive factors to managers. The managerial incentives for 
increasing profit were thus established and strengthened as reform in this area 
intensified. 
To give workers an economic incentive the labour management system also needed 
to be changed. This was achieved by restoring the bonus and collective welfare system. 
As a result of changes in the government-enterprise financial relationship, managers 
were able to use profit to fund workers' bonuses, collective welfare and new investment 
projects. A direct effect of the bonus system was that income came to be directly linked 
to performance in the workplace. This became an important mechanism by which 
managers could reward efficient workers. 
The new financial arrangements helped state enterprises to forge independent and 
profit-oriented business objectives. In the study we proposed that resource allocation in 
the post-reform state enterprises would not differ fundamentally from resource 
allocation in profit maximising firms in free market economies, if there were no 
distortions in extemal institutions. Using survey data we demonstrated that post-reform 
state enterprises do indeed have multiple business objectives, including the maximisation 
of profit. These multiple business objectives have to be realised in a two-stage process: 
enterprises first maximise profit and then use the retained profit to achieve other 
objectives. Thus, profit becomes the intermediary for realising various other objectives 
and resource allocation tends towards the profit-maximisation equilibrium. The 
improvement that has occurred in technical and allocative efficiency over time confirmed 
this proposition. 
Marketisation was another important reform poUcy. The development of a 
competitive market system was initiated and to a great extent shaped by non-state 
sectors. State enterprises were encouraged, allowed and sometimes even forced to sell 
output and purchase inputs on the markets. 
Our analysis suggests that marketisation was an important means of improving 
economic efficiency, by making state enterprises behave rationally and hardening their 
budget constraint. Increasingly more goods came to be traded on the market, with prices 
being determined by demand and supply. The direct effect of such a change, according 
to Komai (1980) is to make the budget constraint of state enterprises less soft. In the 
relatively fi-ee market system, state enterprises had to compete with other suppliers of 
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goods and services. They were forced to improve the quality of their products and 
services on the one hand and to reduce production costs on the other. We have shown 
using data on sample enterprises that the Komai index declined significantly as the share 
of goods traded on the market increased, an indication that state enterprises were indeed 
responding to market pressure. 
We have argued in this thesis that labour management reform constituted an 
important but seriously flawed attempt to change the labour institution and that 
marketisation was the most successful reform policy. In order to test the proposition 
rigorously we used econometric techniques to estimate the impact of various reform 
policies on enterprise-specific technical efficiency. The results of the estimation showed 
that market reform as weU as the bonus system were successful reform policies in terms 
of their contribution to improvements in technical efficiency. On average, they jointly 
contributed more than 65 per cent of the total improvement in technical efficiency 
achieved by sample enterprises in six years in the 1980s. 
During the 1980s, significant progress was made in reforming the trade of energy 
and particularly the trade of coal. Reform in this area was realised by reducing the price 
subsidy on energy allocated through planning channels and by introducing a market for 
the trade of energy. Again the non-state sector played an important role in the 
marketisation of energy. By the end of the decade, more than half of all coal was being 
traded on the free market and both the market and official prices of energy had 
increased substantially but by differing margins. The market price of energy had moved 
far closer to the international price. 
We demonstrated in this study that market and institutional reform had a clear 
impact on the efficiency of energy utilisation in state enterprises: energy input per unit of 
output decreased significantly and consistendy. In the face of higher energy prices and 
pressure from market competition, state enterprises began to adopt energy-saving 
technology. 
Soft Budget Constraint and Economic Inefficiency 
The problem of the economic inefficiency of state enterprises in a centrally planned 
economy is of a highly complex nature. However, Komai's soft budget constraint 
hypothesis proves to be a useful framework for researchers who wish to address 
empirically the relationship between institutional reform and the economic efficiency of 
Chinese state enterprises. Based on this theory, we concentrated our analysis on the 
impact of change in the financial relationship of enterprises and the state and in the 
management of capital on the budget constraint of state enterprises. 
While the profit-sharing scheme, the new taxation system and the Contract 
Management Responsibility System enabled managers to manage their financial 
resources independently, they also created channels by which state enterprises could 
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advance their own economic interests. The ad hoc nature of the new system and the 
irregularity with which rules were enforced left enterprises enormous room to bargain 
over their financial obligations. This, in Komai's terminology, softened budget 
constraint. It induced managers to direct their efforts at negotiating concessions on 
profit share, taxes and contract fees rather than improving managerial and productive 
efficiency. Analysis of income tax reform indicated that this practice was fairly 
widespread in state enterprises and that the new institutions failed to harden budget 
constraint. 
In the area of capital management, substitution of bank loans for government grants 
to fund investment in fixed assets and provide working capital constituted a significant 
reform policy. Using survey data we showed that bank loans became the most important 
source of fmance for post-reform state enterprises, particularly to fund working capital. 
However, the new system failed make the budget constraint of state enterprises hard: 
local government intervention made it difficult for banks to resist pressure to issue loans 
to loss-making and even debt-ridden enterprises; banks found it hard to forge stricdy 
contractual relationships with enterprises; and weak enforcement of the bankruptcy law 
meant there was no effective sanction to deal with loan defaulters. Understandably, the 
budget constraint of state enterprises operating in such an environment was overly soft 
In this study, we used two sets of information to test the softness of budget 
constraint of sample enterprises. The results indicated that the budget constraint of state 
enterprises in the 1980s was still excessively soft. Information on the approval rates of 
applications for working capital and investment projects suggested that banks were able 
— marginally — to discriminate between profitable and unprofitable enterprises in their 
loans policy. Loss-making enterprises still had access to investment funds and were able 
to obtain working capital to finance production. Based on the response of managers 
even to large rises in interest rates, we found that the price elasticity of demand for 
capital was unreasonably low: a typical indicator of a soft budget constraint 
Variation in the technical and allocative efficiency of sample enterprises also 
revealed policy failure in the reform of financial relationships and capital management. 
First, although efficiency was improving, state enterprises were by and large quite 
inefficient. On average they achieved only 70 per cent technical efficiency in the heavy 
industrial sector and 77 per cent in the light sector in the 1980s. Second, in our 
econometric estimation of the effectiveness of reform policies, we found that policy 
variables for the reform in these two areas had no impact whatsoever on the technical 
efficiency of the sample enterprises. Third, analysis of allocative efficiency suggested 
that enterprises had over-reacted to the fall in the relative price of capital and that 
capital expanded far more quickly than it would have in the ideal profit-maximising firm. 
Consequently, the capital intensity of state enterprises rose rapidly in the 1980s and 
capital productivity continued to decline. 
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The soft budget constraint also had a negative and potentially serious impact on the 
efficiency of energy utilisation. The empirical literature suggests that capital and energy 
are complementary in the short run in the manufacturing sector. This relationship implies 
that demand for energy will inevitably increase as capital expands, and therefore that 
state enterprises will use more energy under a soft budget constraint than they would 
otherwise. Our analysis of allocative efficiency indicates that such an effect may have 
been present in sample enterprises. 
Development of an Appropriate Econometric Model 
Critical to the study was the development of an appropriate model and measurement of 
efficiency based on the stochastic production frontier framework. The model relaxes a 
few technical assumptions of existing stochastic frontier models and is particularly useful 
in the estimation of panel data associated with economic units undergoing institutional 
reforms. 
There are serious problems in applying existing modelling techniques to Chinese 
state enterprises, which were undergoing institutional change. In the models available, 
efficiency is assumed to be either time-invariant or monotonic over time and identical 
across firms. In the case of firms experiencing institutional reform, however, the effect 
of reform on the technical efficiency of each individual enterprise wiD be time-variant 
and is very unlikely to be the same either in different time periods or in different 
enterprises. Based on these observations, we relaxed assumptions about the pattern of 
variation over time and modelled the efficiency of enterprises in the panel according to 
the specification of a multivariate distribution. This allowed us to estimate accurately 
enterprise-specific efficiency indices and the effect of multiple and simultaneously 
implemented reform policies on technical efficiency. 
Further, the restrictive assumption of a half-normal distribution for technical 
efficiency (u) was relaxed in this study to model technical efficiency in a more general 
way. In our model, the mean value of the half-normal distribution representing technical 
efficiency is different fi-om zero. This change is a natural extension of the models 
employed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977), 
Jondrow et al. (1982) and Kalirajan and Flinn (1983). The relationship between this 
study's model and previous models can be illustrated in the following matrix. 
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Average Efficiency Estimates Firm-specific Estimates 
Restricted Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) Jondrow etal. (1982) 
Mean Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977) Kalirajan and Flinn (1983) 
Unrestricted Stevenson (1980) This Smdy 
Mean 
Changing the model specification also helped us to obtain a set of reliable estimates, 
which proved indispensable in estimating the impact of four reform policies on the 
efficiency index (chapter 6). 
The methodology applied in this study also has limitations. One possible 
generalisation of the production frontier model is to relax further the assumption of a 
neutral shift in the production frontier. By using the stochastic coefficient model 
(Kahrajan and Obwona 1994), it may be possible to improve further the estimation of 
enterprise-specific technical efficiency. 
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE SUCCESS OF FUTURE REFORM 
The analysis suggests that economic reform in state enterprises has so far achieved a 
mixed result. Reform policies generated efficiency but failed to eradicate a fundamental 
problem of state enterprises — the soft budget constraint. In the first half of the 1990s, 
the economic efficiency of state enterprises remains a difficult problem for reformers. 
Further reform is inevitable. This study offers important insights into the way long-term 
economic growth and future economic reform can best be achieved. 
Achieving Optimal Economic Growth 
In common with many other developing countries, China is scarce in capital and 
abundant in labour. China is now at a stage of development reached by Japan in the 
early 1960s and by Taiwan and the Republic of Korea in the early 1970s (Garnaut and 
Ma 1993). It is likely to follow the growth path of these economies. 
According to Garnaut and Anderson (1980), the best strategy for labour-abundant 
countries lacking in capital and resource, is to speciahse in the production (and export) 
of labour-intensive goods. It is the most efficient way to accumulate both physical and 
human capital in the shortest possible time span. In the course of industrialisation, the 
economy will gradually become capital-rich and production will become more 
concentrated in the capital- and technology-intensive sectors. Garnaut and Anderson 
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concluded that this strategy underpinned the success of Japan and four newly 
industrialised economies (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
The implication for China is clear. The country needs to focus on developing labour-
intensive mdustrial sectors. As an extension of Garnaut and Anderson's (1980) 
conclusion, it is reasonable to argue that existing enterprises also need to adopt labour-
intensive technology. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, there are two main types of institutional distortion 
in state enterprises. First, relative prices encourage enterprises to use capital at the 
expense of labour. Second state enterprises suffer from widespread soft budget 
constraint, which has adversely affected managerial behaviour, the pricing system and 
resource allocation. This distortion in the economic system has accelerated the 
substitution of capital for labour at a time when Qiina is still at an early stage of 
economic development 
This can only hinder efforts to explore the comparative advantages of the economy, 
slow down the capital accumulation process and jeopardise optimal long-term economic 
growth. 
Future Economic Reform 
Institutional distortion may also threaten the process of economic reform. Since 1978, 
high inflation has from time to time plagued the reform process and has even caused 
social instability. Inflation has been driven by two factors: excessive capital investment; 
and the govemment's loss of control over the "consumption fund", that is, workers' 
bonuses, collective welfare and public spending. It is fair to say that these problems are 
at least in part attributable to distortions in the economic system. As capital became 
cheaper, investment accelerated. At the same time, state enterprises were faced with an 
expanding wage and welfare bill for excessive numbers of employees. Both effects 
worked in different ways to push up aggregate demand and thus inflation. High inflation 
has made and will continue to make the task of economic reform more difficult. 
Unemployment is another destabilising factor that may jeopardise reform. Due to the 
distorted prices of capital, the soft budget constraint and poor efficiency, state 
enterprises are reluctant to take on new employees. The problem of excess labour in 
state enterprises will soon or later have to be recognised and dealt with. This problem 
will be compounded by the influx of labour from the countryside that inevitably 
accompanies the industrialisation process. Urban unemployment is in fact already 
attracting government attention. According to a recent report {China Daily 1 April 
1994), the urban unemployment rate stands at 2.6 per cent (4.1 million people) and this 
is expected to rise to 5 million people by the end of 1994. At the same time, there were 
some 130 million surplus labourers in rural areas. This official statement agreed that 
unemployment was a by-product of economic reform in state enterprises, and 
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recognised that unemployment was an "extremely difficult" problem calling for urgent 
rationalisation of the labour management system. 
In a country without a social security system, unemployment is a source of serious 
discontent and social instability. In such an atmosphere, the govemment may find it 
difficult to proceed with reform or to transfer labour from the agricultural sector. This 
would have a negative impact not only on economic reform, but on industrialisation and 
economic growth as well. 
ENERGY EFFICIENCY: AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL 
CONCERN 
China faces another threat to the industrialisation process and sustained long-term 
economic development: continuing deterioration of the natural environment. This 
difficult and contentious topic can only be discussed briefly here. 
Studies of pollution in China give an idea of the daunting nature of the problem. In 
1989, Chinese emissions of carbon dioxide (COj) reached 2,368.6 million tonnes, or 
10.9 per cent of the world total. China ranked third after the United States and the 
former Soviet Union in carbon dioxide emissions in 1989 (Wang Changgui 1994).i The 
daily mean of sulphur dioxide (SO2) concentrations in large urban areas is 5-100 times 
higher than in North American cities (Smil 1993, p. 117). A World Bank (1992b) study 
points out that the top five most polluted cities in East Asia are aU in China. The 
problems are not confined to air pollution. They include soil erosion, loss of soil 
nutrients, salinisation and alkaUsation of irrigated farmland, depletion of ground water, 
deforestation and desertification. It is an unfortunate fact that strong economic growth 
has been accompanied by a deteriorating environmental situation. Between 1965 and 
1989, carbon dioxide emissions increased by 6.9 per cent annually, more than twice the 
average world increase. After a comprehensive investigation of the issue, Smil (1993) 
concluded that China is akeady in the midst of a serious environmental crisis. 
The industrial sector is China's main polluter. The high concentration of suspended 
particulates is caused mainly by discharges of sulphur dioxide and carbon dioxide from 
industrial enterprises. China's heavy reliance on coal, low degree of conversion into 
secondary energy and inefficient use of energy have all aggravated the situation. In 
1990, direct coal combustion accounted for two-thirds of total emissions of carbon 
dioxide (Smil 1993, p. 118). The extraction of coal has also caused land degradation and 
other types of damage. 
Demand for energy in China can be expected to increase significantly. It will take at 
least two decades, even at the current high growth rates, for China to become a middle-
1 Although estimates of carbon dioxide emissions differ, most studies put China's share at about this 
level in relative terms. According to World Bank (1992b), 652 million tonnes carbon dioxide was 
emitted from China in 1989, or 11.2 per cent of world total emissions. 
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income country. During this process, the size of the industrial sector will certainly 
increase and energy consumption will rise significandy. Drysdale (1994) projected that 
demand for energy will quadruple from 682 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 1990 to 
2,728 million tonnes of oil equivalent in 2010. As well, as income rises demand for 
energy will increase, especially in the residential sector and in the countryside.^ 
The increase in demand for energy as the economy grows will inevitably place 
greater strains on the natural environment. According to Grossman and Krueger (1991), 
the ambient levels of both sulphur dioxide and suspended particulates in the air increase 
until per capita income reaches US$4,000 to US$5,000, at which point they begin to 
decline. Other environmental problems associated with energy consumption, such as 
land degradation and acid rain, can also be expected to intensify. A pessimistic study 
(Smil 1993) suggests that, even if China were to achieve Japanese levels of energy 
efficiency, the economy would be consuming an ecologically unsustainable quantity of 
energy early next century. The sustainability of high economic growth is a question, and 
formulating an appropriate energy policy is an urgent priority. 
One thing is clear: the government needs to focus on improving the efficiency with 
which energy is utilised. In 1980, energy policy was reformulated as being "to place 
equal emphasis on the development (of energy) and conservation, with the latter being 
the main priority in the near future". The govemment has since made an extensive 
financial commitment to the conservation program (Keith 1986), which has achieved 
significant results. Economy-wide elasticity of energy not only remained at low levels in 
the 1980s, it actually declined {Statistical Yearbook of China 1993, p. 492). Energy 
policy has failed to effect change in two important areas, however. First, official energy 
prices are still heavily subsidised and are well below international prices. Second, trade 
of energy is export-oriented, a strategic means of eaming hard currency, and energy 
imports are highly restricted (Zhao 1993a; Cheng 1984). These policies have distorted 
energy pricing and have had a negative impact on the efficiency of energy utilisation. 
Based on the evidence presented in this study, we can make the following 
observations about China's long-term energy policy. First, rationalisation of pricing — 
by correcting distortions in official prices and creating an energy market — is an 
economically rational and effective means of suppressing demand for energy and 
improving the efficiency of energy utilisation. If adopted as govemment policy, the 
potential for conservation and efficiency improvement, in the industrial sector in 
particular, would be enormous. This study supports the proposition that a "market-
friendly" energy policy is an "environmental-friendly" one (Drysdale 1994). 
Second, the dynamic growth of enterprises shows that improvements in energy 
efficiency have not been realised at the expense of rapid growth. The central 
^According to Wang Changgui (1994), 120 mUlion people in the niral areas had no access to electricity 
until 1992. 
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government is concerned that if it rationalises energy pricing production costs will 
increase — leading to price hikes in all sectors and to inflation. This ignores or 
underestimates the impact of higher prices on efficiency of energy utilisation and 
substitution among various productive factors. This study has suggested that the most 
likely outcome would be an improvement in efficiency, and that growth particularly in 
the long run, would not be affected. Therefore, a market-friendly policy is also a 
development-friendly one. 
However, there is another side to the relationship between economic reform and 
efficiency of energy utilisation. Our research on the effects of soft budget constraint on 
energy demand in state enterprises suggested price increase without well-coordinated 
institutional reform would not achieve the goal of improving energy efficiency; rather it 
would lead to higher production costs, little improvement in productivity, and eventually 
to lower growth in the industrial sector and the economy. The excessive expansion of 
capital stock in state enterprises has to some extent counteracted the impact of reform 
on the goods (including energy) market. The complementary nature of the relationship 
between capital and energy makes it possible for a soft budget constraint to accelerate 
demand for energy in the short run. In the long run a soft budget constraint weakens the 
incentive to conserve energy and inhibits factor substitution. Therefore the govemment 
needs to formulate comprehensive and coherent, rather than ad hoc, reform policies and 
these policies need to take account of both development and environmental goals. 
REFORM POLICIES IN THE FUTURE 
The message of this study for institutional reform is straightforward and unambiguous. 
A mature market system is an organic whole. Its intemaUy consistent, interrelated, and 
interacting parts combine to form a regular relationship for the attainment of optimal 
allocation of relatively scarce resources among competing and changing altemative uses. 
For such a system to work efficiently, it needs to be complete; the institutional 
framework should be designed in such a way that it is socially agreed upon, legally 
binding and practically enforceable. In the context of this study, reform policies should 
be well-coordinated and oriented towards adopting a comprehensive or integrated 
approach. First, a fully fledged, whole and competitive market system should be 
installed. Second, a market-consistent and enforceable legal framework should be 
established and enforced. 
Establishing a Complete and Competitive Market System 
China's market system is not yet complete. The govemment still determines the pricing 
of many industrial goods, the bulk of industrials goods are still allocated through central 
planning, and the labour and capital markets are too immature to allocate these 
productive factors efficiendy. 
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Economic reform has had both a positive and negative impact on the economic 
efficiency of state enterprises. On the positive side, we have demonstrated in this smdy 
that competition in the goods market in association with economic incentives was a 
major factor in enhancing the economic efficiency of sample state enterprises. Similarly 
market reform of the energy sector brought about an improvement in the efficiency of 
energy utilisation. 
On the negative side, the remnants of central planning have served to place part of 
state enterprises' output outside the control of managers and more importantiy have 
become a tool for govemments to interfere in business operations. This may well have 
contributed to the poor technical efficiency of sample state enterprises (chapter 5). 
Moreover, if the production quota is endogenous to the output level, official prices may 
play an active role in the resource allocation (Lin 1993). In these circumstances, 
govemment planning activity and pricing will send wrong signals, disturb the operation 
of the market system and cause inefficiency of resource allocation. 
Govemment has been deeply involved in the energy trade. In the early 1990s, the 
govemment stiU controlled the allocation and pricing of nearly 40 per cent of coal and 
most petroleum products. If a complete market system is to be established, a higher 
proportion of energy transactions will need to take place on the domestic market and 
international trade in energy will need to be relaxed. 
A complete market system must also have competitive labour and capital markets. 
Although, as we have shown, labour management reform in state enterprises contributed 
greatly to improvements in technical efficiency, the current system is stiU inefficient 
There is limited mobility in urban areas and workers are effectively segregated at 
enterprise level, which significantiy weakens competition among workers. Moreover, 
workers' jobs are guaranteed by law, and managers are unable to dismiss surplus or 
recruit additional labour. Managers are also under pressure to increase wages and 
benefits to employees. Rises in labour costs in the 1980s far exceeded increases in 
productivity and profit, signalling a serious misallocation of resources. A competitive 
market for regulating demand for and the supply of labour would go some way towards 
solving some of these problems. 
As stated earlier, reform in the area of capital management failed to improve the 
technical or allocative efficiency of state enterprises. The fundamental problem was soft 
budget constraint, stemming in part from the govemment's failure to develop a 
competitive capital market. The govemment and its banks almost completely 
monopolised the allocation of capital resources until the early 1990s. This and the 
unique relationship between the govemment and state enterprises made it inevitable that 
the former would adopt a paternalistic attitude towards the latter. Without an 
independent capital market, the allocation of resources in state enterprises and in the 
economy is unlikely to be efficient 
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Finally, corruption has intensified throughout the period of economic reform, giving 
rise to social discontent and instability. The two-tier price system is an important source 
of corruption. Substantial differences between market and official prices and the ad hoc 
nature of the rationing system have induced what Krueger (1974) called rent-seeking 
behaviour. Government officials shared in the benefits to be gained from preferential 
allocation of subsidised goods. Rent-seeking behaviour causes allocative inefficiency; 
worse, it creates a public perception that the market mechanism is at fault. This problem 
needs to be addressed urgently, before it becomes a "vicious circle" (Krueger 1974). 
Establishing and Enforcing a Market-Consistent Legal System 
Economic law in China is still seriously flawed and in many ways inconsistent with the 
operation of an efficient market system. The problem lies not only in the failure of the 
legal system to address all relevant areas but also, and more importantly, in the inability 
of the authorities to enforce existing laws. The guarantee of an efficient market system 
lies in well-defined and practically enforceable rules in the sense that the responsibilities 
and rights of all agents are honoured by law. 
No such contractual relationship is found between the govemment and state 
enterprises. The analysis in this study indicated that a two-way effect was at work: on 
the one hand, the legal system was unable to ensure the autonomy of state enterprises; 
on the other, state enterprises were not legally obliged to honour their responsibilities to 
the government. The former made it difficult for state enterprises to operate in a 
competitive and rational way; the latter led to a pervasive soft budget constraint. 
Our analysis in chapters 3 and 4 suggested that state enterprises were subject to 
varying degrees of govemment control in the areas of marketing and the management of 
labour and capital. Although state enterprises continue to enjoy various kinds of state 
subsidies and are endowed with superior physical and human capital, they have often 
complained that they are unfairly disadvantaged in competition with non-state 
enterprises {Economic Daily 20 March 1991, p. 1). Continued govemment intervention 
and control are, they say, to blame for their failure to meet competition effectively. 
In this study, the soft budget constraint was identified as a major factor in the 
technical inefficiency and excessive capital expansion of sample state enterprises. The 
direct cause of this phenomenon was the ad hoc and irregular financial relationship of 
enterprises with govemment and banks. The legal system, which has been unable to 
regulate successfully the financial obligations of enterprises, is clearly flawed, and can 
hardly serve as the basis of a complete and efficientiy operating market system. 
To make state enterprises economically efficient in a complete market system, 
budget constraint will have to become much firmer than it is at present. This implies that 
the ownership of state enterprises may need to be changed, and this in turn may involve 
a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between state enterprises and the 
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government. Past experience suggests that the ownership problem will be the hardest 
nut to crack in the process of reforming the state sector. 
This study has revealed two specific failures of reform policy in the area of 
ownership. First, in the mid 1980s the govemment attempted to separate ownership and 
the right of operation by introducing the Contract Management Responsibility System. 
Under the new system, the govemment was supposed to delegate all operational power 
to enterprises and retain only ownership. The evidence presented in this study suggests 
that the new system was pro-marketisation^ but failed to provide a fundamental solution 
to the problem of the soft budget constraint. Second, in 1985 the govemment 
promulgated a bankruptcy law, attempting to pave the way for reform in ownership of 
state enterprises. Unfortunately, the govemment has failed to implement this law 
seriously. 
Since 1992, a new development has been taking place in the state sector. In the 
latest wave of reform, the govemment is attempting to transform state enterprises into 
share-holding companies with a modem corporate structure. In the light of analysis in 
this study, one thing is certain: this endeavour will succeed only if the new institution 
can raise the economic efficiency of state enterprises by hardening the budget constraint. 
3ln chapter 4, we showed that the market share of output of enterprises adopting this system increased 
more quickly than those not in the system. 
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